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DIALOGUES OF PLATO:

VOLUME II.

LONDON:
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G.R. III.
BRITISH MUSEUM

THE

FIRST ALCIBIADES,

A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

HUMAN NATURE.

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THE

FIRST ALCIBIADES,

A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

THE NATURE OF MAN.

CONCERNING

DIVTOCAE.

TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

CHARLES, LORD *CAMDEN*,

BARON *CAMDEN*, of CAMDEN-PLACE,

ONE OF THE LORDS, APPOINTED

PRIVY COUNSELLORS TO THE *KING*,

THIS TRANSLATION OF

THE FIRST ALCIBIADES OF PLATO

IS PRESENTED,

as a juſt Offering to his firm Integrity,

founded on the Principles of this Dialogue,

by his LORDSHIP'S

moſt obedient humble Servant,

FLOYER SYDENHAM.

THE

ARGUMENT.

IN this Dialogue, Socrates, *the Chief Perſon of all thoſe Dialogues of* Plato, *in which he bears a Part, excepting* the Parmenides, *holds a Converſation with* Alcibiades *only, without the Intervention of any Third Perſon. From* Alcibiades *therefore the Dialogue muſt of courſe take its* Name.——*It is generally called* the Firſt Alcibiades, *probably becauſe prior, in order of Time, to another Dialogue of* Plato's *between the ſame Two Perſons only,* Socrates *and* Alcibiades. *But we find it ſometimes called* the Greater Alcibiades, *evidently becauſe of greater Length than the other Dialogue of the ſame Name. For ſo did the ancient Geometricians expreſs themſelves, in calling* the longer *of Two Lines* the greater. *The Two Dialogues, of the Name of* Hippias, *are contradiſtinguiſhed, one from the other, in the ſame way.* ——*Many ancient Writers alſo cite this Dialogue by the Name of* The Alcibiades *ſimply, (without any Epithet or Mark of Diſtinc-*

Diſtinction,) *by way of Eminence. For it has been deemed by the beſt* Platoniſts *one of the moſt important Dialogues of* Plato, *as being That, in which is laid* [1] *the true Foundation of his Philoſophy.*——*It is by All* intitled *a Dialogue* concerning the Nature of Man. *We do not mean to controvert its Claim to this* Title. *Whoever reads it will find the Claim incontrovertible. But we think the Title liable to be miſunderſtood by Such, as have not yet peruſed the Dialogue, and conſequently to need ſome Explanation. For the* Subject *of this Dialogue is by no means the* Whole Nature of Man, *conſidered as a Compound-Being, conſiſting of* Soul and Body; *a Subject, treated of at large in* the Timæus: *neither is it the Nature of the* Whole Soul *of Man, conſidered as diviſible*

[1] *Proclus*, in his *Commentary on the Firſt Alcibiades*, never yet printed, adviſeth us to make this Dialogue τὴν πρωτίστην ἀρχὴν, *the very firſt Beginning* of our Study in the Works of *Plato*, for this reaſon,—— becauſe the *Theory of the Human Nature*, here laid down, leads to That, which is the End of all his Philoſophy, the *Knowlege of the Divine Nature*; from which Knowlege only it is poſſible for us to behave with conſtant *Conformity to the Divine Will.*——*Albinus*, in his *Introduction to Plato's Dialogues*, gives us the ſame Advice for a like reaſon, —that from this Dialogue we may learn, What is the proper Study of a Philoſopher, and to What End all his Studys ought to be directed.— Before theſe Writers, *Iamblichus*, as cited by *Proclus*, appears to have been of the ſame Opinion; and from *Laertius* we find it to have been ſtill more ancient.—But this Advice, and the Reaſon aſſigned for it, we purpoſe to conſider and diſcuſs in a Diſſertation concerning the Order and Connection of *Plato*'s Dialogues.

into

into Rational and Irrational, *in other words, into the Seat of Reaſon and the Seat of Paſſion; This Subject is handled in* the Phædrus. *But the* Subject, *on which we are now entering, is the* Peculiar Nature of Man, *That Nature, by which he differs from all other Animals, his ſingular Privilege and Prerogative above them all. The diſtinguiſhed Honour, with which he is thus dignified, is this,——that he* partakes of MIND, *and conſequently of whatever is* eſſential to Mind. *Eſſential to Mind are its* Primary Ideas: *and Theſe are the* Foundation *of all* Knowlege; *the firſt* Principles *of all thoſe* Ideas, *which ariſe as it were out of them*; Univerſal, General *and* Special; *the* Power *of perceiving which, is called the* Faculty of Reaſon: *as the* actual *Perception of Any of them, is called* Intelligence; *and the Conception of Thoſe of the ſame Kind, and of the Relation between ſuch Congenial Ideas, is called* Science.——*The* Deſign *of the Dialogue is to perſuade Men to ſtudy this* Superiour Nature, *to cultivate this* Faculty of Reaſon, *and to endeavour to gain a clear* Perception *of thoſe Ideas, the moſt Univerſal,* The Fair *and* The Good; *a Knowlege or Intelligence, which is of the higheſt Kind; and without which, every other Kind of Knowlege is uſeleſs, and oftentimes pernicious.——Now all Exhortations to any Study, or other laborious Undertaking, are then the moſt perſuaſive, when they are accompanied, not only with a fair Proſpect of Benefit, to reſult from the Succeſs of that Undertaking, but alſo with preſent Aſſiſtance and Aid, in the Proſecution of it.*

—Ac-

——*Accordingly, this Dialogue is intended farther, to aſſiſt Men in attaining to the Knowlege of their own proper Nature, by pointing out to them the Road, which will bring them to it without fail.*——*The* Subject *is handled, and the* Deſign *is executed, in the* Way and Method, *which is now lightly to be run over.* [a] *The Philoſopher lays the Foundation of his Reaſoning in the* Pre-conceptions, *or Natural Notions, which all Men have, of* Good *and* Evil, Right *and* Wrong. *Theſe Pre-conceptions, belonging to the Mind of Man by Nature, being general, indiſcriminating, (of themſelves,) and not ap-*

[a] It is not intended, in this *Argument*, to give either an *Abridgment* or an *Abſtract* of the Dialogue. The Reader will find, on the contrary, Some Parts of the Dialogue largely here dilated on: he will find, in the account given of Other Parts, new Matter introduced, not mentioned by *Plato*, and what may ſeem foreign to the Subject. The Reaſons for this unuſual manner of writing the Argument, and the Intentions in it, are theſe;—to lay open the purpoſely-concealed Method of our Author in the Conſtruction of this Dialogue; to exhibit to View the fine and ſcarcely-diſcernible Cement of its ſeveral Parts; but principally, to diſcloſe his ſecret Meaning throughout, the uniting and animating Spirit of the Whole.—What Reaſons *Plato* had for all theſe Concealments, in this and many other of his Dialogues, we ſhall attempt to ſhow in our *General Preface* to his Works. In the mean time they may be eaſily diſcovered by Such, as have a right Taſte for the Writings of the late *Earl of Shafteſbury*; who, in his *Advice to an Author*, and his *Moraliſts*, is a Copier of *Plato's Manner of Compoſition*; and all whoſe Writings, excepting what regards the different Circumſtances of the Times in which they ſeverally lived, and the different Opinions prevailing in thoſe Times, ſo diſtant one from the other, are as it were a Tranſcript of *Plato's Mind*.

plicable

plicable to Some particular things, more than they are to Others, Experience *is neceſſary to ſhow us, what things are* good to have, *and what are evil; what are* right to be done, *and what are wrong, with reference to the Good propoſed in doing it, the End for which the Action is deſigned. On this Experience of certain Means, proper for the accompliſhment of certain Ends, is built every Art, which has been, or ever can be, diſcovered by Man. To all Thoſe, who have not diſcovered ſome particular Art from their own Experience,* Teaching *is neceſſary, for their attaining to that Art. And none can know, What 'tis right to do, that is, What tends to the accompliſhment of the End propoſed, in any particular Art, unleſs they have been* taught *it by Such as know, or elſe have* diſcovered *it Themſelves. In all Inferiour Arts, this is univerſally acknowleged to be true: and every ſenſible Man, uninſtructed in them, is ready to confeſs his Ignorance, and decline the Practiſe of them. But the higheſt and beſt of all Arts, the Art of* living well and happily, *Men are apt to fancy that they have no need to be* inſtructed *in by Others, or* to ſtudy *by Themſelves: for that, with regard to a* Good Life, *every Man preſumes he knows what is* Right and Juſt; *and with regard to a* Happy Life, *every Man knows (in his own Opinion) what is his own* Private Intereſt, *and generally what is the* Intereſt of the Publick. *Now ſince no Man will ſtudy to* learn *what he fancys that he already* knows, *our Philoſopher endeavours to root out*

of Men's Minds this falſe Conceit and Preſumption of their Knowlege. And this he does,——Firſt, by proving the Ignorance *of the Bulk of Mankind, the Multitude, even in Countrys the moſt civiliſed and enlightened, with reſpect to what is* Juſt *or* Unjuſt, *that is, what is Right or Wrong in their Behaviour towards one another:——Secondly, by ſhewing, from the Confeſſion of* Alcibiades, *that ſo little do they underſtand, what is their* Intereſt *or Good, that they ſuppoſe it often to be their Intereſt to act baſely and unjuſtly; and imagine, that a fair and upright Conduct is often attended with the greateſt Evil to Themſelves; the Falſhood of which imaginary Suppoſitions* Plato *here proves, and evinces the contrary of them to be True. The Argumentation on theſe Two Heads conſtitutes the* Firſt *and* Second Parts *of the Dialogue.——But from what has therein been proved, a Thought ariſes naturally in the Mind, uttered here by the Mouth of* Alcibiades;—*that, if Men who are engaged in the Buſineſſes of Civil Life, and even Thoſe who manage Affairs of State, are All of them thus ignorant in the nature of what is* Fair and Juſt, *in the nature alſo of what is* Good, *whether Private or Public,——then the Advantage, which one Man has over another, muſt conſiſt in the Superiority of his Natural Endowments, of his Education, of his own Wealth and Outward Grandeur, together with that of his Relations and Friends; or elſe, in the ſuperior Excellence of the Government and Laws, under which he lives, and of the*

Public

Public Manners and Cuſtoms, to which he is habituated. With this way of thinking, Men are apt to argue thus;—— that, if in thoſe Advantages, juſt now enumerated, they excell their Competitors or Rivals for Power, nothing elſe is wanting, nothing farther needs to be acquired thro their own Study, to give them a Superiority over Thoſe, who are as ignorant as Themſelves. Now all theſe Advantages are the Gifts of Nature and of Fortune; they are all referable to the Body, and to its Condition in this outward World: and ſince the different Degrees of each of them are not much fewer than there are Men on Earth, Whoever values himſelf on his poſſeſſing any of them, may eaſily find, amongſt Men, amongſt his Enemys too, or the Enemys of his Country, ſuch as excell him in Advantages of the ſame Kind. Theſe Obſervations make the Third Part *of the Dialogue.——Having thus argued the common Ignorance of Men in Subjects of the higheſt importance to their Happineſs, both as Private Perſons, and as Members of Civil Communitys,——having obſerved to us farther, in what things Men fooliſhly place their Confidence, and falſly imagine their Greatneſs to conſiſt,——the Philoſopher proceeds in the* Fourth Part *of the Dialogue, to ſhew, What is a Man's* real Self; *the Knowlege of which Whoever attains to, will find out, What is his* real Intereſt; *he will diſtinguiſh rightly between* Juſt *and* Unjuſt, *and diſcern* Good *from* Evil; *and conſequently, will apply rightly thoſe* Common Notions, *the*

General Ideas *of* Fair *and* Good, *to every Particular, with which he is concerned, in human Life: and this, not only with reference to himſelf, as a ſingle Individual, ſo as to become, by that means, an Honeſt and a Good Man in Private Life; but in like manner with regard to the Publick, ſo as to be qualified, by the ſame means, for judging rightly concerning Public Honour, and Public Good. For all Breaches of Faith or Truſt, whether private or public, all Injurys and Wrongs of every Kind, done by one* Man *to another, by one* People *to another, or by* Princes *and other Civil Magiſtrates to their own People, are owing to the Opinion, generally prevailing, that Riches, Power, and Dominion, together with the Conveniencys and Pleaſures of outward Life, which are thro Them procured, and the Gratification of Appetites and Paſſions which They afford the means of indulging, are the* Faireſt *and moſt Honourable of all things, and the* chief Intereſt *and Good of every Man, every Prince, and every People. And the Ground of this Opinion, which paſſes thro the World unqueſtioned, is no other, than a Suppoſition, taken every where for granted, that a Man's* Self *is either his* Body *and outward* Senſes, *together with the* Appetites *and* Paſſions, *created by thoſe Senſes in his Animal-Soul; or elſe, (if Reaſon or Rationality be acknowleged an Ingredient in his Frame,) is a* Compound *of Body and of Soul,* Part *of which Soul is* Rational.

—*The Divine Philoſopher, having already in the Fourth*

Part

Part eſtabliſhed this Doctrine,——that only the Intellectual Soul *of every Man is his true and proper* Self,——*ſhews, in the* Fifth *and laſt* Part *of this Capital and Fundamental Dialogue, by what* Means *a Man may attain to know the Nature of his Intellectual Soul, and may thus ſee That, which, properly ſpeaking, is Himſelf. The Means, here recommended to us, for the attainment of this Knowlege, are theſe;——to withdraw our Attention from the Outward Senſes, with their Objects; and to transfer and fix it on Mind, with the Objects of Mind, which are indeed none other than Mind its Self;* Mind *being alone* its own Object. *But uſually 'tis called* Mind, *or* Intellect, *only when it is conſidered as the* Subject *of Intelligence: conſidered as the* Object *of Intelligence, it is called* Intelligible. *In this latter Senſe it is, that Mind is* Univerſal Form, *the Idea of all Ideas; being the* moſt general *of all,* comprehending *all, and* uniting *them in its Self. The Superior Part therefore of the Human Soul, being Mind, muſt be at the ſame time the* Subject *and the* Object *of* its own Intelligence. *We ſay* "its own," *becauſe, being a* Particular Mind, *it muſt have a* Particular Intelligence, *an Intelligence of* its own. *Now, as all* Individuals *of the Same Kind* ſympathiſe *with one another, only becauſe they all* partake of *the* Same Kind, *and are* connected *together thro that Kind,* common *to them all; ſo all* Particulars *of any Univerſal have a* tendency to communicate, *one with another, only becauſe all of them*

them partake of *the* Same Univerſal. *This Univerſal therefore being the* connecting Tye *between them, and the* Cauſe *of their* communicating *one with another, and of their continual* tendency *to ſuch Communication, They muſt all of them, by Nature, communicate more immediately and intimately with That Univerſal, from which they* derive *their being* What they are, *and their* Relation *alſo to one another. But ſince it is the Nature of all Mind, and of* Mind *only, to be* always free, *Particular Minds, ſupervening to Particular Souls, tho mixed with* Body, (*and indeed in no other way, than by ſuch Mixture, does either Mind or Soul ever become Particular,*) *muſt, notwithſtanding their Mixture with a Being which is* ſubject to Neceſſity, *ſtill enjoy* Freedom *of Will and Choice. In conſequence of this Freedom, they have the Power of making whatever things they pleaſe the Objects of their Attention, Theory, and Conſideration. As they are united to Senſitive Souls and Organiſed Bodys, and are thus enabled to perceive Outward Things, ſuch as beget Fancys in the Imagination, Appetites and Paſſions in the Concupiſcible and Iraſcible Part of the Soul,——they have the Power of dwelling, as long time as they pleaſe, on theſe Objects of their Perception; and not only on ſuch as are Outward and Senſible, but on the various Fancys alſo within, begotten by Things ſenſible, thro Senſe, in the fertile Womb of Imagination. Theſe various Fancys naturally raiſe a variety of Appetites and Paſſions in the Soul. To*

theſe

theſe Appetites and Paſſions, it is true, the Mind, the governing Power in the Soul of Man by Nature, may, if ſhe pleaſes, ſubject her ſelf, and ſubmit to their Dominion: nay, ſhe muſt of neceſſity ſo do, if ſhe dwells wholly on External Objects, or in the abſence of Theſe, on the Fancys, their Offspring. For, ſince it is the Nature of the Human Soul to love Beauty, and to deſire Good; and ſince almoſt all Things without us, not only the Works of Nature, but thoſe of Human Art, partaking more or leſs of Beauty and of Good, are in ſome meaſure Amiable, and for ſome Uſes in Human Life are Deſirable; every Mind, who perceives no other Beauty, *and is ſenſible of no* other Good, *muſt, by the neceſſity of Nature, become enamoured of* them, *and make* them *the ſole Objects of all her Wiſhes.——But every Mind has, naturally too, the Power of removing her attention from theſe Outward Objects, and transferring it to thoſe which are Mental; and which ſhe will find within her Self, on ſearching for them there;* Beautys *of higher Orders and more perfect,* Goods *more permanent and ſatisfactory. She will then become a Lover of Mind, more than of Body; of the Arts themſelves, and of Artiſt-Minds, more than of their beſt Performances; and of the Author of Nature, the forming Mind of the Univerſe, more than of the Forms which he produces, beautifys, and bleſſes, for their own and each other's temporary Good. She will love the Sciences, not ſo much for the application, which has already been and*

may

may be farther made of them, to the Culture of Human Life, and to Arts founded on them, as for the Aid and Improvement which of themſelves they give to the Faculty of Reaſon, leading the Mind to a more thorow Knowlege of her Self, to a Diſcovery of the Principles of Mind. She will love the Moral Virtues, not only for the Advantages, derived from them to the Body,——*in that they preſerve it from many Evils, and leſſen or lighten thoſe which it cannot eſcape,*——*in that they increaſe the Number of its natural and innocent Enjoyments, and mix them with the Delights of Mind,*——*but farther, and much more, becauſe they ſeat and ſettle the* Mind *in a State of* Tranquillity, *and* Liberty *to enjoy her Self. She will love and delight in this Enjoyment, ariſing from the Contemplation of Truth, or Speculation of the* true Nature *of Things, which is ſeen only in contemplating the* Cauſe *of Nature,*——*not becauſe it elevates her above* her Body, *and above* Things External,——*an Elevation, the Senſe of which may beget vain Reflections on her own Greatneſs,*——*but becauſe it elevates her above* her Self; *whilſt, retiring inwardly, ſhe* communicates *with the Fountain of her Being,* Univerſal Mind; *who indeed is* ever preſent *with her, but* manifeſts *to her* his Preſence *only in her cloſeſt and moſt ſecret* Retirements. *And thus only can a Man attain to know perfectly the Nature of his* true *and* proper Being.——*For it is in the Inward Man juſt as it is*

in

in the Outward. No man knows the natural Temperament of his Body, nor what Condition or Rank in Civil Life his Birth has placed him in, unleſs he knows Who were his Parents, what was their Age and State of Health when he was begotten, and what their Rank and other Circumſtances in the Outward World. In like manner, the Mind *knows not fully her Self, the Principles of her Frame, or the Rank ſhe holds by Nature in the Order of Things, until ſhe knows the Greatneſs and Excellence of the* Parental Mind.——*The Human Mind, in this Inward Converſe with* Mind Univerſal *and Divine, will behold and converſe with the* Fountain of Beauty and of Good, *and with All things fair and good, thence derived, in their perfect Ideas, and pure Eſſences unmixed with Matter.——After this, it will be as difficult for her to apply the General Preconceptions of* Fair *and* Good *amiſs, as it was, before this, to apply them rightly. She will know, What true* Virtue *is: ſhe will know, What is* truly *a Man's* Private Intereſt; *and What the Intereſt of that* Community *to which he belongs. And thus it is, that in the* Science of Mind *thoſe of* Morals *and of* Politicks *have their only ſure Foundation.—— Such is the* Method *of this* Dialogue; *and ſuch the* Order *of its* Parts. *The* Firſt *Part convinces Men of their* Ignorance *of what is* Fair; *and the* Second, *of their* Ignorance *of what is* Good: *the* Third *Part repreſents to them the Errors, into*

 which

which they fall thro their Conceit of Knowlege *in both thoſe Subjects: the* Fourth *ſhews the* Cauſe *of all theſe* Errors, *and of this* Conceit; *namely, the Capital Error of taking their Bodys for Themſelves: and the* Laſt *Part directs a Man, convinced of his Errors and his Ignorance, in this only* Way to *unerring* Knowlege,——*to conſult the* Principle *and* Cauſe *of all* Rectitude *and all* Wiſdom.——*A ſtately* Edifice, *built on loweſt Ground, but reaching to higheſt Heaven!——We are led to it by This* Avenue:——Alcibiades *appears before us, ſcarcely arrived at the Age of Manhood, intoxicated with the Thoughts of his comely Perſon, his ample Patrimony, his noble Deſcent, the Greatneſs and Power of his Relations, and the high Reputation of his Country; full of vain Confidence, and falſe Preſumptions; extending his ambitious Aims to infinite Lengths; and in order to attain them, purpoſing to harangue, in the Aſſemblys of the Athenian People, on Public Affairs, ſuch as regard the Rights, the Honour, and the Intereſt of his Country; at the ſame time,* ignorant *of the Boundarys that diſtinguiſh* Right *from* Wrong, Honourable *from* Baſe, Good *from* Evil. *In this Light is* Alcibiades *here ſhown to us by* Plato, *becauſe ſuch a Character is a very natural* Introduction *to his* Subject.——*The* Genius *of this Dialogue, agreeably to the Account before given of its* Deſign, *is partly* exciting *to the Study of Wiſdom and Virtue, and partly* aſſiſting

assisting *to the Student*, [3] *by pointing to the only Way, in which he can prosecute those Studys with Success.*——*The* Outward Form *of the Dialogue is all* Dramatic: *the* Manners *and Characters of the Two Speakers are strongly painted in the* Sentiments *attributed to Each: and the* Conclusion *has all the Air of the* Catastrophe *of some* Dramatic Fable, *as far as the Nature of a simple* Dialogue *between* Two Persons *will admit of; promising on the One Part, and doubting on the Other Part, a Reformation of Mind and Manners in the Person who is found to need Amendment.*

[3] The Character, which the Ancients give us of the *Genius* of this Dialogue, in calling it *Maieutic*, differs not, in the general, from Ours. See the *Synopsis*, pages 8 and 9.

PERSONS of the DIALOGUE,

SOCRATES, [1] ALCIBIADES.

SCENE,

(moſt probably) [2] THE LYCEUM.

[1] For the Character of *Alcibiades*, at the time when the Converſation, here reported, is ſuppoſed by *Plato* to have been held, ſee the laſt Page but one of the *Argument*.

[2] See Note on the *Scene* of *the Greater Hippias*.

THE

FIRST ALCIBIADES.

SOCRATES.

'SON of Clinias! You wonder, I ſuppoſe, that I, who was [2] the earlieſt of your Admirers, now, when all the reſt have forſaken you, am the only One, who ſtill retains unalterably the ſame Sentiments; and yet, that for ſo many

[1] *Plato*, in the Plan of this Piece, ſuppoſes, that before the Converſation, herein related, *Socrates* had never ſpoken to *Alcibiades*. *Socrates* was a Man of an ignoble Family, and *Alcibiades* of the nobleſt in *Athens*. It therefore became *Socrates* to accoſt him, the firſt time, in a manner not too free or familiar; as it would have been, had he called him by his perſonal and proper Name. The ancient *Greeks* thought, that the moſt reſpectful manner of accoſting any Man was to mention, firſt, the *Name of his Father*. For they conceived ſuch an Addreſs to imply manifeſtly, that the Party addreſſed was not a Perſon of *obſcure Birth*, but One whoſe Father was generally *well known*, and diſtinguiſhed from the *unnamed Vulgar*.—From the ſame Way of thinking, the *Spaniards* at this Day expreſs their Idea of a *Gentleman*, or Man of Family, by the Term *Hidalgo*, a Contraction, as the *Spaniſh Grammarians*

many years I have never ſpoken ſo much as a Word to you, whilſt the Others were preſſing thro Crowds of People, to converſe with you. This Reſerve and Diſtance in my Be-

rians ſay with great Probability, of the Words *Hijo d'Algo, the Son of Somebody*, that is, of ſome Perſon, not confounded with and loſt among the Multitude.—The more illuſtrious the Father of the addreſſed Party, the higher was the Compliment, paid the Son, in ſuch an Addreſs; as it could not but remind him of his Father's Eminence. Numberleſs Inſtances of This will occur readily to the Minds of All, who are converſant in *Homer*, and are not unacquainted with the Hiſtory of the Age immediately preceding That of the *Trojan War*. They will remember, that the Poet honours *Many* of his *Heroes*, by celebrating them as the *Sons* of diſtinguiſhed *Heroes* at the *Siege of Thebes*; and many *Others*, as *Sons* or Deſcendants of the *Gods*. And to apply this Obſervation to the Addreſs, here uſed by *Socrates*, we have only to repeat, what *Herodotus* in the 8th Book of his *Hiſtorys* ſays of *Clinias* the Father of *Alcibiades*, that in the Sea-Fight between the *Perſian* and the *Grecian* Fleets near *Artemiſium*, " *of all the Grecians, the* " *Athenians behaved with the moſt Bravery; of all the Athenians, Cli-* " *nias.*"

[a] *Socrates*, we are told by *Plutarch*, had diſcovered in the Countenance of *Alcibiades*, then in his Puerile Age, the Signs of an ingenuous and noble Diſpoſition. Having thence conceived Expectations of the Boy's becoming an extraordinary Man, he had from that time, as we are told in this Dialogue, been a conſtant Obſerver of all his Motions, Sayings and Actions. When *Alcibiades* was grown up to his full Stature, he was followed and ſurrounded, wherever he went, by ſuch as admired the Handſomeneſs of his Perſon. They flattered his Vanity; but the higher Opinion they raiſed in him of Himſelf, the more he thought himſelf above Them. His Conduct towards them was ſuitable to his Thoughts, was ſuch as might become an abſolute Lord toward his Vaſſals. See *Plutarch's Life of Alcibiades.*

haviour

haviour have been owing to no Human Regards, but to an Impediment thrown in my way by [3] Cauſes ſuperiour to Man; the Power and Force of which you ſhall by and by be made acquainted with. But now, ſeeing that thoſe Cauſes no longer operate to hinder my Approach, I am come thus to accoſt you: and am in good hopes too, that for the future thoſe Cauſes will give no oppoſition to my Deſire of converſing with you. All this while, however, being but a Spectator, I have been able tolerably well to obſerve and conſider your Behaviour with regard to your Admirers. And I find, that, tho they have been numerous, and Such Perſons too as [4] thought highly of Themſelves, there is not One, whom you have not driven away from you, by your ſuperiour [5] Haughtineſs and imagined Elevation. The Reaſons of your being exalted ſo highly in your own Opinion, I am

[3] This Paſſage is explained by *Plato* himſelf, in the Progreſs of the Dialogue, not far from hence.

[4] Amongſt theſe was *Anytus*, who not long after became a bitter Enemy to the Great Philoſopher. And probably This was one of the Motives of his Enmity, ſome Suſpicion that *Socrates* had ſupplanted him in the Favour and Friendſhip of *Alcibiades*. For a Suſpicion of this Sort always begets Envy in Little Minds; and from Envy always ſprings the moſt malicious Hatred.

[5] Here is painted the moſt diſtinguiſhing Feature in the Character of *Alcibiades*. For *Plutarch* aſſures us, that the ſtrongeſt of his Paſſions, tho all of them were vehement, was a Love of Superiority and Pre-eminence in all things. And *Ælian* in *Var. Hiſt.* L. 4. C. 16. repreſents him as the *Pattern* of Arrogance; as if no Perſon could ever in this Quality exceed him.

deſirous

desirous of laying before you. They are these: You presume, that in no Affair whatever you need Assistance from any Other Party: for that What you have of your own, whether of Outward Advantages, or Inward Accomplishments, is so great, as to be all-sufficient. In the first place, you think your self excelling in the Handsomeness of your Person, and in the Fineness of your Figure. And in this Opinion, [6] it is evident to every one who has Eyes, that you are not mistaken. In the next place, you dwell on These Thoughts;——that you are [7] descended from Familys the


[6] Scarce any Author of Antiquity mentions *Alcibiades*, without telling us of the extream Handsomeness of his Countenance, and his whole Outward Form. *Plato* here assigns this Circumstance for one of the Causes, which contributed to exalt *Alcibiades* in his own Opinion. Agreeably to this Remark of *Plato*'s, *Xenophon* in *Memorabil:* ascribes the Corruption of *Alcibiades*, amongst other Causes, to his being followed and courted, θηρώμενος, by many Ladys of high Rank on account of his Beauty. The same dangerous Superiority we find, from every Day's Experience, apt to produce in many of Both Sexes the same Effects, it did in *Alcibiades*, a silly Pride, an unjust Contemptuousness, and a Neglect of the Improvement of their own Minds.

[7] The noble Descent of *Alcibiades* is celebrated by many ancient Writers. A short Pedigree of him is drawn by *Palmerius* in *Exercitat:* pag: 192; a longer one by *Valesius* in *Not. ad Maussac: in Harpocration.* pag: 214; and more at large, on the Female side, by Dr. *Taylor* in his Notes to *Demosthenes contra Midiam*, pag: 297. These learned Men, however, have not done Justice to the Princely Descent of *Alcibiades*. Writing indeed, not as Genealogists, but as Criticks, the First to shew a Mistake in *Plutarch*'s Life of *Pericles*, the Others an Error or two in that Oration of *Demosthenes*, (wilfully made, as Dr. *Taylor* most ingeniously

the moſt illuſtrious in the State, to which you belong;—— that [8] this State is the greateſt of any in Greece;——that you

niouſly ſuppoſes,) they had no Occaſion for carrying the Pedigree of *Alcibiades* up to ſo high an Antiquity, as it may be traced to. It lyes more directly in Our Way, as it ſerves to verify and illuſtrate the Paſſage of *Plato* now before us. We have therefore thought it pertinent to exhibit in the next Page a Table of his Deſcent; referring to the oppoſite Margin, for the Evidence on which every Part of it is grounded. In the Paſſage of *Iſocrates*, cited in the Margin of this Table, that the Word εὐπατριδῶν is a Corruption, appears evidently from the Words which immediately follow it, implying that the Patronymic or Family-Name was juſt before expreſſed. *Wolfius* was ſenſible of This; and in his Note on that Paſſage conjectures the true Reading to be Εὐρυσακιδῶν. Perhaps it rather is Αἰαντιδῶν. The learned Reader will judge for himſelf, which of the two is the more probable. Both however are of the ſame Import; alike deriving the Race of *Alcibiades*, in the Male Line, from *Ajax* the Son of *Telamon*.—The Pride, which high Birth and noble Anceſtry are apt to beget in Men, is no where better expoſed to Ridicule, than it is by Sir *Richard Steele* in his *Conſcious Lovers:* and it deſerves to be ſo expoſed, where it hath the ſame Effect, which it had on *Alcibiades* in his Youth, to make a Man contemptuous, preſumptuous, and careleſs about his own Mind and Manners. But a contrary Treatment is due to it, where it produces the contrary Effect; lifting a Man's Mind above mean Sentiments and baſe Actions; prompting him to acquire ſuch a Knowlege and Taſte, as may diſtinguiſh him from the ignorant and ſenſual Vulgar; and ſpurring him on to equal the greateſt of his Anceſtors in the Worth and Merit which made them great. Inſtances of this latter Sort we ſhall find farther on, mentioned by *Plato* in this Dialogue.

[8] In the Age when *Alcibiades* lived, *Athens* had arrived at the Summit of her Greatneſs. In Military Strength and Valour ſhe rivalled *Sparta*; in the Extenſiveneſs of her Trade and Commerce, and in the


Ajax, the Son of Telamon
Nestor, the Son of Neleus
Eurysaces
Antilochus
Pisistratus
Thrasymedes
Phylæus
Pæon, from whom are the Pæonidæ
Hippocrates
Sillus
Alcmæon, from whom are the Alcmæonidæ
Pisistratus, Tyrant of Athens
Megacles
Hippoclus, Tyrant of Lampsacus
Hippias, Tyrant of Athens
Alcmæon
Archedice
Megacles
Æantides
Alcibiades 1.
Clisthenes
Hippocrates
Agariste
Megacles
Alcibiades 2.
Dinomache
Axiochus
Clinias
Clinias
Alcibiades 3.
Clinias
Pausanias, L. 1. p. 85. Edit. Kuhn.
Pausanias, L. 2. p. 151.
Thucydides, L. 6. § 59. p. 382. Ed. Hudson:
Isocrates περὶ ζεύγους, p. 431. Ed. Battei.
Plutarch: in Vitâ Alcibiadis.
Andocides in Orat. 4tâ p. 308. Ed. Han.

you have Friends here [9], and Relations on your Father's Side, very numerous and very powerful, ready to assist you on every

Culture of the polite Arts, she far exceeded that only Rival of hers for *Power*. Beside these *real* Advantages, there is an *imaginary* Greatness, derived to Citys and Kingdoms, as well as to Familys, from their *Antiquity*. The *Athenians* laid claim to the highest Greatness of this Sort; boasting, like the old *Latins* and *Ægyptians*, to be some of the most ancient People on the Earth; their Ancestors being, as They pretended, αὐτόχθονες or *Aborigines*, not transplanted from any other Countrys.—How apt the Minds of Men are to be intoxicated with such Conceits as these, and how common it is for Men, void of Personal Worth, to estimate themselves by the same Standard, as we find *Alcibiades* did in part, the Renown of their Country, may be seen from abundant Instances in modern Days. But we must here make a Remark, similar to that in the preceding Note,—that where such a Conceit, by being harboured in the Mind, proves an Incitement to noble Actions, or to any Virtue which may contribute to support the Splendour of our Country's Fame, be the Conceit ever so extravagant, it deserves to be encouraged by all good Patriots and wise Statesmen.

9 The Names of all his Relations, by his Father, appear not now on Record, except those of his Father's Brother, *Axiochus*, and of his Cousin German, *Clinias*, the Son of that *Axiochus*. But it seems probable, that Many of the *Æantidæ*, or Posterity of *Ajax*, were then remaining, and lived at *Athens*. For *Pausanias* in *Atticis* relates, that when *Phylæus* made the *Athenians* a Present of the Isle of *Salamis*, of which he was Hereditary Prince, they in return presented Him and his Family with the Freedom of their City, and erected Monuments and even Temples in honour of his Father *Eurysaces*, and of his Grandfather *Ajax*. The same excellent Antiquarian relates farther, that when afterwards the *Athenians* forced *Phylæus* to fly from his Country, perhaps jealous of his resuming the Principality of it, they left those Mo-

every Occaſion;——and that your Relations [10] on your Mother's Side are not inferiour to Them, either in Power or in Number.

numents and Temples ſtanding. Whence it appears that they ſtill pay'd a Regard to the Family of their Benefactor: and this probably might induce many of them to remain at *Athens*. *Phylæus* retreated into *Aſia*, probably to *Lampſacus*; where afterwards one of his Deſcendants, *Hippoclus*, grew great enough to aſſume the Sovereign Power, to dye poſſeſſed of it, and to leave it to his Son *Æantides*, who is only known by this Patronymic or Family-Name. Before he dyed, the better to ſecure the continuance of the Tyranny in his Family, he had procured for his Son a Marriage with *Archedice*, Daughter of *Hippias*, then Tyrant of *Athens*. But *Hippias* not long after being driven from *Athens*, together with his Sons, and the Tyranny there being aboliſhed, the Tyranny at *Lampſacus* ended with the Reign of *Æantides*; and his Son, *Alcibiades the Firſt*, with all his Family, retired to *Athens*. For the *Athenians*, by this time being greatly increaſed in Power, had no Fear of his reclaiming *Salamis*, of which they had ſo long been in Poſſeſſion, from the free Gift of his Anceſtors.

[10] *Alcibiades* was related, by his Mother, to all the *Alcmæonidæ*. This was a Family, held in the higheſt Honour at *Athens*, becauſe the Members of it, who lived a few Ages before, were the chief Promoters of the Expulſion of *Hippias*, with all his Sons; and the chief Leaders in the Reſtoration of the Athenian Libertys and Laws, which had been overturned by *Piſiſtratus*, the Father of that *Hippias*.—Such of our Readers, as may happen to conſult the Pedigree of *Alcibiades*, drawn up by Dr. *Taylor*, and cited in Note 6, are to be here cautioned againſt an Error, either in that Table, (where *Dinomache*, the Mother of *Alcibiades*, appears as the Siſter of *Pericles*, and the Daughter of *Xanthippus* and *Agariſte*,) or in his Note immediately preceding, where he obſerves to us, that *Dinomache* was Daughter to *Megacles*. This manifeſt Inconſiſtency muſt have ariſen from the ſeeming Diſagree-

ment

Number.——But a greater Strength, than from all Theſe whom I have mentioned, taken together, you think that you derive from " Pericles, the Son of Xanthippus, whom your

ment betwixt ancient Authors on this Point; Some of them having chiefly been conſulted by the learned Critick, when he drew the *Table*; and Others, when he wrote the *Note*. In drawing up the *Table*, we preſume, he followed the Authority of *Diodorus Sic. A. Gellius*, and *Suidas*, who tell us, that *Pericles* was Uncle on the Mother's Side to *Alcibiades*. But his *Note* is ſupported by better Authoritys in this caſe, thoſe of *Andocides*, *Lyſias*, and *Plutarch*. For *Andocides* and *Lyſias* lived in the ſame Age with *Alcibiades*; and *Plutarch*, whoſe Diligence, Fidelity, and Accuracy, are unqueſtioned, wrote his Life.—In the next Note we ſhall attempt to reconcile the two different Accounts.

" *Plutarch* reports, that *Pericles* and his Brother *Ariphro* had the Guardianſhip of *Alcibiades*. And indeed it ſeems probable, that, being equally near to him in Blood, they were Joint-Guardians to Him and to his Brother *Clinias*, and agreed together to divide between them the Care of this Office;——that, in purſuance of this Agreement, *Pericles* undertook the Education of *Alcibiades*, the Elder Son; and *Ariphro*, that of *Clinias* the Younger; Both of them being in their Infancy, (the Elder, but Two Years old,) when their Father was killed at the Battle of *Coronea*, where he commanded the *Athenian* Troops, againſt the *Bœotians*. (But ſee Note 95 to this Dialogue.) Their Mother *Dinomache* is ſuppoſed to have been afterwards twice married; firſt to *Hipponicus*, and after his Death to *Pericles*, her Couſin, who thus became Father-in-Law, as well as Guardian, to his young Kinſman *Alcibiades*.——The Conſanguinity between *Pericles* and *Alcibiades*, together with the ſuppoſed Affinity juſt now mentioned, we have exhibited in the following Genealogical Chart, adding the Authoritys for it on the Side.

Megacles

Herod: L. 6. p. 372. Ed: *Gronovii.*

Megacles

Aristonymus

Alcmæon

Clisthenes
Sicyonius

Herod: p. 374.

Megacles — Agariste

Clisthenes | Hippocrates

Ariphro

Plutarch: in *Pericle* & in *Alcibiade.*

Megacles | Agariste — Xanthippus

2 Hipponicus — Hipparete | Callias

3 Dinomache — Pericles | Ariphro | Isander


Paralus | Xanthippus — Ἡ δᾶνα

your Father left Guardian to your Self and to your Brother: ——Pericles, who is able to do what he pleaſes; and that, not

The Suppoſition, contained in the laſt Line but one of this Chart, concerning the two Marriages of *Dinomache* after the Death of her Huſband *Clinias*, reſts on the ſingle Authority of *Cornelius Nepos*, or *Æmilius Probus*; who, in his *Life of Alcibiades*, ſays, that this great General was *Periclis privignus*, the Son of *Pericles*'s Wife by a former Huſband. We learn indeed from *Plutarch*, that the Wife of *Pericles*, by whom he had his two Sons, *Paralus* and *Xanthippus*, was related to him in Blood; that ſhe had been the Wife of *Hipponicus*, and had had by him a Son, *Callias*, ſurnamed the Rich. It appears alſo from *Lyſias*, that *Hipparete*, the Wife of *Alcibiades* the Third, was the Grand-Daughter of *Megacles*, who was the Father of *Dinomache*. Now the ſame *Hipparete* was unqueſtionably the Daughter of *Hipponicus*. From all which *Palmerius* draws this Concluſion, that *Dinomache*, the Daughter of *Megacles*, and the undoubted Mother of *Alcibiades* the Third by *Clinias*, was alſo the Mother of *Hipparete* by *Hipponicus*, and afterwards the Wife of *Pericles*;—a Concluſion, which contains abſurd Falſhoods. One is, that *Alcibiades* the Third is thus ſuppoſed to have married his Siſter on his Mother's Side, contrary to a Law of *Solon*. *Palmerius* himſelf confeſſes, that this could not be done; and therefore he ſuppoſes, that *Hipparete* was the Daughter of *Hipponicus*, not by *Dinomache*, but by ſome former Wife. But this Suppoſition deſtroys the Force of his Argument, drawn from *Lyſias*, to prove *Dinomache*, Daughter of *Megacles*, to have been married to *Hipponicus*. Another falſe Suppoſition is, that *Pericles* marry'd *Dinomache*; which, by a Law of *Solon* he could not do, becauſe he was a Guardian to her Children. If it be ſaid, that he might marry her, when his Wards were of Age to be out of Guardianſhip; we reply, that *Pericles* died within two Years after *Alcibiades* came to that Age; that the Wife of *Pericles*, ſuppoſed by *Palmerius* to be *Dinomache*, was the Mother of his two Sons *Paralus* and *Xanthippus*, as is clear from *Plutarch*; and that *Xanthippus* died a married

not only at Athens, but throughout all Greece, and with many and great Familys abroad.——To all theſe Advantages I ſhall

married Man, two Years before his Father.—We ſhall now preſume to lay before our learned Readers, for whoſe ſake this Note is written, a Conjecture of our own, which we believe will reconcile all the ſeeming Differences of ancient Authors concerning the Relationſhip between *Alcibiades* the Third and *Pericles*; and will at the ſame time clear up ſome collateral Difficultys. Let us then ſuppoſe, that the *Wife* of *Pericles*, and we read of but *one* that he ever had, was a *Daughter* of *Megacles*, and *Siſter* to *Dinomache*, and the *Widow* of *Hipponicus*. It will follow from this Suppoſition, that *Diodorus* of *Sicily*, *A. Gellius*, and *Suidas*, err not in calling *Pericles* the *Uncle* of *Alcibiades*, for that his Uncle he was—by Marriage: and at the ſame time the great Authoritys of *Andocides*, *Lyſias*, and *Plutarch*, remain unimpeached. It follows farther, that no Law was violated by the Marriage between *Alcibiades* and *Hipparete*, who in this caſe were only *Couſin-Germans*. Thus it will appear, that *Pericles* married one of his Relations in Blood, as *Plutarch* aſſures us that he did; and it will appear at the ſame time, that his Wife was not that *only* Relation of his in Blood, whom he could *not* marry. The ſame Suppoſition explains another Paſſage in *Plutarch*, where he ſays that *Pericles* loſt his Siſter by the great Plague at *Athens*; whereas we no where elſe read, that he had any Siſter of his own. The Difficulty ceaſes, if ſhe be ſuppoſed to be his Wife's Siſter, *Dinomache*. It makes more probable too, what we read in *Cornelius Nepos*, that *Alcibiades* was bred up by *Pericles* in his own Houſe. For it ſeems ſtrange, that a Child ſo very young ſhould not live with his Mother. But it was eaſy and agreeable for Perſons, ſo connected as we ſuppoſe, to live All of them together. But the greateſt Uſe of our Hypotheſis, in our own Opinion, is this, that it frees not only the *Genealogy*, but the *Chronology* too, from thoſe many inſuperable Difficultys, which otherwiſe they labour under. If the Hypotheſis be admitted, the lower Part of the Pedigree muſt be drawn after this manner;



Andocid. Orat. 4ta. pag. 296. Ed. Ham.

I ſhall add [12] the Greatneſs of your Eſtate; tho indeed on This Advantage you ſeem to value your ſelf leſs, than you do on any Other.——Elevated, as you are in your own Mind, on

[12] *Diodorus* ſpeaks of the *Riches* of *Alcibiades*, as one of the Cauſes of his Fame, and Elevation to Greatneſs. But we muſt obſerve, that theſe were owing rather to the *Uſe* he made of his Riches. For at the time of this Dialogue, before he came out into Public Life, all the Advantage, he could derive from the Reputation of his being rich, was to draw on himſelf the Eyes of the People, to make them attentive to his future Conduct, and perhaps to raiſe their Expectations of Benefit to accrue from it, not only to many Individuals, but alſo to his Country. His Father, when a very young Man, had fitted out a Ship of his own, manned her with two hundred Marines at his own Expence, and commanded her himſelf, in that Naval Engagement with the *Perſian* Fleet, mentioned before in Note 1. The *Athenians* were probably in hopes, that *Alcibiades* would emulate the *Magnificence* of his *Father*. And their Hopes were not diſappointed. He lived, all his Life, in the higheſt Splendour, which a Commonwealth admits of. And we are told by *Thucydides*, that *Nicias*, in a Speech before the Aſſembly of the People, reproached *Alcibiades* with the extravagantly great Expences, to which he had put himſelf, and the too ſplendid Figure for a Private Man, which he had made at the *Olympic Games:* for that he had there entered for the Races no fewer than Seven Chariots, drawn, each of them, by Four Horſes a-breaſt; a Piece of Magnificence, outdoing every thing of the Kind, ever exhibited before. In Anſwer to this Speech, *Alcibiades* gloried in the Fact, objected to him as a Reproach; and ſhewed it to be highly meritorious in a Man of His Fortune; as it ſupported the Dignity of his Country in the Eſteem of Foreigners as well as Neighbours: for not only from all the *Grecian* States, but from Aſia and other Countrys abroad, Multitudes came thronging, to be Spectators

on theſe accounts, you have looked down on your Admirers: and They, conſcious of their comparative Meanneſs, have bowed their Heads, and have retired. This you are very ſenſible of: And therefore, I well know, that you wonder, What I can have in my Thoughts, or what Hopes I can entertain, ſeeing that I quit you not, but continue my Attachment to you ſtill, when your other Admirers have all forſaken you.

ALCIBIADES.

This however, Socrates, perhaps you do not know, that You have been a little beforehand with Me. For I really had it in my Mind to addreſs you Firſt, and to aſk you theſe very Queſtions;——What can poſſibly be your Meaning; and with what Views or Expectations it is, that you continually preſs on Me, and, wherever I am, are aſſiduous to be there your Self? For I do in truth wonder, What your Buſineſs can be with Me; and ſhould be very glad to be informed.

Spectators of the *Olympic Games*.—Other Inſtances of like Kind are recorded of *Alcibiades* by *Plutarch*.—That he was too magnanimous to ſet any Value on Wealth for its own Sake, or any Value on Himſelf meerly for his being poſſeſſed of it, is evidently implied in the Words immediately ſubjoined by *Socrates*. But they ſeem to Us to imply farther, that a Pride, built on no better Ground than the Poſſeſſion of great Wealth, ſtands on the weakeſt Foundation of Any, and the moſt of Any wants the Aid of perſonal and real Merit to ſupport it; as will appear in the Progreſs of this Dialogue.

SOCRATES.

You will hear me then, 'tis to be ſuppoſed, with Willingneſs and Attention, if you really are deſirous, as You ſay you are, of knowing What I have in my Thoughts. I ſpeak therefore as to a Perſon diſpoſed to hear, and to ſtay till he has heard all.

ALCIBIADES.

I am intirely ſo diſpoſed: it is your Part to ſpeak.

SOCRATES.

But obſerve This: you muſt not wonder, if, as I found it difficult to make a Beginning, I ſhould find it no leſs difficult to make an End.

ALCIBIADES.

My good Man, ſay all you have to ſay: for I ſhall not fail to attend to you.

SOCRATES.

I muſt ſay it then: [13] and, tho it is a hard Taſk for any Man to addreſs the Perſon whom he loves or admires, if that

[13] The Reader, who happens to caſt his Eye on this Note, is deſired to ſtop here a while, and look back on the ſteps which he has already trod, and by which *Plato* begins his *Introduction* to this Dialogue. Let him at the ſame time reflect on the Character and Circumſtances of *Alcibiades*, as before deſcribed; and we imagine that he will then have much Pleaſure in admiring the conſummate Art, attributed to *Socrates* by *Plato*, in the Method of this whole Addreſs, and the proper Diſpoſition

that Perſon be ſuperiour to Flattery, yet I muſt adventure boldly to ſpeak my Mind.——If, Alcibiades, I had obſerved you

ſition of its Parts. For in the firſt place, he attracts the Ear of the Perſon whom he accoſts, by paying him the Reſpect due to him, as we obſerved in Note 1.—In the next place, he conciliates his Good Will, and gains a favourable Hearing, by Compliments, neither falſe, nor fulſome, nor ill-timed; but by ſuch, as are ſtrictly agreeable to Truth; by ſuch, as are mixed with ſeeming Reprehenſions; by ſuch, as naturally ariſe from the Obſervation which he makes, concerning a Matter of Fact, in the firſt Sentence of this Addreſs.—*Socrates* then proceeds to excite the Curioſity, and fix the Attention, of the Perſon whom he is minded to inſtruct: for no Inſtructions can be deeply impreſſed on the Mind of a Diſciple, unleſs he hath Curioſity to know, and Attention enough to learn: and the certain Way, which the Great Maſter of Perſuaſion, as well as of Wiſdom, takes in this Procedure, is by promiſing to explain a Matter, of which the Party to be made attentive had long wanted an Explanation.—Laſtly, in the Speech now before us, *Socrates* will be ſeen reſuming and working up to Perfection every Point, juſt now remarked, of this Preparation, neceſſary to *Alcibiades* for his receiving a Doctrine, which at firſt he was ſo ill diſpoſed to learn.—For *Socrates* will here be ſeen, heightning his Reſpect to *Alcibiades*, in the Appellation which he here gives him; as will be ſhewn in Note 15.—He will be ſeen, acquitting him of the Vices, common to meaner Souls, and making his predominant Paſſion, That which afterwards proved ſo dangerous to his Country, and ſo deſtructive to Himſelf, a Subject of ſeeming Commendation; as will appear in Note 14.—He will be ſeen, paying him the higheſt of all Compliments, in telling him that he was ſuperiour to Flattery; for it followed hence, that he was ſuperiour alſo to Vanity, a Paſſion which cleaves the cloſeſt of any to the Soul, and to be freed from which is the laſt Accompliſhment of a truly great Mind: nor was this Compliment unmerited, ſo far

you ſatisfied with thoſe Advantages of yours, which I juſt now enumerated; if you had appeared to indulge the Fancy of ſpending your whole Life in the Enjoyment of them; I

far as it was expreſſed; for *Alcibiades* was indeed ſuperiour to *thoſe* Flatterys, which he had been uſed to hear.—*Socrates* will here farther be ſeen, raiſing the Curioſity of *Alcibiades* to the greateſt Height, and engaging his Mind to the deepeſt Attention poſſible; by Promiſes of aiding him in the Gratification of his Paſſion, the Attainment of his Ends; by confident Aſſurances of the all-ſufficiency of that Aid; and, what is ſtill more, by paradoxical Aſſertions of the Inability of any other Perſon than Himſelf for that Purpoſe, and the Inſufficiency of any other Aid but That which He had to give him.—To the ſame Ends are directed theſe leſſer Circumſtances; That immediately before, where *Socrates* gives him an Intimation, that he has very much to ſay to him; and This juſt here, (in the place of reference to the preſent Note,) where *Socrates* contrives to delay a little longer the gratifying of that Curioſity which he had raiſed, and conſequently to give it more Vehemence and Ardour.—When the ſeveral Parts of this *Addreſs* of *Socrates*, in his firſt Application to *Alcibiades*, are obſerved ſeparately, and the combined Forces of them all are attended to, we think, that we may fairly venture to pronounce it equal to the fineſt *Exordium* of any *Oration*, ancient or modern, in every one of thoſe Excellencys, which, according to the Rules laid down by the Maſters of the *Art of Rhetorick*, conſtitute all the Merit of an *Exordium*.—Thus far we have conſidered the *Whole* of this *Addreſs*, with regard to its *Dramatic Beauty*, in the Oeconomy of the Dialogue. It remains for us to remark briefly, that *Part* of it is fitted, and ſeems intended, to operate on the Mind of a *Reader* of *Plato*, in the ſame way, as on That of the *Auditor* of *Socrates*. If it ſhould have ſo deſirable an Effect on Any of the Readers of this Tranſlation, we can aſſure them, that, before the Dialogue ends, their preſent Curioſity will be fully gratified, and the Trouble of their Attention will be well compenſated.

perſwade

perſwade myſelf, that [14] My Love and Admiration of you would have long ſince left me. But that you entertain Thoughts

[14] It may ſeem ſtrange at firſt Sight, that *Socrates*, in attempting to engage *Alcibiades* in the Study of true Wiſdom, and to conduct him into the Paths of true Virtue, ſhould lay the Foundation of his Attempt in the *boundleſs Ambition* of that Young Gentleman; nay, ſhould tell him, that, if he had not perceived That Ambition working in his Soul, he ſhould never have entered into any Diſcourſe with him; that is, he ſhould not have thought him a proper Subject for His Inſtruction. But This will no longer ſeem ſtrange, when we conſider, that Contentedneſs with the Preſent, or a Suppoſition of Sufficiency poſſeſſed already, with reſpect to any Things whatever, any Good whether external or internal, effectually precludes all Endeavours to acquire more. Moſt Men are always ſuch, as *Alcibiades* was in his Youth: they think themſelves ſufficiently wiſe, and ſufficiently good; and with ſuch Thoughts they never can become wiſer or better. What they ſuppoſe themſelves to be in want of, is generally either *Wealth*, or *Rank*, or *Power*: and the firſt of theſe Men uſually deſire, as a Means of procuring either more *Pleaſures* of Senſe, and greater *Conveniencys* of Outward Life, or the Advantages ariſing from the *Reſpect* paid by Others, in ſome Countrys, to *Riches* more than to *Rank*: Men too there are, tho few, in whom the meer *amor habendi* prevails over all other Conſiderations. But in all theſe Caſes, without even an Exception of the laſt, Men are apt to *meaſure* their ſuppoſed Wants, by *comparing* their own *Wealth*, or *Rank*, or *Power*, with what Others have of the ſame Kind. *Alcibiades* ſaw no Man at *Athens* ſuperiour to him in *Wealth*: he ſaw nothing therefore, which could make him in this reſpect diſcontented. He was Maſter of a Fortune ſufficient to procure him all the *Conveniencys* and *Pleaſures* to be had at *Athens*, the greateſt City, then, in Europe: And he had a Soul too noble to entertain a Paſſion ſo mean as that of *Avarice*. The *Rank*, to which his *Birth* entitled him, was the Firſt in the Common-

Thoughts very different from ſuch as thoſe, I ſhall now ſhew; and ſhall lay your own Mind open before your Self.

By

Commonwealth. And the all-prevailing Influence of *Pericles*, his Guardian, threw on him the Eyes of all his Inferiours, and ſet him high in the Conſideration of his Equals. Nothing therefore he thought wanting to him, but *Power*, and *Government* in the *State*. So that *Ambition*, when he came to the Age of Manhood, took Poſſeſſion of his whole Soul. The *Spirit* of Man is an *ever-active* Principle; and his *Mind* muſt always have ſome *Good*, real or imaginary, in her *View*. The *greateſt Spirits* are the *moſt active*; and the *greateſt Souls* aim at nothing, which appears not to their *Minds* the *greateſt Good*. Now the *Strength* of every fixed and permanent *Deſire* is always owing to theſe Two Cauſes, concurring,—a reſtleſs *Vigour* in the *Spirit*, and an Appearance of the *Object of Deſire*, as the *greateſt*, if not the only, *Good*. No Man ever ſurpaſſed *Alcibiades* in the Greatneſs of his *Spirit*, τὸ μεγαλόθυμον, which *Plato*, in the Second Book of his *Republick*, ſays is difficult to make conſiſtent with τὸ πρᾶον, *Mildneſs*; as the Hiſtory of his whole Life proves: And the Greatneſs of his *Soul*, τὸ μεγαλόψυχον, raiſed him above All things, which to *Vulgar Minds* appear *Great*. It is therefore no Matter of Wonder, that the Ambition of *Alcibiades* exceeded all ordinary Bounds. And if we conſider farther, that *Power* is only *Relative* to the *Subjects* of that Power; and that *Greatneſs* is a Thing meerly *Comparative*; we ſhall find the *Objects* of Ambition, and conſequently *Ambition* itſelf, to be *without* any *Bound* or Meaſure at all, until we arrive at the Source of all Power and Greatneſs. This infinite Ambition *Socrates* made the Baſis of That Building, which he purpoſed to erect in the Soul of *Alcibiades*, true *Wiſdom* and ſolid *Virtue*; in the ſame manner, as he erected the like Edifice in the Souls of ſome Others on the *general Love of Beauty*. For as ſometimes he ſhewed, that *Virtue* was the *Beauty* of the *Soul*, *Wiſdom* the *Beauty* of the *Mind*, and *Mind* its Self the *Source* of all *Beauty*; ſo at other times he proved,

that

means you will alſo plainly perceive, how conſtantly and cloſely My Mind has attended to you.——My Opinion of you then is This; that, if any of the Gods were to put this Queſtion to you,——" Alcibiades"! were he to ſay, " whether " do you chuſe to live in the Poſſeſſion of all the Things " which are at preſent Yours; or do you prefer immediate " Death, if you are not permitted ever to acquire Things " greater"?——In this caſe, it appears to Me. that you would make Death your Option. But what Kind of Expectations you live in, I ſhall now declare. You think, that, if you ſpeedily make your Appearance before the Athenian People

that *Virtue* was the *Power* of the *Soul*, *Wiſdom* the *Greatneſs* of the *Mind*, and *Mind* its Self the *Source* of all *Power* and all *Greatneſs*. Men, whoſe Souls were neither *enamoured* of *Beauty*, nor *ambitious* of *Greatneſs*, were not fit Subjects for the Teaching of *Socrates*. In the Lovers of Money, the Lovers of Senſual Pleaſure, and the quite Indolent or Apathetic, nothing appeared, which He could take any Hold of, and by which he could lead them, in the way of His Diſcipline, to the great End he had in View for them, their own Happineſs. Accordingly, in the Speech now before us, he declares, that if ever he had perceived *Alcibiades* contented with his preſent Station in Life, and ſatisfied with the enjoying of his Fortune, without any farther Views, he ſhould have given himſelf no farther Concern about him, but have thrown aſide all his Regard for him.—The Compoſition of a truly Great Man, which, in *Plato*'s Opinion, only Philoſophy can accompliſh, (without ſuch a θεῖα μοῖρα, as attends on Heroes,) is the μεγαλόθυμον mixed with the πρᾶον. But more of This in our Notes to *the Phædrus*. See alſo the latter Part of Note 126. to *the Meno*.

in Aſſembly, (and This you purpoſe to do within a few Days) you ſhall be able to convince them, that you merit higher Honours than were ever beſtowed on Pericles, or any other Perſon in any Age: and having convinced them of This, you think, that you will arrive at the Chief Power in the State; and if here at home, that you will then have the greateſt Weight and Influence abroad; and not only ſo with the reſt of the Grecian States, but with the Barbarian Nations too, as many as inhabit the ſame Continent with Us. And farther; if the Deity whom I before ſpoke of, allowing you larger Limits, were to ſay to you, that "You muſt be "contented with being the Maſter here in Europe; for that "'twill not be permitted you to paſs over into Aſia, nor to "concern your ſelf with the Adminiſtration of any Affairs "there"; it appears to Me, that neither on Theſe terms, thus limited, would You think Life eligible; nor on any terms indeed, that fell ſhort of filling, in a manner, the whole World with your Renown, and of being every where Lord and Maſter. I believe, you deem no Man, that ever lived, excepting Cyrus and Xerxes, worth the ſpeaking of. In fine, that You entertain ſuch Hopes, as I have mentioned, I know with certainty, and ſpeak not from meer Conjecture. ——Now You perhaps, conſcious of the Truth of what I have ſpoken, might ſay,——What is all This to the Account you promiſed to give me, of the Reaſons, for which your Attachment to Me ſtill continues?——I will tell you then,

then, [15] dear Son of Clinias and Dinomache! That all theſe Thoughts of yours ſhould ever come to an End, is impoſſible,

[15] We obſerved in Note 1. the polite Addreſs of *Socrates*, in beginning his firſt Speech to *Alcibiades*, with the mention of his *Father's Name*. In repeating here that Compliment, he greatly heightens it by adding the mention of his *Mother's Name* to that of his Father's. For ſuch an Addition was only then uſed, and only then proper, when the *Mother's Rank*, from Birth or Merit, was *higher* than the *Father's*. Accordingly in *Homer*, tho we meet with many Patronymic Names, we never find any Matronymic. Nor do we remember, that the Mothers of Any of his Heroes are ever mentioned by Name, unleſs Thoſe Mothers were more than Human: as in theſe Verſes, put into the Mouth of *Æneas*, ſpeaking to *Achilles*,

Φασί σε μὲν Πηλῆος ἀμύμονος ἔκγονον εἶναι,
Μητρὸς δ' ἐκ Θέτιδος, καλλιπλοκάμου ἁλοσύδνης.
Αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν υἱὸς μεγαλήτορος Ἀγχίσαο
Εὔχομαι ἐκγεγάμεν, μήτηρ δέ μοι ἔστ' Ἀφροδίτη.
Homer. Iliad. Lib. 20. v. 206.

——*Fame gives thee for thy Sire*
Peleus, of Name unblemiſh'd; one of Race
Immortal for thy Mother, a Sea-Nymph
With lovely Locks, fair Thetis: on My Part,
Anchiſes the magnanimous I boaſt
My Father, and a Goddeſs, Venus' Self,
My Mother.——

That *Plato* very frequently alludes to Expreſſions, and even ſingle Words, uſed by *Homer*, ancient as well as modern Criticks have obſerved. We have no doubt of his doing ſo, in Theſe Words of the

 preſent

ble, without My Help. So great Power I think my ſelf to have with regard to your Affairs and to your Self too. For this reaſon, I have long been of Opinion, that [16] God did not as yet permit me to hold any Converſation with

preſent Paſſage, " *Dear Son*" &c. for *Socrates* does not therein mean *Dear to Him*, but *Dear to Clinias and Dinomache*; in Imitation of thoſe Expreſſions, common in Homer, φίλος υἱὸς, φίλον τέκος, φίλε τέκνον. *Hen: Stephens* in his *Schediaſmata varia*, Lib: 2. has taken Notice of ſeveral of *Plato*'s Alluſions to *Homer*, in Paſſages of as ſmall Importance, as That now before us. In *Plato*'s days it was faſhionable ſo to do, it was thought elegant and a Mark of Good-Breeding. For all Perſons of ingenuous Education had *Homer* almoſt by heart. Now if thus much be granted us, that *Plato*, when he wrote this Sentence, had *Homer* in his Mind; we preſume to ſay farther, that in mentioning by Name the *Mother* as well as the *Father* of *Alcibiades*, he had in his Mind, particularly, the very Paſſage in *Homer*, juſt now cited.—— For the ſake of our Readers, unlearned in the Greek, we found our ſelves obliged to give a new Tranſlation of that Paſſage into Engliſh; becauſe Mr. *Pope*, in His Tranſlation, has not mentioned the Name either of *Peleus*, or of *Thetis*; neither has he, that of *Anchiſes*, nor that of *Venus*; on the mention of whoſe Names by *Homer*, in theſe Verſes, the Similitude between the Two Paſſages, and the Probability that This of *Plato* alludes to That of Homer, intirely depend.——The high Reſpect, paid to *Dinomache* at *Athens*, on account of the Merits of her Anceſtors, in the Minds of all *true Athenians*, may be eaſily ſuppoſed from what has been ſaid in the Beginning of Note 10.

[16] The *Divine Principle* within him: or his own Mind, pure and free from the Dominion of any Paſſion, conſequently clear, unobſtructed, and open to the Reception of that *Divine Light* which is ever preſent with all Minds, illuminating every ſuch Mind, as excludes it not, but preſerves the Communication.

you;

you; and I waited for the Time, when he would give me Leave. For, as You entertain Hopes of proving to the People, that your Value to Them is equal to whatever They can give you; and as You expect, that having proved this Point, you ſhall immediately obtain whatever Power you deſire; in the ſame manner do I expect to have the greateſt Power and Influence over You, when I ſhall have proved, that I am [17] valuable to You, more than any other Thing is; and that neither Guardian, nor Relation, nor any other Perſon, is able to procure you the Power you long for, except My Self; with the Aſſiſtance, however, of God. So long therefore as You was yet too young, and before you had your Mind filled with thoſe ſwelling Hopes, I believe, that God would not permit me to have Diſcourſe with you, becauſe You would not have regarded Me, and I conſequently ſhould have diſcourſed in vain; but that he has now given me free Leave, for that you would now hearken to me.

ALCIBIADES.

Much more unaccountable and abſurd do you appear to Me now, Socrates, ſince You have begun to open your ſelf, than when you followed me every where without ſpeaking

[17] In the Greek Text, as it is printed, the Word σοὶ is here omitted, but ſeems neceſſary to be inſerted, and the Paſſage to be read thus, ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄξιός σοι εἰμὶ, κ. τ. λ. ſo as to correſpond, as it ought, with theſe Words in the preceding Part of the Sentence, ὅτι αὐτῇ παντὸς ἄξιος εἶ.

to

to me a Word: and yet you had all the Appearance of being a Man of that Sort then. As to what you have ſaid, whether I entertain thoſe Thoughts in my Mind, or not, You, it ſeems, know with Certainty: ſo that were I to ſay, I did not, the Denial would not avail me, nor perſuade You to believe me. Admitting it then, and ſuppoſing that I indulge the Hopes you mentioned ever ſo much, How they may be accompliſhed by Means of You, and that without Your Help they never can, are you able to prove to Me?

SOCRATES.

Do you aſk me, whether I am able to prove it to you in a long Harangue, ſuch a one as You are accuſtomed to hear? I have no Abilitys in that way. But yet I ſhould be able, as I think, to prove to you, that thoſe Pretenſions of mine are not vain, if You would be willing but to do me One ſmall Piece of Service.

ALCIBIADES.

If That Service be not difficult to be done, I am willing.

SOCRATES.

Do you think it difficult, or not, to make Anſwers to ſuch Queſtions, as are propoſed to you?

ALCIBIADES.

Not difficult.

SOCRATES.

Be ready then to anſwer.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

Do You then propoſe your Queſtions.

SOCRATES.

May I propoſe them, with a Suppoſition that You have thoſe Thoughts in your Mind, which I attribute to you?

ALCIBIADES.

Be it ſo, if You chuſe it; that I may know What farther you have to ſay.

SOCRATES.

Well then: you have it in your Mind, as I ſaid, to appear in Preſence of the Athenians within a ſhort time, with Intention to harangue them and give them your Advice. If therefore, when you are juſt ready to mount the Roſtrum, I were to ſtop you, and to ſay thus;——Since the Athenians are here met in Aſſembly, on Purpoſe to deliberate on ſome of their Affairs, What, I pray you, are to be the Subjects of their Deliberation, now that You riſe up to give them Your Counſel? Muſt not the Subjects be Such, as You are better acquainted with, than They?——What Anſwer would You make me?

ALCIBIADES.

I certainly ſhould anſwer, that the Subjects were Such, as I knew better, than Others who were preſent.

SOCRATES.

On Thoſe Subjects then, which You happen to have Knowlege in, You are a good Counſellor.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

Without doubt.

SOCRATES.

Have you Knowlege in Thoſe Things only, which you have either learnt from Others, or found out, your Self?

ALCIBIADES.

What Things, Other than thoſe, is it poſſible that I ſhould have any Knowlege in?

SOCRATES.

And is it poſſible, that ever you ſhould have learnt, or have found out, any Thing, which you was not willing to learn, or to ſearch out by your Self?

ALCIBIADES.

It is not.

SOCRATES.

And was You ever at any time willing to learn, or did you ever at any time ſeek to know, any Things, in which you imagined your ſelf to be already knowing.

ALCIBIADES.

No, certainly.

SOCRATES.

In thoſe Things, which you now happen to know, was there once a time, when you did not think your ſelf knowing?

ALCIBIADES.

That muſt have been.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Now what the Things are, which you have learnt, I tolerably well know. But if you have been taught any thing, without My knowlege, tell me What. To the beſt of My Memory, you have been taught [18] Grammar, the Gymnic Exerciſes, and to play on Stringed Inſtruments of Muſick: for on Wind-Inſtruments, beſides, [19] You refuſed to learn. This is the Sum total of all your Knowlege; unleſs you have learnt any thing elſe in ſome place or other, which I have not diſcovered: and I think, that neither by day, nor yet by night, did you ever ſtir out of doors, but I was acquainted with all your Motions.

ALCIBIADES.

'Tis true, that I have not gone to any other Maſters, than to Such as taught the Arts, which You have mentioned.

SOCRATES.

Well then; when the Athenians are conſulting together about the Grammar of their Language, how to write or

[18] The teaching of Grammar to the Youth at *Athens* included the reading and explaining to them the ancient Poets, eſpecially *Homer*. See Note 3. to the *Argument* of *the Io*.

[19] Alleging, that the Performances on ſuch Inſtruments were illiberal, and unbecoming to a Gentleman; that they were ungraceful, and diſtorting to the Face; and could not, like thoſe on Stringed Inſtruments, ſuch as the Lyre, be accompanied by the Voice of the Performer. See *Plutarch's Life of Alcibiades*; and *A. Gellius*, Lib: 15. C. 17.

ſpeak it with propriety, at Theſe times is it, that You will riſe up to give them Your Advice?

ALCIBIADES.

By Jove, not I.

SOCRATES.

But is it then, when they are in Debate about ſtriking Chords on the Lyre?

ALCIBIADES.

By no means ſhould I make a Speech on ſuch a Subject.

SOCRATES.

It cannot be on the Subject of Wreſtling neither: becauſe they never uſe to deliberate on This Subject in their Public Aſſemblys.

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly not.

SOCRATES.

On What Subject then of their Conſultations is it, that you intend the giving them Your Advice? It cannot be, when Building is the Subject.

ALCIBIADES.

No, certainly.

SOCRATES.

Becauſe in This Caſe a Builder would give them better Advice, than You could.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

True.

SOCRATES.

Nor yet is it, when they conſult together concerning Divination.

ALCIBIADES.

It is not.

SOCRATES.

For a Diviner would in This Caſe be a better Counſellor than You.

ALCIBIADES.

Without doubt.

SOCRATES.

And That, whether he was [20] a tall or a ſhort Man; whether his Perſon was handſome or deformed; and whether his Family was noble or ignoble.

[20] Theſe external Advantages of Perſon and of Birth, in any Speaker, always dazzle the Eyes and Imagination of *the Vulgar*, and divert their Attention, as well from the Matter of the Speech, as from the Manner in which it is ſpoken. The moſt *ignorant* and *barbarian* Nations too, in all Ages, have always been obſerved to lay the greateſt Streſs on thoſe Circumſtances, in chooſing a King, a Leader in War, or Magiſtrates and Counſellors in time of Peace.—*Alcibiades* was now too young and unexperienced, to judge of Men by better Standards, than Thoſe, uſed by the Vulgar and the Ignorant; or to know the Superior Advantages of Mental Abilitys and Knowlege. The *Size* of an *Underſtanding*, the *Beauty* of a *Soul*, or the *Divine Origin* of the *Human Mind*, he had no more thought of, than he would have done, had he been bred a Plow-Boy, or born a Hottentot.

ALCIBIADES.

How ſhould it be otherwiſe?

SOCRATES.

For to give good Advice in any Caſe whatever, belongs, I ſuppoſe, only to a Perſon ſkilled in the Subject, and not to a fine Gentleman.

ALCIBIADES.

Beyond all queſtion.

SOCRATES.

And whether the Man, who gives them his Advice, be " rich or poor, it will make no difference to the Athenians, when they are conſulting about the Health of the City; but they will always inquire after a Phyſician only, to conſult with.

ALCI-

" *Socrates* perceived, that *Alcibiades* valued his large *Fortune* no otherwiſe, than as one of the chief *Means* of riſing to *Power* and *Greatneſs* in the State; and farther, that he imagined it impoſſible for him to fail of arriving at his End thro ſuch Means. *Alcibiades*, in building his Expectations partly on his *Riches*, did not perhaps ſo much err from Probability, as he did in laying too great a Streſs on the Advantages of his *Perſon* and his *Birth*. For tho the *Conſtitution* of the *Athenian* Government, as ſettled by *Solon*, was compoſed of *Ariſtocracy* and *Democracy* mixed together, yet the *People* had by much the *greater Share*, not only in the *Legiſlature*, but alſo in the *Appointment* to all *Offices* in the Common-wealth, whether Civil or Military. Now, in a *Democracy*, if the Major Part of the People are void of Integrity and Honeſty, the

Avenues

ALCIBIADES.

They will be right in ſo doing.

SOCRATES.

Now on What Subject is it, when they are met in Conſultation together, that You will do right in riſing up and giving them Your Counſel?

ALCI-

Avenues of Government will lye open to Bribery; and Corruption will creep eaſily into all Offices of the Common-wealth. And this will, 'tis to be feared, ever be the Caſe in a *populous*, *rich*, and *powerful* State, ſuch as *Athens* was in the time of *Socrates*: becauſe *Riches* and *Power* have a natural Tendency to deſtroy that Induſtry, Frugality, and Temperance, that Moderation, Equity, and Senſe of the Rights of Others, without the Support of which Virtues, at leaſt in a conſiderable degree, firm Integrity and thorow Honeſty can never ſubſiſt long. And Theſe being deſtroyed, the more *populous* any State becomes, it grows the worſe. For all Vices not only ſpread, but riſe to greater Heights too, in large Countrys fully peopled. Much more happily therefore, than the *Athenian*, is our *Engliſh* Conſtitution framed; by which the Appointment to all ſuperior Magiſtracys, to all Military Commands, and to all the higher Offices in the Common-wealth, is not left to the People's Choice, but is committed into the King's Hands; and no Election, in which the whole Community is intereſted, remains in the People, except That of the Guardians of their legal Rights and Libertys. But This Election is ſo peculiarly a ſacred Right of the People's, that neither the King, nor the Nobles, are by the Conſtitution ſuffered to interfere. So that if the People, who are the only Electors to the Truſt of this Guardianſhip, receive Bribes to elect Perſons, ready to betray that Truſt, they receive them to the Riſque of their own Ruin. Our Engliſh Readers, Such as are truly Engliſh, will, we hope, freely pardon us this

ſhort

ALCIBIADES.

'Tis when they are in Conſultation, Socrates, about [22] their own Affairs.

ſhort Excurſion: We now return to the proper Subject of this Note.—*Socrates* knew, as well as *Alcibiades*, that Money was the Road to Power at *Athens*. But *Socrates* knew farther, what *Alcibiades* knew not, that no Government can be ſupported long without a conſiderable degree of Wiſdom and Virtue in the Governors; and alſo, that the Exerciſe of any Power, veſted in a Man, who knows not how to exerciſe it *well* and *rightly*, is hurtful to all the Subjects of that Power, is miſchievous to the Man himſelf, will defeat its own Purpoſe, and operate its own Deſtruction. *Alcibiades*, however, could apprehend in general, that in any Art, or in any Affair whatever, Knowlege and Skill in the Subject-Matter was ſufficient to qualify a Man for the Practice, or the Management. On the Foundation of this General Truth, and of Common Senſe in *Alcibiades* to perceive it, when laid before him, *Socrates* begins to build his Arguments, for proving to *Alcibiades*, that he wanted That Knowlege, which alone was neceſſary to qualify him for a Counſellor of State.

[22] *Alcibiades* evidently means thoſe Public Affairs, concerning which, every Member of the Community having a Vote, in Popular Governments, is ſuppoſed to be a competent Judge, ſo far at leaſt as his own Intereſt is concerned, of what ought to be done, what to be omitted, and what to be undone or retracted. He therefore calls theſe *the Athenians own Affairs*, that is, Affairs in which Every Athenian Citizen had a Concern; not becauſe the Athenian Publick was not intereſted as much in the Affairs mentioned before, thoſe of Building, Divination, and Medicine; but becauſe Such Affairs were carried on and managed by the reſpective Profeſſors, in whom the Publick confided, as deeming them the only competent Judges of what was Beſt in their reſpective Arts.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

About [23] increaſing their Navy, do you mean? what Sort of Veſſels they ſhould provide, and in what Manner they ſhould have them built?

ALCI-

[23] The Subjects of public Conſultation, or rather of common Converſation, firſt mentioned by *Socrates*, were thoſe in which *Alcibiades* had Knowlege, taught him in his Education; namely, *Grammar*, *Muſick*, and *Gymnaſtick*: for of theſe Three Studys conſiſted the leſſer *Encyclopædia*, or Courſe of Education, which all the Liberal Athenian Youth went thro.——In the next Three Inſtances, thoſe of *Building*, *Divination*, and *Medicine*, we find the chief Particular Subjects, which at that very time occupied the Thoughts of All, who had the Public Intereſt at heart. For the *Athenians* were juſt then buſied in carrying on the execution of the Deſigns, begun by *Themiſtocles*, and compleated by *Pericles*, thoſe of fortifying the Port of *Piræum*, of making it by many *additional Buildings* a large Town, and of raiſing a *Wall* to reach thither from the City. See *Diodorus Sic:* Lib: 11, and *Plato* in his *Gorgias*. Nor were the People leſs buſied in conſulting the *Diviners* about the Succeſs of the *Peloponneſian War*, the Third Year of which is the Time of this Dialogue: for they began already to be anxious and grow ſick of it; partly becauſe their Enemys had been by the Oracle aſſured of Conqueſt, and partly becauſe of their Misfortunes in the Second Year of it. For That was the very Year, wherein *Athens* ſuffered the moſt afflicting Calamities from that great Peſtilence, deſcribed by *Thucydides*. It is therefore highly probable that *Phyſicians* alſo were at this time in great Requeſt, and were conſulted by the State, how to extinguiſh the remaining Sparks of that Diſeaſe; leaſt they ſhould, as indeed Four Years afterwards they did, riſe into freſh Flames.——Theſe frequent Topicks of all public Diſcourſe at that time, the Three here mentioned, *Building*, *Divination*, and *Medicine*,

ALCIBIADES.

I mean no ſuch Thing, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

we may obſerve, are the Subjects of Knowlege, peculiar each of them to ſome certain Artiſts. Stateſmen are not ſuppoſed to be converſant in any of them; for it is not their Buſineſs or Duty ſo to be. The Perſons, conſulted on theſe Topics, were the reſpective Profeſſors of theſe Arts. But in order to ſhew, what is the proper *Science of a Politician*, *Plato* begins in a Negative way, and ſhews us what it is not. He takes the ſame way in *the Rivals*, and in *the Greater Hippias*, as we have remarked in the *Arguments* of thoſe Dialogues. The *Particular Arts* therefore are here introduced, only to be turned out again, and thrown aſide. —— *Plato*'s next Inſtance of Knowlege, wanting in *Alcibiades*, approaches nearer to the *Science of Politicks*; and that is *Skill in Naval Affairs*. To explain This, we are to obſerve in the firſt place, that *Pericles*, the wiſeſt and beſt Stateſman, whom *Athens* was ever bleſt with, had long before perſuaded his Countrymen, to make their *Navy* their *chief Care*; to aim at *no Conqueſts* over their *Grecian Neighbours*; to *diſband* the greateſt Part of their *Land-Forces*; and to carry on their Wars with their Rivals the *Lacedæmonians*, and with their Enemys the *Perſians*, wholly *by Sea*. We know, that 'tis neceſſary at all times, for every Man, who has the Command of any Ship given him, to have his Mind previouſly furniſhed with the Knowlege requiſite for that Command. The Knowlege therefore of Naval Affairs became neceſſary, at this Period of the Athenian State, to every Man who aſpired to the Management of thoſe Affairs, and to the chief Command of the Naval Forces. We are to obſerve in the next place, that in the ancient Kingdoms it was one Part of the Kingly Office, to lead and command in Perſon the Army of the People. When theſe Kingly Governments ended in Tyrannys, the Tyrants, in time of War, never failed to put themſelves at the Head of their Forces; becauſe they did not dare to intruſt Any one of their Subjects with the Supream Command. In the

mixed

SOCRATES.

Becauſe you are ignorant, I preſume, in the Art of Ship-building. Is not This the reaſon? Or is there any other, why you would chuſe in ſuch a Conſultation to ſit ſilent?

ALCI-

mixed Republicks, which aroſe on the Demolition of theſe Tyrannys, wherever the Ariſtocratical Side was the more powerful, the Nobles aſſumed to themſelves the Same Part of the Kingly Office, thro Jealouſy of the oppoſite Side, the Democratic. But in Legal Monarchys, eſtabliſhed on one of theſe firm Baſes, either the voluntary Choice, or the free Conſent, or the cordial Acquieſcence of the People, there was no Danger to the Prince, in committing the Management of a War to Others. For a Prince, who has arrived at Royalty by thoſe Means, and who makes the Laws of his Country the Rule of his own Conduct, will always have the Majority of his Army, as well as of the reſt of his People, well-affectioned to his Perſon and Government. Such Princes therefore were uſed to delegate the Command of their Armys to thoſe Perſons, whom they deemed the fitteſt for that Office. In Monarchys, founded by the People, and governed according to known Laws, this, we ſay, was the uſual Practice. And the reaſon of it was This,——that the Safety of a Prince, who ſo reigned, was too valuable to his People to be hazarded in Battle, except on very particular Occaſions. In pure Democracys, and likewiſe in thoſe Republicks, where the Power of electing to all ſuperior Offices of State was veſted in the People, the Delegation of this Part of Government, the Supreme Military Command, was of neceſſity the conſtant Uſage; becauſe ſuch an Office can never be well executed by More than One Perſon, at leaſt againſt One Enemy, or in One Place; and alſo becauſe a very Few of the People in any Country could have had ſuch an Education, as to qualify them for that Command. In theſe Caſes then the Imperatorial Office evidently appears to be meerly Miniſterial. It is ſo perhaps in its own

ALCIBIADES.

That is the only reaſon.

SOCRATES.

What Affairs of their own then do you mean?

ALCIBIADES.

I mean, Socrates, when they are deliberating about the [24] making War, or the making Peace; or concerning any other Affairs of State.

SOCRATES.

nature. For tho in abſolute Monarchys the Monarchs, and in Ariſtocracys the Nobles, execute that Office in their own Perſons, yet they do it not from Neceſſity, but from their own Choice: in the ſame manner, as the Maſter of a Family may, if he pleaſes, perform any ſervile Domeſtic Office. But no Part of the Authority or Power, eſſentially inherent in the Sovereign, can ever be delegated to Another, as a Deputy. For the Delegate would, in this caſe, become a Principal, and have a Share in the Sovereign Power and Authority. It ſeems therefore, that Imperatorial Skill is no neceſſary or eſſential Part of the Political or Kingly Science. But of this Science, according to the Principles of *Plato*, we ſhall treat in its proper Place, the Notes to *the Politicus*. The Principles themſelves are laid down in *the Rivals*, and in the Dialogue now before us, as will be ſeen in what immediately next follows.

[24] All the Particular Arts, of Uſe in every Civil Society, and divided amongſt the Members of it, being now thrown out of the Inquiry, we are at length arrived at the very Point, in which *Alcibiades* fancied himſelf well-knowing, and in which *Socrates* is about to prove him quite ignorant,——*the Science of Government*. For the purpoſe of proving this, One of the eſſential Parts of this Science is here ſelected from

SOCRATES.

Do you mean, when they are deliberating on theſe Points,——with Whom 'tis Proper for them to make Peace, ——and with Whom, to engage in War,——and [25] in What Way 'tis Proper to carry on that War? Is This what you mean?

ALCIBIADES.

It is.

from the reſt, as an Inſtance ſufficient. The Inſtance choſen is Knowlege of the *Propriety* of making either Peace or War with any Foreign State. *Plato* is juſtly to be admired for his Choice of this Inſtance. It ſhews, what a perfect Maſter he was of Dialogue-writing. For, to ſupport the Probability of a feigned Dialogue, the Circumſtances of Perſon, Time, and Place, ſuppoſed by the Writer, ought to be regarded in every Speech. Now the *Time*, ſuppoſed in this Dialogue, was, as we before obſerved, the *Third Year of the Peloponneſian War*. For preciſely in this Year *Alcibiades* arrived at Twenty Years of Age; when, by the Laws of *Athens*, he became Maſter of his own Eſtate, and had a Right to ſpeak and to give his Counſel, whenever he thought fit, in the Aſſembly of the People. Juſt at this time, it was under Deliberation there, as we learn from *Thucydides*, whether or not to make Overtures of Peace with *Lacedæmon*. The Reſult of this Deliberation, at laſt, was a Reſolution to ſend thither an Ambaſſador, with Propoſals for accommodating all Differences between the Two States. But at the ſuppoſed Time of this Dialogue the *Athenians* had not yet come to this Reſolve: the Subject ſtill lay before them on the Carpet, for any qualified Citizen, as *Alcibiades* would be within a ſhort time, (ſee Pages 42, and 47,) to take up and handle in a public Harangue.

[25] Theſe Words have a plain reference to the Advice of *Pericles*, which was to carry on the War intirely *by Sea*.

SOCRATES.

And you will agree, that 'tis Proper to make Peace or War with Thoſe People, with whom 'tis Beſt ſo to do.

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

And at that time, When 'tis Beſt.

ALCIBIADES.

By all means.

SOCRATES.

And to continue it ſo long, as 'tis Beſt to continue it.

ALCIBIADES.

To be ſure.

SOCRATES.

Now ſuppoſe, that the Athenians were deliberating about the Exerciſe of Wreſtling,——with What Sort of Perſons it is Proper to come to [26] Cloſe Quarters, and with Whom to engage [27] at Arm's Length, and in What Way, would You

[26] This Part of the Similitude is applicable to a *Naval War* between *Athens* and *Lacedæmon*: and we believe, it was by *Plato* meant to be ſo applied.

[27] This, to continue the Similitude, repreſents a *Land-War* between Two Powers on the ſame Continent, but ſeparated, and kept at diſtance, by other Countrys and Powers intermediate. Between *Attica* and *Laconica* lay, not only the *Iſthmus of Corinth*, but all *Achaia*.

give

give the beſt Counſel in this Caſe, or would a Maſter of the Exerciſes?

ALCIBIADES.

Such a Maſter, certainly.

SOCRATES.

Can you tell me now, What End ſuch a Maſter would have in his View, when he gave his Counſel on theſe Points, ——with Whom it is proper to wreſtle cloſely, and with Whom, not ſo;——at what Times it is proper, and in what Manner?——My Meaning is to aſk you theſe Queſtions;—— Whether is it Proper to wreſtle cloſely with thoſe Perſons, with whom it is [28] Beſt ſo to wreſtle, or is it not?

ALCIBIADES.

It is.

[28] For of every *Energy*, and every *Action*, as well as every *Work*, ſome *Good*, real or imaginary, muſt always be *intended* by the Performer. And when we denominate any Action, or Thing done, proper, fit, right, or juſt, we give it thoſe Epithets, or Denominations, with reſpect to that particular End, or Good, for the accompliſhing or promoting of which, the Action, or Thing, is intended. *Abſolute Fitneſs* of Things, and *Abſolute Rectitude* of Actions, having no relation or reſpect to ſome Good End, are Ideas too refined, and too remote from the Nature of Things, to have entered into the Heads of Any, who philoſophiſed in thoſe ſimpler Ages, when Nature and Reaſon were their only Guides.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Whether as [29] Much alſo, as is Beſt?

ALCIBIADES.

As Much.

SOCRATES.

Whether at thoſe Times too, when 'tis Beſt?

ALCIBIADES.

Without doubt.

SOCRATES. ——

But farther; ought not [30] a Singer ſometimes, in ſinging, [31] to touch his Lute, and to move his Feet?

ALCI-

[29] The ſame Fitneſs for the purpoſed End, which conſtitutes the Propriety of the *Action its ſelf*, will aſcertain the proper *Seaſon* for it, and fix the due Bounds and Meaſures of its *Vehemence* and *Duration*. This ſeems relative to Another Queſtion, then in agitation, whether it was proper for the *Athenians* to exert the Utmoſt of their Strength againſt the *Lacedæmonians*, and ſo bring the War to a ſpeedy Concluſion; or whether, by protracting the War, gradually to weaken and tire out the Enemy.

[30] It was a Part of *Political Wiſdom* among the *Grecians*, to have their Liberal Youth educated in *Gymnaſtick*, as a Diſcipline that would prepare their Bodys for *Foreign War* againſt their *Enemys*. With equal *Policy* was Care taken to have the ſame Youth early inſtructed no leſs in *Muſick*, as a Diſcipline that naturally would diſpoſe their Minds to *Domeſtic Peace* and *Civil Concord*. Hence it is, that the Words, *Gymnaſtick* and *Muſick*, are by *Plato* ſometimes uſed, in a metaphorical Senſe, to ſignify the *State of War* and the *State of Peace:* and in his *Republick*

ALCIBIADES.

He ought.

SOCRATES.

Ought he not to do ſo at [30] thoſe times, when 'tis Beſt ſo to do?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

And to continue the doing ſo, as [31] long as 'tis Beſt to continue it.

ALCIBIADES.

I agree.

SOCRATES.

Well now; ſince You agree with Me, that there is a Beſt in Both theſe Actions, in fingering the Lute whilſt ſinging, and in the Exerciſe of cloſe Wreſtling, by What Name call you That which is the Beſt in fingering the Lute? as That

Republick the Private Cardinal Virtues of *Temperance* and *Fortitude* are deſigned under the Names of *Muſick* and *Gymnaſtick*. The Mention therefore of theſe Two Arts has perhaps a peculiar Propriety in This place, where *Peace* and *War* are ſpoken of; beſide another Propriety more obvious, this, that they were Arts well known to *Alcibiades*, and were therefore Inſtances proper to be produced to Him, agreeably to the Laws of *Dialectick*. See Notes to *the Meno*, 38, 40, 54, and 78.

[31] See Notes to *the Io*, 31, and 60: which two Notes, taken together, illuſtrate this Paſſage ſufficiently.

[30] See Note 29.

which

which is the Beſt in Wreſtling I call Gymnaſtical; What Name now do You give to That which is Beſt done in that Other Action?

ALCIBIADES.

I do not apprehend your Meaning.

SOCRATES.

Try to copy after the Pattern, which I ſhall now give you. Suppoſing then, that I had been aſked this Queſtion, —— "In Wreſtling, How is That performed, which is per- "formed Beſt"? —— I ſhould anſwer, —— "'tis performed "in every reſpect [33] Rightly". —— Now in Wreſtling, That Per-

[33] The Word GOOD, in the primary and moſt proper Senſe of it, ſignifys ſome *ultimate End*, abſolutely good, deſirable for its own Sake, and not as the *Means* meerly of attaining ſome *farther End*, to which it is referred. And in this Senſe of the Word GOOD, no other Word is ſynonymous, or equivalent to it; for none other will be expreſſive of the ſame Meaning. We mean this *Abſolute Good*, when we ſay, that *Pleaſure* is the Good of *Senſe*, that *Truth* is the Good of *Mind*, or that *Virtue* is the Good of *Man*. This Abſolute Good admits of no Degrees of Compariſon, when 'tis applied to that Subject, of which it is the Good. *Plato* therefore here, in uſing the Word BEST, cannot mean any *Good abſolute*, or not referable to ſome farther *End*. But there is another, a Secondary, Senſe of the Word GOOD, as it is uſed to ſignify *Means* conducive to ſome *End*; whether that End be an Abſolute Good, or be, its ſelf, a *Means* conducive to ſome ultimate or at leaſt ſome farther End: as when we ſay, that ſuch or ſuch *Food*, or *Exerciſe*, is *good*; we mean, that it conduces to the *Strengthning* of the Body, or to the Preſervation or Recovery of *Health*. So when *Corporealiſts*, or any

Performance is Right, which is according to the Rules of Art. Is it not?

ALCI-

any of *the Multitude*, ſpeak, as they imagine, in Praiſe of Virtue; and ſay, that *Prudence*, *Temperance*, *Fortitude*, and *Juſtice*, are *Good* Things; they mean nothing more by this Commendatory Epithet, than that *Prudence* is *good* for the ſaving or the increaſing of a Man's *Wealth*, and for the better guarding of his *Body* againſt the Evils to which it is liable; that *Temperance* is *good* for the procuring of *Health* and *Long Life* to the *Body*; that *Fortitude* is *good* for extricating the *Body* out of Dangers into which it may fall; and that *Juſtice* is *good* for ſecuring the Exiſtence and the Welfare of any Society, into which Men enter for the ſake of the Longer or the Better Being of their *Bodys*. They conſider then theſe *Virtues* but as *Means* to a certain End; which *End* of theirs is the *Good of the Body:* for their *Bodys* they deem to be their proper *Selves*. But if the Doctrine of this Dialogue be true, that *the Rational Soul*, or Mind, is a *Man's Self*, and that the *Body* is the *Inſtrument* only, by means of which the Soul acts in the Corporeal or Outward World,——if this be true, then, the Good of the Body being the Means only of procuring Good to the Soul, and ſo far only as the Good of the Soul conſiſts in acting outwardly, thoſe Cardinal Virtues, conſidered meerly as Means of procuring Good to the Body, are neither Themſelves the Good of the Soul, nor the proximate or immediate Means of procuring its Good, but are removed a Step farther from this End, which is the Ultimate. But theſe Things will be explained more fully in our Notes to *the Philebus*. They are introduced here only as Inſtances, pertinent to the Subject of this Dialogue, ſhewing the different Meanings of the Word GOOD, when applied to *Ends*, and when applied to *Means*. In this laſt, this ſecondary, Senſe of it, Degrees of Compariſon are admitted: becauſe, amongſt *Several Means* to any certain *End*, Some are *better* than Others; and generally, Some One is the *beſt* of all: in like manner,

ALCIBIADES.

It is.

SOCRATES.

And the Art in this caſe, is it not [34] Gymnaſtick?

as amongſt Many Ways to any certain Place, Some are ſtraiter, and eaſier to paſs along, than Others, and conſequently are ſhorter, and ſooner paſſed. In this very Similitude is to be found the *proper* Uſe of the Word, which is *metaphorically* uſed in this place by *Plato*, the Word RIGHT. For ſince a *Right* Line is the *ſhorteſt*, that can be drawn, between any Two given Points; and ſince the *Direct* Road to any certain Place is *(cæteris paribus)* the *beſt* to travel along, for a Man who is in haſte; the Word RIGHT is thence taken, and in a metaphorical Senſe applied to thoſe *Means*, which are the *beſt* and the *ſpeedieſt* for effecting the purpoſed *End*, in every Energy and every Action which is performed with *Method*. Farther; in the Performances or Works of any *Art*, which are to be executed according to the eſtabliſhed *Rules* of that Art, the *following* of theſe *Rules* is the only *Way* of executing them *rightly*, becauſe they are the *Beſt Means* of accompliſhing the *Ends*. So that, in the practiſing of any Art or Skill, That Performance is the *Beſt*, which is executed *rightly*, and in ſuch a Manner as moſt becomes a thorow Artiſt, the moſt *according to the Rules of Art*.—— We have only to add, that the Words of *Plato* a little before, which we have rendered into Engliſh by the Words "*proper*," and "*ought*," are χρῆ, and δεῖ. According to *Plato* therefore, to do as is *Beſt* to do, with reference to ſome *End abſolutely good*, either immediate or remote, is to act *rightly*, is to act *ſkilfully* and *wiſely*, is to do one's *Duty* or as one *ought* to do.

[34] The Art of *Wreſtling* was deemed the Principal Part of *Gymnaſtick*; becauſe out of the Five Gymnic Exerciſes, Wreſtling required Art rather than Strength, to excell in it; the other Four required Strength more than Art.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

Without diſpute.

SOCRATES.

I ſaid, that That which is the Beſt in Wreſtling is Gymnaſtical.

ALCIBIADES.

You did.

SOCRATES.

And was it not well ſaid?

ALCIBIADES.

I think it was.

SOCRATES.

Come then; do You in like manner (for it would not ill become You likewiſe [35] to diſcourſe well) [36] ſay, in the firſt place, What is the Art, to which belong the Playing on the Harp, the Singing, and the Moving at the ſame time, rightly all; the Whole of this Art, by What Name is it called? Are you not yet able to tell?

ALCIBIADES.

Indeed I am not.

SOCRATES.

Try in this way then.——What Goddeſſes are thoſe, who preſide over this Art?

[35] That is, to learn and to practiſe *Dialectick*. For *Plato*'s Words are τὸ καλῶς διαλέγεσθαι. See Note 29 to *the Meno*.

[36] The Greek of this and of the two following Queſtions, with the Anſwers to them, may be ſeen cited in Note 28 to *the Io*.

ALCIBIADES.

The Muſes mean you, Socrates?

SOCRATES.

I do. Conſider now, what Name is given to their Art, ——a Name, derived from Them.

ALCIBIADES.

I ſuppoſe, you mean Muſick.

SOCRATES.

The very Thing. What then is That, which is performed rightly, according to This Art? juſt as in the Other caſe I told You, that whatever was performed rightly, according to the Rules of that Other Art, was [37] Gymnaſtical; in This caſe now, [38] after the ſame manner, whatever is performed agreeably to the Rules of This Art, How do you ſay it muſt be performed?

ALCIBIADES.

Muſically, I think.

[37] That is, *Gymnaſtically* performed, or a *Gymnaſtic* Performance. ——We have thus tranſlated the Greek in this Place, on a Suppoſition, that the Words ὅτι γυμναστικόν ought to be here read, inſtead of τὴν γυμναστικήν. Let the learned Reader judge, whether our Suppoſition be well founded or not, after he has read a little farther on in the Original.

[38] The Sameneſs of Manner in theſe two caſes conſiſts in the Similitude between the Two Paronymys. For the Paronymous Terms, *Muſick*, *Muſical*, and *Muſically*, exactly correſpond with thoſe of *Gymnaſtick*, *Gymnaſtical*, and *Gymnaſtically*.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

You ſay well. Let us now proceed farther; and tell me, What Name you give to that which is Beſt [39] in making War; and What Name, to that which is Beſt in making Peace: juſt as in the former caſes, the [40] Beſt in one of them you called the more Muſical, in the other, the more Gymnaſtical.

[39] The *Science of Government* is, in the Dialogue called *the Rivals*, ſhown to be the *Science of Juſtice*, and the ſame thing with *Wiſdom*. Had *Alcibiades* been Maſter of this Piece of Knowlege, to this Queſtion of *Socrates* he would have made Anſwer, that "in Theſe caſes the *Beſt* is That which is the *moſt Juſt*." For it follows from the way of Reaſoning, here taken by *Socrates*, that Peace or War is *well* and *rightly* made, or maintained, then only, when made or maintained *juſtly*, or agreeably to the Rules of *Juſtice*: Since the Paronymous Terms, *Juſtice*, *Juſt*, and *Juſtly* anſwer to the Paronymous Terms in the Two former caſes. And thus the Sameneſs of Manner in the Anſwering would have been ſtill preſerved.——*Alcibiades*, however, after being convinced of his Ignorance in that Part of Knowlege, the moſt important to Civil Societys, is in this Dialogue directed in the right Way to attain it.

[40] This Paſſage in the Original, as printed ſeverally by *Aldus*, *Walder*, Henry *Peters*, and Henry *Stephens*, runs thus;——ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐφ' ἑκάτῳ ἔλεγες τῷ ἀμείνονι, ὅτι μουσικώτερον· καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ὅτι γυμναστικώτερον. But if we conjecture rightly, it ſhould be printed thus;——ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐφ' ἑκάτῳ ἔλεγες ΤΟ ΑΜΕΙΝΟΝ· ΕΝΙ; ὅ, τι μουσικώτερον· καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ὅ, τι γυμναστικώτερον. Our Conjecture is favoured by the Latin Tranſlation, which *Ficinus* made from a MS. Copy of *Plato*.——Long ſince we wrote This, we have found the following Emendation of this Paſſage, made by *Cornarius*, in his *Eclogæ*, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐφ' ΕΤΕΡΩ ἔλεγες ΤΟ ΑΜΕΙΝΟΝ, ὅτι μουσικώτερον· κ. τ. λ. And this way

naſtical. Try now in Theſe caſes likewiſe to name That which is the Beſt.

ALCIBIADES.

I find my ſelf quite unable to tell What it is.

SOCRATES.

'Tis a Shame to you, that you are ſo. For, ſuppoſe, you were ſpeaking, and giving your Opinion, concerning the Superiority of one Kind of Food to another, and ſhould ſay, that Such or Such a Kind of Food was the Beſt at this Seaſon, and ſuch or ſuch a Quantity of it; and ſuppoſe, a Man ſhould thereupon queſtion you thus,——What do you mean by the Beſt, Alcibiades?——On theſe Subjects you would be able to give him an Anſwer, and to tell him, that by the Beſt you meant the moſt [41] Wholeſome; and This you would ſay, notwithſtanding that you do not profeſs to be a Phyſician. And yet, on a Subject, which you profeſs to have the Knowlege of, and riſe up to give your Judgment and Advice on, as if you had this Knowlege, are you not

way of reading the Sentence we ſhould prefer to our own Conjecture, but that Ours is quite agreeable to the Tranſlation of *Ficinus*, followed herein by *Dacier*; and alſo that the Error is thus more eaſily accounted for, and the Alteration of the Text leſs.

[41] Wholeſome Food being one of the *Means* neceſſary to the Preſervation of Health, and the Preſervation of Health being the *End* of the Diætetick Part of Medicine, the *more Wholeſome* Food is the *Better* Food with *reference* to the *End*.

aſhamed,

aſhamed, when you are queſtioned, as [43] I think you are, on This very Subject, to be unable to give an Anſwer, and to tell

[43] The *Subjects*, in which *Alcibiades* imagined himſelf to be ſo knowing, were *Affairs of State*, that is, Affairs in which the whole Community was concerned; in particular, thoſe concerning *Peace and War*: the Propriety of making or maintaining either of which with any foreign State, to judge of and determine, conſtitutes one of the principal Parts of Civil Government. Now ſince the Queſtion, before put by *Socrates*, admits no other right Anſwer, than ſuch a one as refers to *Juſtice*, *Socrates* here, in ſaying that he *thinks* he had queſtioned *Alcibiades* on a Subject which he profeſſed the Knowlege of, evidently means, that a Queſtion or Debate concerning the *Propriety* of making Peace, or War, is in truth a Queſtion or Debate concerning the *Juſtice* of ſo doing: for that the only right End of making War is to obtain a Redreſs of Injurys: that therefore the War ought to be continued by the Party injured, until the Injurys be redreſs'd, or Compenſation for them be offered: that then Peace ought to be made, and to be continued, until freſh Injurys, with a Refuſal of Redreſs, call for a freſh War. This Meaning of *Socrates* is to be extended in general to All *Affairs of State*, to every Part of Civil Government. For the ſole End of all Civil Government is to guard and ſecure the Perſon, the Liberty, and the Property of every Member of the Community from unjuſt Violation. Therefore, where any ſuch Violation is made by a ſubject of any Foreign State, authoriſed by that State to commit the Violation, or juſtified in it afterwards, or at leaſt protected from ſuffering any Retaliation, Repriſal, or Inforcement of Satisfaction for the Injury, a Public War is neceſſary to maintain the very End of Civil Government, and to prevent any ſuch Violations for the future. And where the Violation is committed by a Fellow-Citizen, Civil or Legal Puniſhments are neceſſary for the ſame reaſon, that is, for the maintaining of the ſame end, *Juſtice*. To this End are thus directed all the *Parts* of *Civil Government*; the *Deliberatives*,

tell What is That which is the Beſt? And muſt not this Inability appear to Others ſhamefull in you?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly it muſt.

tive, (to make *War and Peace*,) to which Part the directing Rule ought to be the *Law of Nations*; the *Legiſlative*, (to make *Civil Laws*,) the directing Rule to which ought to be the eternal *Law of Nature*; the *Judicial*, to *determine* private Controverſys according to *thoſe Laws*, and to *adjudge* Puniſhments for every Breach of them; the *Executive*, to make thoſe Determinations and Judgments *effectual*; and the *levying* of *Taxes* and of *Forces* neceſſary for the *Support* of all thoſe other Parts of Government. Hence it follows, that Civil Government is no other Thing than the Adminiſtration of Juſtice in Civil Society; and that He is the beſt Politician, and the beſt qualified (as to Knowlege) for Government in the State, the Man who beſt knows, What are the natural and legal Rights of every Citizen,——When thoſe Rights are violated,——and What Satisfaction ought to be made to the Publick, as well as to the Perſon injured, for every ſuch Violation: Becauſe a Man, poſſeſſed of this Knowlege, will beſt know on What Occaſions War is neceſſary to be made with any Foreign Power;——and in What Caſes Puniſhment is proper to be inflicted on any Criminal at home;——in every War, What are the right Meaſures and the juſt Bounds of it;——and in every Criminal Caſe, What Meaſures and Bounds are to be ſet to Puniſhment;——to ſupport this Proſecution of Right, and this Adminiſtration of Juſtice, What Burthen is juſt and neceſſary for the whole Community to bear; and What Share of the Burthen is equitable to be impoſed on each Rank or Order in the State, and on every Individual of each Order. So true is it, that the Science of *Politicks* depends on that of *Juſtice*: and in this Truth *Socrates*, after his uſual Dialectic Manner, is about to inſtitute *Alcibiades*.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Conſider thoughtfully now, and tell me, [43] What is the End or Aim of That which is done Beſt in the making or the continuing of Peace, and likewiſe in the going to War with Thoſe, with whom it is proper.

ALCIBIADES.

Well, I do conſider; but cannot think of what it is.

SOCRATES.

Know you not, when we go to War, What it is, which both the Partys accuſe each other of, during their military Preparations; and what Names they give to the Cauſes of their Quarrels?

ALCIBIADES.

I do, they accuſe each other of deceiving, or of offering violence, or of taking away ſome of their Poſſeſſions.

[43] That is,——What is the *End* of Peace, and What that of War, when *properly and rightly* made:——in other words,——What is the *right and beſt End* of making Peace; and What, that of making War:—— or, in a more familiar way of ſpeaking,——What is an *equitable and good* Peace; and What, a *juſt and proper* War.——Now the End or Deſign of a juſt War is to obtain Reparation for Injurys received; and the End or Deſign of a good Peace is to enjoy the Advantages that flow from Amity between different Civil States, an Amity, which never can ſubſiſt without a ſacred regard to Juſtice.——*Alcibiades* had never thought of theſe things; for he had never had the aſſiſtance of a *Socrates* to ſuggeſt them to his Mind.

SOCRATES.

But obſerve: How, do they ſay, they have been thus treated? Try to tell me, what Difference there is in the [44] Manner of this treatment they give to each other.

ALCI-

[44] See *the Banquet*, page 60. We have made uſe of the Word *Manner* here, as well as there, becauſe *Plato*'s own Words in both places, being πῶς and ὡς, *how*, are *Adverbs*, that is, are attributed or applied to *Verbs* only; and *grammatically* therefore denote Mode or *Manner* of acting, or of being affected by the Action of ſome other Agent; πῶς *(How)* being *Interrogatine*, and ὡς *(how)* being *Indeterminate*. But when the particular *Manner how* comes to be declared, tho *Adverbs* are uſed in the declaring it, we find that *logically* and *really* they denote ſome *Attribute* of the Action, or of the Affection. For inſtance, when we ſay, that Such a one *acted fairly*, or was *praiſed deſervedly*, we mean that his *Action* was *fair*, or the *Praiſe given* him was *merited*. The truly learned Author of HERMES, tho he ranks all *Adverbs* amongſt the *Attributives of the Second Order*, expreſſing himſelf herein well as a *Grammarian*, yet afterward obſerves very juſtly and *logically*, that ſuch *Adverbs* [as are derived from Nouns Adjective] are *in Eſſence the ſame* with thoſe *Attributives of the Firſt Order*, from which they are derived. *Herm:* B. I. Ch: XI. It is well known by Grammarians and Logicians, that all *Nouns Adjective*, the Attributives of the Firſt Order, denote the *Attributes of* thoſe ὄντα or οὐσίαι, *Things* or *Beings*, which are denoted by *Nouns Subſtantive*: and that ſuch or ſuch a Thing or Being may be ſaid to have ſuch or ſuch an Attribute; or, to write in learned Language, that *Propoſitions* may be formed, in which ſome certain Attribute may be *predicated* of ſome certain Thing or Being. In theſe *Propoſitions* then the *Attributes* are the *Predicates*; and the *Things* or *Beings*, to which they are attributed, are the *Subjects*. Now in every logical Propoſition the *Predicate* is of greater Extent than the *Subject*;

ALCIBIADES.

Do you mean, whether they thus treat each other juſtly or unjuſtly?

Subject; for on this account it is called the *Major* Term. An Attribute therefore of any Being or Thing is of *greater* Extent than that Being or Thing, and may be attributed to other Beings or Things beſide. Juſt ſo may *Adverbs*, the Attributives of the Second Order, denoting *Attributes of* thoſe *Attributes* of Things or Beings, become *Predicates* in Propoſitions, where the *Verbs*, to which they are annexed, are the *Subjects*. But to effect this in due form, the *Verb* muſt aſſume the Form of the *Noun Subſtantive*, which is derived from it; and the *Adverb*, that of the *Noun Adjective*, from which it is derived. Our meaning will appear more manifeſt by an Inſtance. —"*Guſtavus Adolphus* "*fought bravely and died honourably.*"——This is a complex Sentence; in reality it conſiſts of four Aſſertions, and is reſolvable into theſe four Propoſitions;——*Guſtavus Adolphus fought: Guſtavus Adolphus died: his Fighting was brave: his Death was honourable.*——Of theſe four Propoſitions the two latter we find much more *important* than the two former; one of which is applicable to the moſt ordinary men, the other to all men: and in the complex Sentence we find this greater *Importance* given by *Adverbs*, expreſſive only of the *Manner* of acting and of ſuffering. Hence it appears, that, as *Nouns Subſtantive*, ſuch of them as denote *Individual* Beings, or *Particular* Things, ſignify but little without *Adjectives*, which denote their *Attributes*; in like manner *Verbs* have little ſignificance without *Adverbs* annexed, denoting the *Manner* of acting, or of being acted on. *Orators* are well aware of this; for the whole Force of *Rhetorical Sentences*, taken each by its ſelf, or out of their argumentative connexion, lies in their *Adjectives* and *Adverbs*. The Cauſe of this greatly deſerves a more diſtinct Philoſophical Inquiry, and will be conſidered on Occaſions more fitting than the preſent.

SOCRATES.

This is the very Difference I mean.

ALCIBIADES.

Theſe different Manners of ill Treatment differ totally and intirely.

SOCRATES.

Well then; with Whom would You counſel the Athenians to engage in War? whether with Thoſe who treat them ill unjuſtly, or with Thoſe who treat them as they deſerve?

ALCIBIADES.

A Queſtion, This, of very ſerious Import. For if any man ſhould entertain a Thought of the Propriety of going to War with ſuch as act uprightly, he would not dare to own it.

SOCRATES.

Becauſe it is not [45] Lawfull, I ſuppoſe, to engage in ſuch a War.

ALCIBIADES.

By no means is it ſo, neither ſeems it to be [46] Fair.

SOCRATES.

[45] The Word νόμιμον, *Lawful*, ſeems here to mean *agreeable to the Law of Nations*; it is ſo underſtood by *Alcibiades*. But for *Plato*'s real Meaning of this Word, ſee his Dialogue called *Minos*, and the *Argument* of his *Greater Hippias*, page 12.

[46] *Ficinus* and *Gryneus* have wrongly, as we think, attributed this Sentence to *Socrates*—What *Plato* here means by *Fair*, is ſufficiently explained in *the Greater Hippias*, and *the Banquet*. We ſhall now therefore

SOCRATES.

47 With a view therefore to Theſe things, and to what is
48 Juſt, you will make your Speeches to the People.

fore only obſerve farther, that this Metaphorical Meaning of the Word *Fair*, as applied to Actions, Negotiations, and Reaſonings, common in our own Language, appears to have been firſt given it by *Socrates*; thro the Writings of his *Diſciples*, to have deſcended to *Cicero*; and from Him to have been diffuſed, wherever the Roman Eloquence hath reached; but to have grown into frequent and vulgar Uſe, only ſince the Language and Philoſophy of old *Greece* have been ſtudied, and applied to the enriching of our own Language, and the improving of our own Minds.

47 *Theſe Things* evidently mean *the Lawful* and *the Fair*, mentioned immediately before. The Sentence in the Original, as printed, is this; πρὸς ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ σὺ τὸ δίκαιον τὸν λόγον ποιήσῃ. In which the Words, καὶ σὺ, are undoubtedly tranſpoſed, and ſhould be read, σὺ καὶ. The Tranſpoſition, not being diſcovered by *Stephens*, obliged hin to change the Word ταῦτα into τοῦτο, as belonging to τὸ δίκαιον, and therefore made to agree with it. This Alteration ſuppoſes νόμιμον and καλὸν, *Lawfull* and *Fair*, to be Words meerly ſynonomous with δίκαιον, *Juſt*, conſequently ſuperfluous, and introduced to no purpoſe. The Tranſpoſition muſt have been more ancient than any MS. of *Plato*, now remaining; for it has corrupted not only the oldeſt Editions, but the oldeſt Tranſlations too; infecting, of courſe, all Thoſe which came after.

48 The *Lawfull*, the *Fair*, and the *Juſt*, are indeed all *one* and the ſame Thing, conſidered in *three* different reſpects. It is termed *Juſt*, as being agreeable to *Moral Rectitude*; it is termed *Fair*, as being agreeable to *Moral Senſe*; and *Lawfull*, as being agreeable to *Right Reaſon*, the ſupreme *Law* to all Rational Beings.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

There is a [49] neceſſity for bringing my Arguments from Theſe Topicks.

SOCRATES.

[49] Becauſe no Man, or Body of Men, dares to profeſs any other Motive to engage in War, than what is derived from Theſe Conſiderations. Accordingly, whenever War is begun by powerful and arbitrary Princes for the ſake of inlarging their Dominions, or by Citys and Common-wealths for the ſake of increaſing their Riches, theſe their real Ends are never openly avowed: their profeſſed Motives are always the *Redreſs* of paſt Injurys, pretended to have been done to Themſelves or their Allys, and *Security* from pretended Danger of farther Injurys to follow. So, whenever unjuſt Claims are made by the mightier Powers, or Poſſeſſions unjuſtly are witheld by them from the lawful Claimants, it is cuſtomary to employ profeſſed Lawyers, who are to ſupport the making of the unjuſt Claim, or the witholding of the juſt Right. Thus were the Civilians employed in *Italy* a few Ages ſince; and in the ſucceeding Ages thus have they often been employed in *Germany*. Requiſitions and Repreſentations, Counter-Repreſentations and Expoſitions, Memorials and Declarations, are Forms commonly thought neceſſary to be gone thro, before the *ultima ratio regum* can plauſibly be urged. In all thoſe caſes there is, as *Alcibiades* here ſays, a *Neceſſity* for ſuch a Procedure,—the *Neceſſity* of juſtifying Themſelves and vindicating their Conduct in the Opinions of Men, to avoid incurring the Cenſure and Enmity of All men. For the Minds of Men are by Nature ſo framed, that, till their natural Principles are totally corrupted, (if that can ever be,) they cannot forbear approving what is Right, and and condemning what is Wrong, in all caſes, where the Mind's Eye is clear, and unobſcured by any Selfiſh Paſſions, and where the Judgment is unprejudiced by Human Doctrines. The *Neceſſity* then for pretending a Regard to Juſtice at thoſe times, when the greateſt Injuſtice is intended

SOCRATES.

That Beſt then, concerning which I juſt now aſked you What it was,——the Beſt on Theſe Subjects,——whether it is proper to go to War or not,——with Whom it is proper, and with Whom not,——at what Times it is proper, and When not,——does the Beſt on Theſe Subjects appear to be any other thing than That which is the moſt agreeable to Juſtice? or does it not?

ALCIBIADES.

It appears to be no other thing.

SOCRATES.

How is this, Friend Alcibiades? Is it a Secret to your Self, that you are ignorant in the Science of Juſtice? or elſe, is it a Secret to Me, that you have learnt it, and have gone to ſome Maſter, who has taught you to diſtinguiſh between What is the moſt agreeable to Juſtice, and What is the moſt repugnant to it? If this, which I laſt mentioned, be the

tended to be done, is founded on That which is called *Moral Neceſſity*, in contra-diſtinction to That which is *Natural* or Corporeal. But if the Word *Nature* be taken, as it is uſed by the *Stoick* Philoſophers, (and perhaps indeed by All, except the *Peripatetic*,) in the moſt comprehenſive Senſe,——and if the *Mind of Man* be derived from Mind Univerſal, the *Mind of Nature*,——it may be juſtly ſaid, that the Mind of Man is determined from *Natural Neceſſity* to aſſent to whatever ſeems True, and to approve whatever ſeems Right.

caſe,

caſe, Who is this Maſter? tell me; that I too may go and learn of him, thro Your Recommendation.

ALCIBIADES.

[50] You banter, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

Not ſo; by the [51] Guardian-God of Friendſhip to Both of us, You and Me; whoſe Deity I would leaſt of all invoke

[50] *Alcibiades* could not imagine *Socrates* to be ſerious in what he had ſaid laſt, becauſe he had no ſuſpicion of his own Ignorance in the Science of Juſtice. He was conſcious, indeed, that he had never made it any Part of his Study, nor ever had employed ſo much as a Thought about it; but he preſumed, and took for granted, that Study or Thinking was not at all neceſſary for acquiring it.

[51] *Plato*'s own Words are theſe;——Μὰ τὸν φίλιον τὸν ἐμόν τε καὶ σόν. The literal tranſlation of which is this;——*No; by the Friendly* [Deity or Divine Nature] *both Mine and Yours.* That the Nature which is truly Divine is here to be underſtood, appears from hence;——φίλιος *friendly* is one of the Epithets given by the ancient Greeks to *Jupiter*; under which name they worſhipped the *ſupremely-Divine* Nature. Thus in *Plato*'s *Phædrus* we find πρὸς Διὸς φιλίου, *in the name of Jupiter the Friendly*; and in the Fragments of *Menander*, Μαρτύρομαι τὸν φίλιον, ὦ Κράτων, Δία. *Witneſs, O Crato, Jupiter the Friendly.* *Jupiter* indeed is not mentioned by Name in the Paſſage now before us: but neither is he by *Pherecrates*, a Comic Poet who lived in the time of *Socrates*, in the following Paſſage, cited by *Suidas* out of the Prologue, as is probable, to his Κραπάταλοι,——

Τοῖς δὲ κριταῖς τοῖς νυνὶ κρίνουσι λέγω μὴ ἐπιορκεῖν,
Μηδ' ἀδίκως κρινέειν· ἢ, νὴ τὸν φίλιον,
Μῦθον εἰς [f. ἐς] ὑμᾶς ἕτερον Φερεκράτης λέξει, πολὺ τούτου
[f. Τἄλλα] κακηγοριχώτερον.——

But

invoke for Witneſs to a Falſhood. If then you have any Maſter, who teaches you that Science, let me know Who he is.

ALCI-

But I forewarn the Judges, who now ſit
In Judgment on our Drama, not to ſwear
Falſly, nor judge unjuſtly: if they do,
(Mark what I ſay,) by th' Guardian-God of Friendſhip,
Pherecrates will ſoon produce before you
Another Drama, charging you with Vices
Much worſe than this doth.——

In which Lines, addreſſed to the Audience, (tho they allude to the Cuſtom of appointing Judges, to determine upon Oath the comparative Merits of Dramatic Pieces, as appears from *Plutarch*, in *Vitâ Cimonis* pag. 884. Ed. Steph.) *to ſwear falſly* means *to ſwear that they are innocent* of the Vices, with which the Poet charges them. See *Horat.* Sat: 4. Lib: 1.——To return from this ſhort Digreſſion, as it may ſeem at preſent, to the Buſineſs we have in hand: We are to obſerve, that *Heſychius* explains the Word φίλιος, (which we have tranſlated *friendly*, and alſo *Guardian* or Preſerver *of Friendſhip*,) by the Word ἀποτρόπαιος, *Averter of Evil*,——After having premiſed thus much, we hope, with *Plato*'s help, to give ſome tolerable account of the Paſſage now before us, to the ſatisfaction of a critical and candid Reader. For ſuch a one may naturally inquire, Who is this Deity, thus *friendly* to the Human Nature, *averting* Evils from Man, and between Man and Man creating and preſerving Friendlineſs and Friendſhip: in the next place, he may reaſonably doubt, for what Purpoſe this Deity is here introduced, and Why *Socrates* ſwears by Him in particular. For, that ſome ſpecial End is here intended, appears from the ſerious and grave Sentence, which is immediately ſubjoined to the Oath, to give it Force and Credit.——In the firſt place then, to ſatisfy the Inquiry concerning

ALCIBIADES.

And what, if I have not? Do you think, that I could by no other means have attained the Knowlege of What is Juſt and What is Unjuſt?

SOCRATES.

this *friendly Deity*, we ſhall begin from the Doctrine of *Plato* in his *Lyſis*,——that *the Divine Nature* is the only true *Friend of Man*,——is the only *Bond of Union* between Man and Man,——is alone That which maketh the Soul to *harmoniſe* with *its Self*, and with every *other* Soul which *reſembles it*. For it is not *every* Kind of Similitude between one Human Soul and another, which begets true Friendſhip; but 'tis the Agreement of them Both with That which is common to them Both by Nature, That which they Both partake of thro their Origin,——the Beautifull its Self, and the Good its Self, *Mind Eternal and Divine*. This in the *Univerſe* is GOD; in *Man*, ſo far as it is in Man, it is ſtiled *Virtue*, or *Goodneſs*, or *Honeſty*, or *Juſtice*; for all theſe are Names, which truly ſignify one and the ſame Thing. This *averts* all real *Evil* from a Man's own Soul, in *preſerving* it from the Tyranny of every Paſſion: it *guards* againſt all inward Diſcord, by keeping all the Paſſions equally in ſubjection to Reaſon: and becauſe theſe Paſſions, when licentious, are the Cauſes of all Contention between Man and Man, it blocks up all the Avenues by which Enmity might enter from without, and opens a Communication with all other Souls who live under the ſame Government, the Government of the ſame Divine Principle. This Similitude, this Sameneſs, is all-ſufficient to conciliate and preſerve Friendſhips: where This is found, whatever Diverſitys or Diſſimilitudes of any other Kind there may be between the Partys, they ſerve but to diſtinguiſh the one of them from the other.——From hence, in the next place, it becomes evident, for what Purpoſe this Divine Principle is here introduced: for it is This, which is the Object of all ſound *Politicks*; it is This Deity, who is the beſt Guardian of *Peace*, both at home, amongſt the ſeveral Members of the ſame Com-

munity,

SOCRATES.

I think, that you would, if you had diſcovered it by your ſelf.

ALCIBIADES.

Are you then of Opinion, that I could not have diſcovered it by my ſelf?

SOCRATES.

I am intirely of Opinion that you might, if ever you had fought for it.

ALCIBIADES.

Do you preſume then, that I have never fought for it?

munity, and abroad, between different Civil States, whether neighbouring or at diſtance; it is only when the Worſhippers of this Deity are injured or endangered, either in their Perſons or in their Property, that *War* is at any time eligible, or ever can be juſtified:——and farther, it is This *Divine Nature in Man*, which is the very Subject of this Dialogue, and to the *Divine Original* of which this very place, firſt, directs our Thoughts.——From hence alſo is evident the Propriety of ſwearing by this *ſupremely Divine Nature* in the Paſſage now before us, and the Reaſon likewiſe of the ſolemn and awfull Manner in which the Oath is made.——This Explication may perhaps farther ſerve to throw Light on thoſe Verſes of *Pherecrates* before-cited. The Poet there ſwears by his Regard to *Juſtice*; and at the ſame time inſinuates, that his Intention is *friendly*, in expoſing their Vices before their own Eyes, in order to their Amendment. For by theſe Means, as *Horace* ſays, *Ipſe ſibi tradit Spectator*. So, in the *Socratic* way of queſtioning, *Ipſe ſibi tradit Reſpondens*. And thus *Alcibiades* is made, by meerly anſwering to Queſtions, out of his own Mouth to deliver to his own Ears, and to expoſe before his own Mind, his own conceited Ignorance.

SOCRATES.

I ſhould preſume that you had, if ever you had thought your ſelf ignorant of it.

ALCIBIADES.

Was there not then a time, when [52] I ſo thought?

SOCRATES.

Well ſaid. Can you tell me then, at what time you did not imagine yourſelf to know What Things are Juſt and What are Unjuſt? For come, let me aſk you; was it laſt year, when you inquired into theſe Subjects, and did not imagine your ſelf already knowing in them? or did you at that time think, that you had ſuch Knowlege? Anſwer truly now, that our Argument may come to ſome concluſion.

ALCIBIADES.

Well then; I did at that time preſume my ſelf to be knowing in thoſe Subjects.

[52] In the Greek, as printed, the Words are theſe,——Εἶτα οὐκ ἦν ὅτε οὐκ εἶχον οὕτω;——We here ſuppoſe, that the οὐκ immediately before εἶχον ought to be omitted: and our ſuppoſition is favoured by *Ficinus*'s Tranſlation. But if this latter οὐκ is to be retained, we ſhould render this Sentence into Engliſh thus,——"*Was there not a time when I had no ſuch Knowlege?*"——as if *Socrates* had granted him to have ſuch Knowlege at preſent. But the State of Mind, which *Socrates* is here ſpeaking of, is not that of a Mind *ſimply* ignorant, but that of a Mind, beſides being ignorant, *conſcious* of its Ignorance, and *not preſuming* itſelf to have Knowlege.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

And in all the third year back from this preſent, in all the fourth too, and all the fifth, did you not preſume of your ſelf the ſame?

ALCIBIADES.

I did.

SOCRATES.

And earlier than the time I mentioned laſt, you was but a Boy.

ALCIBIADES.

True.

SOCRATES.

And in your days of Boy-hood, I am well aſſured, that you thought yourſelf knowing in thoſe Subjects.

ALCIBIADES.

How are you ſo ſure of that?

SOCRATES.

Often in the Schools, when you was a Boy, and in other places too whenever you was playing at Dice, or was a Party in any other Play, I have heard you talking about What Things were Juſt or Unjuſt, not as if you had any Doubts on thoſe Subjects, but very ſtrenuouſly and boldly pronouncing,

cing, that [53] Such or Such a one of your Play-mates was a wicked Boy, and a Rogue, and was guilty of a Piece of Injuſtice. Is not all this true?

ALCIBIADES.

Well; but What elſe was I to do, when any of them injured me?

SOCRATES.

Right: but if you had happened to be ignorant of this very Point, whether you was injured or not, [54] would you ſay, What in ſuch a caſe was I to do?

ALCIBIADES.

But, by Jove, I was not ignorant of that Point; for I clearly ſaw that I was injured.

SOCRATES.

You thought your ſelf, it ſeems therefore, when you was a Boy, knowing in the Science of what is Juſt and what is Unjuſt.

[53] In the Greek it would be better perhaps to read περὶ ὅτα τύχοι, than π. ο. τύχοις, as it is printed.——We have in this, as well as in other places, where we have made Conjectural Emendations of the Text, tranſlated according to them. We ſhould not, however, give them a place among theſe Notes, but for the ſake of accounting, to ſuch of our Readers as are Learned, for the Turn we have given to thoſe Paſſages, different from that of the Greek Text, as it now ſtands, and from that of other Tranſlations.

[54] We have here followed the Text, as it is printed by *Stephens*, where we read λέγοις. The other Editors give us λέγεις.

ALCIBIADES.

I did ſo; and knowing in it I was too.

SOCRATES.

At what time was it, that you firſt diſcovered it? for certainly it was not at a time, when you thought yourſelf knowing in it.

ALCIBIADES.

That, 'tis clear, could not be.

SOCRATES.

At what time then was it, that you thought yourſelf ignorant in it? conſider: but That time you will never find.

ALCIBIADES.

By Jove, Socrates, I am not able to tell when.

SOCRATES.

You did not acquire that Knowlege then by any Diſcovery of your own.

ALCIBIADES.

That does not at all appear to have been the caſe.

SOCRATES.

And beſides, you acknowleged but juſt before, that you did not acquire it by being taught. If then you neither diſcovered it of your Self, nor was taught it by any other Perſon, How or Whence have you this Knowlege?

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

Well, but I was wrong in my Anſwers, when I ſuppoſed that I had found out that Knowlege by my Self.

SOCRATES.

In what way then did you acquire it?

ALCIBIADES.

I learnt it, I preſume, in the ſame way, in which Others do.

SOCRATES.

We are now come round again to the ſame Queſtion as before,——from Whom did you learn it?——inform me.

ALCIBIADES.

From the People.

SOCRATES.

To no good Teachers have you recourſe for the Origin of your Knowlege, in referring it to the People.

ALCIBIADES.

Why ſo? are not They capable of teaching?

SOCRATES.

Not ſo much as what Movements are proper and what improper to make, in a Game at Tables. And yet the Knowlege of theſe things is meaner and more inconſiderable, in My Opinion, than the Knowlege of what things are Juſt and what Unjuſt: Do not You think ſo too?

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

I do.

SOCRATES.

Incapable therefore, as they are, of teaching meaner things, can they teach things higher and of more importance?

ALCIBIADES.

I think they can. Nay, it is certain, that they are capable of teaching many things of more importance than the Movements in a Game at Tables.

SOCRATES.

What things do you mean?

ALCIBIADES.

Such as, for inſtance, to ſpeak the Greek Language: for I my ſelf learnt it from Them. Nor could I name any other Teacher of that Language that I ever had: but muſt refer my being able to ſpeak it to thoſe very Perſons, who You ſay are no good Teachers.

SOCRATES.

Well, my noble Sir; in this matter indeed the People are Good Teachers, and as ſuch may juſtly be recommended.

ALCIBIADES.

Why, particularly in this?

SOCRATES.

Becauſe in this they poſſeſs all the Requiſites neceſſary to every Good Teacher.

ALCIBIADES.

What Requiſites do you mean?

SOCRATES.

Do you not know, that Thoſe, who are to teach any thing, muſt in the firſt place have the Knowlege of it, Themſelves? Muſt they not?

ALCIBIADES.

Without doubt.

SOCRATES.

And muſt not all thoſe, who have the Knowlege of any thing, agree together on that Subject, and not differ in their Opinions of it?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

But where they differ among themſelves in their Opinions, would you ſay that they have, all of them, Knowlege in thoſe Subjects?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly not.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Of Such things then how can they be Good Teachers?

ALCIBIADES.

By no means can they.

SOCRATES.

Well now; do the People ſeem to You to differ among themſelves about the meaning of the words Stone and Wood? Aſk whom you will, are they not all agreed in the ſame Opinion? and, when they are bid to take up a Stone, or a piece of Wood, do they not all go to the ſame Kind of Things? and do they not all apprehend alike, what Kind of Things every other ſuch [55] Word ſignifys? For I preſume This [56] is what you mean by Knowlege of the Greek Language: is it not?

ALCIBIADES.

It is.

SOCRATES.

Now on theſe Subjects, as we ſaid before, do not the People of our City agree among themſelves? and among the

[55] That is,——every ſuch Noun as, like Wood or Stone, is the Name of any Thing, the Object of *Senſe*.

[56] That is,——*nothing more than This*;——not, a Knowlege of the Meaning of ſuch Words, as ſignify Things not falling under the cognizance of *Senſe*;——not, a Knowlege of the *Grammatical Conſtruction* of Sentences, or words in combination;——much leſs, a Knowlege of the *Idioms* and the *Genius* of the Language.

ſeveral Citys of Greece is there any difference of Opinion? do the ſame Words, in different places, ſignify different Things?

ALCIBIADES.

They do not.

SOCRATES.

On theſe Subjects therefore, agreeably to our argument, the People ſhould be Good Teachers.

ALCIBIADES.

It is true.

SOCRATES.

If then we had a mind to have any Perſon inſtructed in this [57] matter, we ſhould do right in ſending him, for ſuch inſtruction, amongſt the Multitude of the People.

ALCIBIADES.

Quite right.

SOCRATES.

But What; if we had a mind to have that Perſon taught, not only to know Men from Horſes by the different Words denoting them in the Greek Language, but beſide this, to know What Horſes are fit for the Race, and What are unfit? is the Multitude able to teach This alſo?

[57] Namely, in the meaning of Common Words, equally well underſtood by all.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly, not.

SOCRATES.

And you admit This to be a ſufficient Proof of their Ignorance in this matter, and of their Inability to teach,—— that they agree not in their Opinions on this head.

ALCIBIADES.

I do.

SOCRATES.

And What; if we would have him learn, not only by what Word in our Language Men are diſtinguiſhed from other Things, but farther, to know What Men are healthy, and Who are unhealthy? whether ſhould we deem the Multitude to be the proper Teachers for him?

ALCIBIADES.

By no means.

SOCRATES.

And it would be an Evidence to You of their being Bad Teachers on this Subject, if you ſaw them diſagreeing in their Opinions.

ALCIBIADES.

It would.

SOCRATES.

And how is it now on the Subject of Juſtice? do you find the Multitude agreeing one with another, or even the ſame

ſame Perſon always of the ſame mind, concerning either Men or Actions, Who are the Honeſt, or What is juſt?

ALCIBIADES.

Leſs than on any other Subject, by Jove, Socrates, are they agreed with regard to This.

SOCRATES.

What? do you then think, they differ on This Subject more than upon any other?

ALCIBIADES.

By far, do they.

SOCRATES.

You have never, I ſuppoſe, ſeen or heard of Men, in any Age, who contended for their ſeveral Opinions concerning the wholeſome and the unwholeſome in Food, with ſo much Zeal, as to fight and kill one another on that account.

ALCIBIADES.

Never.

SOCRATES.

But concerning juſt and unjuſt in Actions, that their Diſputes have carried them to ſuch Extremitys, I am ſure, if you have not ſeen, you have at leaſt heard from many Reports, and particularly from thoſe of Homer. For you have heard both the Odyſſey and the Iliad read to you.

ALCIBIADES.

Thorowly well, Socrates, am I verſed in Both.

SOCRATES.

And is not the Subject of Both theſe Poems the Diverſity of Opinions with regard to What is Juſt and What is Unjuſt?

ALCIBIADES.

It is.

SOCRATES.

And did not this Diverſity of Opinions produce Fighting and Slaughter between the Greeks and Trojans, and between Ulyſſes and the Wooers of Penelope?

ALCIBIADES.

True.

SOCRATES.

And I believe, that the Deaths of thoſe Athenians, Lacedæmonians and Bœotians, who periſhed at [51] Tanagra, and of

[51] The firſt Battle of *Tanagra*, in which the *Lacedæmonians* prevailed over the *Athenians*, was uncommonly fierce; and very Many were ſlain, of the victorious Army as well as of the vanquiſhed: for ſo we are expreſsly told by *Thucydides*, in Lib: 1, §. 108; by *Plutarch*, in the *Life of Cymon*; and by *Diodorus Sic:* in Lib: XI, ad *Ann: 3. Olympiad:* 86.——The next Year, in a ſecond Battle at the ſame place, the *Athenians* were ſucceſsfull; and the Gallantry of their Behaviour in it was equal, ſays the Hiſtorian laſt cited, to that of their Exploits at *Marathon*

of Thoſe who afterwards died at [59] Coronea, amongſt whom was Clinias, Your Father, were not owing to Differences on any other Subject, than this, What was Juſt and What Unjuſt.

ALCIBIADES.

You are in the right.

SOCRATES.

Shall we ſay then, that theſe People had Knowlege in that Subject, on which they differed with ſo much vehemence, as in ſupport of their different Opinions to ſuffer from each other the utmoſt Effects of Hatred?

ALCIBIADES.

It appears, they had not.

SOCRATES.

Do you not then refer to ſuch a Sort of Teachers, as You your Self acknowlege to be ignorant?

Marathon and *Platæa*.——But the *Firſt* Battle of *Tanagra* ſeems to be here meant, and not the *Second*, as Meſſieurs *Le Fevre* and *Dacier* imagined. For the Purpoſe of *Plato* was to ſhow, not the Valour exhibited, but the Blood ſhed, in fighting about Right and Wrong.

[59] The Battle of *Coronea* between the *Athenians* and the *Bœotians*, in the 2d Year of the 83d *Olympiad*, was no leſs fierce than the Firſt Battle at *Tanagra*, and much more unfortunate to the *Athenians*; a great Part of their Army being ſlain, together with *Tolmidas* the Commander of it in Chief; and All, who remained alive, being taken Priſoners: as we learn from *Thucydides*, in Lib: 1, §. 113; and from *Diodorus*, in Lib: XII. *ad Ann: ſupradict:*

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

I do, it ſeems.

SOCRATES.

How therefore is it probable, that You ſhould have the Knowlege to diſcern what is Juſt from what is Unjuſt, when your Account of them is ſo vague, and when you appear neither to have been taught that Knowlege by any other Perſon, nor to have found it out, your Self?

ALCIBIADES.

According to what You ſay, 'tis not probable.

SOCRATES.

Are you ſenſible, that what you ſaid laſt was not ſaid fairly, Alcibiades?

ALCIBIADES.

What was unfair?

SOCRATES.

Your Aſſertion, that I ſaid thoſe things of you, which were ſaid.

ALCIBIADES.

What? did not You ſay, that I had not the Knowlege to diſcern what was Juſt from what was Unjuſt?

SOCRATES.

Not I, indeed.

ALCIBIADES.

Who was it then, that ſaid ſo? was it I my Self?

SOCRATES.

It was.

ALCIBIADES.

Make that appear.

SOCRATES.

You will ſee it, in this way [60]: ——If I aſk you concerning One and Two, Which is the greater Number, You will ſay, that Two is.

ALCIBIADES.

I ſhall.

SOCRATES.

How much greater is it?

ALCIBIADES.

Greater by One.

SOCRATES.

Now Whether of Us is it, who ſays that Two is a greater Number or more than One, by One?

ALCIBIADES.

It is I my Self.

[60] In the way of arguing by *Induction*; that is, by *inferring* ſome *Univerſal* Propoſition *from many Particular* Propoſitions, acknowleged to be true, and comprehended in That Univerſal.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Did not I aſk the Queſtion? and did not You give an Anſwer to it?

ALCIBIADES.

True: it was ſo.

SOCRATES.

On this Subject then Who appears to have made any Aſſertion? do I, who only aſked a Queſtion? or do You, who gave the Anſwer?

ALCIBIADES.

I.

SOCRATES.

And, if I aſk you, How many Letters compoſe the Name of Socrates, and You tell me; Which of us is it, who declares How many?

ALCIBIADES.

I.

SOCRATES.

In a word [61], whenever any Queſtion is aſked, and an Anſwer to it is given, ſay, Who is it, that makes an Aſſertion? the Party that aſks the Queſtion, or the Party that gives the Anſwer?

[61] That is,——*univerſally*, comprehending all ſuch *Particular* Propoſitions, as are aſſerted in the *Anſwers* to *Particular Queſtions*.

ALCIBIADES.

The Party that gives the Anſwer, in My opinion, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

Thro the whole of our paſt Diſcourſe, was not I the Party that aſked the Queſtions?

ALCIBIADES.

You was.

SOCRATES.

And was not You the Party that gave the Anſwers?

ALCIBIADES.

I was.

SOCRATES.

Well then; Whether of Us Two made the Aſſertions?

ALCIBIADES.

From what I have admitted, [62] Socrates, I my Self appear to have been that Perſon.

SOCRATES.

[62] The *Univerſal* Propoſition, when eſtabliſhed, or admitted to be true, is *applicable to* any *Particular* Propoſition whatever, *contained* in That Univerſal: and every ſuch Particular Propoſition, apparently ſo contained, is not to be denied.——In the ſame manner, from many *Particular Facts* or *Phænomena* in the Natural or in the Moral World, as many as ſeem neceſſary to be collected, we aſcend to ſome Natural or Moral *Truth univerſal:* and This Truth being known by us, we may

SOCRATES.

In thoſe Aſſertions was it not ſaid, that Alcibiades, the fine Son of Clinias, had not the Knowlege to diſcern what was Juſt from what was Unjuſt, but imagined that he had; and that he was about going into the Aſſembly, to give the Athenians his Counſel and Advice, upon Subjects which he knew nothing of? Is not this true?

ALCIBIADES.

It appears ſo to be.

SOCRATES.

That, which Euripides [63] ſays, may therefore well be applied to the condition you are now in, Alcibiades. You are in

may know the Certainty of every other Phænomenon or Fact, which comes under that Rule. For, deſcending to Particulars again, and bringing This Truth down with us, and carrying it always about us, we may apply it, as the unerring Standard and juſt Meaſure, to *every Particular* Phænomenon or Fact, which is virtually contained in it, and naturally produced from it in any particular time, thenceforward for ever.——Moſt of *Plato*'s *Reaſonings* are of this Kind, that is, in the way of *Induction*.

[63] Monſ. *Dacier* in this place rightly refers us to *the Hippolytus* of the Poet here cited. For in one of the Scenes of that Tragedy, *Phædra*, being aſhamed to confeſs to her old Nurſe, that *Hippolytus* was the Object of her Love, and yet unwilling to conceal it from her, deſcribes him, without naming him, in Terms ſo pointed, that the Nurſe could not poſſibly miſtake the Perſon. Upon which the Nurſe aſking her if ſhe means *Hippolytus*, *Phædra* anſwers, in Verſe 352,

—— σὺ

in danger of being found to have heard all this, which has been ſaid of you, from your Self, and not from Me. For, not I, but You, was the Aſſertor of it; and you lay the Blame of it on Me without reaſon.

ALCIBIADES.

Indeed, Socrates, you are in the right.

SOCRATES.

Mad therefore is the Undertaking, my good Sir, which you entertain thoughts of attempting, ——to teach Others what you are ignorant of, your Self, from your having neglected to learn it.

ALCIBIADES.

I believe, Socrates, that the Athenians, as well as other Grecian States, ſeldom deliberate in Council about Juſtice or Injuſtice, in any Affair before them: becauſe Theſe things they preſume obvious and plain to all men. Laying aſide therefore the conſideration of this point, they conſi-

——————— σῦ ταῦδ', ὐκ ἐμοῦ, κλύεις.

This from your Self you hear, and not from Me.

——Similar to which is that Mode of Expreſſion, uſed in the Goſpel, *Matth:* C. 26; v. 25, and 64.——σὺ εἶπας. *Thou haſt ſaid* [the Thing.] and this,——not in reply to an Aſſertion, by way of confirming it,——but in anſwer to a Queſtion.

der,

der, [64] which way it will be moſt for their Intereſt to take. For I ſuppoſe, that Juſtice and Intereſt are not the Same Thing;

[64] In all Public Councils, the only *End*, ever propoſed, is the Good or Intereſt of the Publick. And the *Means* to this End are the immediate Subjects of their Deliberations. Accordingly *Ariſtotle* in his *Art of Rhetorick*, Lib: 1. Cap: 4. lays down this Doctrine,——τέλος——τῷ συμβελεύοντι, τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν. *The End, in all Deliberative Orations, is* to ſhow *What is Advantageous, and What is Miſchievous.* And in the ſame Book, Cap: 6,——πρόκειται τῷ συμβελεύοντι σκοπὸς τὸ συμφέρον· συμβελεύονται δὲ, ὰ περὶ τῦ τέλυς, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος. *The Scope, which the Orator in Council aims at, is* the *Advantage* of Thoſe to whom he directs his Speech: and *Theſe deliberate, not about the End*, their own Intereſt, whether they ſhall proſecute this End or not, *but about the Means conducive to it.* This undoubtedly is true. For, the *Subject* of all *Deliberation* being *Action*, or What is to be done, and the *End* propoſed in every Action being to obtain *Good*, all Speeches of Advice in Council muſt have regard to this End alone. Nor can any Evil ariſe from the directing of Speeches to this End, if the Orators and their Audience know, that their true Good or *Intereſt* cannot be ſeparated from what is Honeſt or *Juſt* in Action. *Plato* ſeems to have been the Firſt Writer, who demonſtrated, that what is *Fair* and *Honeſt*, is inſeparable from what is the *Good*, or true *Intereſt*, of every *Man*, and every *Civil State*. This is one of the chief Dogma's in *Plato's Moral Philoſophy:* And to prove a Point ſo important will, we venture to ſay, be found the ultimate End of all his Writings. It is profeſſedly the Subject of his Books *de Repub:* it is treated of copiouſly in his *Gorgias*, and briefly in what follows next, of the Dialogue now before us. All the ancient *Moraliſts*, who came after *Plato*, aſſert it as a Truth, ſufficiently proved, and become unqueſtionable. But the *Maſters of Rhetorick* ſtill went on with their old Rules, derived from the Practice of Political Orators and Demagogues, without taking any notice, that the main

Thing; ſeeing, that Many have found it their Intereſt to have done things the moſt Unjuſt, and that Others have gained no Advantage from having acted with Honeſty.

SOCRATES.

Well, ſuppoſe Intereſt to be a thing ever ſo different from Juſtice; do You imagine now that You know What is a Man's Intereſt? and Why this or that thing is ſo?

ALCIBIADES.

What ſhould hinder me, Socrates, from knowing it? unleſs you will make a Doubt of This too, by aſking me, from Whom I learnt this Knowlege, or how I diſcovered it, my Self.

SOCRATES.

How ſtrangely you deal with me in this[65]? If you ſay any thing wrong, when 'tis poſſible to prove it wrong by the ſame

main Arguments in Political Orations ought to be drawn from the Topick of *Juſtice*. This appears from what *Cicero* ſays, in his Treatiſe *de Inventione*, Lib: 2. Cap. 4.—*In deliberationibus*, ſays he, [quæritur] *ut* NOS *arbitramur, quid honeſtum ſit, & quid utile. nam* CÆTERI *utilitatis modo finem in ſuadendo & in diſſuadendo exponi oportere arbitrati ſunt.* And it is confirmed by *Quintilian*, in his 3d Book *de Inſtitutione Oratoriâ*, Cap: 8. where he adds, by way of a candid Apology for thoſe other Rhetoricians,—*nec dubito quin hi qui ſunt in priore ſententiâ*, [that is, Thoſe who delivered Rules of Rhetorick, *prior in time* to thoſe of *Cicero*'s] *ſecundum opinionem pulcherrimam, ne utile quidem, niſi quod honeſtum eſſet, exiſtimarint.*

[65] That is,—in evading the Proofs of your Ignorance, and thus endeavoring to avoid the neceſſity of your confeſſing it.—In our Tranſlation

ſame arguments uſed in confuting what you before ſaid amiſs, You would have new matter introduced, and different arguments made uſe of, to prove you in the wrong again: as if the former Proofs were worn out like old Cloaths, and you could no longer put them on, but one muſt bring you a freſh Proof, never uſed before. But, without taking farther notice of your Evaſions, I ſhall repeat the ſame Queſtion, and aſk you——from What Learning you came to know what was a Man's Intereſt; and who taught you this Knowlege: and all the Other Queſtions, aſked before, I aſk you again, ſumming them up in One. It is evident now, that Your Anſwers will amount to the very ſame as they did before; and that you will not be able to ſhow, by what Means you attained the Knowlege of what is advantageous to a Man, or conducive to his Good; either How you found it out yourſelf, or from Whom you learnt it. However, ſeeing that you are ſqueamiſh, and decline the taſting of the ſame Arguments again, I wave the Inquiry into this Point, whether you have, or not, the Knowlege of what is the Intereſt of the Athenians. But this other Point, whether the ſame Actions

lation of this ſhort Sentence, we have ſuppoſed, that it ought to be immediately followed by a Mark of Interrogation, or rather by a Mark of Admiration; and ought not to be read as *Part* of a longer Sentence, either *Interrogative*, according to the Verſion of *Serranus*, or *Aſſertive*, according to that of *Ficinus*, and all the Editions of the Greek Original. The Verſion of *Cornarius* is herein, agreeable, to that our Suppoſition.

are Juſt and Advantageous; or whether what 'tis Juſt to do, differs from what 'tis a Man's Intereſt to do; why ſhould not you prove, by putting Queſtions to Me, in the ſame manner as I did to You? " or, if you had rather, make a Diſcourſe upon that Subject, wholly by your ſelf.

ALCIBIADES.

But I know not if I ſhould be able, Socrates, to make ſuch a Diſcourſe [67] to You.

SOCRATES.

[66] In the Greek,——εἰ δ'ἐ,——after which Two Words theſe other Two,——ἄλλως βούλει——are to be underſtood as if expreſſed.——The ſame *Half-Expreſſion* is uſed, and the ſame Words are ſuppreſſed, in the laſt Sentence of the *Speech of Socrates* in *the Banquet*.——Similar to it is This of *Jupiter* in *Homer*,

Εἰ δ', ἄγε, τοι κεφαλῇ κατανεύσομεν, ὄφρα πεποίθῃς.

Iliad: L. 1, v. 524.

But if you chooſe it,——come, your Confidence
To gain, I'll grant the ratifying Nod.

where, after Εἰ δ'ἐ, the Word βούλει, tho not expreſſed, is to be ſupplied by the Reader's Underſtanding.

[67] *Alcibiades* was cautious of haranguing before *Socrates* alone; becauſe he was ſenſible, that to Such a Man fair Arguments only and juſt Reaſonings were to be uſed. But he imagined, agreeably to the common Opinion, that *Oratory* conſiſted in ſpeaking, not with propriety, logically and juſtly, but agreeably, ſophiſtically and plauſibly; for that, the *End* of Oratory being *to perſwade*, not to Truth and Rectitude of Action, but to any Determination or Reſolve whatever, which the Orator could by his Art make to *paſs for* true and right, the *Means*, proper

SOCRATES.

Why, my good Friend, ſuppoſe Me to be the Aſſembly and the People. And, were you addreſſing your Diſcourſe to Them, it would be proper for you to perſwade every ſingle Man of them. Would it not?

ALCIBIADES.

It would.

SOCRATES.

Does it not belong then to the ſame Perſon to be able to perſwade one ſingle Man by himſelf, and to perſwade Many Men aſſembled together, in ſpeaking on any Subject, with

proper to attain this End, were, not to ſatisfy the Underſtanding, but *to pleaſe the Ear*, and *flatter the Opinions* of his Audience, whether true or falſe; captivating thus the Minds of all Thoſe, who were governed by their Outward Senſes, their Imaginations, and their Paſſions. According to this Idea of Oratory, vulgarly received, *Alcibiades* preſumed himſelf to be well qualified for an Orator; for he was conſcious of his great Abilitys for thoſe Purpoſes; he could not but feel the natural Facultys of his Mind, which he poſſeſſed in an extraordinary degree, improved thro the ſingular Advantages he enjoyed daily, from his living with *Pericles*, of hearing and ſeeing how the Athenians were led and managed. Nor was he miſtaken in the Opinion he had of his own Powers and Qualifications. For he became the moſt popular Speaker of his age in the Athenian Aſſemblys; as we learn from *Demoſthenes*, in *Orat:* c. *Midiam*, pag: 203, and from *Plutarch*, in *Vitâ Alcibiadis*.

which he is [68] well acquainted? as, for inſtance, a Teacher of Grammar is equally well able to perſwade One Man and Many Men, when Letters are the Subject of his Diſcourſe.

[68] *Plato* gives us here an intimation of what he proves to us in his Dialogue named *Gorgias*, that True Oratory is the Art of perſwading Men to think juſtly and to act rightly in any Affair; and depends therefore on the Orator's *Knowlege* in *that Affair*, and on his *Knowlege* of the Underſtandings and pre-conceived Notions of his *Audience*; beſides his having, in common with Vulgar Orators, thoſe leſſer requiſite Endowments, on which uſually the whole Streſs is laid. According to this philoſophical and juſt Character of a perfect Orator, *Alcibiades* will be found to have been unqualified, on account of his Ignorance, for a Speaker in publick, or a Counſellor of the People. For He, who has not the Knowlege of what is *Juſt* and *Good* in its *General Idea*, can never know it in any *Particular* Subject, whether Perſon, Action, or Affair. And He, who has not the Knowlege of the *Human Soul*, in which lye the Seeds of all Moral Good and of infinite Moral Evil,——He, who knows not the Dignity and the Power of the Superior Part of it, and the Slaviſh Nature and Self-Impotence of the Part which is Inferior,——He, who knows not, How or What his own Soul energiſes within its ſelf, and How 'tis acted on or What it ſuffers from without,——That Man can never know the Minds, Sentiments, and Paſſions of Other Men; nor conſequently can he know, by what Speeches their Minds are to be directed aright; their Sentiments deaden'd or enlivened, and their Paſſions depreſſed, raiſed, or moderated.——Thus it is, that not only the Science of *Ethicks*, and That of *Politicks*, but the Art of *Rhetorick* alſo, ſo far as it depends on thoſe Sciences, hath its ſole Foundation in the Science of *Mind*, the ſame Science, as will appear in the laſt Part of this Dialogue, with the Science of *The Beautifull and Good*.

SOCRATES.

ALCIBIADES.

True.

SOCRATES.

And when [69] Numbers are the Subject, would not the ſame Perſon, who perſwades Many, perſwade One as well?

ALCIBIADES.

He would.

SOCRATES.

And muſt not this Perſon be one who is well acquainted with Numbers? muſt he not be an Arithmetician?

ALCIBIADES.

Moſt certainly.

SOCRATES.

And would not You alſo, in ſpeaking on any Subjects, if you are able to perſwade Many of the Truth of what you ſay, be able to perſwade a ſingle One?

ALCIBIADES.

'Tis probable that I ſhould.

[69] *Grammar* and *Arithmetick* are the two Inſtances, here choſen, becauſe the Truth of what was to be proved was, of all Arts and Sciences, the moſt obvious and evident in Theſe: for *Grammar* was taught to all Perſons of Liberal Birth, and *Arithmetick* is in ſome degree the common Science of All Men: See Note 99 to *the Meno*.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

But theſe Subjects, it is plain, muſt be ſuch as you are well acquainted with.

ALCIBIADES.

Undoubtedly.

SOCRATES.

Is there any other Difference then between a Speaker in the Aſſembly of the People and a Speaker in ſuch Converſation as this of ours, than meerly ſo much as This?——the Former endeavours to perſwade a Collection of Many Men, ——the Latter, to perſwade men, One by One?

ALCIBIADES.

There appears to be no other.

SOCRATES.

Come then; ſince it apparently belongs to the ſame Perſon to perſwade a Multitude and to perſwade a Single Man, practiſe your Skill on Me, and undertake to prove to Me, that in ſome Caſes Honeſty is not a Man's Intereſt.

ALCIBIADES.

You are very ſaucy [70], Socrates.

SOCRATES.

[70] This Paſſage, we apprehend, is liable to Miſ-conſtruction. *Alcibiades* does not mean, that *Socrates* uſed him ill in attributing to him a Sentiment ſo immoral. He had expreſsly avowed it; and preſently we ſhall

SOCRATES.

And I am now going to be ſo ſaucy, as to convince You of the Truth of a Poſition quite contrary to that, which you decline the proving of to Me.

ALCIBIADES.

Begin then.

SOCRATES.

Do You but anſwer to the Queſtions, which I ſhall put to you.

ſhall find him owning it again. In that age it was looked on neither as flagitious nor as falſe. And indeed in all ages ſince, except among Thoſe who have learnt to think more juſtly from the Doctrines, originally taught by *Socrates*, and delivered down thro the Writings of *Plato*, we fear it ſtill paſſes for a Truth unqueſtionable, that *Honeſty and Intereſt are often at Variance*; and that nothing, but a Man's Expectation of having his *Honeſty rewarded* in Heaven hereafter, can make it appear to him always to be his Intereſt to preſerve it at preſent here on Earth.—*Alcibiades* is ready enough to profeſs his being in the common way of thinking on this Subject; and therefore cannot be offended at *Socrates* for urging him to a more explicit Declaration. But he is affronted at being called on by *Socrates*, to *defend* his Suppoſition, and *prove* it to be true. Beſides, he thought it was treating him with Indignity, and ſhowed a want of Reſpect to his High Rank, to demand of Him Arguments or Reaſons for any thing which He had been pleas'd to aſſert. His Pride therefore is ſomewhat piqued at the Freedom, taken with him by the Philoſopher; tho the Expreſſion of his Reſentment is not to be conſidered as intirely grave, but as partly jocoſe: and that *Socrates* ſo underſtood it, appears in his Reply; where the Pleaſant is in the ſame manner mingled with the Serious.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

Not ſo: but do You, your Self, ſay plainly what you have to ſay.

SOCRATES.

Why ſo? would you not chooſe to be intirely well perſwaded of the Truth of it, if it be true?

ALCIBIADES.

By all means, certainly.

SOCRATES.

And would you not, if you your Self were to aſſert it, have the moſt intire Perſuaſion of its Truth?

ALCIBIADES.

I think ſo.

SOCRATES.

Anſwer then to My Queſtions: and if you do not hear from your own Mouth, that to act honeſtly is to act for one's own advantage, believe no other Perſon who aſſerts that Poſition.

ALCIBIADES.

I ſhall not: and I conſent to anſwer your Queſtions. For no Harm, I think, will come to me that way.

SOCRATES.

You think, as if you had the Spirit of Divination. Tell me then: Do you ſay, that Some honeſt actions are advantageous

geous to the man who performs them, and that Some are not ſo?

ALCIBIADES.

I do.

SOCRATES.

And do you ſay alſo, that Some honeſt actions are fair, and that Some are not ſo?

ALCIBIADES.

What mean you by this Queſtion?

SOCRATES.

[71] Whether did you ever think, that a man acted unfairly, and yet honeſtly at the ſame time?

ALCIBIADES.

I never thought ſo.

[71] We have tranſlated this Sentence, as *Interrogative:* and it is ſo printed in all the Editions, prior to that of *Stephens*. But in His, and conſequently in thoſe, printed at *Lyons* and *Francfort* afterwards, which are exact Copys of His, the Sentence is made abſolute and aſſertive: as if, in anſwer to the queſtion of *Alcibiades*, "*What mean you by this "Queſtion"?* (thus requiring an explanation of it,) *Socrates* was here to ſay, "*I mean, whether you ever thought*, &c." whereas he only repeats his former Queſtion, propoſing it *in other words*, to make the Senſe of it plainer and more intelligible to *Alcibiades*.——We ſhould not take notice of ſuch trifling differences in the Punctuation as theſe, which little or nothing affect the Meaning of the Sentence, but for the ſake of future Editors of *Plato*.

SOCRATES.

You think then, that all actions, which are honeſt, are alſo fair.

ALCIBIADES.

I do.

SOCRATES.

But what, as to actions which are Fair? Whether do you think, that All of theſe are Good to the performer, or that Some of them are ſo, and Some not ſo?

ALCIBIADES.

For my part, Socrates, I think that ſome fair actions are evil to the performer of them.

SOCRATES.

And that ſome baſe actions are good to the performer?

ALCIBIADES.

I do.

SOCRATES.

Do you mean ſuch actions as theſe?——Many men, by aiding in Battle ſome Friend or near Relation, have been wounded mortally: whilſt Others, by witholding their Aid, when they ought to have given it, have come off ſafe and ſound.

ALCIBIADES.

A juſt inſtance of what I mean.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

That Aid then of theirs you call fair, with reſpect to their endeavouring to ſave Thoſe whom they ought to defend. Now ſuch an action proceeds from Fortitude. Does it not?

ALCIBIADES.

It does.

SOCRATES.

But evil you call it alſo, with reſpect to the Wounds and Death which it procured them. Do you not?

ALCIBIADES.

I do.

SOCRATES.

And are not Fortitude and Death two different Things?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

To aid a Friend therefore [72] is not both fair and evil, in the ſame reſpect [73].

[72] This is a concluſive *Aſſertion*; and not, as it is printed by *Aldus* and by *Stephens*, a *Queſtion*. Both of the *Baſil* Editions have it right.

[73] Or with reſpect to one and the ſame thing. For when we look on it as Fair and Handſome, we are viewing it with reſpect to its Cauſe, *Fortitude*; when we look on it as Evil, we are conſidering it only with reſpect to the contingent Conſequence of it, *Death*.——Fortitude and Death reſpectively belong to Things the moſt widely different of all things in Nature, *Mind* and *Body*.

ALCIBIADES.

It appears, that 'tis not.

SOCRATES.

Conſider now, whether it be not Good in the ſame reſpect in which it is Fair; as in this particular, which we mentioned. For with reſpect to Fortitude, you agreed with Me, that 'twas Fair and Handſome to give ſuch Aid. This very Thing then, Fortitude, conſider whether it be a Good or an Evil. And conſider it in this way;——Which Kind of Things would you chooſe to have your own, whether good things or evil things?

ALCIBIADES.

Good things.

SOCRATES.

And would you not chooſe the Beſt things too?

ALCIBIADES.

Moſt of all Things.

SOCRATES.

And would you not chooſe to part with them leaſt of All?

ALCIBIADES.

Undoubtedly.

SOCRATES.

What ſay you then of Fortitude? at what price would you chooſe to part with it?

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

I would not accept of Life, not I, to live a Coward.

SOCRATES.

You think then, that Cowardice is Evil in the utmoſt Degree.

ALCIBIADES.

That do I.

SOCRATES.

On a Par, as it ſeems, with Death.

ALCIBIADES.

It is ſo.

SOCRATES.

Are not Life and Fortitude, the moſt of All things, oppoſite to Death and Cowardice?

ALCIBIADES.

They are.

SOCRATES.

And would you chooſe to have Thoſe, moſt of All things; and Theſe, leaſt of All things?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

Is it, becauſe you deem Thoſe the Beſt of All things, and Theſe the Worſt?

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

For this very reaſon.

SOCRATES.

Viewing then the giving of Aid in Battle to Such as are dear to us, in that Light in which it appears fair,——viewing it with regard to the Practiſe of that Virtue, which you acknowlege to be one of the Beſt of things,——you gave it the Epithet of Fair.

ALCIBIADES.

It appears, I did ſo.

SOCRATES.

But with regard to its operating Evil, the Evil of Death, you gave it the Epithet of Evil.

ALCIBIADES.

True.

SOCRATES.

Is it not then juſt and right, to denominate every action thus? if, with regard to the Evil which it operates, you call it evil, ought it not, with regard to the Good, which it operates, to be alſo called [74] good?

[74] For if an Action takes a certain Denomination from the *Nature* of *one* of its *Effects*, on account of its being the *Cauſe* of that Effect, ——it ought in the ſame manner, by the rule of Analogy, to take another, a different, Denomination, if it be the Cauſe of *another* Effect *different in Kind*.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

I think it ought.

SOCRATES.

In the ſame reſpect then, in which it is good, is it not fair? and in the ſame reſpect, in which it is evil, is it not [75] unhandſome?

ALCIBIADES.

It is.

SOCRATES.

In ſaying then, that the aiding of our Friends in Battle is an action, fair indeed, but that yet 'tis evil, you ſay exactly the ſame thing, as if you [76] called it an action, good indeed, but yet evil.

ALCIBIADES.

I think you are in the right, Socrates.

[75] For *Death*, at the ſame time that it utterly deſtroys the Frame of the *Body*, gives it the moſt uncomely Aſpect.——But 'tis impoſſible, that any other Death ever can befall an *Intellectual Soul*, than the irrecoverable *Loſs of* all its *Virtue*, its proper Life, and only Good. And the Soul, to which ſuch a Death ſhould happen, if this be not likewiſe impoſſible, would be no leſs thorowly *deformed*, than it would thorowly be *evil*. So inſeparable is *Beauty* from *Good*, and *Deformity* from *Evil*.

[76] In tranſlating this Sentence, we have ſuppoſed, that the right Reading here is προσεῖπον, and not, as it is printed, προεῖπον.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Nothing therefore which is fair, ſo far as it is fair, is evil; nor is any thing which is unhandſome, ſo far as it is unhandſome, good.

ALCIBIADES.

Evidently, it is not.

SOCRATES.

Farther now conſider it in this way:——Whoever does fairly, does he not do well too?

ALCIBIADES.

He does.

SOCRATES.

And Thoſe who do well [77], are they not happy?

ALCI-

[77] *Ariſtotle*, in *Mag: Moral:* Lib: 1, Cap: 3, and 4; and in *Ethic: Eudem:* Lib: 2, Cap: 1; makes uſe of this very argument, amongſt others, to prove that Happineſs conſiſts in virtuous Actions and Energies,——that "*the Happy are ſaid to live well, and to do well*";——common Sayings, "*which ſhow it* (ſays he) *to be the Opinion of us* "*all*". And in *Ethic: Nicom:* Lib: 1, Cap: 8, he adds, that "*the* "*Opinion was ancient, and agreed in by* (all) *Thoſe who philoſophiſed*". ——We refer to theſe Paſſages in *Ariſtotle*, chiefly for this reaſon, to vindicate *Plato* from the Suſpicion of illogical and unfair Reaſoning: for ſuch it muſt appear to Thoſe who imagine, that he uſes the Phraſe ——*doing well*——equivocally, or in two different Senſes; firſt, in that of *acting well*; and immediately after, in that of *faring well*. According to ſyllogiſtical or right Reaſoning, from theſe two Propoſitions,

——*Every*

ALCIBIADES.

Without doubt.

SOCRATES.

——*Every one, who does well,* (that is, *fares well,*) *is happy*; and *Every one, who does fairly, does well*; (that is, *acts well*;) it is not to be concluded, that *Every one, who does fairly, is happy:* becauſe the *Medium*, by which this laſt Propoſition is pretended to be proved, is of *ambiguous* ſignification; and in the Firſt or *Major* Propoſition of the Syllogiſm, has a different Meaning from what it has in the Second or *Minor*.—— That *Plato* uſed the ſame Phraſe, εὖ πράτ̃ειν, *to do well*, in its ancient and primary Meaning, when he addreſſed his Friends, in the beginning of his Epiſtles to them, with this Salutation, we think is evident from the Reaſons which he gives, in his *Third Epiſtle*, for his rejecting the *common Form* of Epiſtolary Addreſs, that of wiſhing them χαίρειν *to have Joy*. Beſides, *to act well* is indeed of neceſſity, from the nature of the Human Soul, attended with *Happineſs*; if Happineſs be ſeated in *the Mind*, the *Fountain of Right Action:* but What or Where is the Good of *faring well*, unleſs it be attended with a *Senſe of Pleaſure and Joy?* and the Seat of Theſe is the *inferior* Part of the *Soul*, That which is *Irrational*. If therefore *Plato* meant, by εὖ πράτ̃ειν, *the Faring well*, he could not have condemned a Wiſh of χαίρειν, *the Feeling of it*.——However, that in proceſs of time the Phraſe εὖ πράτ̃ειν, *doing well*, came to be corrupted, and to ſignify *faring well*, cannot be doubted. It is abundantly proved by *Kuſter*, in his Notes to the *Plutus* of *Ariſtophanes*, verſ: 341. And this Corruption is eaſy to be accounted for, like many other Corruptions of the original ſignification of Words, from the Corruption of Men's Minds, in their departing more and more from their Natural Senſe of Things. But Philoſophers, we ſee, went on in the ſame original and natural way of ſpeaking: for They continued in the Same Mind. See Mr. *Harris*'s Note 46 to his *Third Treatiſe*.——But after all, if we examine well the Authoritys, cited by *Kuſter* in his Note above referred to, and by *Spanheim* in his Note to verſe 486 of the ſame

SOCRATES.

And are they not happy, by being poſſeſſed of good things?

ALCIBIADES.

Moſt certainly.

SOCRATES.

And are they not poſſeſſed of theſe good things, by doing well and fairly?

ALCIBIADES.

They are.

SOCRATES.

To do well therefore is in the rank of good things.

Comedy, we ſhall find, that πρᾶτ'ειν, even in the degenerate and corrupt Senſe of the Word, ſignifies the being *engaged* in matters, where the Soul is not meerly Paſſive, but *exerciſes* ſome *Energy*; as for inſtance in *Dying*, the laſt and *finiſhing Energy* of the Soul in this Mortal State of Being.——In the ſame Senſe alſo it is ſometimes by Poets metaphorically applied to Things Inanimate: as when *Æſchylus*, in the Perſon of *Caſſandra*, ſays of *Troy*——ἔπρᾱξεν, *it has finiſhed; there's an End of all its glorious Actions.* In compariſon with the *Boldneſs* of which *animated* Expreſſion, even the *fuit Ilium* of *Virgil* appears flat and lifeleſs.——We ſhall conclude this Note with obſerving, that *Horace*, the great Roman Imitator of the Greek Writers, tranſlates the εὖ πρᾶτ'ειν of *Plato* thus,——*benè rem gerere*,——in his 16th *Epiſtle* of the Firſt Book; where he addreſſes *Celſus* with this *Philoſophical* Salutation of wiſhing him *to do or act well*, adding it to the *vulgar* one of wiſhing him *gaudere, to have Joy.*

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

Beyond a doubt.

SOCRATES.

And is not doing well a Fair thing alſo?

ALCIBIADES.

It is.

SOCRATES.

Again therefore we have found, that one and the ſame thing is both Fair and Good.

ALCIBIADES.

We have.

SOCRATES.

Whatever then we ſhould find to be a Fair thing [78], we ſhall find it to be a Good thing too, according to this reaſoning.

ALCIBIADES.

It muſt be ſo.

[78] It appears from the Tranſlations, made by *Ficinus* and *Cornarius*, that the Greek of this Sentence, in the Manuſcripts from which they tranſlated, was written thus,—Ὅ, τι ἂν ἄρα εὕρωμεν καλὸν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν εὑρήσομεν κ. τ. λ. And we hope it will hereafter be ſo printed. For the Abſurdity of this Sentence in the Tranſlation by *Serranus* was evidently occaſioned by his following the *printed* Editions, and his regarding more the Language of *Cicero*, than the Reaſoning or Philoſophy of *Plato*.

SOCRATES.

And what? are good things advantageous? or are they not?

ALCIBIADES.

They are [79].

SOCRATES.

Do you remember now, what we agreed in concerning things which are Honeſt?

ALCIBIADES.

I imagine that you mean This,——that thoſe Perſons, who do things which are Honeſt, muſt of neceſſity do things which at the ſame time are Fair.

SOCRATES.

And did we not agree in This too,——that Thoſe, who do things which are Fair, do things which are alſo Good?

ALCIBIADES.

We did.

SOCRATES.

And Good things, you ſay, are Advantageous.

ALCIBIADES.

True.

[79] See *the Meno*, pages 181, and 230, of our Tranſlation; and Note to that Dialogue 205. See alſo *the Protagoras*, pag: 333 and 334. Edit: Steph:

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

80 Things therefore which are Honeſt, O Alcibiades! are things which are Advantageous.

ALCI-

80 Here we have the *Concluſion*, in this *Compound-Syllogiſm*, improperly called a *Sorites*,——*Honeſt* things are *fair*:——*Fair* things are *good*:——*Good* things are *advantageous*:——*Honeſt* things are (therefore) *advantageous*.——In the Greek all the *four Terms* of this *Syllogiſm*,——δίκαια, καλὰ, ἀγαθὰ, ὠφέλιμα,——are *Attributes*: and the Article τὰ, prefixed to them, refers to all *Things* to which thoſe Attributes belong; not only to *Poſſeſſions* or Things *had*, to *Speeches* or Things *ſaid*, to *Performances* or Things *done*, but alſo to *Actions*, *Energys*, and *Operations*; it extends, in fine, to all the Objects of our Senſes, and to all thoſe of our Underſtanding. For the ſame Reaſoning holds true of them all. But *Actions* are here *particularly* meant by *Plato*, as appears from his Inſtance of *aiding our Friends in battle*.——But in thoſe Four Propoſitions, juſt now recited, what is chiefly to be conſidered, is Whether they are *true*, and in What ſenſe.——In the *Firſt* Propoſition,——"*Honeſt things are fair*",——it is obvious to perceive, that the Term *Fair* is to be underſtood *metaphorically*, in a Mental ſenſe, to ſignify what appears Fair to the *Mental Eye*. In this ſenſe it is generally uſed by *Plato*: and from Him this metaphorical meaning of the word *Fair* has not only deſcended down to the preſent times, but is ſpred into general and common uſe, in ſpeaking of Perſons as well as Actions that are *Honeſt*. Indeed, wherever it is underſtood, it *muſt* be univerſally received; as it is approved by that *Common Senſe* in Men's Minds, which Mr. *Hutcheſon* calls the *Moral* Senſe, and *Plato* in the laſt Part of this Dialogue calls the *Eye-ſight of the Soul*. For the ſame Eye, which ſees *Honeſty*, muſt ſee it to be *fair* and lovely; becauſe it is the *Natural Object* of that Eye, and therefore moſt *agreeable* to its Sight. Whatever Eye ſees not the *Beauty* of Honeſty, is blind to the Thing itſelf. And every Eye, whoſe Sight is always turned to the

ALCIBIADES.

It ſeems they are.

SOCRATES.

dark ſide of things, muſt be thus blind, and cannot receive a Glimpſe of that brighteſt of all Objects to the Mind's Eye, that Intellectual Sun, the *Principle of Honeſty*; without which, it is impoſſible to ſee, what Honeſty *is*.——In the *Second* Propoſition,——"*Fair things are Good*",——if the Term "*Fair*" hath the ſame meaning which it has in the *Firſt*, then the Term "*Good*", which always ſignifys *deſirable*, muſt mean *good* relatively *to the Human Soul*, as being the proper Objects of Her Deſire. The Propoſition is indeed *true* in *Every Senſe* of the words *Fair* and *Good*, when they are attributed to the *ſame Things*. And for Proof of it, there needs nothing more than to appeal to that Natural Inſtinct of the Human Soul, from which ſhe loves, and deſires to have, whatever appears to Her as fair, beautiful and lovely. But the Propoſition is *falſe*, if the two Terms of it, the words *Fair* and *Good*, be taken in two *different ſenſes*; that is, if the things, to which is given the Attribute of *Fair*, be different *in Kind* from thoſe which in the ſame Propoſition have the Epithet of *Good*.——In the *Third* Propoſition,——"*Good things are Advantageous*",——if the Term "*Good*", and the Term "*Advantageous*", are Both of them attributed to Things immediately belonging to one and the ſame Being, the Propoſition is then undoubtedly true: becauſe it is a neceſſary Conſequence from this univerſal Principle in the Nature of Things,——that every Being is under a neceſſity of purſuing its own apparent Good or Intereſt. In which Axiom it is indifferent, whether of the two Terms we uſe, *Good*, or *Intereſt*. For nothing can be the *Good* of any Being, which it is not the *Intereſt* of ſuch Being to poſſeſs and to enjoy:——a Propoſition, this, equally true if we invert the Terms of it.——The *Fourth* Propoſition,——"*Honeſt things are Advantageous*",—is the συμπέρασμα, or *Concluſion*, drawn from the other *Three*. It is drawn juſtly, and is therefore true, if the Premiſes are true, and if the Term "*Advantageous*" bears the

ſame

SOCRATES.

Well now; are not You the Perſon who aſſerts theſe things? and am not I the Queſtioner concerning them?

ALCIBIADES.

So it appears.

SOCRATES.

Whoever then riſes up to ſpeak in any Council, whether it be of Athenians or Peparethians [81], imagining that he diſcerns

ſame Meaning here in the *Concluſion*, which it bears in the *Third* Propoſition of the *Premiſes*. This whole Argumentation therefore, if it be juſt, amounts to no more than this,—that "Honeſty is [always] advantageous to *the Soul* of Man". But whether it be always advantageous to *Man*, or not,——in other words, whether or no it be always a *Man*'s Intereſt to be honeſt,——depends on this Point, "What it is "which conſtitutes *the Man*, or What is Man's peculiar *Eſſence*": a Point, determined in the Fourth Part of this Dialogue. On the Truth therefore of that Determination will depend the Solidity of the Reaſoning in this Second Part.

[81] *Peparethus* was a ſmall Iſland, not far from *Eubea*, northward of it, and oppoſite to the Coaſt of *Magneſia*. The Inhabitants were a free People, governed by Laws of their own making in their own Aſſemblys. In the great *Peloponneſian War*, then on foot, they embraced the Party of the *Athenians*: but from what Motives they did ſo, does not appear; neither ſeems it material to the preſent Subject to examine. For, if we underſtand this Paſſage rightly, they are here introduced,——not, as having acted on the Principles profeſſed by *Alcibiades* juſt before, that is, with a view to their own miſtaken Intereſt, and without regard to the Juſtice of that Cauſe which they eſpouſed,—— but

diſcerns What is Juſt and What is Unjuſt, if he ſhould ſay, that he knows Honeſty to be ſometimes evil and detrimental, would you not laugh at his Pretenſions to Knowlege? ſince You yourſelf are found to be the very Perſon who aſſerts, that the ſame things are both honeſt and advantageous?

ALCIBIADES.

Now, by the Gods, Socrates, for my part, I know not what to ſay to it; but am quite like a Man diſtracted. For ſometimes I am of one opinion, juſt while you are putting your Queſtions to me, and preſently after am of another.

SOCRATES.

Are you ignorant now, my Friend, what Condition you are in? [82]

ALCIBIADES.

Intirely ignorant.

but meerly as an *inconſiderable* People, compared with the *Athenians*. The meaning of this Paſſage, thus underſtood, will appear to be this, ——that to *act juſtly* is the true *Intereſt* of every People, whether great like the *Athenians*, or little like the *Peparethians*; juſt as it is the Intereſt of every Private Man to act honeſtly in all his own Affairs, whether they be of more or leſs Importance. For the *Legiſlative Power* in *Civil States* is analogous to what the *Mind* is in *Man*; it is that Power which *directs* and *governs*: and the Guilt of Diſhoneſty in this governing Power is equally in both caſes the Evil and Corruption of the Government; and tends alike to the Overthrow and Deſtruction of the whole State, the *Polity*, or the *Man*.

[82] This Condition *Socrates* preſently after proves to him, and makes him acknowlege, to be That of *Conceited Ignorance*.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Do you imagine then, that, if any Perſon were to aſk you, how many Eyes you had, whether Two or Three, or how many Hands, whether Two or Four, or any other ſuch Queſtion [83], you would ſometimes anſwer one thing, and at other times another? or would you always give the ſame Anſwer?

ALCIBIADES.

I confeſs, that I am now doubtful of my ſelf; but I do believe, that I ſhould always give the ſame Anſwer.

SOCRATES.

And is not your Knowlege of the Subject the Cauſe of that Conſiſtency there would be in your Anſwers?

ALCIBIADES.

I believe, it is.

SOCRATES.

When therefore you give contrary Anſwers to one and the ſame Queſtion, without chooſing to prevaricate, 'tis evident that you have no Knowlege of the Subject.

ALCIBIADES.

Probably ſo.

[83] That is, on any Subject with which we are made acquainted by means of our Outward Senſes.

SOCRATES.

Now you ſay, that to Queſtions concerning things Juſt or Unjuſt, Handſome or Unhandſome, Good or Evil, Advantageous or otherwiſe, you ſhould anſwer ſometimes one thing, and ſometimes another. Is it not then evident, that your Ignorance in theſe Subjects is the Cauſe of this Inconſiſtency of yours?

ALCIBIADES.

It appears ſo to Me my Self.

SOCRATES.

Is not This then the true ſtate of the caſe? On every Subject, which a Man has not the Knowlege of, muſt not his Soul be wavering in her Opinions?

ALCIBIADES.

Moſt undoubtedly.

SOCRATES.

Well now; do you know, by what means you may mount up to Heaven?

ALCIBIADES.

By Jupiter, not I.

SOCRATES.

Is your Opinion doubtful and wavering on this Subject?

ALCIBIADES.

Not at all.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Do you know the reaſon, why it is not? or ſhall I tell it you?

ALCIBIADES.

Do you tell me.

SOCRATES.

'Tis this, my Friend: it is becauſe you neither know, nor imagine that you know, the Way up to Heaven.

ALCIBIADES.

How is that the reaſon? explain your ſelf.

SOCRATES.

Let You and I conſider it together. Concerning any Affairs which you are ignorant of, and are at the ſame time convinced that you are ſo, do you waver in your Opinions? for inſtance, in the affair of dreſſing Meats and making Sauces, you are, I preſume, well acquainted with your Ignorance [84].

ALCIBIADES.

Perfectly well.

SOCRATES.

Do you form any Opinions then, your Self, on theſe affairs of Cookery, and waver in thoſe Opinions? or do you leave thoſe matters to ſuch as are ſkilled in them?

[84] This Sentence is *Aſſertive*, and not, as it has hitherto been always printed, *Interrogative*.

ALCIBIADES.

I do, as you mentioned laſt.

SOCRATES.

And what, if you were in a Ship under Sail, would you form any Opinion, whether the Rudder ought to be turned toward the Ship or from it, and be unſettled in that Opinion, for want of Knowlege in the affair? or would you leave it to the Pilot, and not trouble yourſelf about it?

ALCIBIADES.

To the Pilot I ſhould leave it.

SOCRATES.

Concerning Affairs then, which you are ignorant of, and are no Stranger to your own Ignorance in thoſe reſpects, you are not wavering in your Opinions.

ALCIBIADES.

I believe, I am not.

SOCRATES.

[85] Do you perceive, that Errors, committed in the doing of any thing, are all to be aſcribed to this Kind of Ignorance in a man,——his imagining that he knows what he knows not?

[85] In ſuppoſing this Sentence to be *Interrogative*, we have followed the two *Baſil* Editions and *Ficinus*'s Tranſlation; as *Le Fevre* has alſo done. But *Dacier* choſe to follow the other Editions and Tranſlations in making it a concluſive *Aſſertion*.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

How do you mean? [86]

SOCRATES.

Whenever we undertake to act in any Affair, it is only when we imagine we know what to do.

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

And ſuch as have no Opinion of their own Knowlege in the Affair, reſign it up to Others, to act for them.

ALCIBIADES.

How ſhould they do otherwiſe?

SOCRATES.

Ignorant Perſons of this Kind live therefore without committing Errors, becauſe they give up the Management of thoſe Affairs, in which they are ignorant, into the hands of Others.

ALCIBIADES.

True.

[86] *Alcibiades* could not readily apprehend, how this falſe Imagination could be called *Ignorance*. For, ſince he had not the *Knowlege of Himſelf*, he could not know What it was to be *ignorant of one's Self*.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

What Kind of Perſons then are Thoſe who err, and act amiſs? for certainly they are not Such as know how to act.

ALCIBIADES.

By no means.

SOCRATES.

Since then they are neither the Knowing, nor Thoſe of the Ignorant who know that they are ignorant, are any other Perſons left, than of that Kind, who are ignorant, but imagine themſelves knowing?

ALCIBIADES.

None other than Theſe.

SOCRATES.

This Kind of Ignorance therefore is the Cauſe of wrong Doings, and is the only Kind which is culpable.

ALCIBIADES.

Very true.

SOCRATES.

And where it concerns things of greateſt Moment, is it not in theſe caſes, the moſt of any, miſchievous and ſhamefull?

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

By far the moſt ſo [87].

SOCRATES.

Well then; can you name any things of greater Moment, than thoſe which are Honeſt, and Fair, and Good, and Advantageous?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly none.

SOCRATES.

Is it not on theſe Subjects, that you acknowlege your ſelf to waver in your Opinions?

ALCIBIADES.

It is.

SOCRATES.

And, if you are thus wavering, is it not evident from our paſt Concluſions, not only that you are ignorant in Subjects of the greateſt Moment, but that amidſt this Ignorance you imagine that you know them?

ALCIBIADES.

I fear it is ſo.

[87] In the printed Original we here read πολλή γε. But we have made no ſcruple of adopting the Marginal Reading of *Harry Stephens*, —πολύ γε.

SOCRATES.

Fie upon it, Alcibiades! What a Condition then are You in! a Condition which I am loth to name; but however, ſince we are alone, it muſt be ſpoken out. You are involved, my good Sir, in that Kind of Ignorance, which is the moſt ſhameful, according to the Reſult of our joint Reaſoning, and according to your own Confeſſion. From this Kind of Ignorance it is, that you are eager to engage in Politicks, before you have learnt the Elements of that Science. Indeed You are not the only Perſon in this ſad Condition; for in the ſame ſtate of Ignorance are the numerous Managers of our Civil Affairs, all of them, except [88] perhaps Pericles, your Guardian, and a Few more.

ALCIBIADES.

And, Socrates, to confirm this opinion of yours, Pericles is ſaid to have become wiſe, not ſpontaneouſly or of himſelf: on the contrary, 'tis reported of him, that he had had the advantage of enjoying the Converſation of many Wiſe

[88] This Exception is made by *Socrates* from a polite Regard to the Perſon with whom he was converſing, and from a civil Reſpect to the Government under which he lived. Yet we may obſerve it made, not poſitively, but doubtfully, with the reſervation of a *perhaps*.——A piece of Complaiſance of like Kind, and guarded in a like Manner, is uſed by *Socrates* in *the Meno*, where he ſpeaks of *Pericles* and other great *Athenian Stateſmen*. See Note 163 to that Dialogue.

Men,

Men, particularly of Pythoclides and Anaxagoras [89]: and even at this time, old as he is, he is intimate with Damon, for this very Purpoſe [90].

SOCRATES.

[91] But what? have you ever ſeen a man who was Wiſe in

[89] The Character of *Anaxagoras*, or rather, that of his Philoſophy, is well known to be this,——that he applied himſelf chiefly, as All of the *Ionic Sect* did, to the Study of Aſtronomy and of the Elements of Outward Nature.——*Pythoclides* and *Damon*, Both of them, were Such as the old Sophiſts, in Polymathy and extenſive Learning: but Neither of them aſſumed the Character of *Sophiſt*. Indeed, they were ſo far from making a public Diſplay of their *General Knowlege*, like the Sophiſts, that on the contrary they endeavor'd to conceal it under the Maſk of ſome *other* Character, profeſſing only Skill in *Muſick*. We learn this, ſo far as relates to *Damon*, from *Plutarch* in his *Life of Pericles*: and with regard to *Pythoclides*, we are told the ſame by *Plato* himſelf in his *Protagoras*.——But farther, *Ariſtotle*, as cited by *Plutarch*, relates, in ſome of thoſe Works of his which are moſt unfortunately loſt, that *Pericles* in fact became accompliſhed in *Muſick* by ſtudying it under *Pythoclides*. And *Plutarch* tells us, on his own Authority, that *Damon* was the Director and Inſtructor of *Pericles* in *Politicks*; and that he was baniſhed from *Athens* by the People, ὡς μεγαλοπραγμων καὶ φιλοτύραννος, *as a Perſon who buſied himſelf in great Affairs*, meaning thoſe relating to the Conſtitution of the State, *and as a Friend to Tyranny*, meaning the Arbitrary Power of a ſingle Perſon.

[90] That is, with a view to his own Improvement in Wiſdom.

[91] *Alcibiades*, we find, had not attended to the word ἴσως "*perhaps*" in what *Socrates* had laſt ſpoken. For, preſuming his Uncle and Guardian to be a truly wiſe Politician, he naturally ſuppoſed, that *Socrates* had the *ſame* Opinion of him, and had in good earneſt excepted him

[92] in any Art whatever, and yet was unable to make another man Wiſe in the ſame Art? as, for inſtance, the Maſter, who taught You Grammar, was himſelf wiſe in that Art; and in the ſame Art he made You wiſe; as he alſo made every other Perſon whom he undertook to teach. Did he not?

ALCIBIADES.

He did.

SOCRATES.

And you, who have learnt from Him that Kind of Wiſdom, would not You be able to teach it to another Perſon?

out of his general accuſation of Ignorance in the Athenian Stateſmen. It was neceſſary for *Socrates* to correct this falſe Notion in the Mind of *Alcibiades*, who otherwiſe might have imagined, that the *Science of Politicks* was to be learnt from ſuch Men as thoſe, whom he had juſt named, under whom *Pericles* had ſtudied; One of them a great *Naturaliſt*, Another probably a great *Mathematician*, and the Third a *Lover of Monarchy* unlimited and abſolute. Such a Prejudice, in favour of *Pericles* and his Maſters, would have obſtructed the great Philoſopher's principal Deſign, which was to point out to *Alcibiades* the only *right way* to Political as well as Moral *Wiſdom*. For nothing ſo much hinders the admiſſion of Truth into the Mind, as erroneous Opinions preconceived. Theſe are firſt to be rooted out, and the Mind is to be reduced to its native Purity and Simplicity, before the Seeds of true Science can effectively be ſown.

[92] *Wiſe* in this ſentence, and in thoſe which follow it immediately, means *Skilful* or *Knowing*, ſkilful in any of the Arts, or knowing in any of the Sciences. See Note 23 to *the Banquet*.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly I ſhould.

SOCRATES.

And is not the ſame thing true of a Muſick-Maſter, and of a Maſter in the Exerciſes?

ALCIBIADES.

Perfectly ſo.

SOCRATES.

For This undoubtedly is a fair Proof of the Knowlege of Such as are knowing in any Subject whatever, their being able to produce their Scholars, and to ſhow Theſe to be knowing in the Same? [93]

ALCIBIADES.

I think ſo too.

SOCRATES.

Well then; can you name to me any one, whom Pericles has made a Wiſe Man? [94] his own Sons has he? to begin with Them.

[93] The very ſame Argumentation is again uſed in *the Meno*, from page 207 to Page 217 of our tranſlation.

[94] The Reaſoning ſeems to require, that in this Paſſage, as well as in another preſently after, by *Wiſe* we are to underſtand *Wiſe in Politicks*.

ALCIBIADES.

But what, if the Sons of Pericles [95] were ſilly Fellows, Socrates?

SOCRATES.

Clinias then, your Brother? [96]

ALCIBIADES.

Why ſhould you mention Clinias, a Man out of his Senſes?

SOCRATES.

Since Clinias then is out of his Senſes, and ſince the Sons of Pericles were ſilly Fellows, to what Defect in your Diſpoſition ſhall we impute the little care taken by Pericles to improve you? [97]

ALCI-

[95] In calling them *ſilly Fellows*, nothing more is meant by *Alcibiades*, than to attribute to them a want of capacity for acquiring any Accompliſhments of the Mind. See Page 213 of *the Meno*.

[96] *Plato* tells us in his *Protagoras*, that *Pericles*, to prevent *Clinias* from being ſpoilt by *Alcibiades*, ſeparated the two Brothers, and ſent *Clinias* to live with *Ariphro*, reſerving however to Himſelf the care of his Education: but that before the expiration of ſix months from that time, *Pericles*, not being able to make any thing of him, gave him up intirely to *Ariphro*, to be taken care of. For this we apprehend to be the Meaning of that Paſſage, tho ſomewhat differently underſtood by other Tranſlators.

[97] Monſ. *Le Fevre* ſeems to think this Sentence defective in the middle part of it; if we may judge from the large Interpolation he has

ALCIBIADES.

I preſume, that I myſelf am in the Fault, that of not giving due Attention to him.

SOCRATES.

But name any Perſon elſe, an Athenian or a Foreigner, either a Slave or a Free Man, who is indebted to the Inſtructions of Pericles for becoming Wiſer than he was: as I can name to You Thoſe, who from the Leſſons of Zeno [98] have improved in Wiſdom, Pythodorus [99] the Son of Iſolochus, and Callias [100] the Son of Calliades: each of whom, at the

has there made in tranſlating it, which in his Notes he has avowed for his own. But ſuppoſing it really to be defective, (for which ſuppoſition, by the bye, we ſee no neceſſity,) we ſhould chuſe to ſupply the deficience in this manner, and tranſlate thus;—" *Since Clinias* " *then is out of his ſenſes, and ſince the Sons of Pericles were ſilly* " *Fellows,* [let *Pericles* be excuſed with regard to Them. But] *What* " *cauſe ſhall we aſſign, why Pericles neglected to cultivate ſuch a Diſ-* " *poſition as Yours?*"

[98] *Zeno* the *Eleatick* is here meant, the Diſciple of *Parmenides:* and conſequently the *Wiſdom,* meant in the latter Part of this Sentence, is *Knowlege in the Nature of the Univerſe.* This Kind of Knowlege was by the Ancients peculiarly ſtiled *Wiſdom,* or *Philoſophy:* and the *ſtudying of the Nature of Things* was called *philoſophiſing.*

[99] This is the ſame *Pythodorus,* at whoſe Houſe *Plato* lays the Scene of his Dialogue named *Parmenides.*

[100] This *Callias* had the Command of the Army, ſent by the *Athenians* for the recovery of *Potidæa:* but he was ſlain in the firſt Battle before that City. See *Thucydides,* Lib: 1, and *Diodorus,* Lib: 12.

price

price of a hundred Minæ [101], paid to Zeno, became eminent for Wiſdom.

Alci-

[101] In Engliſh Money, 3221. 18s. 4d. the very ſame Price, at which *Protagoras* and *Gorgias* valued their Sophiſtical Inſtructions in Polymathy and falſe Oratory. See Notes 12 and 16 to *the Greater Hippias*.——We are told, that *Protagoras* was *the Firſt*, who demanded of his Pupils this high Price for what he taught them. The Writers, who tell us this, clearly mean the Firſt *of the Sophiſts*. For 'tis highly probable, that *Protagoras* had heard of the Honorary Fee or Reward, given to *Zeno* by *Callias* and *Pythodorus*, and a very few Others; (for the *Eleatick* Philoſophy was from the Nature of it confined to a very Few;) and that, deeming his own Knowlege equal to that of *Zeno*, he ſaw no reaſon why as much Money ſhould not be given to Him for his Teaching, as had been given to *Zeno*, and therefore demanded the like Sum.——To this it may be objected, that *Zeno* was in Age younger than *Protagoras*.——We believe, that he was ſo by about 8 or 10 Years. But we ſhould conſider, that *Zeno* was a Pupil of *Parmenides* very early in Life, the παιδικὰ or *Favorite-Pupil*, as *Plato* calls him, of that Great Philoſopher: whereas *Protagoras* did not, till he was thirty Years old, apply himſelf to what was then vulgarly taken for the Study of Wiſdom, the ſearching after and the collecting of the various Opinions and Sayings of Ancient Writers, and of Living Teachers, on Philoſophical Subjects; the Reſult of which his Inquirys and Collections was this notable and peculiar Doctrine of his,——that all Opinions were equally true; for that Truth had no other Foundation than meerly in Opinion, none at all in the Nature of Things. ——On the Paſſage of *Plato*, now before us, we are farther to obſerve, that the Philoſopher muſt here certainly be *ſerious* in celebrating the Wiſdom of *Zeno*. For he argued very abſurdly, if his Praiſe of *Zeno* was *ironical*, and if his real Meaning was this,——" Show Me the " *maſterly* and *true* Political Wiſdom of *Pericles*, by naming any Perſon, " whom

ALCIBIADES.

Now, by Jupiter, I cannot.

SOCRATES.

Very well. What then do you think of doing about your Self? whether to reſt ſatisfied in the condition, which you are now in, or to apply your ſelf to ſome means of improvement?

ALCIBIADES.

Concerning this, Socrates, I would conſult with You. For I apprehend what you have ſaid, and admit the truth of it. Thoſe, who have the adminiſtration of the State, except a Few of them, ſeem indeed to Me too not to have had a proper Education.

SOCRATES.

Well; and what Concluſion do you draw from thence?

ALCIBIADES.

This,——That if they, thro their Education, were well qualified to govern, a Man who ſhould undertake to enter the Liſts in conteſt with them, ought to come to the Engagement duly prepared by Diſcipline and Exerciſe, as in other Combats. But now, ſeeing that ſuch Perſons as theſe,

" whom *Pericles* made a *truly wiſe* Politician; as I can ſhow You the
" *ſophiſtical* or *ſpurious* Wiſdom of *Zeno* in the Knowlege of Nature,
" by naming Two Perſons, whom *Zeno* made to *paſs for wiſe* and
" knowing in the Nature of Things".

raw

raw and undiſciplined as they are, have attained to the Management of State-Affairs, what need is there for a Man to exerciſe himſelf in ſuch Matters, or to give himſelf the Trouble of acquiring Knowlege in them? For I well know, that by dint of Natural Abilities I ſhall excell them by far, and get above them.

SOCRATES.

Fie upon it, my fine young Gentleman! What a Declaration is this which you have made! how unworthy of your Perſonal Qualities, and of the other Advantages you are poſſeſſed of!

ALCIBIADES.

I ſhould be glad, Socrates, to know Why you think it unworthy of me, and in what reſpect.

SOCRATES.

You offer an Affront, not only to the Regard which I have for you, but to the Opinion too which you have of your Self.

ALCIBIADES.

How ſo?

SOCRATES.

In that you think of entering the Liſts, to contend with theſe Men here at Athens.

ALCIBIADES.

Whom then am I to contend with?

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Does this Queſtion become a Man to aſk, who thinks his Mind to be great and elevated? [102]

ALCIBIADES.

How do you mean? Is it not with theſe very Perſons that I am to ſtand in competition?

SOCRATES.

Let me aſk you this Queſtion;——whether, if you had any Thoughts of commanding a Ship of War, would you deem it ſufficient for you to excell the Mariners, who were to be under Your Command, in the Skill belonging to a Commander? or, preſuming your ſelf qualified with this due Præ-excellence, would you direct your Eye to thoſe only, whom you are in fact to combat againſt,——and not, as you now do, to Such as are to combat together with you? For to theſe Men certainly [103] you ought to be ſo much ſuperior, that they ſhould never be your Aſſociates in competition againſt Any, but your inferior Aſſiſtants in com-

[102] *Aldus* erroneouſly printed this Sentence, in the Greek Original, without a Mark of Interrogation: and in this Error he was blindly followed by *Stephens*. The *Baſil* Editions however, Both of them, are here rightly printed, in agreement with the Tranſlations by *Ficinus* and *Cornarius*, and as the Senſe evidently requires.

[103] Here again the Two *Baſil* Editions are right in giving us δή που; where *Aldus* and *Stephens* have been ſo regardleſs of the Senſe, as to print δεῖ που.

bating againſt the Enemy;——if you really think of exhibiting any noble Exploits, worthy of your Self and of your Country.

ALCIBIADES.

And ſuch a Thought I aſſure you that I entertain.

SOCRATES.

Is it then at all worthy of You, to be contented with being a Better Man than your Fellow-Soldiers [104],——and not to have your Eye directed toward the Leaders of Thoſe whom you have to ſtruggle with, ſtudying how [105] to become a Better Man than They, and employing your ſelf in Exerciſes which are proper with a view to Them? [106]

[104] In *the Greek*, as printed, we here read ςρατιωτῶν: but perhaps we ought to read συςρατιωτῶν, that the Word may correſpond with That juſt before, to which it alludes, συναγωνιςάς.

[105] In the Greek Editions ὁπότε: but we ſuppoſe the right Reading to be ὅπως.

[106] All the Latin Tranſlators rightly preſume this Sentence to be *Interrogative:* tho in all the Editions of *the Greek* it is careleſsly made *Aſſertive.*——The ſecret Meaning of *Socrates*, in what he here ſays, agreeably to the Tenor of all his Philoſophy, we apprehend to be this;——that we ought not to ſet before us the Characters of any *particular Men*, who are all of them full of Imperfections, like our ſelves, for the *Standards* of our Moral Conduct; but ſhould have conſtantly in our view, ſo as to copy after, the *Ideal* and perfect *Patterns* of Moral Excellence. That *Plato* would here inſinuate this Doctrine, will appear probable from the Latter Part of this Dialogue; to which all the Parts preceding it, of little Importance in themſelves, only ſerve to lead us. Every Author of a Work, which is *uniform* and *a Whole*, muſt have, in *every Part* of it, a reference to his *One* chief *Deſign*.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

What Perſons do you mean, Socrates?

SOCRATES.

Do you not know, that Our City is every now and then at War with the Lacedæmonians, and with the Great [107] King?

ALCIBIADES.

True.

SOCRATES.

If then you have it in your Mind to be the Leader of this City, would you not think rightly, in thinking that you will have the Kings of Sparta and of Perſia to contend againſt?

ALCIBIADES.

I ſuſpect, that you are in the right.

SOCRATES.

And yet You, my good Sir, on the contrary, are [108] to

[107] The Kings of *Perſia* were ſo called by the Grecians, from the time that *Cyrus*, Heir to the then ſmall Kingdom of *Perſia*, having ſucceeded to the Kingdom of *Media* by the Death of his Uncle without Iſſue, conquered *Aſſyria*, ſubdued *Aſia Minor*, and acquired the Dominion of all thoſe Countrys which conſtitute the now large Monarchy of *Perſia*.

[108] We intirely agree in Opinion with Monſ. *Le Fevre*, that This is purely *Ironical*, and therefore not *Interrogative*.

fix your view on Midias, a Feeder of Quails [109], and on other ſuch Perſons, who undertake to manage Affairs of State, ſtill

[109] The Grecian *Quails*, being μάχιμοι or *Fighting-Birds*, were fitly trained and fed, for the purpoſe of ὀρτυγομαχία, *fighting one with another*, by ſuch ſort of Perſons as took delight in ſuch ſort of Sports. The Manner of them was this; Matches being made, and Wagers laid by thoſe Gentlemen Quail-Feeders, who were themſelves Owners of the Birds, a Circle was drawn in the Quail-Pit, or Gaming-Room, within which Circle were ſet the Combatant-Birds: and in the Battle, to which they were provoked by their wiſe Maſters, whichever Bird drove his Antagoniſt beyond the Circle, was held to be the Conqueror. ——Another Grecian Sport with the poor Quails, a Sport ſtill more boyiſh than the ὀρτυγομαχία, was the ὀρτυγοκοπία, in which the Hardineſs of thoſe Birds was tried by the σφοκομπία, *the Fillip of a* Man's *Finger* on their Heads; and ſometimes by plucking from it a Feather: the Birds, that endured theſe Trials without flinching, or retiring out of the Circle, won the Wager for their cruel Maſters. See *Meurſius de Ludis Græcorum*, pag: 45. *Julius Pollux*, Lib: 9, Cap: 7. and *Suidas* in vocibus ὀρτυγοκοπία, and σφοκόμπος.——*Midias*, here mentioned by *Plato*, was ſo much addicted to theſe Sports, that in the Comedy of *Ariſtophanes*, named Ὄρνιθες, the Ambaſſador to *Athens* from the aerial City of the Birds, reports to them on his Return, that ſeveral of the Leading Men at *Athens* had taken the Names of different Birds, and amongſt them *Midias* that of *Quail*.——*Socrates* therefore, in the Paſſage now before us, ridicules *Alcibiades*, who affected the ſame Taſte for theſe *Quail-Matches*, for thus emulating *Midias*, and ſetting up Him for a Pattern of his Imitation.——The *Romans*, who copied after the *Grecians* in all their Vices and Follys, more exactly than they did in their Arts, Sciences, and Wiſdom, were ſo fond of *Quail-Fighting*, that the wiſe and good *Marcus Antoninus*, ſenſible how much

ſtill wearing the Badge [110] of Slavery (as the Women [111] would term it) in their Souls, thro their Ignorance of the Muſes;

it was beneath his Dignity as a Man, an Emperor, and a Philoſopher, acknowleges himſelf obliged to *Diognetus* the Painter, for diſſuading him in his Youth from giving into this faſhionable Folly. Lib: 1, §. 6.——This Note is intended chiefly for the Benefit of our Countrymen, the Noble *Cockers*.

[110] In *the Greek*, ἀνδραποδώδη τρίχα, *Slaviſh Hair*. It was the diſtinguiſhing Badge of Slavery in Men, amongſt the *Grecians* and the *Romans*, the wearing their own Hair on their Heads. When they had their Freedom given them by their Maſters, their Heads were ſhaven, and they wore from that time a Cap, or narrow-brim'd Hat, thence called the *Cap of Liberty*. For this Point, ſee ἀντὶ πάντων, *Theodor: Marcilius* in his Commentary on *Perſius*, Sat: 5. v. 82.

[111] This ſeems to be perfectly well illuſtrated by *Olympiodorus*, (whoſe Comment on this Dialogue is extant in MS. abroad,) in the following Paſſage, cited by *Iſ. Caſaubon* in his *Commentary on Perſius*, Sat: 5. v. 116. Παροιμία ἐστι γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλευθερωμένων δούλων καὶ ἐπιμενόντων ἐν τῇ δουλοπρεπείᾳ, (not δουλείᾳ, as it is abſurdly printed,) ὅτι ἔχεις τὴν ἀνδραποδώδη τρίχα ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ· τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ἔτι τὴν δουλικὴν ἕξιν (printed τρίχα, which is explaining *idem per idem*) ἔχεις. *The Women had a Saying, which they uſed to Slaves made free, but ſtill retaining the Manners which belong'd to Slaves,*——"*You wear your Slaviſh* "*Hair on your Head ſtill*": *that is,* "*You ſtill retain your Slaviſh* "*Habits*".——This Proverbial Saying was, it ſeems, by the Athenian Ladys, the Authors of it, applied alſo to Men whom they ſaw *ill-bred and illiterate*.——The Application of it was afterwards extended farther to a Mobile Multitude, gathered together and governed by their Paſſions: for ſo we learn from *Suidas*, in phraſi ἀνδραποδώδη τρίχα.—— See *Eraſmi Adagia*, pag: 426. and the *Greek Proverbs*, collected by *Schottus*, with his Scholia thereon, pag: 357.

and

and not having yet thrown it off, but retaining their old Sentiments, and Manners ſtill barbarian, are come to flatter the People, not to govern them. Ought you now [112] to emulate theſe Men, whom I am ſpeaking of, and diſregard your Self? Ought you to neglect the acquiring of all ſuch Knowlege, as only is acquired thro Learning, when you have ſo great a Combat to ſuſtain? Or ought you to omit the exerciſing your ſelf in all ſuch Actions, as are well performed only thro Practiſe? Should you not be furniſhed with all the Qualifications requiſite for the Government of the State, before you undertake to govern it?

ALCIBIADES.

Indeed, Socrates, I believe you are in the right: But however, I imagine the Commanders of the Spartan [113] Armys, and the Perſian Monarch, to be juſt ſuch Men, as the Others whom you have mentioned.

[112] We have here followed the two *Baſil* Editions, in rendring all the latter Part of this Speech of *Socrates*, in the way of *Interrogation*. Tho *Aldus* and *Stephens*, followed by all the Tranſlators, make the whole Speech to be *Aſſertive*, and conſequently *Ironical*; as thus,—— "*You ought*" &c. But the carrying on the Irony to ſo great a length, we fear, gradually deſtroys all its Poignancy.

[113] The Spartan Armys were always led into the Field, and commanded, by one or other of their *Two Kings*: excepting that, when Either of them was under the Age of Manhood, his place was ſupplied by his *Guardian*, who was always the neareſt Male-Relation to him by his Father, being of mature Age.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

But, my very good Sir, consider this Imagination of yours, what Evils attend on it.

ALCIBIADES.

In what respects?

SOCRATES.

In the first place; What Opinion concerning your Antagonists, do you think would engage you to take most Care about your Self? whether, the Opinion of their being formidable, or the contrary?

ALCIBIADES.

The Opinion, without doubt, of their being formidable.

SOCRATES.

And do you think it would do you any Harm, to take Care about your Self?

ALCIBIADES.

None at all; but on the contrary, great Good?

SOCRATES.

The Want of this great Good then is One of the Evils, which attend on that Imagination.

ALCIBIADES.

It is true.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Conſider, if there be not probably Another too; and that is the Falſity of it.

ALCIBIADES.

How do you prove that?

SOCRATES.

Whether is it probable, that Perſons, the moſt excellent in their natural Diſpoſitions "[4], are to be found amongſt Thoſe who deſcend from Anceſtors the nobleſt? "[5] or is it not?

ALCI-

[114] We are aſtoniſhed to find φύσεις here printed in all the Editions of *Plato*. The Senſe evidently requires us to read φύσεως: And it appears alſo from the *Latin* Tranſlation made by *Ficinus*, and from That alſo by *Cornarius*, that They read φύσεις in the Manuſcripts, from which they made their Tranſlations.——Had *Le Fevre* been aware of this, he would have ſpared himſelf the trouble of writing a long Note, to prove that Hereditary Monarchs and Great Lords are not always the Beſt of Men.——*Socrates* here is not aſking——Who, probably, are the Beſt Men;——for This would be to anticipate the Concluſion of his Reaſoning, in the very Beginning of it; but——Who, probably, have the Beſt Natural Diſpoſitions.

[115] With this agrees the Opinion of *Ariſtotle*, in his *Politicks*, Lib: 3. Cap: 8. Βελτίους εἰκὸς τοὺς ἐκ βελτιόνων· εὐγένεια γάρ ἐστιν ἀρετὴ γένους. *It is likely, that from the Beſt Anceſtors ſhould ſpring the Beſt Men. For to be well-born is to be of a Good* or Virtuous *Family*. (that is, *Nobility is Family-Virtue.)* The Reaſonableneſs of this Opinion the great Maſter of all Lyric Poetry proves by Analogy from Brute Animals, in theſe Verſes of the 4th Ode of his 4th Book;

Fortes

ALCIBIADES.

Undoubtedly, it is.

SOCRATES.

And is it not probable, that Such as have excellent Diſpoſitions from Nature, if they meet with a ſuitable Education [116], ſhould become accompliſhed in Virtue?

Fortes creantur fortibus et bonis.
Eſt in juvencis, eſt in equis patrum
Virtus; nec imbellem feroces
Progenerant aquilæ columbam.

Brave Men are Offſprings of the Brave and Good.
Heifers and Horſes ſtill retain
The Virtue of their Sires: in vain
May one expect to find a timorous Brood,
Such as the weak unwarlike Dove,
Sprung from an Eagle fierce, the daring Bird of Jove.

[116] In the forming of a Good Man, the *firſt* eſſential Requiſite is a *Natural Diſpoſition* to thorow Honeſty or Goodneſs. The *ſecond* is an *Education* in the true *Principles* of this Honeſty. Both theſe Requiſites are uſually mentioned together by our Philoſopher, wherever he takes occaſion to lay down the neceſſary Foundations of a Virtuous Character. It will be ſufficient to cite the following Paſſage from his *Menexenus*, in Mr. *Weſt*'s excellent Tranſlation; where he thus ſpeaks of thoſe *Athenians* who were ſlain in the ſervice of their Country;—"*That* "*they were virtuous, was owing to their being ſprung from Virtuous* "*Anceſtors. Let us then celebrate, in the firſt place, their Noble Birth*; "*in the ſecond, their Nurture and Education*".

ALCIBIADES.

Of neceſſity they muſt.

SOCRATES.

Let us conſider now, in comparing Their Advantages with our own, whether the Kings of Sparta and of Perſia ſeem to be deſcended from meaner Anceſtors than We are. Know we not, that Thoſe [117] are Deſcendants of Hercules, and Theſe [118] of Achæmenes? that the Begetting of Hercules is attributed to Jupiter [119], and the Anceſtry of Achæmenes to Perſeus, the Son of Jupiter?

[117] The Pedigrees of *Leonidas* and *Leotychides*, the Two Kings of *Sparta*, at the time of the Expedition of *Xerxes* into *Greece*, may be ſeen in *Herodotus*, drawn in a direct Male-Line. That of *Leonidas*, in Lib: 7, pag: 447, Edit: *Gronov:* and That of *Leotychides*, in Lib: 8, pag: 502. By which it appears that Each of them was about the Twentieth in Deſcent from *Hercules*.

[118] The Lineal Deſcent of *Xerxes* from *Achæmenes*, to whom *Horace* gives the Epithet of "*dives*", *the rich*, is boaſted of by *Xerxes* himſelf, in the Hiſtories of *Herodotus*, Lib: 7, pag: 386; where he recites the Names of all his intermediate Anceſtors.——From *Achæmenes* were all of his Poſterity called *Achæmenidæ*; as all of the Race of *Hercules* were from Him called *Heraclidæ*.

[119] The *Greek*, as printed, is in this place evidently deficient. For, immediately after the Words τὸ δὲ Ἡρακλέους τε γένος, that the Words εἰς τὸν Δία are dropt, and ought to be reſtored, there needs no Proof to Any, who are at all acquainted with the ancient Fables of *the Greeks*. They well know, that *Hercules* was never ſuppoſed to be deſcended from *Perſeus*, as he is here made to be, in the printed Greek Text.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

And the Family which I am of, O Socrates! deſcends from Euryſaces; and the Deſcent of Euryſaces was from Jupiter [120].

SOCRATES.

And the Family which I am of, my noble Alcibiades! deſcends from Dædalus [121]; and the Deſcent of Dædalus was

[120] *Ajax*, the Father of *Euryſaces*, (ſee page 26.) was the Son of *Telamon*, who was the Son of *Æacus*, who was vulgarly believed to be the Son of *Jupiter*.

[121] That *Socrates* does not mean Deſcent *properly*, or in a *Corporeal* Senſe, but *figuratively*, in a *Mental* Senſe only, never has nor ever could be doubted of. But Meſſrs. *Le Fevre* and *Dacier* call this Figurative Expreſſion *Raillerie*. To Us it ſeems to be partly *Jocoſe*, and partly *Serious*; and perhaps it will ſeem ſo to Some of our Readers too, if they turn to *the Banquet*, page 190 of our Tranſlation, and to the *Note* to that Dialogue 161.——Farther let it be obſerved, that in *the Euthyphro*, pag: 44 of Dr. *Forſter*'s Edition, where *Socrates* ſtyles himſelf *a Deſcendant of Dædalus*, he does not mean to *railly* or banter either *Euthyphro* or any other Perſon; but with harmleſs and true Humour uſes a Metaphor, taken from Man's *Natural* and *Corporeal* Generation, to expreſs the *Propagation* of Arts from one *Mind* to another thro *Teaching*, and a Succeſſion of Artiſts in the ſame Way by *Deſcent of Doctrine*.——Agreeably to this, in the Jewiſh and Chriſtian Religions, it has been cuſtomary to call the *Teachers* and *Diſciples* by the Names of *Fathers* and *Children*; and to term theſe Children, according to the natural Diſtinction of their Sex, either *Sons* or *Daughters*. Uſing the ſame Kind of Metaphor, tho in a Senſe more juſt, as well as more ſublime, the *Platonic* and *Stoic* Philoſophers call the *Divine Mind* the *Father* of all Rational Beings.

from Vulcan, the Son of Jupiter [122]. But the Pedigree of Thoſe,

[122] Let us now look back a little on the Genealogys of the *Kings of Sparta*, on that of the *Perſian Monarch*, and on that of *Alcibiades*. We find *Jupiter* at the *Head* of all the *Three*. Let us examine next the Reaſons, for which he is there placed: and we ſhall find, if we conſult the Hiſtorys of the Fabulous Ages, that *Hercules* was ſuppoſed to be the *Son of Jupiter*, on account of his Heroic Virtue, his *Magnanimity*, in uſing that ſuperior Strength of Body, with which he was veſted, not to acquire forcibly and violently Wealth or Dominion to Himſelf, but to ſecure the juſt Propertys and Rights of all his Countrymen from the Violence and Oppreſſion of the Lawleſs.——We ſhall find, that the ſame *Divine Generation* was reported of *Æacus*, on account of his *upright Adminiſtration of Juſtice* in the Iſland of *Ægina*, which he was Lord of.——We ſhall find, that *Perſeus* had the like Honour attributed to Him, on account of his Superiority to other Men in the *Human Virtues*, which the ancient Mythology perſonified, and repreſented as the Offspring of *Jupiter*. See *Natalis Comes*, Lib: 7. ——If theſe things are all found true, let us next conſider, whether the Metaphor of *Divine Parentage* be not in all theſe caſes perfectly juſt; and whether *Magnanimity*, the Virtue of *Heroes*, *Patriots*, and *Philoſophers*,——*Judicial Equity*, the proper Virtue of *Kings* and *Magiſtrates*, ——and every *Private Virtue*, which belongs to *Man*, can ſpring from any other Source, than from the Divine Mind,——the Creator and Lawgiver of the Univerſe,——the Father and King of all Rational Beings,——imparting to them in different degrees the *Knowlege* of true *Good*,——endowing Some Minds, in greater meaſure than Others, with that *Conſciouſneſs* of their *native Dignity*, which raiſes them *above External Things*,——with that *Knowlege* of the whole *Soul of Man*, his Reaſon and his Paſſions, together with that *Senſe* of impartial Juſtice, Equity and Candour, which Knowlege and which Senſe qualifie a Man for *Government*,——and with that ſuperiour Strength of Reaſon, and the

Power

Thoſe, with whom we ſet our Selves in compariſon [123], beginning from the Perſons who now reign, exhibits a Race of Kings,

Power of it over Paſſion, in which conſiſts every *Private Virtue*.——And now let us reaſon a little farther, and conſider, whether we may not as juſtly ſay, uſing the ſame Metaphor, and a like Allegory, that *Vulcan*, or whoever elſe invented and taught the Arts of working on Metals, Minerals, and Foſſils, Arts ſo neceſſary to Human Life, that He too was the *Son of Jupiter*. For whence is every *Art* derived immediately, but from the *Powers* of the *Human Mind?* and whence are derived thoſe Powers, but from the *Nature of Mind*, from Eſſential *Mind its Self*, Mind *Univerſal and Divine?*——This is the *ſerious* Senſe of what *Socrates* here ſays: the jocoſe or humorous Part of it is that, where he ſtyles himſelf a *Deſcendant* of *Dædalus*, as having been bred a *Statuary* by his Father, who was a Statuary himſelf. But here too there is uſed a Mixture of the ſame juſt Metaphor, to expreſs This,——that from the Arts of caſting, moulding and carving Metals, Minerals and Foſſils, aroſe in time the Art of Statuary, and the other Mimetic Arts of the ſame Tribe.——We are a little ſuſpicious, that in this Metaphorical Senſe only was *Plato* ſaid to be *deſcended* from *Codrus*, the laſt and beſt *King of the Athenians*, and from *Solon* their wiſeſt *Legiſlator*,——in that he *inherited*, as it were, the magnanimous and *Patriotic Spirit* of the former, and the *Legiſlative Wiſdom* of the latter.

[123] Thus far, *Alcibiades* appears the Equal of the *Kings of Sparta*, and even of the Great *King of Perſia*, in comparing together their illuſtrious Deſcents. But at the ſame time it muſt be confeſſed, that *Socrates* appears ſo too. So that *Socrates*, thus far, is found the Equal of *Alcibiades*. This Equality was a Circumſtance very humiliating to that proud young Nobleman, notwithſtanding the Jocoſeneſs of the Philoſopher in recounting his own Metaphorical Genealogy. For the firſt and higheſt Step, in the Pedigrees of all theſe Perſons, whoſe Familys were ſo different, was equally Metaphorical; they had, all of them, in the

Kings, all of them Sons of Kings, in a direct Line quite up to Jupiter; Thoſe, whom I firſt mentioned, Kings of Argos and Lacedæmon; the Others, Kings of Perſia perpetually, and often of all Aſia [124], as they are at preſent: whereas We are but Private Men, our Selves and our Fathers. If You then were to boaſt of your Anceſtors, and pompouſly ſay, that Salamis was the hereditary Dominion of Euryſaces; or, to aſcend higher in your Anceſtry, that Æacus governed in his native Country, Ægina [125]; can you imagine how ridiculous you would appear in the eyes of Artaxerxes [126], the Son of Xerxes? Conſider beſides, whether we may not be found inferior to thoſe great Men, not only in the Pride of Anceſtry, but alſo in the Care taken of our Birth and Breeding. Are you not ſenſible of the ſingular Advantages, which attend the Progeny of the Spartan Kings, in this reſpect, that their Wives have a Guard of State appointed

the ſame Senſe, one common Anceſtor.——*Socrates* after this, lays aſide his Metaphor, and compares the Pedigree of *Alcibiades* with thoſe of *the Kings* before-mentioned, from Father to Son, in the way of *Natural Generation*, as far back as they could be traced.

[124] Meaning the *Leſſer Aſia*, now called *Natolia*.

[125] *Salamis* and *Ægina* being but ſmall Iſlands in the *Saronic Bay*, oppoſite to *Attica*.——*Æacus* had *Ægina* in Sovereignty, by inheritance from his Mother. How it came not to deſcend to *Euryſaces* from his Great-Grandfather *Æacus*, and how his Grandfather *Telamon* came to be Lord of *Salamis*, may be accounted for eaſily, from what we read in the *Metamorphoſes* of *Antoninus Liberalis*, Cap: 38.

[126] *Artaxerxes*, at the ſuppoſed time of this Dialogue, was the reigning *King of Perſia*.

for

for them by the Ephori[127]; to the end that no King of theirs may be the Iſſue of ſtolen Embraces, or have for his real Father any other Man, than a Deſcendant of Hercules[128]? And as to the Perſian King, ſo greatly is He our Superior with regard to this Point, that none of his Subjects entertain the leaſt Suſpicion of his having any other

[127] Theſe were the ſupreme Judicial Magiſtrates in *Lacedæmon:* they were alſo the Guardians and Protectors of the Laws, the Kingdom, and the Common Weal.

[128] This *Lacedæmonian* Law, or Cuſtom, is not, ſo far as we can find, recorded by any other Ancient Writer. And ſuch of the Moderns, as treat of Grecian Antiquitys, wherever they mention it, only cite the Paſſage of *Plato*, now before us. But how careful the *Ephori* were, not to ſuffer any Perſon to ſit on either of their Regal Thrones, who was not deſcended in the Male Line from either *Euryſthenes* or his Brother *Procles*, their firſt Kings of the Race of *Hercules*, we may conjecture from two remarkable Inſtances; one of them, recorded by *Herodotus*, the other by *Plutarch*, and Both of them by *Pauſanias* in *Laconicis*.——The Firſt is the Caſe of *Demaratus*, the Son of *Ariſto*, who was barred of his hereditary Right to the Crown, becauſe his Mother *Timea* was delivered of him Seven Months after her Marriage with King *Ariſto:* for it was thence concluded by the *Ephori*, that he was begotten by his Mother's former Huſband, who had parted from her about Seven Months before the Birth of her Son.——The other Caſe is that of *Leotychidas*, who was by the *Ephori* excluded from the Succeſſion to the Crown, becauſe King *Agis*, his nominal and legal Father, had been abſent from the Queen, his Conſort, more than Ten Months before ſhe was brought to Bed.——It muſt, however, be acknowleged, that other concurring Circumſtances were not wanting, to induce a reaſonable ſuſpicion of the Queen's unfaithfulneſs to the King's Bed, in each of theſe Caſes.

Father,

Father, than the King his Predeceſſor. The Conſort therefore of the King of Perſia is under no Reſtraint, but That of her own Dread of the evil Conſequences [129], ſhould ſhe diſhonour

[129] In the Greek, ὐ φρυρεῖται——ἀλλ' ἢ ὑπὸ φόβυ. literally tranſlated, *has no other Guard to ſecure her* [Chaſtity] *than that of Fear.* Our Paraphraſe of this Paſſage we take to be agreeable to the Senſe. For What is the Object of Fear, beſides Evil, not immediately preſent, but expected? And Whoſe Fear, beſides her own, can of its ſelf be any Reſtraint or Guard on a Wife's Chaſtity? In the Male Sex, Some will always be found, daring enough to violate it, in ſpite of any Evil, ever ſo likely to be the Conſequence, if they are invited by the Lady's Inclination, made known to them, and are at the ſame time urged ſtrongly by their own. What then were the Evil Conſequences, which the *Conſorts* of the *Perſian Kings* were afraid ſhould follow their Unchaſtity, and which the *Conſorts* of the *Spartan Kings* were not afraid of? It ſhould ſeem, from what precedes juſt before, that the former, being always the King's neareſt Relations, (among ſuch Females of the Blood Royal as were ſuitable to him in point of Age,) and being bred up to think the *Achæmenidæ*, or Race of *Achæmenes*, Beings ſuperior to the reſt of Human Kind, *diſdained* and therefore *dreaded* to be the Mothers of any Princes, whoſe Blood ſhould be leſs *Achæmenian* than their own: whereas the Laws of the *Lacedæmonians* permitted their Kings to marry with any of their Country Women, denying that Honour to None but Foreigners.——Notwithſtanding the Weight of this Argument, *(quod valeat quantum valere poſſit,)* we are inclined to think, that the φόβος, *the Fear*, which ſo effectually ſecured the Chaſtity of the *Queen of Perſia*, was either the *Fear* of being guilty of a *Bad Action*, ——the Fear of *Diſhoneſty*, and Infidelity to her Huſband,——That Sort of *Fear*, which always attends on *Shame*,——on the *Shame* of doing an Evil Deed,——on *Shame* in one's own Eyes, and *Reverence* of one's *Self*;—— or elſe it was the Fear of Diſgrace and Infamy, which always attends on

diſhonour the King's Bed. Farther, when the King's eldeſt Son, the Heir apparent to the Crown, is born, all the King's Subjects in the City of his Reſidence keep that Day an original Feaſt-Day: and from thence forward the Anniverſary of that Day is celebrated with Sacrifices and Feaſts by all Aſia [130]. But when We came firſt into the World, alas, Alcibiades! *our very Neighbours*, as [131] the Comic Poet ſays, *little knew what happen'd*. After this, the Child is brought up, not by ſome inſignificant Nurſe, but by the Beſt [132] Eunuchs

on Awe or Reverence of Others; according to the following Hemiſtick of the old Poet, as it is explained by *Plato* in his *Euthyphro*, and by *Plutarch* in his *Life of Cleomenes*,——ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς. *Where Fear is, there is Awe.* Whereas the *Spartan Dames* were much leſs delicate on this head; having Huſbands as complaiſant to their Wives Will, and as wilfully blind to their Frailty, as the moſt faſhionable married Men of modern times in thoſe European Nations, generally deemed the moſt polite.

[130] See Note 124.

[131] We are no leſs in the dark, as to the Name of this Poet, than we are to the Verſe of his, here alluded to.——Monſ. *Le Fevre*, in a Note to his tranſlation of this Paſſage, refers to *Plutarch*'s *Life of Phocion*, where *Demades* tells his Son, at whoſe marriage Kings and Great Lords aſſiſted, that *when He himſelf was married, not a Soul among the Neighbours knew any thing of the matter*. And out of this Paſſage in *Plutarch*, where neither Verſe nor Poet is cited, the ingenious Critick has made a Verſe, to which he ſuppoſes that *Plato* here alludes.

[132] That Eunuchs were highly valued at the Court of *Perſia*, and purchaſed at a great price, we learn from *Herodotus*, in Lib. 6. where he

Eunuchs about the King's Perſon. And Theſe have it in their Charge to take Care of the Royal Infant in every reſpect, but eſpecially to contrive the means of his becoming as handſome as poſſible in his Perſon, by ſo faſhioning his pliant Limbs, and giving ſuch a direction to their Growth, that they may be ſtrait: and for executing this Office well, they are highly honoured. When the Young Princes have attained the Age of Seven Years, they are provided with Horſes and with Riding-Maſters; and are initiated in the Exerciſe of Hunting. At Fourteen Years of Age, they are put into the Hands of Thoſe who are called the Royal Preceptors. And Theſe are choſen out from Such as are deemed the moſt excellent of the Perſians, Men of mature Age; Four in Number; excelling [183] ſeverally in Wiſdom, Juſtice,

he aſſigns this reaſon for it,——the reputation of their Fidelity in all things committed to their Truſt. See other reaſons in *Rycaut*'s *Preſent State of the Ottoman Empire*, B. 1. Ch. 9. and in *L'Eſprit des Loix*, L. 15. C. 18.

[183] *Plato* in this place evidently alludes to the four cardinal or primary Virtues, *Prudence*, *Temperance*, *Fortitude*, and *Juſtice*. But the firſt of them has here the name of *Wiſdom*. To account for which Variation, we are to obſerve, that the Ancients defined *Wiſdom*, or (as it was afterwards called) *Philoſophy*, to be the *Knowlege of Things Divine and Human*.——By the Knowlege of *Things Divine* they meant Knowlege of *Nature*, conſidered as *permanent and invariable*; Knowlege of the *Cauſe of Motion* in *Nature*, conſidered as *varying* continually in every Part whether *permanent* or *tranſient*; and Knowlege alſo of the *Principles* of *all Being*.——By the Knowlege of *Things Human* they meant Knowlege of *Man*, inhabiting this Globe of Earth, and

Juſtice, Temperance, and Fortitude. By the Firſt of theſe they

and having his Frame compoſed of Soul and Body; Knowlege of the *Life*, to which his Frame is fitted and *deſigned* by Nature; and Knowlege of his *Good* and of his *Evil*.——Philoſophy was thus, in the very *Definition* of it, *divided* into *Two* Parts or Kinds. The *firſt* Kind comprehended *Aſtronomy*, general *Phyſiology*, and the *Firſt Philoſophy*, (ſo called by *Ariſtotle*) that is, the *Science of Mind:* the *other* Kind contained the Science of *Ethicks*, that of *Oeconomicks*, and that of *Politicks*. To the former Kind was generally appropriated the name of *Wiſdom*, by way of eminence; becauſe it is, in the Nature of Things, or at leaſt in the Order of the Sciences, prior and ſuperior to the latter; which latter was diſtinguiſhed by the name of *Prudence*.——Some of the Ancients, however, conſidered theſe Two Parts of Philoſophy as unconnected, and intirely ſeparate. For they ſuppoſed, that *Man*, the Subject of the latter Kind, was ſo *variable* a Being, conſidered either in his *private*, or his *domeſtic*, or his *political* capacity, that neither *Morality*, nor *Oeconomy*, nor *Civil Government* could be reduced to any conſtant or certain Rules, ſo as to become a Part of General Science.——Beſides, they argued, that every *Condition* of *Human* Life was ſubject to ſo great a *variety* of *Contingencies*,——and that Conditions, ſeemingly the ſame, were attended with *Circumſtances* both of Things and Perſons, ſo very *different*,——that every Man ſeems to have been left by nature to his own *private* Prudence and *Diſcretion*, for the Conduct of his Life,——nay, that no Man can have any other ſafe and ſure Guide, directing him What to avoid and What to follow, with a view to that which is moſt convenient or expedient for him, in every *unexpected Change* of Circumſtances, or in every *ſudden Emergency* which ariſes.——According to ſuch an Hypotheſis do Men generally think and act at this very day,——Men, who deem themſelves wiſe enough to govern, not only themſelves, and their own Familys, but even thoſe great Multitudes of Familys, which compoſe Civil

States and Kingdoms.——But quite oppoſite to this way of thinking and acting is the *Platonic* Doctrine. For it ſuppoſes, that not only the Simple and *Firſt Principles* themſelves, but alſo the *moſt General Ideas*, to which thoſe *Firſt* are the *immediate* Principles, are truly *Univerſal*, and extend to *all things*:——it ſuppoſes, that *Nature*, conſidered as *permanent* and *invariable*, is the *Intelligible World*, the Archetype (as it were) of the *Senſible World*, or *Outward Nature*; that it contains the invariable Ideas, or eternal Eſſences, of all outwardly-exiſting temporary Forms, as well the periſhable, as thoſe which are permanent and yet to Our Senſes varying continually:——it ſuppoſes, that the *Eſſence*, or eſſential Nature, *of Man*, like that of all other natural Beings, is *definite*, and may be aſcertained, and conſequently is invariable;——that Man therefore is a Being, ſubject by nature always to the ſame Laws, whether he be conſidered as a Single Being, or as a Member of ſome Family, or of ſome Community and Civil State.——Theſe Suppoſitions it ſupports by its Fundamental Doctrines, which are as follow;——that *Mind*, the Fountain of all things, and the Firſt Cauſe of Motion,——perpetually flowing forth, from its unknown Receſſes throughout the dark Abyſs of Infinity, into this viſible finite World,——brings along with it all its own *Eſſence*, introducing into *Exiſtence* the *Principles of Form*. Theſe Principles are, as we have elſewhere obſerved, *Unity* and *Number*, *Sameneſs* and *Difference*. And thus they come to be the Principles of *Outward Nature*, no leſs than they are eternally the Principles of *Mind*. Hence are derived the Sameneſſes and Differences of outward things, that is, the *Kinds* and *Sorts*, ſeen throughout Nature. From the ſame Origin is derived the *Oneneſs* of every *Being*, which is *produced by Nature*: and hence at the ſame time ariſe the *meaſur'd Number* and *Proportion*, the *Order* and *Harmony*, of all the Parts of every Form; for theſe are, all of them, found to be, in Number, Weight and Meaſure, *fitted* one to another, with *reference* to the Nature and End of that *whole Form* which they compoſe. From the ſame Principles, all the different Forms or Beings throughout Nature are, in like manner, ſo *fitted together*, as to compoſe *One great Whole*,——*a World*,

——filled

—filled with *infinite Variety*, according to the *infinite Nature* of the Subject-Matter,—yet *bounded* every where by *Genus* and *Species*, according to thoſe definite unvarying *Eſſences* of Things, which are all wrapped up and lye hidden in the *Principles of Mind*; for theſe Principles, *united* as they are in Mind, *virtually contain*, and therefore *involve* in Themſelves, the Eſſences of *all things*.—Since then the Ideas of *Order* and *Proportion*, *Fitneſs* and *Harmony*, are *univerſal*, and are *exemplified* in every Part of *Nature*,—it follows, that the Ideas of *Beauty* and *Good* are *univerſal* alſo, and muſt be every where *exemplified* in all the *Forms of Nature*, and in every *natural connection* between one Form and another. For to all Beings intelligent and ſentient, *Beauty* always emerges, and ſhines out, from the *Order* and *Proportion* of the Parts of any Whole, conceived or comprehended by thoſe Beings: And *Good* always ſprings up from *Fitneſs* and from *Harmony*,—the mutual *Fitneſs* of things, in the *application* of one thing to another,—and the *Harmony* of the *Senſe* (whether external or internal) with its proper *Object*;—a Good, perceived or felt by thoſe Beings, in proportion to the Kind and Meaſure of their Senſations.—The *Cauſes* therefore of *Beauty* and of *Good* being thus ſpred over and diffuſed thro all Outward Nature, *Beauty* and *Good* muſt every where reſult from ſuch a Conſtitution of Things.—From the view of *This Beauty*, which adorns the Face of *Nature*, and the Face of every *Being* which ſhe *produces*,—from the enjoyment of *This Good*, found in every *Object of Senſe*, if ſeaſonably and duly uſed,—the True Philoſopher aſcends to the contemplation of *That Beauty*, the *Archetypal Idea* of Nature, and of all the Beautys which ſhe is filled with: and attains to taſte of *That Good*, the perpetual *Fountain*, from whence flow all the numerous and various Streams, that refreſh and nouriſh every Being of every different Kind.—Here he finds the *Efficient Cauſe* of all Corporeal Things to be *Univerſal Intellectual Soul*, or MIND, always *in Energy*; their *Formal Cauſe* to be *Univerſal Ideal Form*, that is, MIND conſidered as his own *Object*, all the while that he is thus continually energiſing; and their *Final Cauſe* to be the *Communication* of *Himſelf* and his own *Happineſs*.

—The

——The Philoſopher, being thus, at the End of his Reſearches, arrived at the Knowlege of What is the *ſole Cauſe* of all things, and to What they are, all of them, indebted for their *Exiſtence*, for their *Natures*, and for all the *Good* which they enjoy;——and having long before obſerved, that the Motions, Energys and Operations, of every Being are directed and limited by its own *proper Nature*; and that This its own Nature is therefore the *Law*, *Rule* and *Meaſure* of its Life; (for whoever philoſophiſes rightly, muſt have taken a *General View of all Beings*;) he perceives now at length, that *Univerſal Mind*, in aſſigning to all Beings their *proper* Eſſences or *Natures*, is *the Great Law of the Univerſe*, directing and limiting the Motions, Energys and Operations, of all Beings, by whatever Kind and Sort diſtinguiſhed, and whatever be their different Idioſyncraſys and peculiar Natures.—— From this ſuperior and comprehenſive View of the Univerſe, this Knowlege of *Divine Things*, the Philoſopher deſcends into Himſelf: he views within him *the like* Things: he is conſcious of his having in his Mind *Ideas*, not only *General* and *Special*, but ſuch alſo as are *Univerſal*, and even thoſe of the ſimple and firſt Principles themſelves. He finds, that, whenever he would *judge of* any Thing which he perceives *without*, he muſt in the firſt place view the *Image* of it, which he has in his *Imagination*, *together with* ſuch an *Idea* in his *Mind*, as (from his Preconceptions) he ſuppoſes the Senſible Thing to reſemble or belong to; whether the Idea be *Special*, or *General*, or *Univerſal*, or a firſt *Principle*:——he finds, that viewing within himſelf Both of theſe together, the *Image* and the *Idea*, he forms his Judgment; that is, he makes in his own Mind a Propoſition, affirming or denying ſuch *particular Thing* to be referable to ſuch *Idea*: as when, for inſtance, he ſays to himſelf,——" This is not a Mare, but a Mule":——" Thoſe " are not Buſhes on yonder Hill; they are Animals":——" This " Woman is not handſome; but yet ſhe is pretty":——" Theſe are " not the *Same* Ships, which I ſaw in this Harbour laſt Month; Thoſe " however and Theſe too belong to *One* Fleet, now under Sailing " Orders".——The Philoſopher on farther Search finds, that, when he would

would examine by himſelf, or demonſtrate to Others, the Truth of any Propoſition, thro argumentation or reaſoning, he is obliged to have recourſe to ſome other Truth, or true Propoſition, either already proved, or elſe ſelf-evident, in which there is expreſſed at leaſt One Idea, more general and comprehenſive, than is expreſſed in the Propoſition to be proved.——And laſtly, on ſearching into the Foundation of all his reaſoning, he finds, that the Principles from which he reaſons, and draws all his rational Concluſions, (rightly therefore called the Principles of *Reaſon,*) are the very ſame with the Principles of *Mind,*——*One* and *Many, Same* and *Different*;——*One* Univerſal *reaching to infinite* Particulars; *Sameneſs* of Kind, *diverſified* in all its Species; and *Sameneſs* of Species, running thro an infinite Multitude of Individuals, amidſt all poſſible Accidental *Differences.*——From this Reſemblance of his own *Ideas* to *Things Divine,* the Philoſopher reaſons in the way of *Analogy*; (in which proceeds all Inductional Reaſoning;) and draws theſe natural and juſt Concluſions;——that He himſelf, and every other Being in whom he finds Ideas ſimilar to his own, partake of *Mind and Reaſon Univerſal*;——that he hath thus a Particular Mind and Reaſon of his own, a Rational and Intellectual Soul, joined to no other Body than his own;——and that, as this Soul derives all its native Virtue from the Mind Univerſal which gave it Birth, ſo ought it to be always open to that Ocean of Good and Beauty, and by thoſe ſecret ways, diſcovered by Philoſophy, to have perpetual Communication with it;——for that, otherwiſe, its own Beauty and Good will be dried up, for want of freſh Supplys of Food to refreſh and nouriſh them.——What and how great the *Difference* is between the Ideas of the *Divine Mind* and the *Human,* and how the Communication between them is kept open, we ſhall endeavour to ſhew, agreeably to the Doctrine of *Plato,* in our Notes to the laſt Part of this Dialogue.——The Philoſopher, having diſcovered the Nature and Origin of all his Ideas to be Divine, now perceives that the Ideas which he has of *univerſal Juſtice,* or thorow Honeſty and Goodneſs, are derived to him from the Sovereign Mind, JUSTICE and GOODNESS *itſelf,* the *governing Law* of the Univerſe,

——executing,

they are taught [134] the Magick of Zoroaſter [135] the Son of Oromazes,

——executing his own *Deſign*, and accompliſhing his own *Will*, throughout all *Paſſive Nature*,——and to Beings *Intelligent* as well as *Active*, and therefore naturally *free Agents*, imparting *Himſelf*, to be the Standard of Their Conduct, and a Pattern for the Laws they make for Themſelves, to direct their own Actions by, and thoſe of All under their Care.——If then our Philoſopher has reaſoned rightly from the only true Principles of Philoſophy, the Knowlege of *Divine* Things muſt of neceſſity *precede* the Knowlege of *Human* Things, and of the right way to manage them. For Human Things are governed immediately by *Human Reaſon:* And the Standard of Human Reaſon is That Reaſon, which alone is infallibly right, the *Divine Reaſon*, the Law of Univerſal Nature.——That Virtue, which rightly manages and governs Human Things is properly term'd *Prudence*, or Moral Wiſdom: but the *Foundation* of this Virtue, we ſee, is that higher Part of Philoſophy, which is, by *Ariſtotle* in his *Nicomachean Ethicks*, peculiarly termed *Wiſdom*,——the Knowlege of the Conſtitution, Fundamental Laws, and Government of the Univerſe.

[134] That is,——*the Science*, called by the name of Magick, *taught firſt by Zoroaſter*. Accordingly, we are told by *Laertius*, in the *Proëm* to his *Lives of the Philoſophers*, that the *Magi* derived their Origin from *Zoroaſter* the *Perſian*.——As to the Nature of this Science,——*Philo*, the Platoniſing Jew, in his Treatiſe concerning *the Special Laws of the Decalogue*, pag: 542 Edit: *Turneb:*, reports, τὴν ἀληθῆ μαγικὴν, "*the* "genuine and *true Magick* of the *Perſians*", to be ὀπτικὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἣ τὰ φύσεως ἔργα τρανωτέροις φαντασίαις αὐγάζεται, "*an Optical Science*, "(meaning, poſſibly, a Science to be learnt *thro the Organ of Sight*; "juſt as *Muſick* is ἀκουστικὴ, learnt *thro the Organ of Hearing*; or "rather, perhaps, a Science learnt by the help of *Optical Inſtruments*, "ſuch as *Teleſcopes*;) a Science, ſays he, *which illuſtrates the Works of* "*Nature by plainer Images*", that is, by Mimetic Repreſentations, ſuch

Oromazes [136], by which Magick is meant the Knowlege of Divine

ſuch as *Artificial Globes*, *Zodiacks*, and *Orrerys*; which, being Miniatures of the Heavenly Bodys, of their Relative Poſitions, and of the Order of their Motions, are more eaſy to be comprehended, than thoſe vaſt Bodys themſelves, ſo diſtant from each other as they actually are in Place, and ſo diſtant in Time as their ſeveral Appearances are to Us. ——This Account of the *Perſian Magick* is confirmed by *Laertius* in his *Proëm*, and by many other Authors whom Mr. *Stanley* cites in his *Hiſtory of Oriental Philoſophy*. For all of them agree, that the firſt and principal Part of this Philoſophy, by the *Perſians* and *Chaldæans* termed *Magick*, conſiſted in *Theology* and *Phyſiology*, the Foundation of which was always laid in the Science of *Aſtronomy*.——Agreeable to this is the Opinion of *Philo:* for, in his Treatiſe *concerning a Wiſe Man perfected by Diſcipline*, he relates, and in other of his Writings repeats the ſame Story,——that the Knowlege, which the Patriarch *Abraham* had of the Supreme Being, *began* from the Science of *Aſtronomy*, learnt by him amongſt the *Chaldæans*.

[135] Who *Zoroaſter* was, and in what Age he lived, is totally uncertain. A great variety of different Opinions on theſe Points is found amongſt learned Writers; the Probability of any One of which Opinions, above the reſt, it is an idle Study, we think, to ſearch for,—— ſo long as it remains doubtful, whether any One Man ever exiſted, who was diſtinguiſhed by that Name from Other Men addicted to the ſame Studys. For the Learned in the Eaſtern Languages tell us, that the Name *Zoroaſter* ſignifys an *Obſerver of the Stars*. We have therefore no occaſion to be puzzled with Uncertaintys, when we read of different Men living in different Ages, and different Countrys of the Eaſt, all of them, called by the ſame Name, *Zoroaſter*,——if the Name was general, and given to every Man famous for his Knowlege in Aſtronomy.

[136] This was the Name given by the *Perſians* to the Supreme Being, the ſole *Author of* all *Good* to All.——We preſume that *Zoroaſter* was

Divine Things[137]: and the ſame Perſon inſtructs them likewiſe

called *his Son*, by way of *eminence*. For, tho Philoſophy does indeed teach us, that All Men are by Nature, the Nature of their Superior Part, *equally Sons of God*,——yet the Ancients, in *Greece* as well as in the *Eaſt*, rightly diſtinguiſhed by this glorious Title Such Men only, as, having diſcovered this their high Deſcent, acted ſuitably to it in ſome degree, by being the Authors of ſome eminent Good to Mankind, or at leaſt to All within the reach of their Beneficence.——This Circumſtance ſeems to be here mentioned by *Socrates*, with a view of giving *Alcibiades* a high Opinion of the *Education* of the *Perſian* Kings, by raiſing as high as poſſible the Character of *Zoroaſter*, in whoſe Diſcipline they were all inſtructed.——The *Fact* of their being thus inſtructed is atteſted alſo by *Cicero* in his Treatiſe *de Divinatione*, Lib: 1. and by *Philo* in his Treatiſe cited at the beginning of Note 134.

[137] In the Greek,——θεῶν θεραπεία,——that is, literally tranſlated, "*the Worſhip or Service of the Gods*".——By this expreſſion *Plato* interprets to us what is meant by the *Magick of Zoroaſter*. But the Interpretation itſelf has need of an Interpreter. For it is certain, that the expreſſion, here uſed by *Plato*, muſt not be underſtood in the vulgar or prieſtly ſenſe, to ſignify *Outward Worſhip*, or the Practiſe of religious *Rites and Ceremonys*, becauſe in *Perſia* the *Prieſtly* Office was not annexed to the *Kingly*, but was committed ſolely to *the Magi*; as appears from *Xenophon*'s *Inſtitution of Cyrus*, not far from the beginning of Book 8. We therefore made it our buſineſs to ſearch amongſt other ancient Writers, who ſpeak of the Science of the *Magi* more diſtinctly, if Any could be found, who give it the ſame Name, here given it by *Plato*,——θεῶν θεραπεία, the *Worſhip* or *Service of the Gods*. And in ſearching we found Two, of authority ſufficient for a good Ground of our Interpretation of the Paſſage now before us. For, tho we ſhould admit, that they had this very Paſſage of *Plato* in their Minds while they were writing, we believe 'twill be allowed ſufficient, if

if the expreſſion appears to have been underſtood by Them in a much more enlarged and elevated Senſe, than it conveyed to Vulgar Underſtandings,——that is, in a *Philoſophical* rather than a *Prieſtly* Senſe,——and without excluding the Shows and Formalitys of Religion, to have had a reference chiefly to the Reality and Subſtance of it.——We ſhall begin with *Dion Chryſoſtom*, becauſe what he writes concerning the *Perſian Magick* he deduces from the reputed Founder of it, *Zoroaſter*. Of Him *Dion*, in his 36th Oration, reports, as a Tradition of the *Perſians*,——ἔρωτι σοφίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἀποχωρήσαντα τῶν ἄλλων, καθ' αὑτὸν ἐν ὄρει τινὶ ζῆν, that, "*thro his Love of Wiſdom and of Juſtice, he* "*withdrew from the Society of other Men, and lived by himſelf on* "*ſome Mountain*". A little after, he tells us, that in time *Zoroaſter* is ſaid to have quitted the Mountain, and to have returned to the Converſation of Men,——*not, to that of All Men* indifferently, συγγενέσθαι, ſays *Dion*, οὐχ' ἅπασιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν πεφυκόσι, καὶ τῷ θεῷ ξυνιέναι δυναμένοις, οὓς Πέρσαι μάγους ἐκάλεσαν, ἐπισταμένους θεραπεύειν τὸ δαιμόνιον, "*but of Such only, as were naturally the beſt diſpoſed to* embrace *Truth*, "*and the beſt able to apprehend the Nature of God: Theſe Men are by* "*the Perſians called Magi,——Theſe, who underſtand how to worſhip that* "*Nature which is ſuperior to the Human*".——The other Author we have to cite is *Clitarchus*, who attended *Alexander the Great* in his *Aſiatic* Expedition, and wrote an Account of whatever he thought rare and remarkable in the Countrys thro which they marched. His intire Work, conſiſting of at leaſt Twelve Books, is loſt: but many Particulars, contained in it, are preſerved in ſeveral ancient Writings, ſtill extant. In the Twelfth of theſe Books it was recorded, as we are told by *Laertius*, τοὺς μάγους περί τε θεραπείας θεῶν διατρίβειν, καὶ θυσίας, καὶ εὐχάς· ἀποφαίνεσθαί τε περὶ ὁσίας θεῶν καὶ γενέσεως, ὡς καὶ πῦρ εἶναι, καὶ γῆν, καὶ ὕδωρ·——περί τε δικαιοσύνης λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀνόσιον ἡγεῖσθαι—— καὶ ὅσιον νομίζειν κ. τ. λ. "*that the Study and Employment of the Magi* "*was the Worſhip of the Gods, and Sacrifices, and Prayers*"; that is, the offering of ſuch Sacrifices, and of ſuch Petitions, as are fit to be offered to the Divine Being, whoſe Wiſdom and whoſe Goodneſs are

diſplayed in all the Powers of Nature;—" *and that from* Senſible Objects " *they explained the Being and Generation of the Gods*"; that is, of the immediate Powers of Nature; " *which*, according to Their Doctrine, *are* " *Fire, and Earth, and Water*";—" *that they made Diſcourſes concerning* " *Juſtice*; *and held* certain Practiſes to be *unholy*, and certain others to be " conſiſtent with *Sanctity*".—In the Paſſage, cited from *Dion*, we are to obſerve, that the Natural Diſpoſitions of Mind, repreſented there as neceſſary for the acquiring of this Knowlege, *how to Worſhip the Gods*, were theſe,—*a Love of Truth* above all things, and a *Capacity* of being taught *to think rightly of the Divine Nature*.—In the Quotation out of *Clitarchus*, let us ſee with what other Studys this of the *Worſhip of the Gods*, and that of Sacrifices and Prayers, are joined; they are theſe,—the Study of *General Phyſiology*, or of the Elements of Outward Nature, the Study of *Juſtice*, and the Study of *Holineſs*.—The Uſe we would make of theſe two Paſſages taken together, and of our Remarks on them, is to prove, what we think no unfair Concluſion, that the *Magick of Zoroaſter*, That *Science of the Worſhip of the Gods*, ſpoken of in the Paſſage we are now explaining, is no other than the Science of Him who truly philoſophiſes, that is, *Wiſdom*. For, in the firſt place, the Natural Diſpoſitions of the Soul, here required, we find to be the Same with Thoſe, requiſite for the Study of true Philoſophy: ſee *Plato de Repub:* vol: 2. Edit: Cantab: pag: 30. and Note 143 to *the Meno*. And before the End of this Dialogue, we ſhall learn, that true Wiſdom, even with regard to *Human* Things, is attainable only thro the Knowlege of *Divine* Things, and of God Himſelf, ſo far as Man is capable of ſuch Knowlege. In the next place, the *Study of Nature*, in the *General*, was the way which the Ancients took to come at the Knowlege of the *Cauſes* and *Principles* of Things. For, to go thro the *whole Courſe of Philoſophy*, they began with *Mathematical Learning*; and from hence proceeded to *Natural Philoſophy:* by theſe Steps they aſcended to the *Science of Mind*; and thence deſcended, thro thoſe *Ideas* on which are founded the Sciences of *Morals* and of *Politicks*, to the Conduct or at leaſt to the Conſideration of *Human Things*.—

Agreeable

likewiſe in the Art of Government [138]. He, who excels in

Agreeable to our Concluſion upon this point is the account of *the Magi*, given by *Suidas* in voce Μάγοι. παρὰ Πέρσαις, ſays he, οἱ φιλόσοφοι καὶ φιλόθεοι. "*Amongſt the Perſians*, by this Name are diſtinguiſhed *the* "*Philoſophers and Lovers of God*".——*Heſychius* explains the Word Μάγον thus,——τὸν θεοσεβῆ καὶ θεόλογον, καὶ ἱερέα, οἱ Πέρσαι οὕτω λέγουσι. "*The Perſians attribute this Name to a Worſhipper of God, and a Studier* "*of Divinity*, or Divine Things, *and to a Prieſt*".——Theſe old Lexicographers ſeem Both of them indebted, for theſe their accounts of *the Magi*, immediately to *Porphyry*. For this learned Philoſopher, in Lib. 4. §. 16. *de Abſtinentiâ*, thus writes,——Παρά γε μὴν τοῖς Πέρσαις, οἱ περὶ τὸ θεῖον σοφοὶ, καὶ τούτῳ θεράποντες, Μάγοι μὲν προσαγορεύονται· τοῦτο γὰρ δηλοῖ, κατὰ τὴν ἐπιχώριον διάλεκτον, ὁ Μάγος. "*Thoſe who are wiſe* or "knowing *in Divinity*, or that which is Divine in Nature, *and who* "*attend on the Worſhip of it, have the name of Magi given them. For* "*in the Language of that Country, this very Wiſdom is ſignified by the* "*word Magick*".——Upon the whole,——in the *Perſian Magi* the two Characters of *Philoſopher* and *Prieſt*, different as they are, appear to have been united. But ſince the Prieſtly Office was, as we obſerved before, appropriated to *the Magi*, and no Part nor even the Superintendance of it, belonged to *the King*, it remains, that this *Knowlege of Divine Things*, this *Magick of Zoroaſter*, in which all Thoſe who were likely to inherit the *Crown of Perſia* were early inſtructed, was *true Philoſophy*, or the Knowlege of *Things* moſt juſtly ſtiled *Divine*.

[138] That the *Science of Politicks* is founded on that true Wiſdom, the Knowlege of *Good and Evil*, or the Knowlege of *one's Self*, is a Truth ſufficiently proved by *Plato* in his Dialogue named *the Rivals*. Now, ſince the *Art of Government* is founded on the *Science of Politicks*, it muſt belong to the ſame Perſon who teaches Wiſdom or *Philoſophy*, in all its Parts, to teach alſo the *Art of Government*. And by the way let us take notice, that a collateral Argument may be well drawn from hence,

hence, to prove that the *Magick of Zoroaſter* was no other thing than true *Philoſophy*.——But becauſe in the Dialogue, now before us, the ſame Truth will appear in a different and ſtill brighter Light, it may not be amiſs to point out, What it is which gives that brighter Light; that our Aſtoniſhment may be thus the leſs, in the latter Part of the Dialogue, where it is to ſhine out both on Us, and on the Objects to be then preſented to our View. Indeed we cannot but think, that *Plato* intends to prepare our Minds for this View, by his mention of the *Worſhip of the Gods* in this place; when the Subſtance of what he means by this expreſſion is nothing more, than what in *the Rivals* he means by the *Knowlege of one's Self*.——We may remember, that in the beginning of the preſent Dialogue *Socrates* ſpeaks of *Cauſes ſuperior to Man:* ſee page 23. He reſumes the mention of them again in pages 44 and 45, where he thrice uſes the name of GOD; and he never does ſo, but on extraordinary Occaſions, and in matters of the higheſt Import. In page 80, having, immediately before, ſpoken of Maſters to teach the *Science of Juſtice*, he adjures *the Divine Being* in a very ſolemn and awful manner: and we ſhall find him, ſoon after this, profeſſing Himſelf to be *taught of God*. In the Paſſage, now under conſideration, juſt before he mentions the *Art of Government*, he ſpeaks of the Knowlege of *Divine Worſhip*, as of neceſſity *previous* to that Art, or, at leaſt, ſtrictly *connected* with it. We have brought theſe ſeveral Paſſages together, that our Readers may look at them in one Point of View, and conſider them as tending to this one Purpoſe,——The Elevation of our Thoughts above what is Human. And we imagine, that we ſecond the Intentions of *Plato*, in thus preparing our Readers Minds for the latter and diviner Part of this Dialogue.——But before we can explain the preſent Paſſage, as tending to operate the ſame Effect, before we conſider it as directing our Mental Sight to the Higheſt of Things, we are to premiſe a few *Data*, from which to argue in the way of Analogy.——*Ariſtotle*, in his *Phyſicks*, Lib: 2, Cap: 2, argues hypothetically from this Poſition, that *Art imitates Nature*; a Poſition, which ſeems to have been laid down by ſome Philoſopher

loſopher before him, and which he appears to favour, by making it the Foundation of an Argument, to prove the Probability of what he would eſtabliſh.——As to the *Truth* of the Poſition itſelf;——It is evident, that the *Materials*, on which *all the Arts* works, are *taken originally*, that is, in their primitive State, from ſome or other of the *Forms of Nature*, Forms, endowed by Her with certain Propertys, of which no Art ever can diveſt them.——It is the general Opinion, that the Works of all the *neceſſary Arts* are, either in their Structure and Frame, or in their Shape and Figure, (relative, at leaſt, to the Uſes of Man,) *Imitations* of what is done by *Nature's Self* in her own Productions, or by Brute Animals thro their *natural Inſtincts*. For to Man is given, inſtead of Inſtinct, a *Speculative Mind*, to view all the Operations performed by and thro Nature; *Wiſdom*, to conſider their Ends; and *Reaſon*, Ingenuity, and Contrivance, to do for Himſelf what he ſees done by Her for Brute-Animals, for Such as want thoſe Powers of ſpeculating and reaſoning, and that Knowlege of Nature, on which all Art depends. Accordingly *Hippocrates*, in his Firſt Book περὶ διαίτης, treating of the difference between Art and Nature, ſays, that Men are *employed in Arts agreeing to the Human Nature:* τέχνῃσιν χρεόμενοι ὁμοίῃσιν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει: *For the Divine Mind has taught them to imitate His Works.* Θεῶν γὰρ νόος ἐδίδαξε μιμέεσθαι τὰ ἑαυτῶν.——The like *Imitation* is perhaps not leſs probable, tho not quite ſo obvious to be diſcerned, in the *inſtrumental*, the *uſeful*, and the *convenient* Arts.——That the *decorating* and *ornamental* Arts *copy after Nature* in their trueſt Embelliſhments, appears from the late Improvements made in theſe Arts, thro Men's obſerving the infinite *Variety* which Nature exhibits, in forming the ſeveral *Individuals* of every Species in the Vegetable World, with reſpect to thoſe *Differences* called *Accidental:* whereas the Rudeneſs and Barbariſm of our Anceſtors ſeem to have confined their Views to the *Specifick Sameneſs* or *Uniformity* of thoſe Individuals, and to that *Order* and *Regularity* of Parts, *eſſential* to the *Species*.——And the Arts, peculiarly ſtiled *Mimetic*, make it their *Glory* to *copy after Nature*; and *profeſſedly* direct all their Regards to Her, in whatever they perform: from ſo doing,

doing indeed it is, that they receive their common characteriſtic Epithet. For, tho it may be ſaid, that the *Poetic*, the *Graphical*, and the *Plaſtic* Arts do ſometimes deſcribe, draw, and faſhion after *Works of Art*, Buildings, for inſtance, and Veſtments, Arms and Armour, Vehicles, Utenſils, and Inſtruments of all Kinds,——yet, if we conſider thorowly, we ſhall find, that theſe ſeveral *Imitations* of the *Works of Art* do in truth reſemble the *deſigning* or *planning* Part of thoſe Arts, whoſe Works they imitate; the *Deſigns* or *Plans* of which Works, as we before obſerved, *follow Nature*.——It will be very appoſite to the Point we have in View, to obſerve alſo on this occaſion, that in theſe *Mimetic Arts* the *beſt Artiſts* will always be Thoſe, who enter deepeſt into *Nature's Meaning*;——Thoſe, who converſe ofteneſt with the great *Deſigning Mind*, and with His perfect and pure *Ideas*; and who thence, in their own Deſigns, have principally a Regard to thoſe Ideas, the *Originals* from which all *Nature's* own Forms are *copied*.——Now, if it be true, that *all the Arts imitate Nature*, it ſhould ſeem, that the *Art of Kingly Government*, the nobleſt of all *Arts*, inaſmuch as *Man*, the Subject of it, is the nobleſt of all *Subjects*, imitates or copies after the *Government of the Univerſe* by Univerſal *Mind*. The Probability of This will appear greater, on viewing the *Reſemblance* between the *Government of the Univerſe*, and *Kingly Government* amongſt Men. Their Reſemblance conſiſts in theſe Two Points, of all the moſt eſſential, their *Natures* and their *Ends*. We ſhall firſt conſider the Reſemblance between their *Ends*; becauſe the *Nature* of a Thing can never be judged of rightly, without knowing for what *End* it *is*.——That the *Government of the Univerſe* is carried on for the *greateſt Good* of the *moſt Beings*, (Such as are capable of enjoying *any* Good,) in Kind and Degree proportioned to their Capacitys of Enjoyment, is evident from hence,——that the Creator and Governor of the Univerſe, being eſſential *Mind Univerſal*, and having thus the Eſſences of all things in Himſelf, muſt be ſelf-ſufficient, and can have no *Private Ends* of his own to ſerve;——none, in creating as many Particular Beings as can ſubſiſt together;——nor any, in directing and governing the ſeveral Motions of their

their Particular Souls, thoſe Vital Principles within them. It muſt therefore be of neceſſity concluded, that they are all created, and their ſeveral Motions all directed, to theſe Ends,—their *Common* Good, the Good of *All taken together*,—and their *own Private* Good alſo, ſo far as it may conſiſt with that *higheſt End*, the perpetual Preſervation of the Whole, yielding all poſſible Good to *endleſs Multitudes*.——And that the *End* or Deſign of *Kingly Government* on Earth is the *Good of the Governed*, is plain from the eſſential Difference, by which it is diſtinguiſhed from *Tyranny*, this,—that the *Foundation* of every *Kingly Government* is either the *free Choice* of the People, knowing what they do, as it is in *Elective* Kingdoms,—or it is the *Conſent* of all, implied in their *voluntary Acquieſcence*, as it is in *Hereditary* Kingdoms: whereas *Tyranny*, on the other Hand, ariſes either from *Cajolery* and *Corruption*, blinding the People's Underſtandings, or from *Violence* and *Terror*, forcing and frightning them into Submiſſion.—— The other of the Two Points, in which *Kingly Government* on Earth reſembles the *Divine Government* of the Univerſe, is the eſſential Form or *Nature* of it.——The Univerſe is governed by *One* univerſal eternal *Mind*, ſubject to no Change from any Cauſes without, to none from any Fickleneſs within. This Great Mind governs according to *One* invariable eternal *Law*, the Rule or Standard of Right; which Law, Rule, or Standard, is none other than his own all-comprehenſive Idea, that is, Himſelf, conſidered as the *Object* of his own Intelligence.—— An *Image* of this Government, as far as Human Things can be made to reſemble Things Divine, is the Nature of *Kingly Government* amongſt Men. For *Kingly Government*, beſides that 'tis *Natural*, and in fact *Primæval*, is, like the Divine Government, a Government by *One*: for it is, in truth, the Government of *Law* and of *right Reaſon*, humanly ſpeaking, or according to *Men's Apprehenſions* of what is Rational, Right, and truly Legal: and *right Reaſon*, which alone is truly *Law*, is always *One* and the *ſame*, however it may ſeem to vary, in the application of it to varying Subjects: whereas Tyrannical or *Arbitrary Government* is, in reality, a Government by *Many*, as

many as there are *Paſſions* in the Irrational Soul of Man, or *Fancys* in his fickle Imagination.——We preſume therefore, that, when Artificial Governments were firſt framed, the *Idea* of that which is *the Beſt* was formed on the *Model* of the *Divine Adminiſtration*, and formed by Wiſe Men who had juſt Conceptions of the Nature of the Univerſe. And this Hypotheſis of ours is confirmed from what may be obſerved in that Worſt of all Governments made by Man, abſolute or deſpotic Monarchy; where the Management of all State-Affairs is referred to the Intereſt of One Man,—of a Man, who, being ſole Lord and Maſter, makes his own Decrees to paſs for Laws, and iſſues out, recalls, or alters his arbitrary Mandates at his own pleaſure.——A late ingenious French Writer ſuppoſes, that all the Deſpotic Governments of the Eaſt aroſe from the Terrors of Superſtition. But whatever was their Origin, thus much is certain, that Opinions, entertained of the *Supreme Being*, as if he was an *Arbitrary Monarch*, who had created all things for *his own Glory*, in the human Senſe of that Word,—and as if his own Nature was no Law to Himſelf, and his own meer Will was a Law to all his Creatures, making to be Juſt and Right whatever he pleaſed, and diſpenſing his Favours without regard to any other Merit than blind Obedience,—ſuch Opinions as theſe, of the Divine Governor of the World, have been always found favorable to Earthly Tyranny: and in return, the Tyrants of the Earth have always favoured and encouraged Superſtitions, founded on ſuch impious Fancys. So near is the Affinity between the *religious* and the *political* Opinions of Men; and of ſo great Importance is it to the natural Rights and Libertys of Mankind in Civil Society, that Thoſe, who govern them, ſhould early have imbibed right Notions of the *Divine Nature*, and of the *Human*. For ſuch as are their *Principles* in *Religion* and in *Morals*, ſuch will be their Principles in *Politicks*; ſuch alſo, as far as in their Power, will be the *Bounds* and *Meaſures* of their Government; and ſuch the *Ways* and *Methods* which they will chuſe to take, for ſecuring the *Obedience* of their Subjects.——But to deal fairly with our Readers, we muſt now, before we finiſh this Note, inform them, that

the words of *Plato*, which we have taken the Liberty of interpreting by this Phraſe, *the Art of Government*, are τὰ βασιλικὰ, ſignifying in general *what belongs to a King* [to know]; but meant here in a *limited* ſenſe,—what belongs *peculiarly* to a King,—what belongs to *the Kingly Office*;—not any Skill or Knowlege, which a King ought to have, in common with his Nobles.—It cannot be ſuppoſed, that the *Wiſeſt* of the *Magi* was the propereſt Perſon who could be found, to inſtruct the young Prince in the *Art of War*, in the Art of *managing the Horſe* on which he rode, or in any other inferior Accompliſhments, neceſſary indeed for a Prince, but no Parts of the *Magick of Zoroaſter*. Much leſs ought it to be ſurmiſed, that the *Prince of Perſia* was by *Religious Philoſophers* taught, what has been ſatirically termed the *Science of Princes*, —ſuch *State-Maxims*, as thoſe, which *Ariſtotle* in his *Politicks*, Lib: 5, Cap: 11, and *Machiavel* in his Treatiſe intitled *the Prince*, ſhow to be neceſſary indeed for maintaining *Tyranny* or Abſolute Monarchy; but which all real Religion, true Philoſophy, and permanent Policy condemn;—or ſuch *Coups d'Etat*, as thoſe, which *Naudè* has given us many notable Inſtances of, in his *Conſiderations Politiques*; which are ſo many ſignal Acts of Hypocriſy, Perfidy, Cruelty, and every other Species of Injuſtice.—We therefore doubt not, but that our Readers will be of Opinion with Us, that τὰ βασιλικὰ, *the Knowlege and Skill proper for a King*, meant here by *Socrates*, is the Science of *ſound and ſtable Politicks*, and the Art of *good Government* founded on that Science. —We could mention ſeveral Writers, of Diſtinction in the Commonwealth of Letters, whoſe Senſe of this whole Paſſage is the ſame with Ours, and in like manner connects the latter Part of it with the former: but we ſhall content our ſelves with citing the authority of *Cælius Rhodoginus*, becauſe the moſt expreſs of any. For in his *Lectiones Antiquæ*, Lib: 9, Cap: 23, we thus read; "*Plato in Alcibiade apertiùs teſtatur, non aliud ſibi videri Zoroaſtris magiam, quam divinorum ſcientiam atque cultum; quâ imbuantur Perſarum regum filii, ut* AD MUNDANÆ REIPUBLICÆ IMAGINEM, *ſuam & ipſi rempublicam adminiſtrare diſtribuereque condiſcant?*

in the Science of Juſtice[139], teaches them to follow Truth in

[139] In the Greek,—ὁ δὲ δικαιότατος. But we preſume, that *Socrates* does not here mean the Man who excelled all others in the *Practiſe* of univerſal Juſtice. For where *many* Men are *honeſt and good*, (and to teach the *Perſians* to be Such, made a conſiderable Part of liberal Education among them) to ſingle out One, as a Man honeſter and better than the reſt, ſuppoſing it poſſible, would be of all Diſtinctions the moſt invidious. Neither doth the meer *Practiſe* of any Virtue qualify a Man for *teaching* it,—any otherwiſe than by *Example:* and Examples of *Honeſty and Goodneſs* often operate more powerfully *at diſtance*, thro the medium of Fame, than they do when *near* at hand or *preſent*; for then the Alloys of Selfiſh Motives are more eaſily diſcerned, or, if wanting, are apt to be by bad Minds more readily imagined. The way of teaching therefore, meant here by *Socrates*, muſt have been by *Precept*; and the Perſon, choſen for the purpoſe of teaching the young Prince the Dutys of univerſal Juſtice, muſt have been ſuppoſed to excell in the *Science of Juſtice*, and to be able to teach on what *Principles* it is founded. Such a Perſon muſt either have been ſelected from amongſt the Perſian Philoſophers, the *Magi*; or, what ſeems more probable, from Thoſe, whom *Herodotus* calls βασιλήϊοι δικασταί, *the Royal Judges*. Theſe Judges indeed had, in all likelyhood, when young, been initiated by the *Magi* in the Studys of Philoſophy, but devoted the reſt of their Lives to the Study of the *Laws of Perſia*. For it appears from the Caſe of *Cambyſes*, related by the great Hiſtorian juſt now cited, that the *Perſian Kings*, even on points where their own Inclinations were ever ſo much concerned, always *conſulted* their *Judges*, to be informed whether the Perſian Laws, which were held ſacred on account of their antiquity, permitted them to follow thoſe Inclinations.——We are told, 'tis true, by *Dion Chryſoſtom*, in Orat: 49, pag: 538, that the *Magi* were ἐπιστάται τοῖς βασιλεῦσι, *the Kings Aſſeſſors* in the Government. But the reaſon he gives for it, "*becauſe of* "*their*

" *their Knowlege in Natural and Divine Things*", ſhews that 'twas only for the Purpoſes of *Divination*, both *Natural* and *Artificial*; without which the *Perſian Kings* never engaged in any Buſineſs of Importance; as appears ſufficiently from *Xenophon*. *Queſtions of Law*, as well as *Political Affairs*, belonged to a Department in the Adminiſtration, very different from that of the *Magi*.——With this agreed the Policy of the remoter Eaſtern Nations. For we learn from *Strabo*, in his *Fifteenth Book*, (which is wholly appropriated to the Deſcription of *India* and of *Perſia*,) that *the Brachmans* were uſed παρακολουθεῖν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι συμβούλους, *to attend on the Kings, as their Counſellors*; and farther, συνεῖναι τοῖς αὐτοῦ βασιλεῦσιν, ὑφηγουμένους τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεούς, ὡς τοὺς μάγους τοῖς Περσαις, that *they accompanied the Kings in the Places of their Reſidence, ſuggeſting* to them what was to be done *in Divine Matters; juſt as the Magi did to the Kings of Perſia*.——*Diodorus* alſo, in his *Second Book*, (where he treats of *Indian Antiquitys*, with thoſe of other ancient Nations,) having divided all the *People of India* into *Seven Claſſes*, expreſly tells us, that *the Counſellors to the* ſeveral *Kings* of India, *and the Adminiſtrators of Public Affairs*, or Miniſters of State, *and alſo the Judges of Controverſys*, or Suits at Law, οἱ σύμβουλοι τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν, οἵ τε διοικηταὶ τῶν κοινῶν, καὶ οἱ δικασταὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων, were appointed out of a Claſs, *quite diſtinct* from That which contained the *Philoſophers*, the *Sacrificers*, or Prieſts, and the *Diviners*.——It appears, however, from the Words of *Clitarchus*, cited in Note 138, that the *Perſian Magi* made the *Science of Juſtice* a Part of their Philoſophy. And this is confirmed by *Porphyry*, who tells us, *that Pythagoras heard the Lectures of the Magi concerning the Worſhip of the Gods*, (or Sanctity,) *and the reſt of the Dutys of Human Life; and that he received* (or embraced) *their Doctrines*; περὶ τῆς τῶν θεῶν ἁγιστείας, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν περὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιτηδευμάτων παρὰ τῶν μάγων διακῦσαί τε καὶ λαβεῖν. *Porphyr: de Vitâ Pythag:* pag: 4. Edit: *Rom:* And *ſo much* of *Philoſophy*, at leaſt, muſt have been ſtudied by the Man, choſen to be *Teacher of Juſtice* to the Prince of Perſia. For otherwiſe the royal Pupil could not have received from his Preceptor right *Principles* in *Politicks*; or have been

140 in every Part of their Conduct throughout Life. The Perſon,

been inſtituted in the Knowlege of that *eternal Law* which *governs the Univerſe:* he could not have been taught, that This would be the only ſtable Support of his future Throne; nor that This was the ſure Foundation of thoſe ſacred Laws of the *Medes and Perſians*, which were to be the Rules and Meaſures of his Government.

140 Whoever has only peruſed this Dialogue in *Dacier*'s Tranſlation, or has attributed too much authority to any of the Tranſlations into *Latin*, muſt have been ſurprized, in reading, that the beſt *Moraliſt* and greateſt *Lawyer* in all *Perſia* was employed, during eleven or twelve Years, (for a Courſe of liberal Education in Perſia took up ſo long a Time,) meerly in teaching the Heir Apparent to the Crown *never to tell Lyes*. It muſt, however, be acknowleged, that *Le Fevre* apprehended *Plato*'s Meaning ſomewhat better, as appears from his Note to this Paſſage. The words in the Original are theſe,—ἀληθεύειν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου. Perhaps indeed the primary and proper Senſe of the word ἀληθεύειν is That, in which it is uſed by *Homer*, *Batrac.* ver. 14, to ſignify the ſame as ἀληθῆ λέγειν, *to ſpeak the Truth*. But in the ſecondary and figurative Senſe, it has a much larger Extent:—it ſignifys to have ſuch *Apprehenſions* of things, as *correſpond* with the *true Nature* of them; or to *think* of things, *as they are:* accordingly in *Ariſtotle*, *Ethic: Nicom:* L. 6. C. 7. περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν ſignifys to *have the Truth, or to be in the right*, about the *Principles* of Things:—and thus to *think* is, indeed, to *form* within our Minds *true Propoſitions, affirmative and negative*, or to *ſpeak the Truth* to our Selves concerning them; as the ſame great Philoſopher expreſſeth himſelf in the ſame Part of the ſame Treatiſe, Cap: 2 and 3:—farther, it ſignifys to *act agreeably* to this their *true Nature*; that is, to *behave* with regard to God, our Selves, and Others, *with Propriety*, and to uſe all inferior things *according* to the Ends for which they are *deſigned* by Nature: and This is, in fact to *expreſs*, without words, our right Senſe of the *Nature of the*

the Univerſe,—of our *own Nature*,—and of our Relation to the *Divine Mind*, to our *Fellow-Minds*, and to all Perſons and Things with which we have any *connection* or *concern*, by means of our *Bodys*.——Now thus to think, and thus to act, is to practiſe *Univerſal Juſtice*, founded on *Wiſdom*;——it is *to follow Nature*, the Nature of the Whole, and the peculiar Nature of Man, *Reaſon*, which always harmoniſes with Nature Univerſal;——it is *to follow God*, the *Author* of Nature, the *Univerſal* Reaſon, the *Father* of all Minds, the *Fountain* of all Truths, TRUTH *its Self*.——This Doctrine ſeems to correſpond with the late Mr. *Wollaſton*'s: for in no other Senſe, probably, meant he to maintain, that *Truth* was the *Principle of Virtue*, the *Rule of Right*, and the *Meaſure of* all the *Dutys* of *Human Life*.——But to have clear Notions on this Point, 'twill be neceſſary to conſider the ſeveral *Kinds of Truth*, or rather perhaps the ſeveral *Meanings* of the *Word*, Truth, and the Connection there is between them. If that ingenious Gentleman laſt-mentioned had done ſo too, his Syſtem of Morality would not have appeared, as it has to ſome ſuperficial and haſty Readers, chimerical, and like a *Caſtle built in the Clouds*; nor, as it has to Others, like a *vaſt and weighty Building* on a *ſlight Foundation*; or as it were a *mixt Heap* of heterogeneous Truths, Logical, Moral, and Metaphyſical, without any other *Cement*, than what is meerly *nominal*, That *Word* of ſo many diverſe ſignifications, *Truth*.——Philoſophers often uſe this Word to ſignify *Reality*; as when they ſpeak of the *Truth of Things*: and ſometimes they mean by it the *Foundation of* that *Reality*. This Kind of Truth, commonly called *Metaphyſical*, we ſhould chuſe to call *Natural* Truth, or the *Truth of Nature*; ſeeing that all Nature, without it, would be a mere *Phantaſm*.——In common diſcourſe the ſame Word is uſed to ſignify *Veracity* in a Man's *Words*, or *Fidelity* in his *Intercourſe* with Others, or *Probity* and *Sincerity* in his whole *Conduct*: as, when we ſay *a Man of Truth*, or a true Man, we mean, that the Man is no Deceiver, but that his Appearance, Words, Profeſſions and outward Conduct, are correſpondent to what he *really is*, or to what he *really thinks*. And this Kind of Truth may be fitly called

Perſonal

Perſonal Truth, or *Truth of Man.*——Another Senſe of the word *Truth* is the *Conformity* of our *Notions*, or Opinions, to the true *Nature of Things:* as, when we ſay of any Man, that he *has the Truth*, we mean, that he *thinks rightly*, or agreeably to the *Truth*, or true Relations *of Things.* This Kind of Truth is ſeated in the *Human Mind*, is *Speculative*, and belongs to *Science*, or, where Principles are wanting, to *Right Opinion:* it is diviſible into as many Sorts, as there are Sciences; for to one or other of Theſe every ſuch Truth belongs. One of theſe Sciences, That, which we have now to do with, and therefore chuſe to inſtance in, is *Univerſal Juſtice.* For, tho the *ultimate End* of this Science is *Action*,—and tho all the *Truths*, contained in it, are *Moral*, and referable to *Practiſe*, and therefore may be called *Practical* in that ſenſe, in which *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks of ἀλήθεια πρακτικὴ, *Practical Truth*,—yet, being a *Science*, and converſant only about *Truths* of a certain Kind, (namely Moral,) it is *Speculative* and *Mental*, as all other Science is. We are too apt indeed not to diſtinguiſh the *Sciences* from their ſeveral *dependant Arts*; as for inſtance, we diſtinguiſh not the *Science of the Human Mind*, or of Reaſon, from *Logick*, the *inſtrumental Art of Reaſoning*; the *Science* of *Arithmetick*, from the *Art of Numbering*; nor the *Science of Muſick*, from the *Art of Singing*, or that of *playing on* Muſical *Inſtruments.* But, to diſtinguiſh rightly, *Practical Rules* only belong to *Art*, and only *Speculative Truths* to *Science.* On the *Science of Univerſal Juſtice* depends the *Art of living well and happily*, that is, agreeably to thoſe *Rules* of Honeſty and Goodneſs, which make the Happineſs of all Social Beings; and which *Rules* are founded on *Moral Truths*, the Truths contained in that *Moral Science.* But we muſt here be mindfull to remark, that this great *Art of Life* depends not on *Moral Science* only, but, as all other Arts do, on the *Power* of performing, ſuper-added to the *Science*; and farther,—that *Power*, in this and every other Art alike, (a *Capacity* of acquiring being *preſuppoſed*,) is acquired *actually* thro learning the Rules and *Precepts* of the Art, joined with conſtant *Practiſe*, and followed by *Experience:* hence it is, that a Man may have his Mind well

well furniſhed with *Moral Truths*, and yet be all the while a Slave to his *Paſſions*. For, tho it be indeed impoſſible for a *Free Man*, with his *Inward Eye open*, and the *Light of Truth ſhining* on his Mind, to reject his own real Good, and chuſe his own real Evil,—yet 'tis quite otherwiſe with a Man whoſe Soul is in the oppoſite State, where Reaſon is impotent, and ſervilely ſubmits to Paſſion. For Vice in general darkens the Underſtanding, and inſlaves the Soul; and every particular Vitious Habit blinds the Mental Eye to thoſe particular Truths, which condemn it. Nay, even where Virtue prevails in general, and has no vitious Habit to oppoſe her,—where Moral Truths are habitual to the Mind, clearly ſeen by the Underſtanding, and frequently reviewed,—yet, if they be not always actually preſent to the Mind, if at any time ſhe be wholly taken up with Senſible Objects, and with the Fancys which they raiſe, ſhe will for the time be governed by the Paſſions which they either kindle or inflame: nor will the opponent Truths come again into View, till the Senſible Objects are withdrawn, till the Fancys ſubſide, and the Mind grows cool again.——Truths of this Kind relate to *General Things*, and are the proper Objects of the Human *Underſtanding*.——Truths of another Kind, but improperly called Truths, relate to *Individuals*, the Objects of *Senſe*. Now all *Individuals* in *Nature* are *Copys*, more or leſs imperfect, of ſome *Ideas* in the *Mind of Nature*; and in proportion as they *reſemble* their *Archetypes*, are called more or leſs *true*: but, for any Truth or *Reality* of their *outward Exiſtence*, we have no other Evidence than That of our outward *Senſes*: and if Theſe be true, their Objects real, and the Mediums, thro which they paſs to our Senſes, be true alſo, the *Truths*, which are perceived, may be called *Senſible*.——When any of theſe Truths the Objects of our Senſes, or any of thoſe the Objects of our Underſtandings, are delivered in *Speech*,—that is, when any of our Perceptions, or of our Conceptions, being true, or agreeable to the Truth of Things, either Senſible or Intelligible, are clothed with *Words*,—they form *True Propoſitions*, and are alſo called *Truths*. And if the Subjects of theſe are *General Things*, they are called *Logical*

Truths; but if *Particular Things* or *Facts* are ſpoken of, the *Truths* ſpoken are called *Hiſtorical*, and relate either to *Natural Hiſtory*, or to the *Hiſtory of Mankind*.——Theſe, which we have mentioned, are the *general* and *common* Meanings of the *Word* Truth: for it ſignifys Truth in *Nature*, Truth in *Man*, Truth in *the Mind*, Truth in *the Senſe*, and Truth in *Speech*, whether *Logical* or *Hiſtorical*. But Two other Meanings, *particular* and *leſs common*, are ſometimes affixed to it. In One of theſe Meanings it is applied to Works of the *Imitative Arts*; as for inſtance, when we ſay of any Pictures, that they have *Truth of Colouring*, or *Truth of Expreſſion*: in the firſt of theſe caſes we mean, that the *Colouring* of all Parts of the Picture *exactly reſembles* the *Natural Colours* of the Things *imitated*; in the other caſe, that the *Expreſſion*, given by the Painter to his Human Figures, is an *exact Copy* of thoſe Marks, by which *Nature expreſſes* the different Affections and Paſſions of the Soul. And this Kind of Truth therefore may be called *Truth of Imitation*.——The other Particular Senſe, in which the word *Truth* is uſed, is when we ſay of the beſt *Performances* of ſome *Art*, whether Imitative, Mechanical, or any other, that they are executed *according to Truth*. Here we mean, that the Performance is *agreeable* to the *Rules* of that *Art*, whoſe Work it is. In this Senſe therefore, *Truth* is no other Thing than the *Art* its ſelf, and may properly enough be called, as it often is, *Truth of Work*, or of *Performance*.——We are now to conſider the Connection between theſe ſeveral *Kinds of Truth*, or rather, theſe ſeveral *Meanings* of the *Word* Truth. And here it is obvious to perceive, that *Truth of Imitation* depends on the exact *Repreſentation* of Perſons, Things, Actions, or Paſſions, ſo far as they *appear outwardly*, by artificial Figures, or Colours, or deſcriptive Writings. In like manner, *Truth of Speech*, whether Hiſtorical or Logical, depends on the juſt *Repreſentation* of the Thing, ſpoken of, by the Words ſpoken, wherever certain Words are agreed to ſtand for and to ſignify certain Things. If the Thing, ſpoken of, be an *Object of Senſe*, whether a *Fact*, or a *Being*, the Truth or *Reality* of the *Fact*, or *Being*, will depend on the *Truth of Senſe*. If it be *General*,

and

and an *Object of Science*, the *Truth* or *Reality* of it will depend on the *Truth* or *Rectitude of the Human Underſtanding*. If the Thing, ſpoken of, belong to the *Rules of* any *Art*, the *Truth* or *Juſtneſs* of what is ſaid depends on the *Truth* or *Juſtneſs* of *Human Reaſon*, the Parent of all Arts. Farther; the *Truth of Senſe* depends on the *Agreement* between the outward *Senſes*, and their *Objects*; and this Agreement depends on the *Harmony* and mutual *Correſpondence* of all the Parts of outward Nature. The *Truth* or Rectitude *of the Human Mind*, conſidered as the *Subject of Science*, depends on the *Similarity* of its Nature to that of the *Divine Intelligence*: and this *Similarity* depends on the immediate and pure *Derivation* of the Human from its *Fountain*, the Divine. Juſt ſo doth the *Truth* or Rectitude of any *Ideas* whatever *in the Human Mind* (and theſe Ideas are the only *Objects of the Sciences*) depend on their *Reſemblance* to thoſe *Ideas in the Divine Mind*, their true *Originals*, the *Standards* of all Truth, and the *eternal Eſſences* of all Things. In like manner, the *Truth* or Juſtneſs of all *Reaſoning*, whether Demonſtrative or Dialectical, depends on the *Truth* or true Being of the *Principles of Reaſon*, of Science, and of every Particular Mind; and theſe are not only *ſimilar to*, but the very *ſame with* the *Principles* of *Univerſal Nature* and *Univerſal Mind*, that *Foundation* of all real and *true Being*. See Notes to *the Banquet* 186, 187; and Note to *the Meno* 55.——It remains on this Subject to be conſidered, from what Principle depends *Perſonal Truth*, or Truth of the whole Man; and what Connection this Kind of Truth has with all the other Kinds, thro that Dependance. If we reflect, that this Truth is found the moſt frequently in Countrys thinly peopled, and among Nations called Savage,—ſuch as have little or no Commerce with the reſt of Human Kind,—ſuch as are deſtitute of all Arts, except thoſe abſolutely neceſſary to Human Life,—we ſhall find reaſon to think, even without the authority of *Holy Writ*, that *God made Man upright*, and that Falſhood, Fraud, Impoſture, and Hypocriſy, were all *of Man's own Invention*. But where a great Increaſe of Population,—many Arts of Convenience, Ornament, and Luxury, invented and highly improved,

—an extenſive Commerce, and the free Circulation of Riches, have provided plenty of Fuel for the Paſſions;

And baniſh'd from Man's Life his happieſt Life,
Simplicity and ſpotleſs Innocence;

Integrity, or *Perſonal Truth*, muſt there have other Supporters: it muſt there depend on *Science* and on *Art*,—on that beſt of all Sciences, the Science of Man's True Good, or the *Science of* univerſal *Juſtice*, —on that moſt valuable of all Arts, the Art of living a good and happy Life, or the *Art of Virtue*. For, to preſerve this *Truth*, amidſt the *outward Conveniencys* on one hand, which offer themſelves frequently on condition of *parting with it*, and the *outward Inconveniencys* on the other hand, which often attend the tenacious *holding of it*, a Man muſt *know* well the *Value* of his inward and ſuperior Part, his *Mind and Reaſon*; becauſe only this Knowlege can *raiſe* him *above* all *outward* and meerly human *Things*: he muſt be free from the Tyranny of thoſe Paſſions, which make him *ſtoop* to the *meaneſt* of their Objects, and *ſubmit* to the *baſeſt* Drudgery in their Service; *ſinking* him into Moral *Falſhood*, and forcing him to *belye* his Heart and Mind, not in *Words* only, but in every Part of his *Conduct*. Ultimately therefore the conſtant Maintenance of Integrity depends on a Man's *Knowlege of Himſelf*, and of his *True Good*: more immediately it depends on his *frequent Converſe* with thoſe perfectly fair *Ideas*, which are the continual Objects of the Divine Mind, and are thence communicated to that of Man, whenever he pleaſes to go deep *into Himſelf*, and to withdraw from too cloſe a Converſe with *Outward Things*; until, *habituated to Truth*, he knows how to diſtinguiſh it from *meer Semblance*; and until his own Mind, *aſſimilated* and as near as poſſible united *to the Divine*, is *impowered* to ſtand firm, and amidſt Senſible Perceptions to remain *ſuperior*, *free*, and *uncorrupted*.—This Kind of Truth therefore, by theſe Means preſerved, not only preſerves in Man *the Divine Image*, but gradually makes him more and more a *Partaker of the Divine Nature*, ETERNAL TRUTH, and UNIVERSAL JUSTICE.—Throughout theſe

theſe Conſiderations we may perceive, that all Truths of every Kind depend on *Reſemblances* to *other* Truths, of a Kind *above them*,—until we come to the conſideration of *Truth its Self*, which alone is *One*, and is always *like* only *to its Self*: and in this way of *Reſemblances* it is, that we aſcend from *lower* Truths to *higher*;—from *Words*, to *Things*;—from *Images*, to the *Forms of Nature*;—from *Individuals*, to *Species* and *Genus*; and from *Senſe*, to *Science*;—from *Ideas* in the *Human Underſtanding*, (which are evermore mixed with the Traces of Senſible Objects, left in the Imagination,) to thoſe pure and perfect *Ideas* which are *eternal*;—from *Particulars*, to *Univerſals*; and from *our own Minds*, to *the Divine*; from which depends, linked together in one intire Chain, the whole Series of Forms, invariable and variable, natural and artificial.——What we have now written, concerning *Truth*, is chiefly with a View to the latter Part of this Dialogue, where we hope to ſhew the Uſe of making theſe Diſtinctions. But it may alſo be of Uſe in illuſtrating the Paſſage now before us, concerning the *Inſtitution of the Perſian Princes*; if our Interpretation of this Paſſage be agreeable to our Author's Meaning. And that 'tis ſo, may perhaps appear on comparing that general Account of the *Perſian Education*, given us by *Herodotus*, with what *Xenophon* tells us on the ſame Subject. The latter of theſe Authors, in his *Inſtitution of Cyrus*, relates, "that all thoſe "Perſians, who were able to give their Sons a Liberal Education, "ſent them to the Public Schools; where, inſtead of learning Gram-"mar, as it is the Faſhion to do in Greece, they were taught *Juſtice*, "and in this Study emploied the greateſt Part of every Day, until "they arrived at ſixteen or ſeventeen Years of Age." Now we learn from the ſame well-informed Relator, when a little afterwards he enters into a Detail on this Subject, that, during the Years of their Education, "they were taught Piety to *the Gods*, the Dutys owing to "their *Country*, and to their *Friends*; particularly, that chief Duty, "owing to them all, that of *Gratitude*." In thoſe Years alſo, as we learn from the ſame Writer, they were inſtructed in the *Laws of Perſia*, not only in Thoſe concerning *Crimes*, but in Thoſe too-

which concerned *Property:* and in all theſe Laws they were inſtructed, not thro *Lectures*, but thro *Practiſe* in their own Mimetic Courts of Juſtice, authoriſed by the State for that very Purpoſe: For ſo much may fairly be inferred from the Story, (whether real, or feigned by *Xenophon*, to ſhew the Nature of the Perſian Education,) told by *Cyrus* to his Mother, whilſt he was yet *a Boy*, to prove to her his Proficience in the *Study of Juſtice*. What *Xenophon* immediately ſubjoins to this Part of his account of Liberal Education among the Perſians, will be conſidered in the next Note. He finiſhes the whole with telling us, that "beſides all this, they learnt to *ſhoot Arrows*, "and to *fling Javelins*."——The other Author whom we are to cite, *Herodotus*, relates, that the *Perſians*, from Five Years of Age to Twenty, were *taught only Three Things:* (meaning, that they were taught no other *Art* or *Science:*) *One* of theſe Things was ἱππεύειν, *the Art of Riding*, [on managed Horſes;] an Art, unknown in Perſia, when *Cyrus* was a Boy: for *Cyrus* himſelf firſt introduced a *Cavalry* into the *Perſian Army*; and for that purpoſe, procured *Horſes* to be brought out of the adjacent Countrys, ſeeing that *Perſia* afforded none, of her own Breeding: and *Herodotus* only treats of that Diſcipline and thoſe Manners, which prevailed among the *Perſians* in the Reigns of *Darius* and of *Xerxes*.——*Another* Thing which they learnt, according to this inquiſitive Hiſtorian, (who agrees herein exactly with *Xenophon*, was τοξεύειν, *the Art of ſhooting with Bows and Arrows*. And now, laying aſide the Authority of *Xenophon*, it is probable, that the learning of this Art by the Perſian Youth was *followed* by their learning *all the other* Military Exerciſes, ſuch as the Management of the *Sabre*, the *Dagger*, and the *Javelins*, mentioned by *Xenophon*, where he ſpeaks of the *Perſian* Arms and Armour. But 'twas ſufficient for *Herodotus*, in his general and conciſe Account, (according to the Nature of his Hiſtory,) to inſtance in the *principal* and moſt *neceſſary* of them all, That, which the Youth were taught *before the reſt*, as being the moſt ſuitable to their earlier Age.——*The Third* and laſt Article of their Learning, mentioned by *Herodotus*, was ἀληθίζεσθαι, a Word, which

Heſychius

Heſychius explains by ἀληθεύειν, the very Word, uſed by *Plato* in the Paſſage we are now endeavouring to illuſtrate, and to juſtify our having tranſlated by theſe Words,—"*to follow Truth*".——This way of conſidering *Univerſal Juſtice*, as it is *expreſſive of the Truth of Things*, (that is, of their true Natures and Relations,) ſeems to have been introduced among the Grecians originally by *Pythagoras*. For this Founder and Father of the beſt Syſtem of Philoſophy, in giving to his Diſciples many excellent Precepts, exhorted them above all things *to follow Truth*, μάλιςα δ' ἀληθεύειν· as we learn from *Porphyry*, in his *Life of Pythagoras*, pag: 27. *Edit: Rom:* On which beſt of all Philoſophical Precepts, *Iamblichus*, the Diſciple of *Porphyry*, in his *Exhortatory Diſcourſes*, pag: 114, thus comments,—τὸ γὰρ ἀληθεύειν, ἢ πρὸς θεὸς κατὰ τὴν θείαν ἀλήθειαν, ἢ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην, ἡγεῖται ἡμῖν πάντων τῶν θείων ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων ἀγαθῶν. *For, to follow Truth, both with regard to Gods*, (for the *Platoniſts* of the *Alexandrian* School gave this Name to *Ideas* which are *eternal*) *according to Divine Truth*, (that is, according to their pure and perfect Nature,) *and alſo with regard to Men*, (meaning with regard to our Conduct in Human Life,) *according to Human Truth*, (that is, according to *Human Ideas*, the imperfect and corrupt Copys of thoſe in the Divine Mind) *conducts us to all Good, Divine and Human*, (that is, to Wiſdom, and to Virtue or Univerſal Juſtice).——The Foundation of that Precept is, according to *Porphyry*, this Doctrine of *Pythagoras*, τοῦτο μόνον δύναθαι τὸς ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖν θεῷ παραπλησίους, that *only This* [the following of Truth] *is able to make Men like unto God*. And here another Argument, to prove that we have interpreted *Plato*'s ἀληθεύειν in a Senſe agreeable to *Plato*'s own Doctrine, may be drawn from comparing the Paſſage of *Porphyry*, laſt cited, with this of *Plato* in his *Theætetus*, pag: 176. Οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ [ſc. θεῷ] ὁμοιότερον ἄλλο, ἢ ὅς ἂν ἡμῶν γένηται, ὅτι δικαιότατος. *There is not any Thing* (in the Univerſe) *more like unto God, than Whoever of Us* [Men] *becomes univerſally* [or in the higheſt degree] *juſt*. For we preſume, that *Porphyry*, being a Platoniſt, agreed with *Plato* in this Point of Doctrine: and if this be a fair Preſumption,

Perſon, who excells in Temperance [141], enures the young Prince not to be governed by ſenſual Pleaſure of any Kind; that he may acquire the Habits of a Free Man, and of a real King; by governing, firſt, all his own Appetites, inſtead of being their Slave. And the Fourth, He who ex-

tion, then the ſame Thing, which *Plato* calls *perfect Juſtice*, *Porphyry* calls *the following of Truth*.

[141] In the preceding Note, it has been ſhewn from *Herodotus* and *Xenophon*, that in the Kingdom of *Perſia*, from time immemorial to the Expedition of *Xerxes* into *Greece*, All of liberal Rank, as well as the Heir apparent to the Crown, were inſtructed in *Natural Juſtice* and in the *Laws of their Country*. So that, in *this* reſpect, the Education of the *Perſian Gentry*, (as we ſhould call them in *England*, or *Nobleſſe*, as they would be called in *France*, including the *Gentils-hommes*,) All of whom were of equal Rank, ὁμότιμοι, was of the *ſame Kind* with that of the *Prince Royal*: the ſuperiority of His Education over Theirs conſiſted only in This, that He had the *moſt excellent* of the Kind. Nor was any Difference, beſides This, made between them, in *another* Part of their Education, That which is here mentioned. For *Xenophon*, immediately after the Paſſage cited from him laſt, informs us, that *all the liberal Youth* were bred to *Sobriety* and *Temperance*; and that, to prevent an Indulgence of their Appetites, they eat not with their *Mothers*, but with their *Preceptors*, (meaning Thoſe who taught them Natural and Civil Law;) and not at ſtated Hours, but whenever it pleaſed their *Governor*, who, by virtue of this Authority, could exerciſe the Youth in *Abſtinence*, as much and as often as he found convenient. The only Advantage therefore, which *the Prince* had over the reſt of the Youth, in *this* Part of Education, was in having for *His Governor* a Perſon deemed the *moſt prudent*, and in other reſpects the fitteſt who could be found, for the diſcharge of that important Truſt.

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cells in Fortitude [142], forms his royal Pupil to be fearleſs and

[142] *Xenophon*, as he proceeds in deſcribing the Diſcipline of the *Perſian Youth*, tells us, that about the ſeventeenth Year of their Age, ſtill continuing thoſe their accuſtomed Studys and Exerciſes, mentioned in Note 140, they joined the Royal Hunt, which was always of Wild Beaſts, a favourite and frequent Diverſion of the King, and all the ὁμότιμοι or Gentlemen. That wiſe Politician and prudent General, from whom we learn this, aſſigns the following reaſons for inſtituting the Perſian Youth in this noble Exerciſe.—They were hereby *enured* to bear *Cold and Heat*, and all the *Fatigues* incident to a Campaign.—They became *experienced* in the ſerious Uſe of Military Weapons: for in Hunting were uſed the ſame Arms, and the ſame Armour, as in War.——They were *accuſtomed to Dangers*; and were even initiated in *actual Fighting*, whenever the Game faced about and made reſiſtance, or in its turn purſued and attacked its Hunters.——The King himſelf, in Perſon, was always at the Head of this grand Hunt, till the Reign of *Artaxerxes* the Firſt. It may therefore reaſonably be preſumed, that ſome great *Military Officer* was appointed to marſhall and direct this Royal Hunting; ſuch a one, as in *Germany* is (tho now only titular) the *Grand Huntſman of the Empire*. To the *Care* and *Tuition* of ſome ſuch Perſon the young Prince was, in all probability, committed, for the Purpoſes mentioned here by *Plato*.——The reſt of the Youth, who partook of that royal Exerciſe, were left to themſelves, it ſeems, to acquire *Habits of Boldneſs and Bravery*, thro the Force of thoſe natural Paſſions, ſo ſtrong in Youth, Emulation, and Love of Glory.——What we have thus far written in this Note, and in Note 141, following the authority of *Xenophon*, may at firſt ſight appear to contradict the Paſſage, cited from *Herodotus* in Note 140, concerning the *Education* of the *Perſian Youth*. For no mention is there made of their being taught either *Temperance* or *Fortitude*. The reconciling of this ſeeming difference between thoſe Two Writers, the moſt ancient now remaining of ſuch

as treat of *Perſian Affairs*, affords a happy Opportunity of reconciling another difference, much more important, becauſe it nearly concerns the *Nature of Virtue*,——a ſeeming inconſiſtence between *Plato* and Himſelf. For not only in the Paſſage now under inſpection, but alſo in others, *Plato* mentions the *Four* Cardinal Virtues *together*, as if they were of *equal* Dignity, or nearly ſo, in his *Syſtem of Morals*, and differed only in the Order of *Place*, given to Each when they were named together, an Order too, which is often varied. Yet in ſome other Paſſages he expreſſes himſelf in ſuch a manner, as if he held the *Eſſence* of all *Moral Virtue* to conſiſt in *Prudence*, or Moral Wiſdom:—for that only *This* diſtinguiſhes manly *Bravery* from brutal *Fierceneſs*, and from childiſh *Raſhneſs*; and that, in every other Energy which admits of *Intenſion* and *Remiſſion*, only *This* conſtitutes that *Golden Mean* which is always right and always beneficial;——that only *Prudence* can diſtinguiſh between *Temperance* and ſenſeleſs *Abſtinence*, between œconomical *Frugality* and illiberal *Parſimony*, between generous *Bounty* and ruinous *Prodigality*;——and that, in every other Action, converſant about *much* and *little*, or about *great* and *ſmall*, whether natural and ſelfiſh *Appetite*, or natural and ſocial *Affection* be the Motive, only *Prudence* can aſſign the due *Bound* and *Meaſure*, and draw the *Line of Virtue*. See *the Meno*, page 183, and the two which follow it.——In many other Paſſages again, *Plato* ſpeaks of δικαιοσύνη, *Juſtice*, not as *One* among *Four principal* Virtues,—nor yet as a *conſtituent Part* of the Eſſence of Virtue conſidered in *One* general *Idea*,—but as *the Whole* of Virtue, or That Quality from which every Man, poſſeſſed of it, is entitled to the Character of ἀγαθὸς, *a Good Man*. See Note 22 to *the Meno*.——Thoſe Perſons who have well ſtudied *Plato*'s Dialogues *of a Republick* or Civil State, muſt have perceived the Difference and the Agreement between the Four Virtues, called Cardinal, too well to want our Aſſiſtance in harmoniſing all theſe ſeveral Paſſages together, which ſeparately taken ſound ſo diſſonant. But perhaps Some of our Readers may not be among thoſe Perſons who have been ſo fortunate. Such are deſired in the firſt place to conſult Note 43 to *the Rivals*, and for

the preſent to reſt aſſured, that the Philoſophy of *Plato* adopts the *Pythagorean Syſtem*, briefly related in that Note, with regard to thoſe Four General Virtues, whoſe comparative excellence we are now conſidering.——In this Syſtem we are to obſerve, that *Moral Wiſdom* may be defined *The Virtue* or Excellence (in general) *of the Rational Part of Man's Soul, reſpecting Good and Evil.* Now in this reſpect the *Excellencys* of Man's Soul are of *Three Kinds*. The Firſt is *to know* and to diſtinguiſh rightly between what is *Good* and what is *Evil*: and This depends on *Soundneſs of Underſtanding*. Another of its Excellencys is *to be diſpoſed aright*, to be diſpoſed to *love* what is really *Good*, and conſequently to *hate* the *Oppoſite*: and This depends on *Uprightneſs of Heart*, that is, of the *Affections*. The other Excellency of the rational and human Soul is *to govern* its inferior and irrational Partner, ſo as that its Self may *follow* the Good which it loves, and *ſhun* the Evil which it hates, unimpeded and unhindered: and This depends on perfect *Liberty of Will*.——Viewing our Subject in this Light, we may perceive, that *Moral Wiſdom* infers *every Moral Virtue*. For *to govern* the ἐπιθυμία *Concupiſcence*, or Deſire of Pleaſure, by *indulging* or by *reſtraining* it, *when* and *as far* as it is *proper* to do either, is the Virtue of *Temperance*. To *govern* the θυμὸς or *Spirit*, by *lowering* or by *raiſing* it, *when* and *as much* as proper, is the Virtue of *Fortitude*. For no Virtue, to ſpeak accurately and ſtrictly, belongs to theſe inferior Parts of the Soul: their only *Duty* is an *eaſy Submiſſion* to the ſuperior Part, or an *Aptitude to be governed*. And as to the remaining Excellency of the Soul,—to have the *Affections*, or Heart, habitually *diſpoſed aright*, or according to Right Reaſon and Moral Wiſdom, is to have *Univerſal Juſtice*, or *Honeſty* and *Goodneſs*; for we have learnt from *Socrates*, and his noble Diſciple, *Xenophon*, to make this the *firſt* and moſt general *Diviſion* of Univerſal Juſtice. See *Xenoph: Mem:* L. 4. C. 8.——On the other hand, if we conſider, that the *Excellence* of the *Human Soul* conſiſts in the *reſemblance* which it bears to the *Divine Mind*,—that the Divine Mind is *Univerſal Juſtice its Self*, That Law of Truth and Good, by which the Univerſe is governed,—and that from this Foun-

tain flow the Ideas of *Juſtice* and of *Goodneſs* into all *Particular Minds*, —we ſhall perceive, that the *Pythagoreans* had good reaſon to call *this* Cardinal Virtue, and *only* this, ἀρετὴ ἀληθινὴ *true Virtue*, ἀρετὰ τελήα καὶ πανυπερτάτα *Virtue perfect and all-excellent*, and to give it the title of πανάγαθία *all-Goodneſs*: ſee the Pythagorean Fragments in *Gale's Opuſcula Mythologica*, and the divine Λόγοι προτρεπτικοὶ of *Iamblichus*:—— We ſhall perceive, that *Moral Wiſdom* is the habitual and actual Knowlege of this UNIVERSAL JUSTICE; a *Knowlege*, followed of neceſſity by the *Affections*; as Theſe are followed by *Purſuits* agreeable to them, and an according uniform *Conduct thro* Life:——We ſhall perceive alſo, that *Temperance* is no otherwiſe to be conſidered as a Part of Virtue, (with immediate reference to *the Mind*, that only *Seat of all Moral Virtue*,) than as it preſerves *clear* and *quick-ſighted* the Mind's *Eye*, whoſe Virtue it is to view the *Faireſt of all Objects*, TRUTH and GOOD.—— And farther we ſhall perceive, that *Fortitude* is juſtly deemed a Part of Virtue for no other reaſon, than becauſe it is neceſſary for the *protection* and *defence* of That, which *indeed*

Is the immediate Jewel of the Soul,

THOROW HONESTY: whereas the Splendor of a *Good Name*, to which the Poet attributes that high Character, ſhines not in the *Mind* or *Underſtanding* of its Owner, but merely in his *Fancy*, and even there by *reflexion* only, from the unſtable *Fancys* of *other* Men.——That *Univerſal Juſtice* is the *very Eſſence of Virtue*, may farther appear from hence; that in a Soul, deſtitute of Honeſty and Goodneſs, all other Endowments, whether natural or acquired, are dangerous, and often lead to Evil; and all the other Virtues loſe their Natures and their proper Offices, and ought therefore to change their Names: thus *Prudence* degenerates into *Cunning*, and becomes a Cheat; *Sobriety* joins her ſelf to a calm Gameſter, or a cool Villain; and *Bravery* lends her Aid to an over-bearing Tyrant, or to a Highway-Robber and a Ruffian. That theſe or ſuch other Conſequences do not always attend a total Want of Honeſty and Goodneſs, but that *Semblances of Virtue* are

are ſometimes ſtill maintained, is in ſuch caſes owing either to a general Weakneſs of all the Selfiſh Paſſions,—or to an equal Oppoſition between thoſe of different Kinds, hindering the Predominance of any One Paſſion,—or elſe to the ſuperior Strength of Some one of the better Sort, whether Love of Eſteem and Reputation, Love of Health and Soundneſs of the Bodily Frame, or Love of Peace and the ſecure Enjoyment of a Man's Property and juſt Poſſeſſions: ſee Note 33.—— Such are the Arguments made uſe of, to ſupport the Claims of *Moral Wiſdom* on the One Side, and of *Univerſal Juſtice* on the other, not only to be *Chief* among the Virtues, but even to have been *Mother* to all the reſt. Now if we have fairly ſtated the Arguments on Both ſides, the Conteſt between them may eaſily be compromiſed, by a reference had to the Diſtinction, laid down in *the Argument* of this Dialogue, page 13, between the *Subject* and the *Object* of all Knowlege and all Intelligence. We are there told, that they are *one* and the *ſame* thing,—*Mind*,—under *different conſiderations*.——*Perfect Mind*, That which in and throughout Nature is Divine, conſidered as the *Object of* all *pure Intelligence*, is *Truth and Good its Self*, the *Fountain* of all *Truths*, and the *Source* of *Good* to all Beings.—The Ideas of *Moral Truth* and *Moral Good*,—in other Words, the Ideas of *Honeſty* and *Goodneſs*, —or, in Pythagorean Language, τὸ ἀληθεύειν καὶ τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, (ſee *Ælian:* in *Var: Hiſt:* L. 12. C. 59.) ariſe in all Particular Minds, tho *obſcurely* and *imperfectly*, *by Nature*, the Nature which theſe Minds *derive* from the Great *Mind*, their *Parent*. Theſe Ideas are made more clear and explicit thro *thinking* and *reaſoning*, from materials which are provided by Learning, and are thence collected together in the Mind, but are *purified* and brought nearer to *perfection* only by communicating with that Living Fountain of Univerſal Juſtice, ever preſent within every Mind. The Knowlege, hence gained by Man, is *Moral Wiſdom*, the *Source* of which, as we have before ſaid, is *Wiſdom its Self*, that is, the ſame *Divine Mind*, conſidered as *intelligent* of Himſelf, and converſing with Himſelf, who is the *Firſt* all-comprehenſive *Truth*, and the *Sovereign* all-communicative *Good*. The *Rational Soul* of Man, however,

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ſo long as ſhe is connected with an *earthly Body*, ſeems to be far from ſuch a *Simplicity of Eſſence*, as that of her Divine Origin: *Senſe*, *Imagination*, and *Paſſion*, mingle themſelves in this her Compound-Frame. She enters into this mortal State of Being endued neither with *Wiſdom* nor with *Juſtice:* bringing with her nothing more than the *Principles* of them, a *Diſpoſition* to purſue them, and a *Capacity* of attaining to them, in ſome degree, by ſetting out from thoſe Principles in the Road of *Study* and *Inquiry*. In proportion to her Progreſs in that *beſt Knowlege*, *Moral Wiſdom*, is the Increaſe of her *Love* to that *true Virtue*, *Univerſal Juſtice*. But an Averſion to taking Pains, and a Deſire of taking Pleaſure, (any Pleaſure which lies in her Way, or to which ſhe takes a Fancy,) will bar all Progreſs and Improvement. Before any promiſing Advances therefore can be made, her *Averſion to Pain* and her *Love of Pleaſure* muſt be removed out of the way. She muſt be diſciplined to patient *Endurance* and ſevere *Continence*. Her frequent Exerciſe in theſe *Rudiments of Virtue* will at length beget in her thoſe *Habits* of manly *Fortitude* and ſober *Temperance*, ſo neceſſary to keep the *Underſtanding ſound*, the *Heart honeſt*, and the *Will free*. This *Proceſs*, as of neceſſity *previous* to the acquiring of Moral Wiſdom and Virtue, accords with that *Emblematic Picture*, deſigned, and painted in the faireſt words, by *Cebes*; where *Continence* and *Endurance* are ſeen to *lift* the Youth, who commit themſelves to Their Care, *up to* the ſublime Habitation of *the Virtues*. So that *Cebes*, the Diſciple and Friend of *Socrates*, appears to have conſidered *Continence* and *Endurance* as the *Means* to Virtue; and *not* as *Virtues* themſelves. And indeed they are the *ordinary Means* of acquiring the *virtuous Habits* of *Temperance* and *Fortitude*; as theſe Habits are the *only Means* of preſerving always that *Wiſdom*, whoſe Object and End is *true Virtue*; which is no other thing, than a clear-ſighted, free, and affectionate Obedience to the *Law of all Rational and Social* Beings,—That Law, which divides and meaſures out all their ſeveral Dutys, in all the ſeveral relations of Some to Others,—*Univerſal Juſtice*,—That, which makes the *Happineſs of All*.——For the ſake of This therefore, ultimately, are all other

other Diſciplines, and Studys, all Arts, and Methods of acting, all Exerciſes, and Practic Habits, ſuch as are truly virtuous, ſuch as *contribute*, ſays Hierocles, *to compleat the Wholeneſs of Juſtice*, συντελεῖ εἰς τὴν ὁλότητα τῆς δικαιοσύνης, *that moſt perfect of all the Virtues, containing the Meaſures of all the reſt, as Parts of her own Nature*, τελειοτάτης ὕσης πασῶν ἀρετῶν, καὶ μέτρων περιεκτικῆς τῶν ἄλλων, ὡς οἰκειῶν μερῶν. *Hieroclis Com: in Aur: Carm:* ad ver. 13. Thus, as the ſame Philoſopher ſays in the ſame Part of that excellent Work, ἀρχὴ μὲν τῶν ἀρετῶν ἡ φρόνησις εὑρίσκεται, πέρας δὲ ἡ δικαιοσύνη· διὰ μέσου δὲ ἡ ἀνδρία καὶ σωφροσύνη· *the Beginning of the Virtues is diſcovered to be Prudence; the Bound* or End, *Juſtice; and between are found Fortitude and Temperance*, as being the *Means*, leading to the *End*, and connecting it, in continuity, with the *Beginning*.—Conſonant with this Syſtem is the Diſcipline of the *Stoicks*. For in the *firſt place*, according to Their Method, *Appetite* muſt be totally *ſubdued*; (This is Temperance;) and *Averſion* muſt be *directed aright*; (that is, the *Spirit* muſt only rouſe to oppoſe *real Evils*; and This is *Fortitude*:) in the *next place*, all the Moral Dutys are to be learnt; for when no fancied Evil lyes *in the way*, and no imaginary Good entices *out of the way*, then, and not till then, can we diſcharge thoſe *Dutys*, which are the *Ends of Human Life*. Hence it was, that *Epictetus*, as we learn from *A. Gellius*, L: 17. C: 19. laid ſo much ſtreſs on theſe two Words,—ἀνέχου καὶ ἀπέχου,—*bear* and *forbear*,—as to ſay, that "*if a Man had them at his heart, and had ſuch a* "*Command over Himſelf*, (meaning his Inferior Soul,) *as always to* "*obſerve them, he would ſcarcely ever*, [in moral concernments] *act* "*amiſs.*" But we ought here to obſerve, that this excellent Moraliſt, when he made ſo bold an Aſſertion, muſt have been ſpeaking to his Diſciples, and could mean it only of Such Men as themſelves, Such, as had been already taught the Social Dutys, or *Laws* of *Juſtice*, but had not yet arrived at the *laſt point* of perfection, the place of Stability,—at ſuch a *Logick*, as would ſecure them at all times againſt all Sophiſts, and eſpecially againſt the *moſt dangerous* of all, *Pain* and *Pleaſure*. See *Arrian:* in *Diſſertat. Epictet:* L: 3. C: 2. For the *Stoic* Philoſophers

Philoſophers were too wiſe to think, that the voluntary *bearing* of Pain, or the *forbearing* to taſte of Pleaſure, was in the leaſt degree meritorious *of its ſelf*, when no *Duty* made ſuch *Endurance*, or ſuch *Abſtinence*, neceſſary to its being performed; much leſs could they imagine, that ſuch *bearing* and *forbearing* would make a Man impeccable and perfect. But they knew, that every Man ought to be *provided* with thoſe *Habits*, whenever the *Want* of either of them would hinder ſome *Act of Virtue*; that is, whenever the *Avoidance* of Pain, or other external Evil, or whenever the *Purſuit* of Pleaſure, or other external Good, would interfere with the diſcharge of any Duty, which the Laws of Nature and of Reaſon might at that time injoin. The *Uſe* of thoſe *Habits* is thus referred to the *Facility* of performing, whenever Occaſion calls, the *Dutys* of an *honeſt* and a *good* Man. — But the *Knowlege* of theſe Dutys can only be acquired by *learning* them from Maſters qualified to teach them. For let a Man be ever ſo well diſpoſed to do what is juſt and right, fair and good,—let him have by nature the moſt diſintereſted *Love of Truth*, and the livelieſt *Senſe* of the Lovelineſs *of Honeſty and Goodneſs*,—let him feel the ſtrongeſt *Attraction to Society*, the warmeſt *Benevolence to his Kind*, and all thoſe *Affections*, peculiarly ſtiled *Natural*, in their utmoſt Vigour,—yet the *particular Dutys*, to the performance of which thoſe ſeveral Affections *pre-diſpoſe* a Man, and make him *prompt*,—the *Meaſures* alſo, and the *Boundarys* of thoſe Dutys,—muſt be *ſtudied* and *learnt* by every Man who would truly *know* them. For the *Affections* are as void of *Knowlege* and *Underſtanding* as the *Paſſions* are, and can teach nothing.—But the *Science of Juſtice* is of much larger Extent than is commonly imagined. For the *Subject-Matter* of Juſtice is every Kind of *Right* and *Obligation*, whether natural or acquired, plenary or partial, perfect or imperfect. On this Science, thus extenſive, are founded certain Rules or *Maxims of Law*, the moſt *general* of which are not a few; but being divided and ſubdivided into leſs and leſs general, for the ſake of Certainty and Preciſion, the number of *Rules*, by which all *Particular Caſes* are to be *governed*, becomes aſtoniſhingly great; and,

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after all the Diſtinctions, which have been made, the moſt *Special Rules* are extremely difficult in their *application*. For, beſides the different *Conſtitutions* of *Civil Government* in different Nations, or in the ſame Nation at different times,—beſides the different *Relations* in *Domeſtic Life*, eſtabliſhed by thoſe different Conſtitutions,—the various *Alliances* between Civil States, and the various *Contracts* between Man and Man, ſo diverſify, mix, and complicate the *Rights* on one ſide, and the *Obligations* on the other, that the Controverſys or Queſtions, which ariſe between the contracting Partys, are often almoſt endleſs. Often too it happens, that where Two Caſes differ but in a ſingle Circumſtance, ſeemingly trivial, and are in all other reſpects exactly ſimilar, yet this Circumſtance ſhall totally ſeparate the Reaſons of them, and bring them under quite different Rules of Law. The greater is the number of theſe *Special Rules* in any civil or national *Syſtem of Laws*, the leſs is the danger of any unjuſt or wrong Judgments, given by the *Judicial Magiſtrates* in that State or Nation; becauſe fewer Particulars are there left to the uncertain Arbitrement or Diſcretion of the Magiſtrates. But numerous Diſtinctions, Sub-diviſions, and Exceptions, under every General Rule of Law, muſt render the Study of Law or Juſtice, according to *that Syſtem*, nice and intricate, and a work of much time and labour. We therefore cannot wonder, that the *Perſian Princes*, and the *Perſian Gentry* too, were employed, all the years of their Education, in learning a Science, impoſſible to be learnt in leſs time, wherever the People are in all Caſes governed by *eſtabliſhed Laws*; and under ſuch a Government the *Perſians* had lived for many ages before the Reign of *Cyrus*. It was neceſſary that the *King*, or Supreme Magiſtrate, ſhould be perfectly well acquainted with the *Laws*, becauſe they were to be the *Rules* of his *Government*: and the ſame Knowlege was no leſs neceſſary for every *Gentleman*, or free-born Subject; becauſe the *Laws* were to be the *Rules* of his *Obedience*; and becauſe alſo, out of the Elders of this Rank the Judges, or Inferior Magiſtrates, were always choſen.——But farther, if we conſider this *Science of Juſtice*, as it ought to be conſidered,—as *founded on*

 Wiſdom,

Wiſdom, on the Knowlege of the Divine and the Human Nature,—as including the Sciences of *Morals* and of *Politicks*,—and as reaching even to the *petite Morale*, to all the Rules of *right Behaviour* toward Others, accommodated to their Age, Sex, Rank, and Other Circumſtances of Outward Life,—it will appear to be the only Science, proper at all times for a *Gentleman*, as ſuch, as exempted from the neceſſity either of Bodily Labour, or of learning ſome Art to ſupport his Life.——Thus it is, that a thorow illuſtration of this whole Paſſage, concerning the Four Cardinal Virtues, ſhows how well *Herodotus* and *Xenophon* agree, the one with the other, and Both of them with *Plato*, on a Point where they ſeem all Three to differ,—the Nature of the *Perſian Education*. For what *Herodotus* calls the *following of Truth* is found to be the *ſame* with what *Xenophon* terms JUSTICE; for ſo we find from this Paſſage of *Plato*, where *Both* thoſe Terms are uſed, as being explanatory, the one of the other.—*Herodotus* indeed takes no notice of *Temperance* and *Fortitude*, mentioned here by *Plato* to have been eſſential Parts of *Good-Breeding* in *Perſia*; becauſe the great Hiſtorian undertakes to tell us, concerning the Perſian Youth, *only* what they were *taught:* now *Temperance* and *Fortitude* are not to be acquired thro *learning* any *Leſſons* of Inſtruction, but thro *Habit*,—the Habits of *Abſtinence* and *Endurance*: and a *Habit of Abſtinence* is no otherwiſe to be gained, than by *frequently abſtaining*; nor a *Habit of Endurance*, any other way than by *frequently enduring*. Agreeably to this, it appears from *Xenophon*, who has not omitted to mention theſe Articles of the Perſian Education, that no *Preceptors*, or Teachers, were appointed for the *inſtruction* of the Youth in Theſe;—but to *Abſtinence*, he ſays, they were *habituated* by their *Governors*,—to *Endurance*, thro their conſtant *Exerciſe of Hunting*.——*Herodotus* and *Xenophon* Both agree, that the Youth learnt, and had *Maſters* to *teach* them, the *uſe of Arms*; but ſince a *Cavalry* in the Perſian Army was an Improvement made by *Cyrus*, the *learning to ride* could only be mentioned by *Herodotus*, and not by *Xenophon* when he was writing of that Prince's *Inſtitution* in his early Years. And as to the Silence of *Plato* on this head, we may with great Probability preſume,

and intrepid; for that [143] his Mind, under the Power of Fear, would be a Slave. But, Alcibiades, for Your Preceptor, Pericles appointed one of his Domeſticks, too old to be fit for any other Service, Zopyrus of Thrace. I would recount to you the [144] other Articles of the Breeding and Inſtruction, given to your Antagoniſts, if the Narration would not be too long; and beſides this, the Articles, already mentioned, are ſufficient Indications of thoſe others, which they infer [145] and draw along with them. But Your Birth,

ſume, that the *Art of War* was the principal among thoſe *other Articles of the Breeding and Inſtruction, given to the Perſian Princes*, which are not ſpecified by the Philoſopher, as being (in a *Philoſopher*'s conſideration at leaſt,) Accompliſhments inferior, in Dignity and Value, to the *Four Cardinal Virtues*.

[143] This Part of the Sentence, in the Greek Original, contains only theſe Words,—ὅταν δείσῃ, δοῦλον ὄντα. *Stephens* conjectures, that, immediately before theſe, the Words ἅτε δή ought to be inſerted. We imagined formerly, that the Word to be ſupplied was ὡς, which is often uſed in the ſame ſenſe as ἅτε δή, and might more eaſily be omitted. The late learned Dr. *Taylor* had not then publiſhed his *Lyſias*; the Second Index to which exhibits ſeveral Inſtances, where we find the like elegant *Ellipſis* of the Particle ὡς.

[144] Our Readers will of themſelves immediately perceive, that we had this Paſſage in our view, when we wrote the laſt Sentence in Note 142. They may alſo pleaſe to turn back to the firſt Sentence in Page 179.

[145] For the Inſtitution of the Perſian Princes in *Wiſdom*, or in the ſublimer Parts of Philoſophy, *infers* their Inſtitution in all the *Mathematical Sciences*, and in ſo much *Knowlege of Nature*, as is *fundamental*

Birth, Alcibiades, your Breeding and Inſtitution, or any other Circumſtances attending you, ſcarce any One of the Athenians

to all true Philoſophy.——The Erudition, which qualifys a Man for *Kingly Government*, generally *includes* a competent degree of Skill in all the *Military* and *Imperatorial Arts*, neceſſary for the *Defence* of a Kingdom againſt *foreign Enemys:* nor is leſs Skill in all the *Oratorial Arts*, and other engaging *Methods of Addreſs*, neceſſary for the *quiet Government* of a rational and free *People*.——The *Science of Juſtice*, taught the young Prince, *implies* his being taught *Propriety of Behaviour*, at all times, in all places, and to all perſons; without which Knowlege a King will be liable to loſe the Affections of many of his People, and to fall into Contempt with others, greatly to the diminution of his Authority, and, conſequently, of his Power to govern as *a King*.——The Care taken to beget in him the Virtue of *Temperance*, by enuring him to *Abſtinence*, ſuppoſes an equal Care taken to indemnify him for his Loſs of Pleaſures, either miſchievous or dangerous, by providing him with Pleaſures innocent and ſafe,—with Such as amuſe the *Fancy* without inflaming the *Paſſions*,—eſpecially with Such as the *Mind* or Underſtanding hath a Share in;—Such is *Muſick*, eſpecially the *grave* and the *ſublime*; Such is *Painting*, eſpecially the *Hiſtorical*, and the *Portraiture* of *Heroes* or Men truly Great; and Such is *Poetry*, eſpecially the *Epic* and the *Tragic*.——His Exerciſe of hunting wild Beaſts, for the ſake of acquiring *Fortitude*, thro his frequent Endurance of the Perils and Fatigues, incident to that manly Sport, being uſed only at ſtated times and ſeaſons, it muſt have been thought proper to fill up his Vacation-times, between, with Exerciſes neither perillous nor fatiguing,—with ſuch as are graceful and becoming in a Prince,—with ſuch as would contribute to preſerve his Health, to augment his Strength, and to keep his Military Skill in conſtant Practiſe;—Such are *Dancing*, and other *meaſured Motions*, or *regular Actions* of the Limbs; *Shooting* with Arrows at a Mark; *throwing* of *Javelins*, and

Athenians [146] is at all ſolicitous about, unleſs there be ſome Man who happens to have an eſpecial Regard for you. Farther; if you would conſider the Treaſures of the Perſian Kings, the ſumptuous Furniture of their Palaces and Tables, their Wardrobes of Apparel, the long Trains of their Garments, and the Fragrancy of their Unguents, their numerous Retinue of Attendants, and the reſt of their Magnificence, in comparing all this with what you have of the ſame

and (perhaps) *tilting* with *Lances*; Such alſo are thoſe Performances in *Horſemanſhip*, practiſed and taught in *Greece*, which are often of ſervice to a *Cavalry* in time of *Action*.——And for every one of theſe *Studys* and *Exerciſes*, it muſt have been neceſſary to provide the Prince with ſkilful *Maſters*.

[146] In tranſlating this Paſſage we have differed from the Senſe given it by the *Latin*, *Italian*, and *French* Interpreters. They have, every one of them, ſuppoſed *Sòcrates* to be here ſpeaking contemptuouſly of the Birth and Inſtitution of *all* the *Athenians* as well as of *Alcibiades*, in compariſon with the Birth and Inſtitution of the *King of Perſia*. But this would be foreign to his preſent Purpoſe, which is to lower the Self-Conceit of *Alcibiades* only, and not That alſo of the *Athenians*.—Mention is here made of the *Athenians*, in no other reſpect, than to note the *Unconcern* of every one of them, at the time of this Dialogue, (when *Alcibiades* was too *young* to have *diſtinguiſhed* himſelf from Others of his Rank and Fortune,) as to the Legitimacy of his *Birth*, or the care taken of his *Education*; and to ſet this *Unconcern* of theirs in contraſt with the *warm Concern* of the whole *Perſian Nation*, about every *Circumſtance* relative to the Prince who was to govern them.——The *Punctuation*, however, of this Paſſage is made agreeable to our Senſe of it, by putting a Comma between ὅτεοῦν and Ἀθηναίων, in the fair and laudable Edition of this Dialogue, lately printed at *Oxford*.

Kindi

Kind yourſelf, you would evidently perceive how much you fall ſhort of Them, and would be aſhamed at the compariſon. If, on the other hand, you would conſider the Lacedæmonians, their Sobriety and Modeſty, how ſimple their way of living, and how eaſily they are ſatisfied [147], their Magnanimity and Obſervance of Order, their manly Endurance of Pain and Love of Labour, their Emulation to excell and their Love of Honour, you would think yourſelf a Child to Them in all theſe Excellencys. Beſides this; if you make Riches any Part of your conſideration [148], and in this reſpect imagine your ſelf a Perſon of conſequence, let us not paſs over this Point neither unexamined; if by any means you can be made ſenſible, in what Rank you ſtand. If you chuſe then to conſider the Lacedæmonians with regard to Wealth, you will find, that what We have

[147] The *Virtues*, for which the *Lacedæmonians* were celebrated moſt, are here enumerated: and the *Order*, in which they are here placed, is worth the attending to. Firſt appear the Virtues belonging to *Temperance:* Between theſe, and the Virtues compriſed in *Fortitude*, are placed the Virtues flowing from *noble Sentiments*, whoſe Seeds are in the Human Soul by its Nature; for a *Senſe of* its own *native Greatneſs*, and a natural *Love of Order*, diſpoſe it to that *Paſſive* and to that *Active* Fortitude, which follow in the Third place: and Laſt we find thoſe *Generous Paſſions*, which, if well nouriſhed and directed aright, preſs on *in Aid of Virtue*, ſupporting her when fainting, and raiſing her when fallen, thro Weakneſs of the Body. Perhaps *this* was the very *Order*, obſerved by the *Lacedæmonians* in educating the Youth, and cultivating their beſt Diſpoſitions.

[148] See Page 34 of this Dialogue.

here

here in Attica falls far ſhort of Theirs. For the Lands, which they poſſeſs in their own Country [149], and in Meſſenia, are ſuch, as that no Perſon here would diſpute their ſuperiority in this reſpect; whether he conſiders the Quantity or the Value of thoſe Lands, the Number of their other Slaves, beſides ſuch as the Helotes [150], or the Number of their Horſes,

[149] Meaning *Laconia*.—Concerning *Meſſenia*, ſee in the next Note.

[150] The *Helotes*, properly ſo called, were deſcended from the ancient Inhabitants of *Helos*, a maritime Town in *Laconia*, near the Mouth of the River *Eurotas*, under the Dominion of *Menelaus* at the time of the *Trojan War*. It was afterwards beſieged and taken by the *Heraclidæ*, and their *Dorian* Army, who had before conquered all the reſt of *Laconia*. The *Helotes* were thus made Captives to their Conquerors; by whom they were condemned, They and their Poſterity for ever, to till the Lands of theſe *Dorians*, (then become *Proprietors* of the Territory of *Laconia*,) as their Vaſſals, and, in lieu of the Produce, to pay a certain and fixed Rent to their Lords and Maſters; not unlike to *Tenants in Villenage* under the *Feudal Laws* in after ages.—To the like hard Conditions did theſe *Lacedæmonians*, long afterward, ſubject their own Kindred and Neighbours, of *Meſſenia*, at the end of many long Struggles between them,—on the *Lacedæmonian* ſide, for the Conqueſt of a Country better than their own,—on the other ſide, for the Preſervation of their Lands and Libertys. The *Meſſenians*, being thus reduced to the ſame State of *Vaſſalage* with the *Helotes*, were often comprehended under this latter name: as appears from *Pauſanias*, in Lib: 3, pag: 201, Ed: *Hanov:* as alſo from *Thucydides*, in Lib: 1, § 101. The Scholiaſt to this great Hiſtorian informs us farther, that *the Lacedæmonians*, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ διαφόρους εἶναι εἱλώταις, (for ſo this laſt Word ought to be read, and not ἀλλήλοις, as it is abſurdly printed,) *becauſe of the Hatred which they always bore to the Helotes*, were

Horſes, and other Cattle in the Paſture-Grounds of Meſſenia. But ſetting aſide all This, you will find, that as to Gold and Silver, there is not ſo much amongſt all the Grecians, as there is amongſt the Lacedæmonians, in private hands [151]. For Gold and Silver have now for many Generations

were uſed to call their Slaves by that Name, in the way of Contemptuouſneſs and Contumely.——But *Plato*, in the Paſſage now before us, uſes more accuracy: for, meaning to include *all the Vaſſals*, by whoſe Labour in the Lands much Wealth accrued to the *Lacedæmonians*, he calls them, not εἱλώτας, *Helotes*, but εἱλωτικὸς, *Such, as the Helotes*. Juſt as *Pauſanias*, in Lib: 4, pag: 259, means by τὸ εἱλωτικὸν, *Such a Vaſſal-State, as that of the Helotes.*——*Plato*, by *other Slaves*, means Such as were acquired by Purchaſe, or by Conqueſt unconditional, Them and their Offſpring; and of Theſe, Such as were not employed in domeſtic Services, but were ſet to work in *Agriculture* and other *Country-Labour:* for *Socrates* is here ſpeaking only of the Value of the *Lacedæmonian* Eſtates in *Land*, ariſing from ſuch Labour.

[151] We have tranſlated this Sentence as literally as we could, placing all the Parts of it in the ſame Order which they have in the Original; that we might not obtrude our own Senſe of it on our Readers, without enabling them to judge of it for themſelves. But we apprehend the Meaning to be,—" that no *Private Perſons* any where in the " *reſt of Greece* were Maſters of ſo much Gold and Silver as ſome " *Private Perſons* in *Laconia*."—*Cornarius* however and *Serranus* refer the laſt word ἰδία (that is, *in private hands*,) to the *Lacedæmonians only*; thus giving to the whole Sentence a Meaning, in which it is not true; —" that in *all Greece* beſide, there was not ſo much Money, as " there was in private hands at *Sparta*."—For *Athens* alone, conſidered as *a State*, had much more Money at her Command than *Sparta:* as appears from *Thucydides*, Lib: 1. § 80. But the Wealth of *Athens* was laid

rations been flowing into them from all parts of Greece, and often too from foreign countrys; but there is no Reflux any way [152]. That therefore which the Fox ſaid to the Lion in

laid up in her *Public Treaſury:* whilſt the Wealth of *Sparta* lay all in *Private Hands*; for ſhe had no Public Treaſury at all.—If therefore the word ἰδία, in the Sentence now before us, had no reference to *all the reſt of the Grecians*, it might as well have been omitted: and omitted it is, accordingly, by *Ficinus*, *Gryneus*, *Bembo*, *Le Fevre*, and *Dacier*, in their Tranſlations. Thus the Wealth of *Sparta*, conſidered as *a State*, is made to be brought into compariſon with the Wealth of all the other *Grecian States*, taken together: whereas the principal Deſign of *Socrates* in this place evidently is, as we apprehend, to ſet in compariſon together—the Wealth of a *rich Spartan*, and that of *Alcibiades*, or any other the moſt wealthy *Private Perſon* in all the reſt of *Greece*.

[152] The *Lacedæmonians* were abundantly ſupplied with all the Neceſſaries of Life from their own Lands: and being by their Laws reſtrained from all Splendour and Magnificence, from all Delicacy and Luxury, as well in their Houſes and the Furniture of them, as in their Apparel and the Proviſions of their Tables, they could have no Occaſion to purchaſe for their own Uſe any foreign Trinkets or Commoditys. Indeed Sumptuary Laws were almoſt unneceſſary in Their Commonwealth, thro the Force and Effect of another Law, by which they were prohibited not only from *uſing* any coined Money, whether of Gold, Silver, or Copper, in their Home-Traffick, but even from *having* any ſuch uſeleſs Treaſure in their Houſes. The only Money, permitted to paſs current amongſt them, was of their own making; it conſiſted in Pieces of Iron, of a Conoidical Form, ſo peculiarly tempered, as to be of no other Uſe. Theſe Pieces therefore, having no *real* Value, and a *nominal* Value no where but in *Laconia*, would not be taken by any Foreigners in Exchange for Merchandiſe. On the other

in a Fable of Æſop's, may juſtly be applied to Them; the Footſteps of Money, coming into Lacedæmon, are eaſy to be diſcovered, as being all turned towards it; but the Tracks of Money, going out of it, are no where to be diſcerned [153]. Thus it may eaſily be conceived, that of all the Grecians the richeſt in Gold and Silver are the Lacedæmonians, and that of all the Lacedæmonians the richeſt is their King. For of ſuch Comings-in a larger Share, and oftner, is received by Kings [154], than by other Men. And beſides this [155], the Taxes paid by the Lacedæmonians to their Kings,

hand, all the Corn and Cattle, produced or bred in the fertile Fields and fine Paſtures of *Meſſenia*,—all the Copper and Iron, dug out of the rich Mountains of *Laconia*, and manufactured by the great Number of thoſe *Helotes*, who lived in the City of *Sparta*, and laboured not for their own Profit, but for that of their Maſters,——all This, except the little wanted at home, was ſold abroad and paid for in Gold and Silver: which Money was by the Owners either depoſited in the Temple at *Delphi*, or intruſted to the Cuſtody of their Neighbours, the *Arcadians*; (ſee *Athenæus* Lib: 6. pag: 233.) beſides much of it, perhaps, buried under Ground; (as *Silver* is ſaid to be at *Pekin*, and *Gold* under the Stadt-Houſe at *Amſterdam*;) or concealed in ſecret Places; an Inſtance of which Kind we have in the Story of *Gylippus*, told by *Plutarch* in his *Life of Lyſander*.

[153] The *Fox*'s Anſwer to the *Lion*, in the well-known Fable, to which this Paſſage alludes, is cited by *Horace*, in Epiſt: 1. Lib: 1.

[154] Only meaning here the Revenue ariſing from their *Demeſne-Lands*; More of which in Quantity, and Better in Quality, Kings have than other Men.

[155] That is,—*beſides* the Profit ariſing from their Demeſne-Lands.

bring

bring them in a large Revenue. But whatever Wealth the Lacedæmonians have, tho great if compared with that of any other Grecians, yet in compariſon with the Riches of the Perſians, and eſpecially of their King, 'tis nothing. For I once heard a Man of Credit, who had been at the Capital City of Perſia, ſay, that in going up to it, he travelled almoſt a Day's Journey thro a large and fertile Territory, which the Inhabitants of it called the Queen's Girdle [156]; that there was another extenſive Tract of Land, called the Queen's Veil; and that many other fair and fruitful Countrys were appropriated to provide the reſt of the Queen's Apparel [157]; each of thoſe Countrys having its Name from that Part of the Apparel which the Revenue of it furniſhed. So that, were any Perſon to tell the Queen-Mother, Amaſtris, the Conſort formerly of Xerxes, that the ſon of Dinomache [158] had it in his Head to lead an Army againſt Her Son;

[156] See *the Leſſer Hippias*, page 34.

[157] The ſame Cuſtom was in ancient *Ægypt*. For we read in *Herodotus*, Lib: 2. pag: 123, Edit: *Gronov:* that the City of *Anthylla*, that is, the Revenue of the Crown, ariſing from the Taxes impoſed on it, was aſſigned and ſet apart for the ſupplying of the Queen-Conſort with *Shoes* and *Slippers*.

[158] *Perſius* in his *Fourth Satyr*, where he laſhes the Arrogance of the Emperor *Nero* under the Character of *Alcibiades* in this Dialogue, ſeems to have concluded juſtly from the Paſſage now before us, that *Alcibiades* valued himſelf, in the firſt place, on his being Son to *Dinomache*, and conſequently of *Alcmæonian* Race. But his Haughtineſs on this account is here humbled by *Socrates*, in comparing *Dinomache* with

Son;——and were ſhe told at the ſame time that Dinomache's whole Attire might be worth perhaps fifty Minæ [159]; ſuppoſing it to be of the moſt coſtly Kind [160]; and that this Son of hers had Land in the Diſtrict of Erchia [161], containing not ſo much as three hundred Acres [162];——She, I ſuppoſe, would wonder in what Kind of Things this Alcibiades could place ſo much Confidence as to think of contending with Artaxerxes. And I imagine, that ſhe would ſay,—— It is impoſſible that this Man ſhould undertake ſuch an Affair with any other Confidence, than what he places in the Prudence and Skill which he is Maſter of: for that the Grecians have nothing elſe worthy of account. Becauſe if ſhe was to hear farther, that this ſame Alcibiades in the firſt place had not compleated the Twentieth Year of his Age; in the next place that he was utterly uninſtructed; and beſides this, that, when a Friend of his adviſed him firſt to acquire the Knowlege, the Prudence, and the Habits, ne-

Amaſtris, who was of *Achæmenian* Race, being Daughter to *Otanes* by the Siſter of *Xerxes*, to whom according to the Cuſtom of the Perſian Royal Family ſhe was married, and from that Marriage bore *Artaxerxes*, the then reigning Monarch.

[159] Equal to 161l. 9s. 2d. Engliſh Money.

[160] Meaning the moſt coſtly among ſuch as were worn by *Grecian* Women.

[161] See *Meurſius* in his *Reliqua Attica*, Cap: 5.

[162] Πλέθρα. A *Greek* πλέθρον contained 10,000 Square Feet: an *Engliſh* Acre contains 4,840 Square Feet. So that the Land-Eſtate of *Alcibiades*, near *Erchia*, contained about 619 *Engliſh* Acres.

ceſſary

ceſſary for the execution of his Deſigns, before he offered to attack the King,——he refuſed to hearken to this Advice, and ſaid,——that even in his preſent condition he was prepared ſufficiently;——I believe She would be aſtoniſhed, and would aſk, What Kind of a Thing it could be then, in which the Youth put his Confidence? Upon this, were we to tell her,——in his handſome and fine Perſon, in his Birth and Family, in his Riches, and in the natural Facultys of his Mind,——ſhe would think us, Alcibiades! out of our Senſes, when ſhe reflected on all the Advantages which her Son enjoyed, of the ſame Kinds. No leſs do I imagine that Lampido [164], Daughter of Leotychidas, Wife of Archidamus, and Mother of Agis, who, all of them in their turns, ſucceeded to the Crown of Sparta, She too would wonder, in reflecting on Their Greatneſs, were ſhe told, that You had taken it into your Head to make War againſt Her Son, ſo ill inſtructed as You are. And now do you not think it ſhamefull, if the Wives of our Enemys conſider more prudently for Us, than We do for our Selves, what Sort of Perſons we ought to be, before we venture to attack ſuch Enemies? Hearken therefore, my good Sir, to the Advice which I give

[163] See Note 24.

[164] This Princeſs is called *Lampidro* in the Editions we have of *Plutarch*, probably from an ancient Error in the Manuſcripts, as *Meurſius* in his Treatiſe *de Regno Laconico* rightly ſeems to judge. By *Herodotus* ſhe is called *Lampito*, Lib: 6. pag: 354, Edit: *Gronovii*.

you

you, in agreement with the Delphic Inſcription [165], KNOW THY

[165] If we *obſerve* in what *manner* this *divine Precept* is here *introduced*, and at the ſame time *reflect* on all which has *preceded*, we ſhall be apt to imagine, that *Socrates*, in giving *Alcibiades* this Advice, means nothing more than to ſuggeſt to him his comparative Deficience in thoſe Outward Advantages, juſt now enumerated, on which he valued himſelf ſo highly: or, at moſt, we ſhall ſuppoſe the ſame Advice here meant to be given, which is thus expreſſed by *Perſius*, in the concluſion of his *Fourth Satyr*,

> Tecum habita; nôris quam ſit tibi curta ſupellex.
>
> *Dwell with your ſelf; you ſoon would find,*
> *Furniſh'd how ſcantily your Mind.*

In the *Sequel*, however, we ſhall find it *not* to be the Philoſopher's Intention *to depreſs* the Mind of his new Pupil, by drawing thoſe unequal and humiliating Compariſons,——but, on the contrary we ſhall perceive, that his *main End*, with regard to *Alcibiades*, was *to elevate* his Thoughts above the conſideration of thoſe Outward Goods as valuable, compared with ſuch Excellencys of the Mind, as were in his own Power to attain without any Rivalſhip or Contention. This, we ſay, was the chief Intention of *Socrates* in ſeconding that Advice, ſuppoſed to have been firſt given by *Apollo:* and agreeable to This was the profound Meaning of that ancient *Philoſopher*, who was the real Author of it,——a Meaning, which will open itſelf more and more, as we proceed.——Tis undeniable, however, that *Socrates* hitherto has all along endeavoured to *lower* the *high opinion*, which *Alcibiades* had conceived of himſelf, on account of the advantages given him by Nature and by Fortune. But *this End* is to be conſidered only as the *Means* to that *other End*, the *ultimate*. The *humbling* of the *inferiour* Soul is neceſſary to the *exalting* of that which naturally is *ſuperiour*. For Nature ſeems to have endued every man

THY SELF: ſince your Antagoniſts are to be, not Thoſe whom

man with a *Pre-conception* or *Pre-ſumption* of *Something* very valuable, *belonging* to him: but this, like all other *natural Pre-ſumptions*, is obſcure, general, and indeterminate. *What* this Something *is*, only *Reaſon* can diſcover, and determine. If Reaſon then be never exerciſed on the Subject, and conſequently this Jewel be never brought to Light, a man will ſuppoſe it to be That Quality in him, whether natural or adventitious, a meer Relation perhaps, or accidental Circumſtance, which he hears the moſt *praiſed*, or perceives to be the moſt *admired* by Others. And if from experience he finds himſelf in any thing to *excell* Thoſe of his Kind with whom he is converſant, he fixes here the *Value of Himſelf*; he over-rates This Excellence, be it ever ſo trifling; and contemns, or under-rates, every Excellence which he poſſeſſes not.——To prepare the way therefore for the recogniſing of a Man's *better Self*, the *Mental Principle* within him, his admiration muſt be taken off from *Body*, and from things *belonging* to Body, or valuable only *for the ſake* of Body; and thence it muſt be transferred to *Mind*, and *Mental Excellence:* he muſt be taught, that every thing elſe is truly valuable to him, ſo far only as it has a *reference* to Mind, and is *favourable* to Mental Excellence. And this is the very Method, which *Socrates* in this Dialogue takes with *Alcibiades*, as we ſhall very ſoon have occaſion to obſerve.——Thus much of this Note is intended to rectify the Miſtake of Such, as ſuppoſe the *Knowlege of our Selves* always to mean the Knowlege of our *Infirmitys*, both of *Body* and of *Soul*,——a Senſe of our Deformitys and Defects, and a Conſciouſneſs of thoſe Fancys and thoſe Paſſions to which we are the moſt prone.——But there is another Miſtake, of a quite oppoſite Kind, tho indeed leſs common, as well as leſs dangerous; againſt falling into which it may not be amiſs, here in good time, to caution Such of our Readers, as have a Genius inclining them to true Philoſophy. For if their Attention, by and by, ſhould happen to be ſo intirely taken up by the *ſubſequent* Part of this Dialogue, as to make them

whom You imagine, but Theſe whom I have told you of: and

them *forget* all which has *preceded*, they will be apt to think, that the Meaning of the Precept, recommended here by *Socrates*, relates ſolely to the *Divine Principle* in Man; ſeeing that *This* is found to be, properly ſpeaking, *the Man Himſelf*,——That which peculiarly characteriſes *Man*, and diſtinguiſhes the *Human Soul* from the Souls of all other known Animals.——Theſe two oppoſite Miſtakes are incident to Men of oppoſite Tempers: *the Magnanimous* are eſpecially ſubject to That, laſt mentioned; *the Puſillanimous*, chiefly to the former. Both the Miſtakes ought to be avoided. For to lead a Life rational and virtuous, a Man ought to be appriſed both of his inward Strength and of his inward Weakneſs.——If he is ignorant of his *ſuperiour and divine* Part, he will be apt to make no reſiſtance againſt the Impulſes and Suggeſtions of his *inferiour and brutal* Part: for he will think, that, in giving himſelf up to Their Guidance, he only follows his Nature, to which all reſiſtance is abſurd, becauſe it muſt be ineffectual.——On the other hand, if he is quite unacquainted with the natural Temper of his *inferiour Soul*, he will not be ſufficiently guarded againſt the ſudden and unforeſeen Violence of his *Paſſions*, nor yet againſt the inſinuating and ſubtle Sophiſtry of his *Fancys*.——Ignorance of that *Better Self*, which is Divine and the only Seat of Man's *Knowlege of Divine Things*, leaves the Mind open to *Superſtition*; Superſtition is often followed by *Religious Enthuſiaſm*; and This introduces, without any oppoſition from that Knowlege which the Hypotheſis preſumes wanting, the proud, tyrannical, and cruel *Spirit of Bigotry*. For if a Man, having a religious Turn of Mind, be ſenſible of nothing *within him* but what is *evil*, either he will imagine the *Governour of the World* to be an *evil Being*, like Himſelf,——and will thence be in continual Dread of ſuffering *Evil from him*, ——or, if he has been taught to *believe* otherwiſe of *the Divine Being*, he muſt *think* of *his own Nature* as wholly *oppoſite*, and the Object therefore of *Averſion*, to That which is *Divine*.——If then a Man, poſſeſſed

and Theſe you never can excell, in any other Point, than Skill

with theſe Opinions, ever comes to *feel* aught of *God* or *Goodneſs* within Himſelf,——if ever he *finds* himſelf, in any One Inſtance, to *adhere to* what he *thinks* to be *Truth*, or *Juſtice*, when at the ſame time ſome ſelfiſh Paſſion, or ſome blind Affection, *pulls* him toward the *oppoſite Side*,——if ever he is *conſcious* of entertaining with *complacence* any *generous Sentiment*, of indulging any *diſintereſted Wiſh*, or of addreſſing any *real Prayer* to the Fountain of Good,——ſuch as Parental Affection, Filial Piety, Virtuous Love or Friendſhip, Gratitude, Love of Country, of Kindred, or of Kind, or of the whole Creation, naturally inſpire, ——if ever he *diſcovers* in himſelf a *Delight* in procuring Good to any Others, or in averting Ill from Any, in ſuccouring the Needy, in relieving the Oppreſſed, or in vindicating the Injured,——if ever he is *ſenſible* of *Joy*, when he hears or reads of any of theſe Actions done by Others,——and if he is *drawn*, he knows not how, to *unite* himſelf in *Heart* and *Mind* to the Perſons who *do* or but *endeavour* to do them, ——he cannot but imagine, that ſuch a *Conduct*, ſuch *Thoughts* and *Ideas*, ſuch *Sentiments* and *Delights*, ſuch *Attractions*, *Tyes*, and *Unions*, are *ſuper-natural*,——are *Divine Communications*, out of the ordinary roads of *Nature*, *Reaſon*, and *Intelligence*:——he muſt imagine himſelf to be *enlightened* with an *eſpecial* Ray of *Divine Light*, purpoſely ſent *to Him*; and to be *inſpired* with ſuch a Portion of the *Divine Spirit*, as is denied *to Other Men*.——Muſt he not then at length imagine himſelf to be one of the *Favourites* of the Divine Being? and muſt he not ſuppoſe the far greater Part of his Species, (of whoſe *Ideas*, *Sentiments*, and *Affections* he is not conſcious, and yet has conceived an ill Opinion,) to be *abandoned* by their *common Father*, to be deſtitute of all Goodneſs, to be full of all latent Wickedneſs, and conſequently the proper Objects of Hatred and Deteſtation to thoſe Happy Few, ſuch as Himſelf, who are made to *participate of the Divine Nature*? How dreadful, how direful to Human Kind, the natural Effects of theſe Fancys and Sup-

Skill and Application: in which Articles if you are found deficient, you will fail of that Reputation and Renown, as well

poſitions are, may be learnt from many the moſt authentic *Hiſtorys of Religion*.——The prime Cauſe (in Man) of this *Superſtition*, this *Enthuſiaſm*, this *religious Malice*, is a Man's Ignorance of what is *Divine* in the *Human Nature*. On the other hand, a Knowlege of this *Divine Part* of Man, accompanied with an Ignorance of his *Brutal Part*, naturally leads to *Enthuſiaſm in Philoſophy*, to the Purſuit of Wiſdom and Virtue, both in Theory and in Practice, *ultra quam ſatis eſt*. For a Man, who is attentive only to the *nobler* Part of himſelf, and is loſt to all conſideration of the *meaner*, will ſtudy to improve *That alone*, and will totally neglect *this Other*. Like *Anaxagoras*, he will ſuffer his *Fortunes* to run to Ruin, thro defect of *Care*,——or perhaps, like *Porphyry*, will ſuffer his *Body* to pine away, thro neglect of *Food* to nouriſh it: he will be apt to endanger his *Health*, or to riſque his *Life*, without juſt and ſufficient *reaſon:* nay, poſſibly, he may either forget that he is *a Man*, or elſe make too much haſte to become *more* than Man, quitting by his own voluntary Act the State and Condition of Human Life: 'tis certain, that the *Hiſtory of Philoſophy*, eſpecially of the *Eaſtern*, exhibits too many Inſtances of this latter Kind.——For want of knowing the *Principle of Rectitude and Goodneſs*, as an Ingredient in the compoſition of the *Human Soul*, a Man will never underſtand the Mind or Meaning of the wiſer, honeſter, and better Part of his Species; he will never know either *his own Friends*, or the *Friends of Human Kind*; he will miſtake the beſt *Intentions* for the worſt; and will *often* miſinterpret even the beſt *Actions*, by attributing them *always* to corrupt *Motives*. ——For want of knowing, on the other hand, the *Principle of Error and of Evil*, as it is mixed (of neceſſity) with the other Ingredient in the formation of Man's Soul, one may eaſily be deceived by Bad Men, by Flatterers, Impoſtors, and falſe Pretenders; and, what is of worſe conſequence than any of ſuch Deceits, one may eaſily flatter, impoſe

well with Grecians as Barbarians, which I think you long for with more Ardour, than any other Man does for whatever is the Object of his Wiſhes.

ALCIBIADES.

Can you teach me then, O Socrates, what Sort of Application I ought to uſe? for you ſeem to be intirely right in all which you have ſpoken.

SOCRATES.

Something I have indeed to ſay upon that Subject. But let us enter into a joint conſultation, You and I, about the Means of becoming, Both of us, Better Men. For when I ſay, there is a neceſſity for Inſtruction, I mean it of my Self as well as of You: ſince one only difference there is between You and Me.

on, and deceive one's Self.——It is therefore not to be imagined, that in this the fundamental and moſt important Precept of true Philoſophy, KNOW THY SELF, the word *Self* is to be underſtood only of the *Divine Part* of the Soul, in which Meaning indeed the word is uſed by many *ancient Philoſophers*, particularly by the *Pythagoreans* in that Precept of the *Golden Verſes*, αἰδοῦνεο σαυτὸν, *Revere thy Self*:——much leſs can it be underſtood, according to the Senſe of ſome modern Anti-Philoſophers, to ſignify That Part only which is *Irrational* and meerly *Animal*.——Both Parts of the Soul muſt be here meant to be included; and they are underſtood ſo to be by *Cicero*, in the *Sixth* of his *Third Book* of *Epiſtles* to his Brother *Quintus*; nor otherwiſe by the late *Earl of Shafteſbury*, in vol: 1, page 170, 184 and 185. See alſo Note 121 to *The Banquet*, and Note 44 to *The Rivals*.

ALCIBIADES.

What is That?

SOCRATES.

He, who is My Guardian, is better and wiſer than Pericles, who is Yours.

ALCIBIADES.

And Who is Yours, O Socrates?

SOCRATES.

GOD [166], O Alcibiades! He, who permitted me not [167], before this very day, to enter into any Diſcourſe with you: He it is, on whoſe Dictates to me I rely, when I am bold to ſay, that you will acquire the Renown you long for, by no other means than thro Me [168].

ALCIBIADES.

You are in jeſt [169], Socrates.

SOCRATES.

[166] See *The Second Alcibiades*, near the Concluſion of it; and compare it with Note 70 to *The Greater Hippias*. But our Notes on the laſt Part of the preſent Dialogue will beſt explain this Paſſage.

[167] See Page 44 of this Dialogue.

[168] See Pages 45 and 46.

[169] That is, in giving himſelf ſuch Airs of Importance, and attributing to himſelf ſo wonderful a Power, as he ſeemed to *Alcibiades* to have done in the *latter Part* of his Sentence.——What *Alcibiades* here ſays, is no way applicable to the *former Part* of it. For *Socrates* is never more ſerious, than when he derives all Wiſdom, all Rectitude in the Mind of Man, from its Divine Fountain. But inconſiſtent with Seri-

SOCRATES.

Perhaps ſo: but I ſpeak the truth, however, in good earneſt, when I ſay [170], that we want Improvement; or rather, that all men want it; but that You and I have very eſpecial Need of it.

ALCIBIADES.

In ſaying that I have Need of it, you are not miſtaken.

SOCRATES.

Neither am I, in ſaying that I my ſelf have.

ALCIBIADES.

What then muſt we do?

Serioufneſs on this Subject would be the next Reply, made by *Socrates*, (not denying, that he had expreſſed himſelf jocoſely, or ſeemingly ſo at leaſt,) if he had thought, that *Alcibiades* conſidered *the whole* of that Sentence as *jocoſe*.——The uſual manner of *Socrates*, in his converſations with Others, was ſo much the reverſe of *the Boaſtfull*, and his manner was ſo generally known, that *Alcibiades* could not be ignorant of it, tho he had never before converſed with That εἴρων, as he was called, That *Diſſembler of his Knowlege*; ſo that, not diving into his Meaning, and miſ-interpreting his Words, *Alcibiades* might eaſily miſ-apprehend the *latter Part* of what *Socrates* had ſaid, and take it for *jocoſe*; but he had too *ſerious* a Senſe of Religion, *himſelf*, as appears from the other Dialogue which bears his Name, to imagine that *Socrates* could be *in jeſt* from the very *beginning* of the Sentence.——

[170] See before, in page 150.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

We muſt not deſpair, nor give our ſelves up to indolence[171], my Friend.

ALCIBIADES.

By no means, Socrates, does it become us ſo to do.

SOCRATES.

Indeed it does not. We muſt therefore conſider of the Affair, You and I together. Now then anſwer to my Queſtions. We profeſs to be deſirous of becoming as excellent[172] as poſſible: Do we not?

ALCI-

[171] See *the Meno*, pages 167 and 168.

[172] *Socrates*, having now *purged* and cured *Alcibiades* of his conceited Preſumption, and Over-forwardneſs to engage in Public Affairs, and in the conduct of a War againſt the *Perſians* and the *Lacedæmonians*,——by convincing him of his total Ignorance in the Science of Politicks, and his utter Inability to cope with thoſe formidable Enemys of the Athenian State,——is about proving to him, in the *Dialectic* Way, what *Kind of Food* he ought to uſe, for the gaining of Strength and Nouriſhment; that is, in plain language, to what *Kind of Knowlege* he ought to apply his Mind.——He lays for the Foundation of his reaſoning, as we obſerved before in Note 14, That infinite Ambition, which the Soul of *Alcibiades* was full of. And in laying this Foundation, he ſuppoſes and takes for granted, that *Ambition* is of *Two Kinds*,——the One, vicious, mean, miſchievous and often ruinous to Kingdoms and Civil States, ſtill more often to Private Perſons, and even to the Ambitious themſelves,——the Other, always laudable, noble, and beneficial to All.——The Firſt is an ardent Deſire of outward Greatneſs, whether Rank or Power, thro *whatever Means* acquired, and meerly for

ALCIBIADES.

We do.

SOCRATES.

In what Kind of Excellence?

ALCIBIADES.

In That certainly, which belongs to Men of Merit [173].

SOCRATES.

for its own Sake:——the Other is a Deſire of ſuch Honours or Diſtinctions, as ordinarily are attained only thro *excelling* in ſome Science, or Art, or Practic Habit.——This Kind of Ambition is always gentler and more generous than the former Kind; and, if a Man, ſpurred on by it, has reached That particular *Excellence*, which is the ordinary *Mean* to attain his *End*, tho he ſhould fail and be diſappointed of the *End itſelf*, yet he is ſtill conſoled by the Conſciouſneſs of having *deſerved* the attaining of it: beſides, that the ſame Merit often procures Other Good unthought of: and in *That Kind of Excellence*, which we ſhall preſently find *Socrates* recommending to *Alcibiades* the Study to attain, Whoever actually attains it,——tho the Deſire of Honour or Diſtinction might have firſt put him on ſtudying and labouring after ſuch attainment,——will find an *End* more valuable than that which he propoſed to himſelf, in having reached *That Excellence*, which he deſigned only as *a Mean*.——The Ambition of *Alcibiades* was of the latter Kind; as, on being queſtioned by *Socrates* concerning it, he at once acknowleges.

[173] In the Greek,——ἄνδρες οἱ ἀγαθοὶ, *thoſe Men who are the Good*. In order to produce an explication of That Excellence, to which he would have *Alcibiades* to aſpire, *Socrates* in his next Queſtion takes the word *Good*, here uſed by *Alcibiades*, in that general and indeterminate Senſe of it, mentioned in Note 31 to *the Leſſer Hippias*. See alſo the Index to *Ælian's Var: Hiſt:* in voce ἀγαθὸς.——But the Epithet *Good*, when

SOCRATES.

Of Merit in what reſpect?

ALCIBIADES.

In the management of buſineſs and affairs [174], undoubtedly.

SOCRATES.

But What buſineſs do you mean? The buſineſs of a Jockey?

ALCIBIADES.

Clearly, not.

SOCRATES.

For then we ſhould go, for inſtruction, to Thoſe who underſtand the management of Horſes.

when applied to Men, without any other words to determine *the Kind of Goodneſs*, from which they are denominated *good*, hath, ever ſince *Plato*'s Philoſophy enlightened the more civiliſed Part of Mankind, been generally underſtood to mean *morally good*,——good, as *Men*, as rational and ſocial Beings. We have therefore, in tranſlating this Paſſage and a few others which follow, uſed an expreſſion more indeterminate and vague at this day, than that of *Good Men*,——that of *Men of Merit*.

[174] In the Greek,——πράτ∫ειν τὰ πράγματα. Hence our learned Readers will obſerve, that the particular *Kind of Excellence*, which *Socrates* is beginning to point out to *Alcibiades* for his Study and Purſuit, relates to *Action* and *Affairs*; and is the Virtue of a *Man*, conſidered as a *Social* Being, converſant with the *Fellows of his Species*, and, jointly with Some or Others, engaged in carrying on ſome or other of the various *Buſineſſes* of *Social* and *Civil* Life.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly, we ſhould.

SOCRATES.

Do you then mean the Buſineſs of a Mariner?

ALCIBIADES.

I do not.

SOCRATES.

For in that caſe we ſhould apply to Thoſe who underſtand Navigation.

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly ſo.

SOCRATES.

But What Buſineſs or Affairs then? and by What Sort of Men are theſe Affairs managed?

ALCIBIADES.

I mean ſuch Affairs, as are managed by Men of Honour and Merit amongſt the Athenians.

SOCRATES.

Men of Honour and Merit do you call Such as have Underſtanding, or Such as are void of Underſtanding?

ALCIBIADES.

Such as have Underſtanding [175].

[175] What is next to be obſerved in the Progreſs of the preſent Inquiry is This,——that *Underſtanding*, Intelligence, or Knowlege, of ſome

SOCRATES.

In whatever Buſineſs a Man has Underſtanding, in That has he not Merit?

ALCIBIADES.

He has.

SOCRATES.

And in whatever Buſineſs he is void of Underſtanding, is he not, in That, void of Merit?

ALCIBIADES.

Without doubt.

SOCRATES.

Whether hath a Shoemaker Underſtanding in the Buſineſs of making Shoes?

ALCIBIADES.

He certainly has.

SOCRATES.

In this reſpect therefore he has Merit.

ALCIBIADES.

He has.

Kind or other, is requiſite for the attainment of that *Excellence*, into the nature of which our great Philoſopher is here inquiring.——Thus already it may appear, that Human *Affairs* and Human *Actions* are the *Subject-Matter* of this Excellence, whatever it be; and farther, that Human *Underſtanding* is That, which *manages*, and *directs*, and gives them the *Form* of *excellent*, that is, of *fair* and *good*.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Well; but is not a Shoemaker void of Underſtanding in the Buſineſs of making Cloaths?

ALCIBIADES.

No doubt of it.

SOCRATES.

In this reſpect therefore he is void of Merit.

ALCIBIADES.

He is ſo.

SOCRATES.

The ſame Man therefore, according to this account, is at the ſame time void of Merit, and poſſeſſed of Merit.

ALCIBIADES.

It appears ſo.

SOCRATES.

Would you ſay then, that Men, poſſeſſed of Merit, are at the ſame time void of Merit?

ALCIBIADES.

That cannot be.

SOCRATES.

What Kind of Men then do you mean by the Men of Merit?

ALCIBIADES.

I mean Such as have Abilitys to govern at Athens [167].

SOCRATES.

Not to govern Horſes, I preſume.

ALCIBIADES.

No, certainly.

SOCRATES.

But to govern Men.

ALCIBIADES.

That is my Meaning.

SOCRATES.

But What Men do you mean? Men who are Sick?

ALCIBIADES.

I do not mean Theſe.

SOCRATES.

Men then, who are going a Voyage?

ALCIBIADES.

I mean not Such Men.

[176] Another thing, obſervable as we proceed, is This,—that the *Excellence*, ſought after, conſiſts in *Ability to govern Men, united in Civil Society*, partaking of the ſame Polity, and contributing their ſeveral Helps to the promotion of One End, their Common Good.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Men then, who are gathering the Harveſt?

ALCIBIADES.

Nor Such neither.

SOCRATES.

But Men, who do nothing, do you mean? or Men, who do ſomething?

ALCIBIADES.

Men who do ſomething.

SOCRATES.

Who do What? try if you can make me ſenſible of your preciſe Meaning.

ALCIBIADES.

Well then; I mean Men who have Commerce one with another [177], and make uſe of one another's Aid and Aſſiſtance, in that Kind of Life which we lead in Citys [178].

[177] In the *Greek*,——συμβαλλόντων ἑαυτοῖς.——But we apprehend, that the Pronoun ἑαυτοῖς can never follow the Verb συμβάλλω, (in connection with it,) in any Senſe ever given to that Verb. Preſuming therefore, that the right Reading is σὺμβαλλόντων ἀλλήλοις, we have tranſlated agreeably to this Preſumption. In confirmation of which we find, within a few Lines after, συμβαλλόντων πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

[178] That is,——in Politys, or Civil States. See Note 4 to *the Greater Hippias*.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

You ſpeak then of Such as have Abilitys to govern Men, who make uſe of other Men to aid and aſſiſt them.

ALCIBIADES.

I do.

SOCRATES.

Do you mean the governing of Men, who make uſe of Mariners in the rowing of Gallys, and give them the proper Orders [179]?

ALCIBIADES.

I mean no ſuch thing.

SOCRATES.

For Ability to govern Such Men [180] belongs to the Commander of a Gally.

ALCIBIADES.

True.

SOCRATES.

Do you then mean the governing of Men who are Muſicians, and lead the Song to other Men, making uſe of Chorus-Singers and Dancers [181]?

[179] Or, rather, *the proper Signals*, when to row faſter, and when ſlower: for the Inſtructions of this Kind were given, not by *ſpeaking*, but by ſtriking out *Sounds* from certain *Inſtruments*, in different Meaſures, quick or ſlow.

[180] For they were but ſubordinate or Petty Officers, ſubject to the Orders of the Maſter or Commander.

[181] In the *Greek*,——χορευταῖς. See Note 60 to *the Io*.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

I mean not This neither.

SOCRATES.

For this Skill belongs to the Maſter of the whole Choir [182].

ALCIBIADES.

Right.

SOCRATES.

In ſpeaking then of Ability to govern Men, who make uſe of other Men, what Kind of Uſe do you mean? or in what Way?

ALCIBIADES.

Fellow-Citizens, I mean, Partakers of the ſame Polity, and engaged in mutual Commerce for mutual Help and Benefit; I ſpeak of Ability to govern Theſe.

SOCRATES.

What Art then is That, which gives this Ability? as if I were to aſk You, on the Subject juſt now mentioned, the knowing how to govern Men embarqued in the ſame Voyage [183], What Art is it, which gives this Knowlege?

ALCI-

[182] See Note 61 to *the Io*.

[183] This *Inſtance* of diſtinct *Names*, given to diſtinct *Arts*, is not taken at random, as it may ſeem to thoſe Readers, who have been too converſant with ſhallow or careleſs Writers; but is ſelected from the reſt for this purpoſe,—to ſuggeſt to us the Reſemblance between *a*

ALCIBIADES.

The Art of commanding Ships.

Ship under Sail and a *Civil State* or *Commonwealth*.——The Safety and the Well-being of them Both depend on Right Motion and Right Action.——Storms and Tempeſts repreſent Wars abroad: and Mutinys on board are like Civil Inſurrections.——The Maſter and the Mariners, the Governor and the Governed, have alike one *common Intereſt:* this, in the former caſe, that of the Simile, is *a proſperous Voyage;* in the other caſe, to which the Simile is applied, 'tis JUSTICE; as a little farther on will be made apparent.——This Simile or *Image* of a Commonwealth was by the fine Underſtanding and Taſte of *Horace* perceived to be ſo juſt and elegant, that in the 14th Ode of his 1ſt Book he has enlarged and formed it into an *Allegory,* ſignifying under it, according to the Judgment of *Quintilian,* Inſtit: L. 8, C. 6, the *Commonwealth of Rome.*——And This *Allegory* is adopted by that excellent Painter, *Rubens;* who has repreſented the *Kingdom of France* by a Ship, where Cardinal *Richelieu* is placed at the Helm, in one of his Pieces which adorn the *Luxemburg Gallery* at *Paris.* But whether ſuch Allegorical Deſigns in *Painting,* as are taken from Similes, Images, or Parables, found in the Writings of *Philoſophers,* and underſtood only by Perſons who *philoſophiſe,* are as juſtifiable and proper as thoſe, which are taken from a generally-known *Mythology,*——or ſuppoſing them ſo to be, yet whether they are as elegant in *Pictures,* as they are in *Poems,* where by the Aid of Language they are more readily underſtood *by All,*——we leave to the deciſion of profeſſed *Criticks* and *Connoiſſeurs* in thoſe fine Arts.——It will not perhaps be quite foreign to the Purpoſe of this Dialogue, in which we are conſidering what is *Beſt* in the Human Nature, and what is the beſt Courſe of Action, and the trueſt End of Human Life, to add,——that the ſame Similitude of *a Ship,* bound on ſome *Voyage,* is beautifully carried on, and applied to *Human Life* in general, by *Arrian,* in his *Manual of Epictetus,* C. 12; in Mr. *Upton*'s Edition, C. 7.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

And What Science is That, which gives the Power of governing thoſe Others whom we mentioned, Thoſe who have Parts in the ſame Song [184]?

ALCI-

[184] Another *Simile* to a *Commonwealth* is here introduced, in the ſame manner as the firſt, as if it were only another *Inſtance* of *denominating* the Whole of any Art or Science in One Word. This ſecond Simile is a *Muſical Concert*: the reſemblance of which to a Civil State, or to a legitimate and legal Kingdom, is not leſs juſtly nor leſs elegantly conceived, than the former Simile, that of a *Ship*.——For *One Law* preſides over and directs the *Concert*; as *One Law* does, with regard to the *Commonwealth*.——*One Deſign* adapts every Part of Each to every other Part, as a Co-adjutor.——In Both, *One Soul* as it were pervades, animates, and moves the Whole.——In Both, the very ζωὴ *Life* conſiſts in *Energy* and *Motion*; and in *right* Energy and *well-meaſured* Motion, ἡ εὐζωία καὶ ἡ εὔροια, *the Well-going-on and the happy Flow*.——The Whole of Each is *compoſed of Parts* not only diſagreeing, but even *oppoſite*, Some of them to Others: and in each Whole, theſe Parts, different as they are, ſo admirably are diſpoſed, ſet together, and combined, that they, all of them, proceed in perfect Harmony.——*Pythagoras* ſeems to have been the Firſt who perceived, that a *Concert of Muſick* bore a juſt Similitude to every Thing which conſiſted of various Parts, all in continual Energy, and all conſpiring to accompliſh ſome One End belonging to the Whole. He applied this *Simile* in the firſt place, and principally, to *the Univerſe* or *Whole of Things*, on diſcovering thoſe very Features of Reſemblance between them, which we have juſt now pointed out in comparing together a *Concert of Muſick* and a *Commonwealth*. Deſcending afterwards to the Study of *Morals* and of *Politicks*, he applied this favourite Simile of his, a *Concert of Muſick*, to the Harmony of the whole *Soul* in a *Virtuous Man*, and to the Harmony of the *Common-*

ALCIBIADES.

That which belongs, as juſt now you ſaid, to the Maſter of the whole Choir.

SOCRATES.

wealth in a *well-ordered State*.——See the laſt Compariſon, the ſame here made by *Plato*, made before him by *Hippodamus* the *Pythagorean*, in a large Fragment of his Writings, which is extant in *Stobæus*, *Serm:* 41.——That all the Three Compariſons ſhould in many reſpects hold good, is not to be wondred at by Thoſe, who can obſerve and conſider,——that NATURE is, in every thing, equal and *like her Self*;——that all her Works, Operations, and Productions, bear the Mark and Character of their Cauſe;——and even that *Sounds*, ſome of the meaneſt of her Productions, have an Aptitude to receive the Forms of *Harmony*;——farther, that notwithſtanding the great ſuperiority of a *Human Being*,——the nobleſt of Nature's Works, the Subject of *Virtue* and of *Civil Life*,——to *Sound*, the Subject of *Harmony*,——yet Artificial *Muſick*, Human *Virtue*, and Human *Politys*, are, all of them, the godlike Works of Human *Art* and *Reaſon*;——and that all of them are *Forms* of the *Human Mind*, who derives her *Principles* immediately from the great MIND OF NATURE, and enters into Human Life with a Capacity of receiving an *Image* of her Sire, in the *Tranſcripts* of his own beautiful *Ideas*.——Hence it is, that we ſee *Beauty* poured over all the *Works* of Nature, and perceive *Order* and *Harmony* in all her *Operations*:——hence it is, that the fineſt *Arts* are of ſo near Kindred to each other, to the *Sciences*, and to *Philoſophy*:——and hence alſo it is, that the Two Forms, compared together by *Plato* in the place now before us,——Both of them the Contrivances of *Man* copying after NATURE,——however widely different in their *Subjects*, are yet ſo like, one to the other.——Part of the Similitude between them is thus happily expreſſed by Mr. *Pope* in the moſt conciſe way, that of a Metaphor,

Th'according Muſick of a well-mix'd State.

SOCRATES.

And by What Name do you call That Science, which gives Ability to govern Thoſe who partake of the ſame Polity?

ALCIBIADES.

Prudence I call it, for my part, Socrates [185].

From whence the Genius of this elegant Poet immediately takes a Flight to the *Source* of this Similitude, thus ſinging,

Such is the World's great harmony, that ſprings
From order, union, full conſent of things.
3d *Eſſay on Man.*

[185] We here proceed another Stage, in the Progreſs of our Inquiry into the nature of the higheſt *Human Excellence*.——It has appeared before, as we obſerved in Note 176, to conſiſt in *Ability to govern Men united in Civil Society*.——And we ſhall now find it to be agreed by the Multitude, (for whom *Alcibiades* here ſpeaks, as their Repreſentative,) and alſo by the Wiſe, (whoſe Repreſentative in this place is *Socrates*,) that 'tis not *Wiſdom* or Underſtanding *in general*, which gives this *Ability* for Civil Government,——but That *Species of Wiſdom*, which is called *Prudence*.——The word, here uſed by *Plato* to expreſs this Prudence, is εὐβουλία, which properly ſignifys Wiſdom, Skill, or Cunning, to contrive the *beſt Means* of attaining ſome particular *End*, (of whatever Kind it be, and whether it be good or bad,) the End which is propoſed. In our own Language this Sort of Wiſdom is *commonly* called *Prudence*. *Prudence* in a *philoſophical* Senſe, one of the Cardinal Virtues, is by *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, after the *Pythagoreans*, called φρόνησις. But this word is here judiciouſly avoided, becauſe *Alcibiades* is not as yet advanced ſo far in the Inquiry, as to know, that the Art of Government is founded immediately on *this Prudence*, the ſame with *Political* and *Moral Wiſdom*.

SOCRATES.

What? do you think then, that Want of Prudence is proper for the Commander of a Ship?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly, not ſo.

SOCRATES.

But rather, that Prudence is.

ALCIBIADES.

I think it is,——ſo far as it regards [186] the Safety of thoſe who are ſailing in the Ship.

[186] We have here followed *Aldus* and *Harry Stephens* in their Editions of Plato, as alſo *Cornarius* and *Serranus* in their Tranſlations, who all agree in aſſigning this Reſtrictive Clauſe to *Alcibiades*; altho *Ficinus* in His Tranſlation, and Both the *Baſil* Editions, attribute it to *Socrates*. ——The Senſe of the Paſſage before us ſeems to be This;——*Alcibiades* could not but ſee and acknowlege, that εὐβουλία *Prudence*, vulgarly ſo called, or a Diſcernment of the *beſt Means* to any particular *End*, was the Miſtreſs and Manager of all *other* Affairs, *as well as* thoſe of Civil Government. But he ſaw likewiſe, that all *other* Affairs than Thoſe, (an Inſtance of which *others* is given us in the Office of a Sea-Commander,) regarded certain *particular*, limited, and narrow *Ends*; Prudence in the proſecution of which Ends did not qualify a Man for Government in the State. Here therefore he diſtinguiſhes rightly between *Civil Prudence* and *Prudence* (as it is called) of that *ſubordinate* Kind, by ſhewing the particular and limited End of *Marine Prudence*, a Prudence of this inferiour Kind: and by ſo diſtinguiſhing, he gives *Socrates* an occaſion of bringing to Light,——What is the *End of Civil Government*; and of ſhewing from thence,——What the *Prudence* is, in which it is requiſite for a *Politician* or Stateſman to excell.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

It is well ſaid [187]: and that Other Science, that which you call Prudence, What End does That regard?

ALCIBIADES.

The good Government and Safety of the Commonwealth [188].

SOCRATES.

[187] This ſhort Speech of Approbation, καλῶς λέγεις in the *Greek*, is put into the Mouth of *Alcibiades* by Thoſe, who put the preceding Sentence into the Mouth of *Socrates*. But, beſides what we have juſt now ſaid, in the Note to that Sentence, againſt ſuch an Inverſion of the Speeches proper to each Character, we ſhall add this Remark,—— that Approbation of what is ſaid by Another, beſtowed in theſe ſtrong yet ſober Terms,——Well ſaid!——uſually proceeds only from a Conſciouſneſs or a Conceit of *Knowlege* in a Man's Self concerning the *Subject* of his Approbation. *Alcibiades* had been already convinced of his own *Ignorance* and *Inſufficiency*.

[188] This Anſwer to the laſt Queſtion, put by *Socrates*, ſerves to mark the preciſe Difference between the *Office* of a Sea-Pilot who directs the *Ship*, and that of a Pilot or Director of the *Commonwealth*, by diſtinguiſhing their *Ends*. For in every Buſineſs or *Affair*, every *Work*, and every *Action*, the *Deſign* or *End* of it muſt be diſtinctly known by us, before we can know, whether the Affair be well or ill *conducted*, the Work well or ill *executed*, or the Action well or ill *performed*. And this *Good* or *Evil* in the Management, Execution, or Performance, muſt be clearly aſcertained, before we can judge rightly, Who is an *able* Manager, Workman, or Performer, and What particular Science, Art, Prudence, or Practic Habit it is, which gives him that *Ability*. ——It may ſeem, that by this laſt Queſtion and Anſwer we have gained no Ground in our Inquiry. We are not yet told, What the *Deſign* or *End*:

SOCRATES.

And What is it, which the Commonwealth enjoys, when it is governed beſt, and preſerved in Safety? and What is it, from which it is then preſerved? as, if you were to aſk me this Queſtion,——What is it which the Body enjoys, when it is beſt taken care of, and preſerved in Safety? and from What is it then preſerved?——I would ſay,——that then it enjoys Health, and is preſerved from Diſeaſe.——Are not You of the ſame Opinion?

ALCIBIADES.

I am.

SOCRATES.

And if you were to aſk me farther,——What do the Eyes enjoy, when the beſt Care is taken of them? and from What are they then preſerved?——I would anſwer in like manner as before,——that they enjoyed their Sight, and were preſerved from Blindneſs. So likewiſe of the Ears; when they are preſerved from Deafneſs, and have their Hearing perfect, they are then in their beſt Condition, and are taken the beſt Care of.

End of all *Civil Government* is,——or, When it is, that the *Commonwealth* is well governed.——This we ſhall arrive at the Knowlege of, in our next Stage: nothing more is meant, in the Sentence now before our Eyes, than to facilitate the remainder of our Way, by removing out of it all the *lower* Species of *Government*, all, which are not *Political*,——and all the *lower* Kinds of *Prudence*, all, which do not properly belong to the Governor of a *Civil Polity*.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

Right.

SOCRATES.

Well now; What does the Commonwealth enjoy, and from What is it preſerved, when 'tis in its beſt Condition, has the beſt Care taken of it, and is beſt preſerved?

ALCIBIADES.

It ſeems to Me, Socrates, that the Members of it then enjoy mutual Amity, and are preſerved from Enmity and Factions [189].

[189] The *End* or Deſign of *Civil Government* being here declared to be *Civil Amity*,——declared ſo by *Alcibiades*, and tacitly aſſented to by *Socrates*, as an Opinion received by All men, by *the Wiſe*, as well as by *the Multitude*,——it now appears, that a Civil State or Commonwealth is only then well governed, when, thro the *Political Prudence* of the Governor, it enjoys a laſting *Peace within its ſelf*, and all the Members of it live in *Harmony* together, undiſturbed by thoſe Animoſitys, and that Spirit of Malevolence, which a Diviſion into Partys uſually inſpires.——At the time of this Dialogue the Commonwealth of *Athens* was diſtracted by thoſe Party-Feuds, between Such as ſtrove to exclude *the People* from that *Share* which *Solon* had given them in the Government, and to erect an *unmixed Ariſtocracy* or Government of *the Nobles*,—— and Such, on the other ſide, as ſtrove to reduce *the Nobles* to a *Level* with the reſt of *the People*, in point of Authority or Legal Power, and to eſtabliſh a Government purely *Democratical*.——The Paſſage in this Dialogue, where we now are, evidently, we think, alludes to theſe two Factions.——Their Struggles for the Whole of the Sovereign Authority and Power, ſoon proved ſubverſive of the Conſtitution of the Athenian State, ſettled formerly by *Solon*: for it was now undermined equally/

SOCRATES.

By Amity do you mean their being of the Same Mind, or of Different Minds [190]?

ALCIBIADES.

Their being of the Same Mind.

equally by Both Partys. After the Ruin of the Conſtitution, Each of theſe Partys, in its turn, prevailed and triumphed over the Other: and the final Iſſue of this fluctuating and unſettled Tyranny, at home, was the total Loſs of the ancient, the immemorial, Freedom and Independancy of *Athens*, and an abſolute Subjection to foreign Tyrannys, the *Macedonian* firſt, and then the *Roman*.——The Paſſage in this Dialogue, where we now are, evidently, we think, alludes to theſe Factions and Commotions: and if ſo, it implys an accuſation of Want of Wiſdom in the Government.——What Kind of Wiſdom was really wanting, and What is the only Way to prevent ſuch Feuds and Animoſitys, in Mixed Forms of Government, (their natural and proper Soil,) from ever ſpringing up, or at leaſt from growing to any conſiderable height, will be pointed out at the end of the preſent Inquiry.

[190] That *Socrates* agreed in Opinion with *Alcibiades* concerning the *End* or Deſign of *Civil Government*, we here find, from his demanding only an explanation of what *Alcibiades* meant by the term *Amity*, when applied to *Fellow-Citizens*. This explanation he demands for the purpoſe of unfolding the *Means* to attain that godlike End, *Civil* Amity and *Concord*: and theſe Means are unfolded and produced to Light by this and the following Queſtions, propoſed to *Alcibiades*.——We are now arrived ſo far in this Inquiry into the nature of that *Chief Excellence*, thro which a Man is qualified for Government in the State, as to diſcern, that it conſiſts in *Political Prudence, effective of Unanimity between all the Members of a Commonwealth*.

SOCRATES,

SOCRATES.

Now thro What Science is it, that different Civil States are of the Same Mind concerning Numbers [191]?

ALCI-

[191] Thus far, in our Notes to this Part of the Dialogue, we have followed our Author, ſtep by ſtep, without diſcovering to his Readers any clear Proſpect of what is to come, more than he has thought fit to open to them gradually, Himſelf.——But leſt the remainder of the Way, being rather obſcure, and beſet with a few Difficulties, ſhould to Strangers ſeem intricate and tedious, we now chooſe to advance a little before them, opening the Way, and letting in more light on the ſteps they have to go.——The *Prudence* then, which we are now in ſearch of, will be found by and by the Same with *Moral Wiſdom*,——That PRUDENCE, which is the Firſt of the Cardinal Virtues;——and its *Object*,——That, of which it is the *Science*,——will appear to be That *End of every other Virtue*,——That Completion and Comprehenſion of them all,——*Univerſal* JUSTICE.——This *Juſtice*, the nobler and ampler Part of which is *Goodneſs*, is *The eternal Law*, to which all rational and ſocial Beings muſt, willingly or unwillingly be obedient; or elſe they muſt ſuffer Evil for their Diſobedience, until they are reclaimed, and reduced to Order. For *This Law*, in governing thoſe Beings who are the Subjects of it, is no *dead Letter*, but is for ever *active* throughout the Univerſe, *executing its Self*, and carrying with it every where its own *Sanctions*, both of *Puniſhment* and of *Reward*.——That this *ever-living Juſtice* is and muſt be to all rational and ſocial Beings their *Law*, immutably fixed, and that the Obſervance of it is inſeparably attended with *Good* to them, may be proved as follows.——If the *Nature* of every Being be, to That Being, the Rule or *Law* of all its Energys, Actions, and Operations, and alſo the *Boundary of Good and Evil*,——then, to every *Rational Being*, as Such,——to every Being, whoſe Nature *partakes of Mind*, and conſequently of Truth and Right

Reaſon, *Truth* or *Right Reaſon* is the Rule or *Law*; and *Moral Rectitude* and *Moral Depravity*, meaſured by this Rule, are, of That Being, ſo far as it is rational and ſocial, the proper *Good* and *Evil*.——Farther, if Right Reaſon, or Truth, be *One* in its Self, and the *Same* in All who partake of it,——then, there is a *Common Tye* between all Theſe; and they are, All of them, united together as *Members*, under that Univerſal Right Reaſon as their *Head:* beſides that they are eminently and ſtrictly *Social*, as *Brothers*, the children of One *Father*.——A reverential Love and filial Regard to this their Common Father is the Cauſe of thoſe Attractions to each other, felt irreſiſtibly in Virtuous Love and Friendſhip. It is That alſo, which is the Ground of thoſe Obligations to Sincerity, Veracity, Candour, and Modeſty, due from every Rational Being to every other Such, with whom he converſes, or has aught to do with. For every Violation of any of theſe Dutys is an immediate Offence againſt *Reaſon* Himſelf, againſt *Truth*, and *Juſtice*; it is a throwing off, in that inſtance, of all Reverence and Regard to him, not only as he appears *in Others* thro their *Outward Form*, but alſo as he is felt within a Man's own *Self* thro *Conſcience:* and, as *Socrates* ſays in *the Greater Hippias* concerning one of theſe Species of practical Atheiſm, or direct Rebellion againſt Truth and Reaſon,——" the Sacredneſs of Truth will never ſuffer us, if we are of " Sound Mind, (and conſequently know what is our own Good,) to " oppoſe the Man who has Truth with him on his Side."——Injuſtice of this Kind, in all its Species, committed habitually, conſtitutes a Character compleatly worthleſs, renders a Man utterly unfit for *Human Society*, and cuts off all Communication between his *own Mind* and the Fountain of Truth, tho immediately there preſent, the great *Mind Parental*.——All the other Kinds of Injuſtice are Violations of other Dutys,—of Such as ariſe from other Tyes and Connections, in which we are engaged by means of the *other Part* of our *Nature*,—*Body*. With Some of theſe Connections we are *born*; and in Some we are engaged by the Birth of *other Beings*, either derived from our *own Bodys*, or *born* with the *ſame Connections:* Some we are urged by *natural Impulſe* to

to engage in; and Some by *natural Prudence* we are led to form, of our ſelves indeed, but in the manner which That Prudence directs. But in forming the far greater number of our Connections, we are compelled by a *Feeling* of our *natural Indigence*, by a Foreſight of the Difficultys we ſhould have, without the Aſſiſtance of Others, to procure even the Neceſſarys of Life, and by a Conſciouſneſs of our utter Inability to provide our ſelves, by our ſelves, with any of its Conveniencys, or with any ſuch of its rational Delights, as are furniſhed by Human Art. Theſe *Connections* therefore, being all of them formed either by *Nature*'s *own Hand*, or by *Nature operating* in the Body and Soul of Man, may all of them be juſtly called *natural*: and conſequently, the *Obligations* and the *Dutys*, created by theſe Connections, ought likewiſe to be conſidered all of them as *natural*, as having their *Efficient Cauſes* in the *Nature of Things*, and their *Formal Cauſes*, or Ideal Archetypes, in that *Great Mind*, who is the *Original of Nature*, and her εἶδος εἰδοποιοῦν, or *forming Form Univerſal*. By Him then all thoſe ſeveral *Dutys*, compriſed in *Univerſal Juſtice*, are *created*, not thro his *meer Will*, but according to his own *eſſential Ideas*: and farther, inaſmuch as all theſe Ideas are compriſed and united together in His Eſſence, which is not complex, but ſimply One, He is properly ſtyled *Juſtice its Self*, or, what is the ſame thing in effect, *Goodneſs its Self*, the living *Law*, and *King*, of the Great *City of the Univerſe*, that Commonwealth of all *rational and ſocial Beings*.——This *Divine Polity* is the *Standard* of all, which are of *Human* Frame. For Whoever attempts to govern a Kingdom, or other Civil Polity on Earth, without having a conſtant Regard to that *unerring Law*, beneficial to All, injurious to None, is not a *King*, or *Supreme Magiſtrate*, but an *arbitrary Monarch*, and a *Tyrant*: and whatever Command, Decree, or Sentence, iſſued out or pronounced by Man, claſhes with that *invariable Rule of Right*, deſerves any other name, ſays *Plato* in *the Minos*, rather than that of *Law* or *Juſtice*. Such a Government never can be laſting; nor will ſuch Commands, Decrees, or Sentences, be long ſubmitted to. But ſo deeply are the Seeds of *Reaſon* and of *Juſtice* ſown in the Minds of

ALCIBIADES.

Thro the Science of Arithmetick.

SOCRATES.

Well; and is it not thro that very Science, that Private Perſons are of the Same Mind, one with another [192]?

ALCI-

Men, thro their Origin, that for the moſt part they are willingly ſubject to *wiſe and good Government*, to ſuch as is *agreeable to Reaſon*, wherever their private Paſſions are not intereſted in oppoſing it: and for the moſt part they yield a quiet Obedience to *Laws*, which are conſonant with the Laws of *Natural Juſtice*, and eſpecially to ſuch, as from time immemorial have proved conducive to the *Common Good*, or preſervative of the *Public Peace*. Thoſe few Individuals, who happen to be refractory under ſuch a Government and ſuch Laws, muſt either be reduced to Obedience, or be cut off from the Community, by the Authority of the State: and in ſuch a State the *Authority* will be always armed with a ſufficient *Power*, becauſe it will be always readily aided by the reſt of its Subjects, who will always be the far greater Number.

[192] Juſt ſo 'tis with the *Science of Juſtice*; This, in like manner, creates and maintains *Unanimity* between *Private Perſons*. For the *ſame Obſervance* of Law and Juſtice, (properly ſo termed,) which is the ſtrongeſt Guard to any King or Magiſtrate,——the only ground of Stability to any Government,——and the only perpetual Conſervator of the Public Peace,——is no leſs the faithful Guardian of Love and Friendſhip,——the Maſter and Leader of Domeſtic Harmony, and of ſocial Correſpondence between Neighbours, Kinſmen, and All who have any Commerce one with another;——is alſo That which conciliates Strangers, and the Unknown to each other, draws Men together from the moſt diſtant Parts of the Globe, or unites their Minds and Hearts, be their Perſons ever ſo far aſunder.——The *ſame Science* therefore it is, which *ſecures*

this

ALCIBIADES.

It is.

SOCRATES.

And that any Perſon too, by himſelf, continues always in the Same Mind, is it not thro his poſſeſſing that Science [193]?

ALCIBIADES.

It is.

SOCRATES.

And thro What Science is it, that a ſingle Individual is always of the Same Mind concerning a Span and a Cubit,

this Obſervance equally in *all theſe caſes:* the *ſame Science,* which qualifies a Man fundamentally for the Office of a *King,* or other *Public Magiſtrate,* qualifies him no leſs to be the *Maſter of a Family:* See *the Rivals,* pages 72 and 73: and the *ſame Knowlege of Law and Juſtice,* which fits him to be an *Umpire* in the Differences between *Private Perſons,* fits him as well for undertaking the Office of a Public *Ambaſſador,* or even that of a *Mediator,* in the Differences between *States* and *Nations.*

[193] The Similitude ſtill holds good. For we are rightly taught by *Plato* in his *Meno,* page 241, that nothing *eſtabliſhes* a Man's *Opinions* on any Subject whatever, but only *Science* in that Subject. On the Subject therefore of *Univerſal Juſtice,* the *Science* of it inſures to a Man his own *perpetual abiding* in the *ſame Notions.*——We may ſafely indeed go farther, and ſay with truth, that in this caſe the *Science* inſures the conſtant *Practiſe.* For no Man ever can depart or deviate from what he knows to be his Good, ſo long as he continues in that Knowlege.—— How a Man, who is once poſſeſſed of it, can ever come to loſe it, will, in going thro the laſt Part of this Dialogue, lie in our way to be conſidered.

whether

whether of the Two is the greater Meaſure? is it not thro the Science of Menſuration?

ALCIBIADES.

Without doubt.

SOCRATES.

And is it not ſo too between different Private Perſons and Civil States [194]?

ALCI-

[194] That the ſame Conſequences, agreed juſt before to follow from the *Science of Numbers*, called *Arithmetick*, are here agreed to follow from the *Science of Menſuration*, or *Geometry*, is by no means worth remarking; becauſe they follow in like manner from *every Science*, in all Minds where it reſides. But we meet with ſomewhat elſe, in this place, very remarkable. For *Plato*, reciting thoſe Conſequences in this *Second Simile*, inverts the Order of his recital of them in the *Firſt*. This Inverſion of his we call remarkable, becauſe, as he never diſpoſes the Parts of his Subject-Matter at random, ſo he never changes their ſettled Diſpoſition idly, or without a Meaning.——In the preſent caſe, we apprehend his Meaning to be This:——he began with reciting thoſe Conſequences of Science in an Order agreeable to the *Order of Things in Nature*. For after that he had, Himſelf, attained the Idea of that *Divine Wiſdom and Juſtice*, which leads and preſides over the *Harmony of All things*,——ſetting out from thence, he purſued this *harmoniſing and uniting Principle*, firſt, to thoſe larger Syſtems in the Moral World, which imitate the Conſtitution of the Univerſe,——Civil Communitys, Commonwealths, or legal Kingdoms,——thence, to every leſſer Society, formed for the Good of all the aſſociated Partys,——and thence, to the little Kingdom of Man within Himſelf.——This *Natural Order* is that, which is truly *Scientific*. For every Science begins from *Principles* the moſt *ſimple*, and at the ſame time the moſt *comprehenſive*: it proceeds, thro

thro the *moſt General Objects* of that Science, which are few and ample, to the *ſubordinate*, narrower, and more numerous *Kinds*; ſtill ſubdividing, till it ends in the *loweſt* and minuteſt *Species*, which are only diviſible into the infinite Number of *Individuals*.——And this is the uſual *Order of teaching* any Science to Others by Thoſe who are Maſters of it Themſelves.——But the Way, in which any *Science* was *originally attained* by Man,——the Way, in which the *Principles* of it were at firſt *diſcovered*,——the Way of *Inveſtigation*,——that Way in which *Socrates* taught his Diſciples,——is by inverting that Dogmatical and Magiſterial Order: it begins from *Particulars*, and thro *Induction* reaches That, in which they *all agree*: it aſcends from *Species* to *Genus*; from leſſer *Wholes* to greater; and from *Univerſals* to *Unity*, the Principle of all Univerſality.——In this Way it was, that *Socrates* himſelf, according to *Xenophon*'s *Memoirs* of his Life and Converſation, arrived at the Science of τὸ θεῖον *That which is Divine in Nature*. He began from *Himſelf*, from his own *Reaſon*, or Rational Principle, which he perceived to be by nature the *Governing Power* within him, and from the Seeds of thoſe *Paſſions*, the natural *Subjects* of this Government: he afterwards found the like Rational Principle, and Seeds of the like Paſſions, in every other Man. Thus he attained, firſt, the *Knowlege of Himſelf*, and then, thro that Knowlege, a juſt Diſcernment of the different Characters of Men, diſtinguiſhed by the *different Paſſions* uppermoſt in their Souls, and by the *greater or leſs* Subjection of *their Reaſon* to Theſe, or of Theſe to *Reaſon*.——From his Knowlege of the whole Human Soul,——from his Knowlege of the *Rational* Part of it, the rightful Sovereign therein,——from his Knowlege of the *native Rectitude* of this Part,——a Rectitude, which alone gives it the Right of Sovereignty,——a *Rectitude*, which is the ſame thing with *Right Reaſon*, having its *ſecret Seat* in the *Rational Part* of the Soul, by *Lucan* rightly termed *Dei ſedes*,——a Rectitude, which is to that Part the *Rule* and *Meaſure* of its Government,——the great Philoſopher went on to conſider the ſame Principle of Rectitude, or *Right Reaſon*, as the *Law* and Rule of Man in the little Societys, firſt formed by Nature,——in *Friendſhip*,

in

in the *Conjugal Union*, in *Familys* thence ariſing, in different *Familys united* by the Bond of *Brotherhood* between their Chiefs; and ſo on to thoſe larger *Aſſociations* between *Kindred*, ſtill naturally affectionate to each other, but between whom the natural Affection grows weaker, as the natural Relation grows more remote; till it becomes neceſſary, for the maintenance of Union, to form *Civil Societys*, Commonwealths, and Kingdoms. (See Note 47 to *the Rivals*, page 68.) In advancing along, he ſaw, that in proportion as *Natural Affection* leſſened, the greater was the neceſſity of being governed by *Right Reaſon*, by the *Rules* of Rectitude and *Juſtice*, and by *Civil Laws* built on that *eternal Law* as their *Foundation*. He ſaw, that this *Law of Reaſon* confirmed that of *Natural Affection*, and farther extended it to All of *Human Kind:* he ſaw, that 'twas no leſs *natural to Man* than his Affections; ſince it was the Law of his better Part, of That by which he is a Man, a rational and ſocial Being. Natural *Affection* and Right *Reaſon* being thus found to co-incide, the Philoſopher had but one Step farther to advance, before he ſaw, that *Right Reaſon* was the *Law of Univerſal Nature*; and that Nature had implanted in all her Offspring thoſe Affections to each other,——*in Aid of Reaſon*, wherever Reaſon alſo was imparted,——and wherever it was wanting, *to ſupply that Want*. He attained to ſee *Nature* her Self, as *affectionate* to All, *provident* for All, and continually *operating* for the *Good of All*, under the Direction of her own MIND, *Univerſal* REASON, and *Univerſal* LAW.——We have now before us a ſhort Specimen of Both the Methods of Reaſoning, above mentioned, on the preſent Subject;——firſt, in *deſcending* from Civil States to ſingle Perſons,——and then, in *aſcending* from Theſe to Thoſe again.——From the latter of theſe Two Methods of reaſoning it follows, that *Alcibiades*, and every other Perſon, *ambitious of governing* in the *Commonwealth*, ought to learn, firſt, how to *govern* his own *Paſſions*, and *direct* his own *Actions*, by ſtudying *Moral Wiſdom*, or the *Science of Natural Juſtice*, and by applying this Science to the due *Diſcharge* of *Moral Offices* in his own *Private Life*, unhindered by the Allurements of *Pleaſure*, and the Menaces of *Pain*. If afterward he

ALCIBIADES.

It is.

SOCRATES.

And how concerning Weights? does not the ſame hold true in This caſe [195]?

ALCI-

acquires a thorow Knowlege of the *Laws of his Country*, he will then be fit for *Magiſtracy at home:* if he ſuperadds a Knowlege of the *Law of Nations*, he will be ſo far qualified to negotiate with *Foreign States:* and if he proceeds to the Science of *Civil Government*, and acquires *Political Wiſdom*, he will know how to manage the *Paſſions*, and lead the *Actions* of his *Countrymen*. But Whoever has not the *Knowlege of Himſelf*, and of the *immutable Law* within him, will, as *Alcibiades* confeſſes of himſelf, (ſee page 128,) be of *one Mind* to day, and of a *different Mind* to morrow, on the *Same Subject*; and, if ever he undertakes the ſupreme Management of *Public Affairs*, he will vary as much in his way of thinking on Theſe Subjects; and thence fluctuating in his *Political Conduct*, he will drive the *Political Veſſel* one way to day, and another way different, or even contrary, to morrow.

[195] It was hinted in Note 194, that the producing of a *Second Inſtance* from the Sciences, to ſhew That which is alike true of *Every* Science, might ſeem *ſuperfluous*,—did not the Method of *Inductional Reaſoning* require an Enumeration of *Many Particulars*, agreeing in ſome *common Idea*, λόγος, or *Nature*, before it can be fairly *inferred*, or rationally *preſumed*, that this *Idea* runs thro *All* Particulars *of the Kind*. *Two* is indeed the *leaſt Number*; but *Three* is the *leaſt* Many or *Multitude*. A *Third Inſtance* therefore is here produced, (and *Plato* contents himſelf uſually with *Three Inſtances*, in reaſoning by *Induction*) to compleat his *Preſumptive Evidence*, that the Effects of *all and every* Science are *Stability of Mind*, and *Unanimity*, or the Agreement of All Minds, with regard to thoſe Truths which are the Objects of their Science.——Why

ALCIBIADES.

I agree, it does.

SOCRATES.

theſe Three Inſtances, *Arithmetick*, *Geometry*, and *Staticks*, are here ſelected from the reſt, when any others would have as well ſerved to ſhew, what Effects *all Science* in *general*, and conſequently the *Science of Juſtice* in particular, has upon the Minds of Men, the following account is offered from Conjecture to the Judgment of our learned Readers.——In the firſt place we preſume, that *Plato*, by taking his Inſtances all from *Mathematicks*, would inſinuate, that the *Science of Mind*, and thoſe of *Morals* and *Politicks*, are no leſs ſtable or certain than the *Mathematical*; being built on Principles no leſs firm, and the Truths, contained in them, being no leſs demonſtrable, than the Principles and Theorems of Mathematicks.——In the next place let us obſerve, that *Plato*, in his Writings, did not confine himſelf to the ſimple and plain Diction, uſed by *Socrates* in Converſation; but aſſumed the Metaphors, uſed by the *Pythagoreans*, and by Them taken from the *Mathematical Sciences*, to expreſs Things remote from Senſe, the Objects either of Reaſon or of Intellect. For in Terms of *Arithmetick* they expreſſed their Notions of the *Principles* of all things, which they held to be *Mind* and *Matter*; and deſcribed by *Numbers* thoſe oppoſite Effects, produced in the Senſible World by theſe Two oppoſite Principles,——ſuch as Friendſhip and Strife, Light and Darkneſs, Beauty and Deformity, Good and Evil.——We have farther to obſerve, that thoſe λόγοι, thoſe *Natures* or *Eſſences* of Senſible Things, that is, their *Genera* and *Species*, which, conſidered as *ſeparate* from Senſe and from Objects of Senſe, are *Objects of Mind* alone, and by *Plato* are termed IDEAS, are by the *Pythagoreans*, uſing a Metaphor very juſt and proper, termed μονάδες, *Monads*, or ἑνάδες *Units*. For Each of thoſe *Ideas* is really *One*; and ſuch no Object of Senſe can be, in any other reſpect, than under the conſideration of ſome *One Form*, given it either by *Nature* or by *Art*, and copied from the *Ideal Form* in the *Creative Mind*

SOCRATES.

But now the Sameneſs of Mind, which You ſpeak of, What is That? What is the Subject-Matter of it? and thro What

of *Nature*, or in the Conception of ſome *Human Artiſt*.——From theſe Obſervations, added to that general Preſumption, firſt mentioned, we infer, that the *Science of Numbers* in this place repreſents the *Science of Mind*.——If this *Conjecture* of ours ſhould be received as *probable*, (and we deſire no more in its behalf,) we doubt not of the like reception for theſe Two Others;——that the Science of *Ethicks*, or of Private Virtue, is here ſignified by Geometry, or the Science of *Menſuration*; and that under the *Statical* Science is couched the *Judiciary* and *Political*.——For μέτρον *Meaſure*, plainly a Geometrical Term, was frequently by *Plato*, as well as by the Followers of *Pythagoras*, applied to *Moral Actions*, as an apt Metaphor to repreſent *Moral Virtue*, conſidered as ſetting their *due Bounds* to the Paſſions of the Soul, marking out the *Lines* of every *Duty*, and aſcertaining the exact *Medium* between the *too little* and the *too much*, in every Affection, Energy, and Action.——As to the remaining Inſtance, the Common Senſe of Mankind has led all men to uſe, as if by Compact, *Metaphors* taken from *Staticks*, in expreſſing their Opinions of the different degrees of Merit and Demerit, the Subjects of *Political Juſtice*. Thus the metaphorical Terms, *heavy* and *light*, are every where applied to *Crimes*, and to *Puniſhments*. Thus likewiſe any important Services, rendered to the Commonwealth, are termed *weighty* and momentous; whilſt all little ones are termed *light* and of *little Moment*. Hence in all ages, ever ſince *Ethicks* and *Politicks* were advanced into *Sciences* by a diſcovery of their *Principles*, the *Balance* has been acknowleged and taken as a fit Emblem of *Diſtributive* or *Civil Juſtice:* as the *rectangular Rule*, and the Upright or *Plummet-Line* have been underſtood to be Symbols or Marks, aptly repreſentative, of *Relative* Juſtice, and of Juſtice *Commutative*, in *Private Life*.——

What Science is it procured? I aſk you likewiſe, whether the Same Science, which procures it for the Publick, procures it no leſs for Private Perſons; and whether it operates that Effect in a Man conſidered by himſelf, as well as between One Man and Another.

ALCIBIADES.

Probably it does.

We are confirmed in theſe Conjectures by the following conſiderations. *Arithmetick*, or the Science of Numbers, is the moſt *ſimple* of all the *Mathematical* Sciences; it is alſo the moſt *pure* and *abſtracted* from Body. *Geometry*, or the Science of Menſuration, dwells on the *Surfaces* of Bodys; and applys thoſe ſimple Numbers to meaſuring the Magnitude of Lines, Angles, and Figures. *Staticks*, or the Science of Weighing, enters into the *inward* and *component Parts* of Bodys; and applys the Science of Numbers to their *Specific Forces* of *Gravitation* toward their common *Center of Gravity*.——Juſt ſo is it with the higher Sciences, the *Mental*.——*Metaphyſicks*, or the Science of *Mind its Self*, the Science of its *Principles*, and of all the *Ideas* involved in thoſe Principles, is the *moſt ſimple* of the Sciences, the *pureſt* from Body, and the *moſt abſtracted* from all Senſible Objects.——*Ethicks* and *Oeconomicks* apply the Univerſal Ideas of *Good*, and *Juſt*, and *Fair*, to the Moral Actions of Men in *private* and *domeſtic* Life.——And *Politicks*, or the Science of Law and Government, are converſant with thoſe very Ideas of *Good*, and *Juſt*, and *Fair*; and apply them to the Actions of Men conſidered in *Publick* Life, or as Parts of ſome *Political Syſtem*; where the Worth or *Weight* of each Part is to be *eſtimated* by the more or leſs Importance or Moment of it to the Preſervation of the Syſtem, and by its greater or leſſer Propenſity to adhere to the *Center* of all *Civil Union*, the fundamental Laws of the Civil Conſtitution.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

What Science or Art then is it? Do not labour for an Anſwer, but ſpeak readily what you think [196].

ALCIBIADES.

I think it to be ſuch an Amity and Sameneſs of Mind, That which we are ſpeaking of, as there is between a Father and a Mother in loving their Child, and as there is between Brother and Brother, and between Man and Wife [197].

SOCRATES.

[196] *Socrates* thus encourages *Alcibiades* to utter his Thoughts freely and extempore; becauſe he well knew, that the Young Gentleman had never been in the hands of *Sophiſts*, and would therefore, in his unpremeditated Anſwers to the Queſtions propoſed to him, naturally ſpeak either the *Common Senſe* of all Mankind, or the *General Senſe* of his Fellow-Citizens. For on the one or the other of theſe Foundations did the great Philoſopher of Athens, whenever he converſed with the Young, the Candid and Ingenuous, build his Arguments; teaching them in the modeſt and engaging way of *joint Inquiry*; drawing out of them, by his firſt Queſtions, their own *pre-conceived Notions*; and by farther Queſtions gradually *unravelling* and *clearing up* the Dictates of *Nature* and *Common Reaſon* in their own Minds. And this is neceſſary to be done; becauſe thoſe Dictates, tho always *true*, muſt of themſelves always be *confuſed* and *obſcure*; as being, all of them, *general* and *indeterminate*. The Work and Office of a Man, who philoſophiſes honeſtly, is this,——to *diſintangle* and *unfold* his own Mind firſt, within himſelf, then the Minds of Others; and thus, at length, to diſcover TRUTH, in the inmoſt receſſes of All Minds hidden, but ever ready to reveal himſelf to All, who with ſimplicity ſeek Him alone.

[197] It appears from this Paſſage, how high the *Athenians* lifted their Ideas of the Patriotic Love of their Country; and we learn at the ſame time,

SOCRATES.

Do you then think it poſſible, Alcibiades, for a Man to be of the Same Mind with his Wife on the Subject of Weaving, when He is ignorant and She is knowing in the Art?

ALCI-

time, What thoſe Ideas were. For *Alcibiades*, in all his Anſwers, is ſuppoſed to ſpeak the Senſe of all *his Countrymen*,——the Senſe of *the Multitude*. On the one hand, he had never been ſophiſticated by the Pretenders, in thoſe days, to the Teaching of Wiſdom; nor, on the other hand, had he ever received any of the refined, juſt, and accurate Notions, with which the Mind is furniſhed in no other way, than by reaſoning from the true Principles of Philoſophy.——The *Athenians* then, we find, conſidered themſelves in their Political Capacity, as related to each other by Connections, which they could not deſcribe better, in Their Apprehenſions, than by likening them to the neareſt and deareſt *Tyes of Nature*. Senſible, that every Man of them derived his Security, in all which he poſſeſſed or enjoyed, from the fundamental *Laws* of the Commonwealth, put in *execution* by the ſupreme Magiſtracy,—they conſidered the *Conſtitutional Law* as their *Nurſing-Mother*,—and the *King* or Supreme Magiſtrate as their *Common Father*, active to invigorate the Laws, and to protect the Legal Conſtitution, together with all her Children.——For they conceived it neceſſary to the Peace and Harmony of the whole Commonwealth, that the *Legiſlative* and the *Executive* Powers of Government ſhould be equally well-*affectioned* to the *Good of the Governed*; and this *Affection*, it ſeems, they *likened* to that which is the moſt natural, the *Parental*:—They conceived it likewiſe neceſſary, that the *Governed* ſhould be All of the *Same Mind*, and co-operate with each other, in ſupporting, *like Brothers*, the common Intereſt of their *Political Family*, and in defending Thoſe their *Political Parents*: In fine, they ſaw it neceſſary, for the prevention of

Tyranny,

ALCIBIADES.

By no means.

SOCRATES.

Nor ought he neither. For 'tis a piece of Knowlege, belonging only to Women.

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly.

Tyranny, or Arbitrary Power, that the *King*, or Supreme Magiſtrate, ſhould always be of the *Same Mind* with the *Laws*, and *united* to them by ſuch a *Love*, as That which preſerves the Conjugal Union, free from Lordly Dominion on the one Part, and from Want of Confidence on the other.——The following Sentiment therefore, cited by *Marcus Antoninus*, L. 4, §. 23, (or 15,) is very properly, by ſome old Tragic Poet, put into the Mouth of an *Athenian*, apoſtrophiſing his Country,

——πόλι φίλη Κέκροπος!

——*Dear City, once*
By Cecrops govern'd, and by Cecrops lov'd!

On which Sentiment the wiſe Emperor well remarks, that a true Philoſopher may ſay, with equal Propriety,

——πόλι φίλη Διός!

Dear City, govern'd and belov'd by Jove!

meaning the Great Commonwealth of all rational and ſocial Beings.—— The ſame *Remark*,—the ſame *application* of the ſame *Simile*, a Commonwealth or Kingdom,—is the ultimate Meaning of *Plato* in the Paſſage now before us.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Well; and can a Woman be of the Same Mind with her Huſband on the Subject of fighting in battle among the Infantry, when ſhe has never learnt the Art?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly, ſhe cannot.

SOCRATES.

For the Knowlege of This, you would perhaps ſay, belonged only to Men.

ALCIBIADES.

I ſhould ſo.

SOCRATES.

Some pieces of Knowlege, therefore, properly belong to Women; Others, to Men; according to Your Account.

ALCIBIADES.

No doubt can be made of it.

SOCRATES.

On thoſe Subjects therefore, which are not common to Both the Sexes, there is no Sameneſs of Mind, between Huſbands and their Wives.

ALCIBIADES.

There is not any.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Neither then is there any Friendſhip;——if Friendſhip conſiſt in Sameneſs of Mind [198].

ALCI-

[198] That *Unanimity*, or the Agreement of Minds, is the only durable *Cement* of true Love, or *Friendſhip*, and likewiſe that of all *Domeſtic* and *Civil Union*, is the common Opinion of all Mankind: for it is a Dictate of *common Senſe*. But common Senſe *alone* does not diſcover, and conſequently cannot teach us, on *what Subjects* it is neceſſary, that true Lovers and Friends, or the Members of a Family, or thoſe of a Civil Society, ſhould *think alike*, for the procuring and maintaining of their Union. *Socrates* therefore, to aſſiſt the Mind of *Alcibiades* in attaining to clear and preciſe Notions on this Point, *diſtinguiſhes That* Unanimity, which *alone* is *neceſſary* to thoſe Ends, from *all other* Agreements or Sameneſſes of Mind, which are *ineffectual* to procure and *unneceſſary* to maintain true Love and Friendſhip, and which are even *Obſtacles* to Conjugal and to Civil Union. Of this Kind are the *ſimilar Thoughts*, preſenting themſelves to all Minds from a *like Skill* in thoſe Arts, or Operations, which are the *peculiar* and *diſtinct* Provinces of the two different Sexes to learn, or to perform. Such alſo are thoſe *homogeneous Images* and *Ideas*, which a Breeding up to the *ſame Occupation*, or Employment, generates in the Minds of Men, by directing their Attention to the *ſame Objects*, and by confining their Knowlege to the *ſame Subjects*: whereas *Civil Aſſociations*, begotten by the *many* and *various Wants* of every Man, require a *Variety of Knowlege* to relieve all thoſe Wants, and depend on the mutual Helps of *Many*, who *ſeverally* excell in each *particular Kind* of Knowlege.——Thoſe confined and narrow Sameneſſes of partial Knowlege being by *Alcibiades* admitted to be, None of them, That Sameneſs of Mind, which is requiſite to the internal Peace of a Commonwealth, and to the Concord of all its Members,—it remains, that This Sameneſs of Mind, This Unanimity, muſt be Such only, as may extend to and embrace All Minds, however

ALCIBIADES.

It appears, there is not.

SOCRATES.

So far therefore as Women are attentive to their own Buſineſs, they are not beloved by their Huſbands.

ALCIBIADES.

It ſeems, they are not.

diverſified in the reſt of their acquired Knowlege. And no other ſuch Unanimity can there be,—no other Sameneſs of Mind, comprehending all the Diverſitys of Minds Particular,—than the Agreement of all theſe Minds in their *Notions* of What is *morally Right*, *Juſt* and *Good*, and What is the Contrary.——That the Multitude, in any the beſt-framed Commonwealth, ſhould have the *Science of Juſtice*, is never to be expected; nor is it indeed at all *neceſſary*, that they ſhould: 'tis enough, if they have *Right Opinions* on this Subject. But ſuch Right Opinions can by no other means be inbred in them, and as it were naturaliſed, than by their being born, and bred, and continuing to live, under ſuch *Civil Laws*, as are agreeable to their *natural* and *general* Notions of moral Right and Wrong. And Such Laws certainly cannot be made by any other Men, than by thoſe Few who have *Science* in the Subject, the *truly Wiſe*; nor can any other, than Such Men, maintain them when made, or put them in Execution.——Juſt ſo is it in Private and Domeſtic Life. *True Virtue*, or thorow Honeſty, ſecured by Science, is the only laſting Cement of *Friendſhip*: and the only indiſſoluble Bond of *Marriage* is the conſtant *Agreement* of Both Partys, in obſerving the Matrimonial *Laws*, and in diſcharging their *diſtinct Dutys* in the Matrimonial State.——That this true Virtue, this *Univerſal Juſtice*, is the *Center of all Union*, is fully and finely ſhown by *Plato* himſelf in his Dialogue, named *Lyſis*.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Neither are Men beloved by their Wives,——ſo far as their Minds are engaged in their own Buſineſs..

ALCIBIADES.

They are not.

SOCRATES.

Neither then do Citizens live well [199] together in Citys, when Each of them minds only his own Buſineſs.

ALCIBIADES.

Nay, Socrates; for my part, I imagine, that they do,——ſo far as they are thus employed [200].

SOCRATES.

How ſay you? What, without Friendſhip between them, by means of which, we ſaid, that Civil States were in a

[199] In all the Editions of *Plato*, we here read ſimply οἰκοῦντας. In all the MSS. therefore, from which the Firſt of them were printed, and in thoſe alſo, which *Ficinus* and *Cornarius* tranſlated, there ſeems to have been an omiſſion of the Word εὖ. We think it an Omiſſion, becauſe the ſame Word is inſerted in the *very next* Sentence of *Socrates*, which the reaſoning requires to correſpond with *this*. *Serranus* alone, in His Tranſlation, appears to have ſeen the neceſſity of its being here reſtored.

[200] This Sentiment is *common* to all men, to *the Multitude* as well as to *the Wiſe*.——But What it is, to mind one's own Buſineſs,——This is not *equally well underſtood* by All: as will be ſhown in *the Charmides*.—— Here, however, that Phraſe is to be taken only in the Vulgar Senſe.

happy condition, and without which, we ſaid, they could not flouriſh [201]?

ALCIBIADES.

But it ſeems to me, that Friendſhip is, on this very account, produced between them, becauſe [202] Every one gives his whole attention to his own Buſineſs.

SOCRATES.

It did not ſeem ſo to you juſt now [203]. But how do you explain at preſent, what you ſaid, that Friendſhip was produced by Sameneſs of Mind? Whether [204] is it poſſible, that Fellow-Citizens can be All of the Same Mind on Subjects, in which ſome of them are Knowing, and others Ignorant?

ALCIBIADES.

It is not poſſible.

SOCRATES.

And do they do their Duty, and act as they ought, or not, when Each of them attends to his own Buſineſs?

[201] See before, in Page 239.

[202] We here read ὅτι in all the old Editions of *Plato*, except in the 2d *Baſil*, where, inſtead of ὅτι *becauſe*, we read ὅτε *when*. Mr. *Etwall* has preferred this laſt Reading in his late handſome Edition of this Dialogue: and *Serranus* alſo followed it in his Tranſlation: but not ſo *Ficinus* and *Cornarius*, who appear to have read ὅτι in their MSS.

[203] See juſt before, in Page 257.

[204] In this Mode of Interrogation all the Latin Tranſlators rightly render this Paſſage. Yet in all the Editions of the Greek, ἤ *or* is printed, inſtead of ᾖ *whether*.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

As they ought, undoubtedly.

SOCRATES.

When the Citizens then of any City act as they ought, and All of them do their Duty, is not Friendſhip produced between them [205]?

ALCIBIADES.

It muſt be ſo, I think, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

What Kind of Friendſhip, or Sameneſs of Mind, do you then mean, in the procuring of which, you ſay, that Wiſdom and Prudence are requiſite, to make us Men of Virtue and Merit? For I can neither learn from You What it is, nor What Objects [206] it regards. But ſometimes it ſeems to regard the

[205] The Philoſopher is here endeavouring to lead his Pupil into the philoſophical and larger Senſe of theſe Phraſes,——the *doing* of *one's Duty*, and the *minding* of *one's own Buſineſs*. For he would ſuggeſt, that *to be thorow'y honeſt*, is every Man's *Whole Duty*,——and that *to do his whole Duty*, after having acquired the *Knowlege* of it, is every Man's *whole and ſole Buſineſs*.

[206] We doubt not, but that moſt of our Readers have by this time diſcovered, that the *Prudence*, here meant, is *Moral Wiſdom*; that the *Object* of it is *Univerſal Juſtice*, or thorow Honeſty, in which is included Goodneſs; and that the *thorow Knowlege* of this Object, the Same with a *thorow Knowlege* of a *Man's Self*, is That *chief Excellence*, to

the Same Objects, and ſometimes not, according to Your Account of it.

ALCIBIADES.

Now by the Gods, Socrates, I know not What I mean, my Self. But am in danger of appearing to have been, of a long time, in a ſhameful State of Mind, without being ſenſible of it [207].

SOCRATES.

Now therefore you ought to take Courage. For if Fifty Years of your Life had elapſed, before you had diſcovered the real State of your Mind, an application of it to the Care of your Self would have been a difficult Taſk for you [208]. But you are now at the very time of Life, in which

to perſwade to the Study and Purſuit of which, to aſſiſt that Study, and to direct that Purſuit in the only right way, are the *Views* of our Author in this Dialogue. Theſe Diſcoverys will throw a clear Light on the latter Part of it, which for want of them has been greatly miſunderſtood by Many.

[207] This Interruption of the Argument, which remains a very ſhort while ſuſpended, beſides yielding as it were a Breathing-time, and enabling us to go on with freſh Attention, gives *Socrates* an Opportunity of inforcing on the Mind of *Alcibiades* that Conviction of his own Ignorance, which he had before received perhaps too ſlightly. For the more that any Mind opens to a Proſpect of diſtant Knowlege, the more ſenſible it becomes of its preſent Ignorance.

[208] If any Readers of *Plato* have not as yet diſcovered, that *Right Reaſon* and *Univerſal Juſtice* are ſo connatural to the Soul of Man, as to conſtitute

which ſuch a Diſcovery ſhould be made, to be of any advantage to you.

ALCI-

conſtitute a Man's proper and true *Self*, they muſt imagine the former Parts of this Dialogue to be foreign to the Subject, if the Subject of it be *Self-Knowlege:* for they will not find the leaſt mention made of Self-Knowlege, before page 214:——they muſt imagine, that no ſooner was it there firſt brought on the carpet, than it was removed;——that the Inquiry, then introduced in the room of it, and but juſt ended, concerning the Science neceſſary for Civil Government, was an impertinent Digreſſion;——and that now at length, thus late, our Author addreſſes himſelf, in good earneſt, to the diſquiſition of this important Queſtion, ——*What is a Man's true Self?*——To Such Perſons we ſhall content our ſelves at preſent with ſaying only This,——that, if they will but give us half an Hour's Credit for the Truth of the Repreſentation, we have juſt now given of what *Plato* means by a *Man's Self*, and in the Light of that Repreſentation will with us look back, and take a curſory View of the Ground they have hitherto gone over, they will receive full Satisfaction at their approaching Journey's End.——Reviewing the *Firſt Part* of this Dialogue, which begins where the *Introduction* ends, at page 47, they will obſerve, that the Ignorance of *Alcibiades* and of the Multitude, there detected and expoſed, is concerning the *Nature of Juſtice*; to which Ignorance are owing their perpetual Quarrels, Controverſys, and Wars.——In the *Second Part*, which begins at page 102, they will obſerve the like general Ignorance concerning the *Nature of True Good*; from which Ignorance, together with the Deceitfulneſs of Senſe, ariſes the common Error of fancying a Man's *Good* to be ſeparable from Rectitude or *Juſtice*.——In the *Third Part*, beginning at page 143, is ſhown the Ignorance of *Alcibiades* and of the Bulk of Mankind concerning the *Human Nature*; thro which Ignorance they miſtake their Outward Perſons, their *Bodys*, for *Themſelves*; and, in conſequence of this Miſtake, whatever Outward Things are convenient

for

ALCIBIADES.

What then am I to do, Socrates, now that I am made ſenſible of my Condition?

SOCRATES.

for their Bodys, whatever Senſible Objects are agreeable to their Senſes, and whatever Acquiſitions gratify the Paſſions which are excited by thoſe Objects, all theſe, joined together, they cannot but deem to conſtitute their natural, proper, and true Good.——But in this retroſpective Survey, they may at the ſame time ſee, preſented before *the Mind of Alcibiades*, Objects much more excellent,——the Education of the *Perſian* Princes in *all the Capital Virtues*, the Completion and the End of which is *Univerſal Juſtice*,——the Diſcipline alſo of the *Spartan* Princes in the Virtues of *Temperance* and *Fortitude*, the neceſſary Means of ſecuring that End: the high Regard to the *Laws of their Country*, to which all the *Spartans* were trained up, would not probably have been omitted, as ſeeming moſt material to the Purpoſe, but becauſe the *Athenians* thought, and perhaps *Socrates* and *Plato* might concur with them in thinking, that the *Spartans* held every thing to be *lawful* and *juſt*, which increaſed their Dominion, or advanced their Influence and Intereſt in foreign Countrys.——This brief Recapitulation of the prior Parts of the Dialogue ſerves to ſhow, what *Kind of Knowlege* was wanting in *Alcibiades*, thro the Defects of his Education, to qualify him for Civil Government. It was the Knowlege of *Right*, of *True Good*, and of a Man's *true Self*. Theſe *Three*, we dare aſſure the newly initiated in the *Philoſophy of Plato*, they will perceive to be *One and the Same Thing*, when they have partaken of all the Myſterys.—— From the Reaſoning in this *Fourth Part* of the Dialogue hitherto, it appears,——that *Peace*, *Harmony*, and *Union* between all the Members of a Body Politic, is the *Good* of that whole Body;——that this *Good* is then produced, when every Member performs its *proper Office*, in obedience to that *Law of Juſtice*, by which the general Offices, common to All, are deſcribed as it were in one common Out-line, and the par-

SOCRATES.

Only to anſwer to the Queſtions I ſhall put to you, Alcibiades. And if you will ſo do, You and I, by the favour of God [209], if any Credit may be given to a Prophecy of mine, ſhall Both of us be the better for it.

ticular Office alſo of each Member is diſtinguiſhed;——and that the *Science* of this *Juſtice* univerſal as well as particular, and the *Skill* to effect this *Political Good*, are the *Science* and the *Art* of *Government*.—— It appears farther, at the ſame time, and from the ſame Reaſoning,—— that all This is applicable to the *Inward State* of Man, and to *Self-Government*;——that the *Science of Univerſal Juſtice*, conſtantly abiding in the Soul, produces ſuch a *Harmony* between all its Parts, the *Rational*, the *Iraſcible*, and the *Concupiſcible*, that the Man is at perfect *Peace* within Himſelf, and is truly *One*;——that this *internal Peace* is his *True Good*;——and that in this caſe he is governed by *Mind*, by *Right Reaſon*, and by the Law of *univerſal Juſtice*.——We ſhall here ſtop; that we may not too ſoon anticipate the Remainder of the Dialogue, where theſe Truths will be ſeen ſufficiently confirmed.

[209] *Socrates* doth not here introduce the *Divine Being* out of any *Superſtition*, as the over-religious and Enthuſiaſts are wont to do on every Subject of converſation; nor out of *Hypocriſy*, like the falſe Pretenders to Religion, over-acting their aſſumed characters; nor yet idly and profanely, as the unmeaning and thoughtleſs followers of Faſhion frequently do in their ordinary diſcourſe:——The *Divine Nature* is ſoon to become the Subject of our Inquiry: and this Paſſage is to be added to thoſe many others, which we have aſſembled together in Note 138, and Page 174, as meant to be the Harbingers, one after another at proper intervals, to that high Subject; leſt the Simplicity of its appearance, if preſented to us unawares, ſhould make us inſenſible and blind to its real Greatneſs.

ALCIBIADES.

Your Prophecy ſhall be accompliſhed, as far as the accompliſhment depends on My anſwering to your Queſtions.

SOCRATES.

Come on then: What is it to take care of one's Self [210]? that we may not falſely imagine, as we often do, that we are taking care of our Selves, and know not, that all the while we are otherwiſe employed: And when is it, that a Man is taking that Care? whether, [211] when he is taking Care of what appertains to him, is he then taking Care of Himſelf?

ALCIBIADES.

For my part, I muſt own, I think ſo.

[210] The only *Remedy* for a Man's *falſe Conceit of* his own *Knowlege* is, as we have ſeen proved in the Caſe of *Alcibiades*, the Man's *diſcovery of* his own *Want of Knowlege* in thoſe very Subjects, in which he had imagined himſelf knowing. And the only *Remedy* for a Man's *Want of Knowlege*, in any Subject, is the *application* of his Mind to the *Study* of that Subject.——The Subjects, in which *Alcibiades* hath diſcovered his own Ignorance, are, as may be ſeen in Note 208, theſe Three;——What is *Juſt and Fair*;——What is a *Man's Good*;——and What is a *Man's Self*.——*Socrates* is now proceeding to inſtruct *Alcibiades* in the *Knowlege of Man's Self*. But if the Knowlege of *This Subject* doth not *infer* Knowlege of the *other Two*, we fear, that *Alcibiades* will be ſtill left in the Dark, as to thoſe very Points, in which *Socrates* had given him Hopes of being enlightened thro His Means.

[211] *Stephens* hath here rightly printed ἆρα. In all other Editions of *the Greek* we read ἄρα.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

And when is it, think you, that a Man is taking care of his Feet? whether is it then, when he is taking care of the Things appertaining to his Feet?

ALCIBIADES.

I do not apprehend your Meaning.

SOCRATES.

Do you acknowlege ſomething to be appertaining to the Hand,——a Ring, for inſtance? Or [212] does it appertain to any other Part of the Human Body, than a Finger?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly, not.

SOCRATES.

And does not a Shoe appertain to the Foot, in like manner?

ALCIBIADES.

It does.

SOCRATES.

Whether then, at the time of our taking care of our Shoes, are we taking care immediately of our Feet?

[212] If in *the Greek* we here inſert the Particle ἢ *or*, there will be no occaſion to *ſeparate* theſe Two Queſtions of *Socrates*, ſo as to inſert between them an affirmative Anſwer of *Alcibiades* to the Firſt Queſtion;] as *Ficinus* doth in His Tranſlation.

ALCIBIADES.

I do not quite apprehend you, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

Do you acknowlege, that whatever be the Subject of our care, a right care of it may be taken?

ALCIBIADES.

I do.

SOCRATES.

I aſk you then, whether you think, that a Man takes a right care of whatever is the Subject of his care, when he improves it and makes it better?

ALCIBIADES.

I anſwer, yes.

SOCRATES.

What Art now is That, by which our Shoes are improved and made better?

ALCIBIADES.

The Shoemaker's Art.

SOCRATES.

By the Shoemaker's Art therefore it is, that we take a right care of our Shoes.

ALCIBIADES.

True.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

And is it alſo by the Shoemaker's Art, that we take a right care of our Feet? or is it by that Art, by which we improve our Feet, and make them better?

ALCIBIADES.

It is by This Art.

SOCRATES.

And do we not improve and make better our Feet by the ſame Art, by which we improve and make better the reſt of our Body?

ALCIBIADES.

I believe we do.

SOCRATES.

And is not this the Gymnaſtic Art?

ALCIBIADES.

Undoubtedly.

SOCRATES.

By the Gymnaſtic Art therefore we take care of the Foot, and by the Shoemaker's Art we take care of what is appertinent to the Foot.

ALCIBIADES.

Exactly ſo.

SOCRATES.

And in like manner, by the Gymnaſtic Art we take care of our Hands, and by the Art of engraving Rings we take care of what is appertinent to the Hand.

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

By the Gymnaſtic Art alſo we take care of our Bodys; but 'tis by the Weaver's Art and ſome [213] others, that we take care of things appertinent to the Body.

ALCIBIADES.

I agree with you intirely.

SOCRATES.

By one Kind of Knowlege therefore we take care of Things [214] Themſelves, and by a different Kind of Knowlege

[213] In *the Greek* of this Paſſage we ſhould perhaps read τίσιν, inſtead of ταῖς.

[214] In *the Greek*——αὐτὸ ἑκάστου, *each Thing its Self*, (that is,) each Thing, conſidered as it is *in its Self*, and without its *Appertinances*.—— The only liberty, taken with this Paſſage in our tranſlation of it into *Engliſh*, is that of uſing the *Plural Number*, inſtead of the *Singular*; a variation, not at all affecting the Senſe, and only making it ſomewhat plainer to Thoſe who content themſelves with an *Engliſh* Tranſlation. ——*Ficinus* and *Cornarius*, whom Mr. *Etwall* has here followed, appear to have underſtood the Paſſage in the ſame Senſe with Us.——But neither the Words nor the Reaſoning will admit the Interpretation of it, given

lege we take care of things only appertinent to thoſe Things which are the Principal.

ALCIBIADES.

It appears ſo.

SOCRATES.

You are not therefore taking care of your Self, when you are taking care only of the Appertinances to your ſelf [215].

by *Serranus*. For he ſuppoſes it to mean *a taking care of our very Selves*; and tranſlates it, as if the words of the Original were, not αὐτῦ ἑκάϛῳ, but ἑαυτῦ ἕκαϛος ἡμῶν. *Le Fevre* and *Dacier* ſeem to have been miſled by their Countryman, in making Their Tranſlations conformable in this place to His. It will be ſufficient to tranſcribe the latter, which is in theſe words;—"*Et par conſequent l'Art, par lequel nous avons ſoin* "*de nous, n'eſt pas le meſme que celui, par lequel nous avons ſoin des choſes* "*que ſont à nous.*"—The *Propoſition* in this Senſe, *taken ſingly*, is indeed *true:* but it does not *follow* from what *Alcibiades* had before admitted; (and the word ἄρα *therefore*, in this Sentence, ſhews it to be intended for a *Conſequence*, or at leaſt a *Corollary*, drawn from the Propoſition immediately preceding it;) unleſs it be ſuppoſed, that by a *Man's Self* the Philoſopher meant *the Body:* but this Suppoſition is quite contrary to his Meaning; as will preſently be ſeen. In the mean time, it doth not appear from any thing as yet proved, that the Body, or *Outward Perſon*, is *not* a Man's *very Self*. So that all the Three Meſſrs, *de Serre*, *Le Fevre*, and *Dacier*, ſeem to have been too haſty, and to have out-run the well-meaſured Steps of their Author's Reaſoning.

[215] If the French Gentlemen have interpreted the preceding Sentence rightly, That now before us doth not advance us one Step forward in the Reaſoning, and amounts to no more than meer Tautology. This alone is a fair Preſumption, that they were in the wrong.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

At that time, 'tis very true, I am not.

SOCRATES.

For one and the ſame Art, it ſeems, doth not take care of a Thing its ſelf[216], and of the Appertinances to that Thing beſides.

ALCIBIADES.

It appears to be not the Same Art.

SOCRATES.

Now then, by what Kind of Art[217] might we take care of our Selves?

ALCIBIADES.

I have nothing to anſwer to this Queſtion.

[216] Had *Le Fevre* underſtood the words αὐτῶ ἑκάςῳ juſt before, as explained in the beginning of Note 214, he would not, by a needleſs alteration, have here diſturbed the Greek Text: for, as it ſtands in all the Editions, there are no ſuch Soleciſms, as He, from miſunderſtanding the word αὐτῶ, imagined.

[217] Mr. *Etwall*, in his late Edition of this Dialogue, has here followed the Second *Baſil* Edition, by printing ποίῳ. We preſume, that he underſtood this word as agreeing, in grammatical conſtruction, with the word τρόπῳ, not expreſſed, but implied, ſo as to ſignify,——*By what ſort of Means.*——We do not controvert the Propriety of ſuch a Phraſe. But we chuſe to follow all the other Editions of *Plato*, and all his Interpreters, in reading ποίᾳ, as agreeing with the word τέχνῃ, to be ſupplied here by the Mind from the preceding Sentence.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

So much, however, we are agreed in, that it is not an Art, by which we improve or better any thing which is Ours; but an Art, by which we improve and better our very Selves.

ALCIBIADES.

I acknowlege it.

SOCRATES.

Could we ever know, what Art would improve or amend a Shoe, if we knew not What a Shoe was?

ALCIBIADES.

Impoſſible.

SOCRATES.

Neither could we know, what Art would make better Rings for the Finger, if ignorant What a Ring for the Finger was.

ALCIBIADES.

True.

SOCRATES.

Well; and can we ever know, What Art would improve or make a Man's Self better, ſo long as we are ignorant of What we our Selves are?

ALCIBIADES.

Impoſſible.

SOCRATES.

Let me aſk you then, whether it happens to be an eaſy Thing to know one's Self; and whether he was ſome Perſon of mean Attainments in Knowlege, He who put up this Inſcription in the Temple at Pytho[218]: or is it a piece of Knowlege difficult to be attained, and not obvious to Every one?

ALCIBIADES.

To Me, Socrates, it has often ſeemed eaſy and obvious to Every one; and often too, at other times, a Thing of the greateſt Difficulty.

SOCRATES.

But whether, in its ſelf, it be an eaſy Thing or not,—— with reſpect to Us, Alcibiades, the State of the Caſe is this;——had We attained to That piece of Knowlege, we ſhould perhaps know What it is to take care of our Selves:

[218] *Pytho* was another name for the City of *Delphi*, as we learn from *Pauſanias*,——a name, more antient than the name *Delphi*, and, on that very account, retained by *Homer* and *Apollonius* of *Rhodes*. The Paſſages to which we here refer, may be ſeen, cited together by *Cellarius*, in Geog: vol: 1. pag: 721, Edit: *Cantab:*——An Air of *Antiquity* in the *Diction* is obſerved by the beſt Criticks to be one of the Sources of *the Sublime* in *Epic Poetry*. And *Plato* treads every where in the Steps of *Homer*, while he is ſearching out all the Sources of Sublimity in Style, to maintain throughout his Writings the Dignity of true *Philoſophy*, and at the ſame time to preſerve its Simplicity, and unadulterated Beauty.

but

but never can we know This, ſo long as we remain ignorant of That.

ALCIBIADES.

Theſe are Truths, which I acknowlege.

SOCRATES.

Come then; by what means might it be found, What is the very Self of every thing[219]? for ſo we might perhaps find,

[219] In *the Greek*——αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτὸ, (literally tranſlated into Engliſh,) THE SELF *its Self*; (that is) the *Idea of Self*: juſt as αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ſignifys the *Beautifull its Self*, or the *Idea of Beauty*.——*Cornarius* tranſlates the αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτὸ, in the Paſſage now before us, by theſe words—"*hoc ipſum*,"—*this thing, Self*: *Grynæus*, the pretended Corrector of *Ficinus*, (and not *Ficinus* himſelf, as *Le Fevre* thro miſtake ſuppoſes,) thus,—"*illud ipſum*,"—*that thing, Self*: *Serranus* thus,—"*Ipſum per ſe*,"—*Self* [conſidered] *by* [or in] *its Self*. And None of theſe Three Tranſlations, conſidered as *meer Tranſlations*, are to be condemned. But *Ficinus* here tranſlates the beſt of all, (if he intended to give an *explanatory Tranſlation* in *one word*, and did not miſtake the τὸ αὐτὸ for ταυτὸ or ταυτὸν,) thus,—"*ipſum idem*,"—which exactly anſwers to our Engliſh Phraſe, *the Self-Same*. For by αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτὸ *Plato* means *Eſſential Form*, the Form, by which every Being in Nature is *the Being which it is*, according to its *Species*, and by which it continues the *Same Being* ſo long as ſuch (its eſſential) Form laſts.——This Form, abſtracted from Matter, as it is *in pure Mind*, and as it is of ſuch Mind the *Object*, is by *Plato* generally termed IDEA, and ſeems to be his full Meaning in the preſent Paſſage. For we intirely agree with *Le Fevre* in condemning his Countryman *Serranus*, (and *Dacier* muſt fall under the ſame Cenſure,) for ſuppoſing the *Divine Being* to be here meant. The mention of

find, what We our Selves are: but ſo long as we continue in the Dark as to That Point, it will be no way poſſible to know our Selves.

ALCIBIADES.

You are certainly in the Right.

SOCRATES.

Attend now, I conjure you in the name of Jupiter: with Whom is it, that you are at this preſent time diſcourſing? Is it not [220] with Me?

ALCIBIADES.

It is.

SOCRATES.

And am not I diſcourſing with You?

ALCIBIADES.

You are.

Univerſal Mind would be premature, before we have learnt, What is the *Nature of Mind*, from the Fifth and laſt Part of this Dialogue; to which the Paſſage, now before us, is a direct and proper Introduction.

[220] In *the Greek* we here read,——ἄλλῳ τινί, ἢ ἐμοί;——*Is it with any other Perſon, than with Me?* But the Anſwer of *Alcibiades*, being in the *Affirmative*, is ſufficient to ſhow this Reading to be wrong. It may be rectified by this ſmall alteration,——ἄλλοτι ἢ ἐμοί; *Whether is it not with Me?*

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

It is Socrates then, who is diſcourſing and arguing [221].

ALCIBIADES.

Quite true.

SOCRATES.

And Alcibiades is attentive to his arguments.

ALCIBIADES.

He is.

SOCRATES.

Is it not by Rational Speech [222], that Socrates thus argues in diſcourſe?

ALCIBIADES.

Undoubtedly.

SOCRATES.

[221] In *the Greek*, ὁ διαλεγόμενος. See Note 35 to this Dialogue, and Note 39 to *the Meno*, there cited.——We are well aware, that διαλέγεσθαι in many places of *Plato* ſignifys nothing more than meerly *to diſcourſe:* but in this place, we are inclined to think, that the Perſon of *Socrates* repreſents the *Rational Faculty* of the Soul, and that *Alcibiades* ſtands for *Fancy* and *Opinion:* and if this thought is juſt, an Intimation probably is here given, of what is ſoon to be proved dialectically, that the *Reaſoning Principle* in the Soul of Man is a Man's proper and true *Self.*

[222] In *the Greek*,——λόγῳ.——The Interpreters here differ. Moſt of them ſuppoſe this word to ſignify here *Speech* in general: *Le Fevre* tranſlates it—" *raiſon.*" *Ficinus* in His Verſion ſeems dubious, *whether* of theſe Two Meanings of the word λόγος is the *right* meaning in this place; and accordingly offers *Both* of them to our Choice, by the Conjunction

SOCRATES.

And is not to argue in Diſcourſe, the ſame thing as to uſe Rational Speech?

ALCIBIADES.

Quite the ſame.

SOCRATES.

But is not the Perſon, who uſes a thing, different from the Thing, which he uſes?

ALCIBIADES.

How do you mean?

SOCRATES.

As a Shoemaker, for inſtance, cuts his Leather with the Sheers [223], and the Paring-Knife, and other Tools.

ALCIBIADES.

Well; he does ſo.

junction Disjunctive, *or*; rendring the word into *Latin* thus,——"*ſer-*"*mone vel ratione.*" But if the Meaning, attributed in the preceding Note to the word διαλέγεσθαι be right, then λόγῳ in the place now before us muſt ſignify both *Speech and Reaſon.* Of what ſervice this comprehenſive Meaning will be to the ſubſequent Reaſoning of *Socrates*, we ſhall preſently obſerve.

[223] In the Greek,——τομῇ,——inſtead of which word *Cornarius* ſays, we ſhould read ἡμιτομῇ. but he gives us neither Reaſon nor Authority for his alteration.—That, inſtead of τομῇ, we ought here to read τομεῖ, we have the expreſs Authority of *Julius Pollux*, L. 10. C. 31. where he cites the very Paſſage of *Plato*, now before us.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Is not then the Shoemaker, who cuts the Leather, and uſeth thoſe Tools in cutting it, different from the Tools, which he uſes?

ALCIBIADES.

Without doubt.

SOCRATES.

Are not, in like manner, the Inſtruments, on which a Muſician plays, different Things from the Muſician himſelf?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

It was in this ſenſe, that juſt now I aſked you, whether you thought, that, in all caſes [224], the Perſon, who uſed a thing, was different from the Thing, which he uſed.

ALCI-

[224] This being admitted by *Alcibiades* to be true *univerſally*, it follows, that ſome *Power within* Man *makes uſe* of words in combination, or Speech, *at pleaſure*;—that Speech may be put to a *right uſe*, ſo as to indicate, to inſtruct, and to direct; and that a *wrong uſe* may be made of it, ſo as to deceive, to miſinform, and to miſ-lead.——It follows alſo, if the words διαλέγεσθαι λόγῳ are rightly explained in Notes 221 and 222, that ſome *inviſible Power* in Man makes uſe of *Argumentative Speech*, (that is) of arguing in Diſcourſe with Others, *at the pleaſure of that Power*; and that *Speech Argumentative* may be uſed, like *Simple Propoſitions*, either to good or to bad Purpoſes; either to prove ſome Truth,—and then it is called Sound Argumentation, or Right Rea-

ALCIBIADES.

I think, he is.

SOCRATES.

Now then, to reſume the inſtance of the Shoemaker; ——What ſay we? does he cut the Leather with his Tools only, or alſo with his Hands?

ALCIBIADES.

With his Hands alſo.

SOCRATES.

He therefore uſes alſo Theſe.

ALCIBIADES.

He does.

ſoning,—or elſe, to prove (in appearance, or plauſibly,) ſome Falſhood, —and then it is called Sophiſtry, or Sophiſtical Reaſoning.——This *Power* within us, ſtiled by the *Stoicks* λογικὴ δύναμις, *the Rational Faculty* or Power, whether it *uſes* Speech and Argumentation *rightly*, or whether it *abuſes* them, is the *particular Self* of each *Individual* of the Human Kind.——When this Power in Man, which has the Uſe and the Management of Speech and Reaſoning, hearkens to *Right Reaſon*, and follows the Dictates of it, a Man then cannot, either willingly or unwillingly, deceive Others, nor can he be deceived, Himſelf: as Artiſans never err, in making uſe of their Tools or Inſtruments, when they follow the Rules of their reſpective Arts: And that *Right Reaſon* is *always preſent* to this higheſt Part of the *Human Soul*, the *Rational Faculty*, tho its Preſence be not always perceived,—the Readers of this Dialogue, who with Minds unprejudiced will attend to the laſt Part of it, may readily apprehend.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

And does he not uſe his Eyes alſo, when he is cutting the Leather?

ALCIBIADES.

He does.

SOCRATES.

And we are agreed, that the Perſon, who makes Uſe of any things, is different from the Things, which he makes Uſe of.

ALCIBIADES.

We are.

SOCRATES.

The Shoemaker then, and the Muſician, are different from the Hands and Eyes, with which they perform their Operations.

ALCIBIADES.

It is apparent.

SOCRATES.

And does not a Man uſe alſo his whole Body?

ALCIBIADES.

Moſt certainly.

SOCRATES.

Now the Uſer is different from the Thing uſed.

ALCIBIADES.

True.

SOCRATES.

A Man therefore is a Being different from his Body.

ALCIBIADES.

It ſeems ſo.

SOCRATES.

What ſort of Being then is Man?

ALCIBIADES.

I know not.

SOCRATES.

But you know, that Man is ſome Being, who makes Uſe of the Body.

ALCIBIADES.

True.

SOCRATES.

Does any Being make uſe of the Body, other than the Soul?

ALCIBIADES.

None other.

SOCRATES.

And does it not ſo do, by governing [225] the Body?

ALCI-

[225] *Simplicius*, in the *Proëm* to his *Commentary* on the *Manual of Epictetus*, having cited the Argument, here uſed by *Socrates*, to prove

ALCIBIADES.

It does.

SOCRATES.

Farther; I ſuppoſe that no man would ever think otherwiſe than This.——

ALCIBIADES.

Than what?

SOCRATES.

That a Man himſelf was One of theſe Three Things.

ALCIBIADES.

What three things?

that the *Soul of Man* is a Being diſtinct from his Body, and is properly *the Man*, ὁ κυρίως ἄνθρωπος, his proper and true *Self*, concludes in theſe words,——χρῆται τῷ σώματι, ὡς ὀργάνῳ, ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις [f. τεχνικαῖς] καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐργασίαις, ἐκ ἄλλό τι ἢ ἡ λογικὴ ψύχη, ἢ ὡς ὀργάνω χρωμένη τῷ σώματι. *No Being uſeth the Body as an Inſtrument, in the Operations of Art and in other Operations likewiſe, other than the Rational Soul, governing* [or managing] *the Body, as its Inſtrument:* (that is,) in the ſame manner, as any *Particular Artiſt* manages the *Inſtruments* of his own proper *Art*.——That the latter Part of the Sentence, here tranſcribed from the printed Copys of *Simplicius*, ſhould be read, as we have tranſlated, thus,——ἢ ὡς ὀργάνῳ ἄρχουσα τοῦ σώματος,——is evident, not only from the Beginning of his next Sentence, (which ſuppoſeth the Soul's *Rule over the Body* to have been *mentioned before,*) but alſo from the very Paſſage in *Plato*, to which this Note belongs.

SOCRATES.

Soul, or Body, or a Compound of them Both, conſtituting One Whole.

ALCIBIADES.

What beſides could be imagined?

SOCRATES.

Now we agreed, that the Being, which governs the Body, is the Man.

ALCIBIADES.

We did.

SOCRATES.

What Being then is the Man? Doth the Body its Self govern its ſelf?

ALCIBIADES.

By no means.

SOCRATES.

For the Body, we ſaid, was governed.

ALCIBIADES.

True.

SOCRATES.

The Body then cannot be That Being, which we are in ſearch of.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

It ſeems, not.

SOCRATES.

But whether doth the Compound-Being govern the Body? and whether is This the Man?

ALCIBIADES.

Perhaps it is.

SOCRATES.

Leaſt of any of the Three can This be ſo.+ For of Two Partys, One of which is the Party governed, there is no poſſibility, that Both of them ſhould govern jointly.

+ For, neither of them not governing,

ALCIBIADES.

Right.

SOCRATES.

[226] Since then neither the Body, nor the Compound of Soul and Body together, is the Man, it remains, I think, either that a Man's Self is nothing at all, or, if it be any thing, it muſt be concluded, that the Man is no other Thing than Soul.

ALCIBIADES.

Clearly ſo.

[226] A Summary of this Argument, as well as of That preceding it, is given us by *Simplicius* in his *Proëm*, cited in the foregoing Note.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Needs it then to be proved to you ſtill more clearly, that the Soul [227] is the very Man?

ALCIBIADES.

It needs not, by Jupiter: for the Proofs, already brought, ſeem to Me ſufficient.

SOCRATES.

If it be proved tolerably well, tho not accurately [228], 'tis ſufficient for Us. For we ſhall then perhaps, and not before, have

[227] *Simplicius* rightly underſtands *Plato* here to mean the *Rational Soul.* For the Arguments, produced in this Part of the Dialogue, to ſhew that the *Soul* is a Man's proper *Self*, regard the *Rational* Soul *only.* ——This Soul alone uſes *Speech*, as the *Inſtrument*, by which it makes *known* to Others its *Mind* and *Will.*——This alone uſes *Argumentative Speech*, as an *Inſtrument* to teach *Art* and *Science*, to correct Error, to confute Falſhood, and demonſtrate *Truth.*——This alone uſeth the *Organical Parts* of the Body, eſpecially the *Hands* and *Eyes*, as *Inſtruments*, by which it operates in all the performances of the *Manual Arts.*—— This alone employs the *whole Body* in its ſervice, as the *Inſtrument* of its *Will* and *Pleaſure*; and is the ſole *governing* and *leading* Power in *Man*, whether it governs well or ill, and whether it leads in the right way or in the wrong; for the reſt of the Man muſt obey and follow. ——It governs *well*, and leads *aright*, thro *Knowlege of its Self*;——if this Knowlege *infer* the Knowlege of what is *Juſt*, *Fair*, and *Good*,—— and if the Knowlege of theſe Things be the Science of *rational*, *right*, and *good* Government.

[228] That is,—not with the abſolute Certainty of *ſtrict Demonſtration*, ——For all rational Demonſtration depends on *Principles*; either on the *General*

have an accurate Knowlege of Man's Self, when we ſhall have diſcovered, what we juſt now paſſed by, as a Matter which required much conſideration.

ALCIBIADES.

What is That?

SOCRATES.

That, of which was ſaid ſome ſuch thing as this,——that in the firſt place we ſhould conſider, What is Self† its Self [229]: whereas, inſtead of This, we have been conſidering, What

General Principles of Knowlege, or on *Axioms*, which are immediately derived from thoſe *Firſt* and *Univerſal Principles*, and are, themſelves, the *Particular Principles* of the reſpective *Sciences*.——Now the *Principle* of the *rational Soul* of Man, and conſequently of the Knowlege of it, hath as yet been only *hinted* to us, and not laid down as the *Foundation* of that Soul's being the *very Self*, or the Eſſential Form, of *Man*.

[229] For, in the Order of *Demonſtration*, it ſhould have been, firſt, laid down as a *Principle*, or at leaſt, as a *Definition*,—that FORM is That *Univerſal Being*, by partaking of which *Every Being in Nature* is the Being which it is,—before the *Specific Form* of any Being whatever was *diſtinguiſhed* from other Forms: as the Nature of *Figure in general* ought to be defined, before any *Species of Figure* be conſidered: and as the Nature of a *Triangle in general* ought to be defined, before it be *divided* into its Three Species, or the Propertys of any One of theſe Species be conſidered ſingly.——Perhaps the true reaſon, why *Plato* here gave us only a Hint of this *univerſal Principle of Being*, was This,—— to put us on conſidering by our ſelves, whether the *Human Soul* does not partake of the *whole Eſſence* of its Principle, *Form Univerſal*, as being *intelligent*, *ſentient*, and *active*,——and thus to prepare us for the better apprehending of what is ſoon to follow.

is

is the proper Self of every Man [230]. And This indeed for Our purpoſe will perhaps ſuffice. For we could by no means [231] ever ſay, that any thing was more peculiarly and properly [232] one's Self, than is the Soul.

ALCI-

[230] Every *Univerſal*, (whether *Univerſals* are conſidered as real *Things*, or as *Words*, the *Symbols* of Things,) *comprehends* all its *Particulars:* and all Particulars have their *Denomination* from That Univerſal, which they partake of.——The Nature therefore of That Univerſal, which *comprehends* the Particular Nature of *Every* SELF muſt be known, before the Nature can be known of any *Particular Self* whatever.——For in all Paronymous or *Denominative* Terms, the Denominator, or Term *Denominating*, muſt be underſtood, before That Term can be underſtood, which is the *Denominated*. As, for inſtance, the Term *Good* muſt be underſtood in *the general*, or, as Some are pleaſed to expreſs themſelves, *Goodneſs* in *the abſtract*, before it can be known, whether any Individual Being, or Species of Being, is juſtly denominated *good*.

[231] Meaning,——even if we had begun in a *ſcientific way*, and had conſidered in the firſt place *Univerſal Form*, or inquired into the nature of What conſtitutes the *Identity* or Self-Sameneſs of *every Being*, (and this is *Form in general,*)——before we deſcended to the conſideration of any *particular Form*, or inquired, in What the *Identity* of a *Man* conſiſts, and What it is which conſtitutes *his* proper and true *Self*.

[232] In *the Greek*,—κυριώτερον,—by *Dacier* rightly thus interpreted,—*plus proprement & plus preciſement*. For the whole *Reaſoning*, from which this *Conſequence* is drawn, admits of no other Meaning of the word κυριώτερον in the Sentence now before us. Yet *Le Fevre* tranſlates it—*plus excellent*,—according to *another* Senſe of the ſame word, a Senſe indeed not uncommon, but foreign to the preſent Purpoſe. Perhaps he was miſ-led by *Cornarius*, who tranſlates it—*præſtantius*;—or by *Grynæus*, who tranſlates it—*majus*;—or laſtly by *Serranus*, who has adopted Both

theſe

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly, we could not.

SOCRATES.

May we not then fairly thus determine,——that We are converſing one with another, by means of Rational Speech, You and I, Soul with Soul?

ALCIBIADES.

Quite fairly.

SOCRATES.

This therefore was our Meaning, when we ſaid a little before [233], that Socrates diſcourſed with Alcibiades, making uſe of Rational Speech: we meant, it ſeems, that he directed

theſe wrong words.—*Ficinus* uſeth the word—*principalius*,—an ambiguous Term, and capable of *either* Meaning.—But what is more important, is the *falſhood* of the *Sentiment*, conveyed to us by *Le Fevre*'s Verſion, and the repugnance of it to the *Doctrine* of Dialogue; in the latter of which we ſhall be informed of Something *within the Soul* of Man, much greater and more excellent than its own *peculiar Self*.—— In the mean time, we recommend to the conſideration of our learned Readers the Paſſage, cited in Note 121 to *the Banquet*, out of *Plato*'s *Timæus*, pag: 90, Edit: Steph: It ſerves to confirm our Interpretation of the preſent Paſſage, and of the particular word here conſidered. For the *Divine Mind*, or *Univerſal Reaſon*, is not there meant by κυριώτατον εἶδος ψυχῆς, but the *Mind of Man*, or his own *rational* and ſuperior *Soul*. This is pointed out to us, not only by the words παρ' ἡμῖν, but alſo by the diſtinction, expreſsly there made, between θεὸς and δαίμων.

[233] See page 276, and the Two which follow it.

his Words and Arguments, not to your outward Perſon, but to Alcibiades Himſelf, that is to the Soul.

ALCIBIADES.

It ſeems ſo to Me too.

SOCRATES.

He therefore injoyns a Man to recogniſe the Soul, He [234] who gives him this Injunction,——to know Himſelf.

ALCIBIADES.

That is probably his Meaning.

SOCRATES.

Whoever then has a Knowlege only of his Body [235], has indeed attained the Knowlege of what is His, but not the Knowlege of Himſelf.

ALCI-

[234] This Precept was by all the *Learned*, among the *Grecians*, attributed to One or Other of their *old Sages:* but by the *People in general* it was ſuppoſed to have been a Reſponſe or Dictate of the *Delphian Oracle:* a ſuppoſition, which gave it Authority with *the Vulgar*; who paid little regard to any the wiſeſt *Precept*, or to any *Doctrine* how rational ſoever, unleſs they believed it to proceed immediately from *Apollo*. ——In ſpeaking therefore of this wiſe Piece of Advice, fundamental to the Study of Truth and Nature,——to ſtudy the *Knowlege of our Selves*, ——*Plato* here, as well as a little before in Page 273, leaves it dubious, whether ſome Man, or ſome God, was the Author of it.

[235] *The Greek* of this Paſſage, in all the Editions of *Plato*, is abſurdly printed thus,——ὅςις ἄρα τῶν τῦ σώματος γιγνώσκει, τὰ αὑτῦ, ἀλλ' ἐχ'

ALCIBIADES.

Juſt ſo.

SOCRATES.

None therefore of the Phyſicians, ſo far as he is only a Phyſician, knows Himſelf: neither does any Maſter of the Exerciſes [236], ſo far as he is ſuch a Maſter and nothing more.

ALCIBIADES.

It ſeems, they do not.

αὐτον, ἔγνωκεν.——The firſt Member of which Sentence being ungrammatical, *Stephens*, in the Margin of his Edition, ſuppoſes may be rectified, either by inſerting the word τι before τῶν, or by changing the τῶν into τα. In either of theſe ways indeed the *Grammatical Conſtruction* is amended, but not the *Senſe:* for thus repreſented, (and thus repreſented it is by the Latin Verſions of *Cornarius* and *Serranus,*) it is inconſiſtent with the *Reaſoning*, which requires, that the *Body itſelf* ſhould be intended, and not τα (or τι τῶν) τῦ σώματος, the Garments and other external things, or any of them, which are only *appertinent* to the Body. *Le Fevre* and *Dacier* ſeem to have been well aware of this, and have rightly therefore rendered it into *French* by theſe words —*ſon corps*. They were led thus aright by *Ficinus*, who, in tranſlating this Part of the Sentence, uſes only the word—*corpus*. Perhaps in the Manuſcript, from which he tranſlated, he found the right Reading, which we conjecture to be this,——ὅτις ἄρα τὸ αὐτῦ σῶμα γιγνώσκει, τὸ αὐτῦ, ἀλλ' ἢ χ' αὐτὸν, ἔγνωκεν.

[236] To underſtand the *Phyſiology* of the Human Body, was, in the age when *Socrates* lived, neceſſary for a *Maſter of the Exerciſes*, as well as for a *Phyſician*. See Note 27 to *the Rivals*.

SOCRATES.

Far from knowing Themſelves then are Huſbandmen, and other Artificers or Workmen. For ſuch men as Theſe are ignorant, it ſeems, of the Things which are Theirs [237], and knowing only in Subjects, ſtill more remote [238], the meer Appertinances [239] to thoſe Things which are Theirs, ſo

[237] The whole *Body*;—its *Members*,—an Inſtance of which was given in the *Hand*;—and the outward *Organs of Senſe*,—inſtanced in the *Eye*:—to which may be added, becauſe no leſs care is uſually taken of them, the internal Parts, the *Stomach* in particular, for inſtance; and that common Tegument of all the external Parts, the *Skin*.

[238] That is, *more remote from Themſelves*. See the Note next following.

[239] In *the Greek*, as it is printed, we here read—ἔτι πορρωτέρω τῶν ἑαυτῶν.—But we are admoniſhed by the *Soleciſm* of this Phraſe,—by the *Senſe* its ſelf,—and by a *parallel* Paſſage a little farther on,—to ſuffix the point, called a *comma*, to the word πορρωτέρω, and to inſert the *article* τὰ before the words τῶν ἑαυτῶν.—For τῶν ἑαυτῶν cannot mean *Themſelves*; becauſe the Pronoun ἑαυτῶν admits not the præpoſitive τῶν, as wanting no *definitive article* to aſcertain its meaning. See Mr. *Harris*'s *Hermes*, page 225 of the firſt Edition. Nor can τῶν ἑαυτῶν mean *the Things which are Theirs*, (the *Body* and its Parts,) becauſe in this caſe the word πορρωτέρω *more remote* would be abſurd here, where no Things, *leſs remote* from the Body, have been mentioned, or could poſſibly have been meant.—As to the *Senſe* of this Paſſage, it is explained in the very next Sentence by *Plato* himſelf, to mean things *appertinent to the Body*.—The Paſſage, *parallel* to this, laying down in the ſame words the ſame threefold diſtinction between the *Soul*, the *Body*, and thoſe *External Things* which are only relative to the Body, will occur in Page 317, or not far from it; where the Greek words alſo will be cited.

far

ſar as their ſeveral Arts lead them. For they are acquainted only with Things appertinent to the Body, to the Culture and Service of which Body theſe Things adminiſter.

ALCIBIADES.

What you ſay, is true.

SOCRATES.

If therefore Wiſdom conſiſt in the Knowlege of one's Self, None of theſe Artificers are Wiſe Men, by their Skill in their reſpective Arts.

ALCIBIADES.

I think, they are not.

SOCRATES.

On this account it is, that theſe Arts ſeem mechanical and mean, and not the Learning fit for a Man of virtuous Merit.

ALCIBIADES.

Intirely true.

SOCRATES.

To return to our Subject;——Whoever then employs his care in the ſervice of his Body, takes care indeed of what is His, but not of Himſelf.

ALCIBIADES.

There is danger of its being found ſo.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

And whoever is attentive to the improvement of his Wealth, is not taking care either of Himſelf, or of what is His, but of Things ſtill more remote, the meer Appertinances to what is His [240].

ALCIBIADES.

It ſeems ſo to Me too.

SOCRATES.

The Man therefore, who is intent on getting Money, is, ſo far, not acting for his own Advantage.

ALCIBIADES.

Rightly concluded.

SOCRATES.

It follows alſo, that whoever was an Admirer of the Outward Perſon of Alcibiades, did not admire Alcibiades, but Something which belongs to Alcibiades.

ALCIBIADES.

You ſay what is true.

SOCRATES.

But whoever is Your Admirer, is the Admirer of your Soul.

[240] The two preceding Notes are referable to This Paſſage alſo, where in *the Greek*, as printed, the like Omiſſion is made of the article τὰ before τῶν ἑαυτῦ.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

It appears to follow, of neceſſity, from our Reaſoning.

SOCRATES.

And hence it is, that the Admirer of your Outward Perſon, when the Flower of it is all fallen, departs and forſakes you [241].

ALCIBIADES.

So it appears.

SOCRATES.

But the Admirer of a Soul departs not, ſo long as that Soul goes on to improve itſelf [242].

ALCIBIADES.

Probably ſo.

SOCRATES.

I am He then, who forſakes you not, but abides by you, when, the Flower of Youth having left you [243], the reſt of your Followers have left you and are gone.

[241] There is a Paſſage very like to this, both in Meaning and Expreſſion, in *the Banquet*, page 68.

[242] In tranſlating this Sentence thus, we agree with *Le Fevre* and *Dacier*. But all the Tranſlators into *Latin* ſuppoſe it to mean,—*until he be improved*.—As to the laſt Word in this Sentence, we intirely embrace Mr. *Etwall*'s Conjecture, and are glad to find it confirmed by the *Bodleian* MS.

[243] In *the Greek*,—λήγοντος τοῦ σώματος,—where the word ἀνθοῦς ſeems neceſſary to be ſupplied. The ſame Metaphor is uſed, a few Lines farther on. See alſo Note 48 to *the Banquet*.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

It is kindly done of you, Socrates: and never do You forſake me.

SOCRATES.

Exert all your Endeavours then to be as excellent a Man as poſſible.

ALCIBIADES.

I will do my beſt.

SOCRATES.

For the State of your Caſe is this:——Alcibiades, the Son of Clinias, never, it ſeems, had any Admirer, neither has he now, beſides One only, and therefore to be cheriſhed [244], this Socrates here, the Son of Sophroniſcus and Phænarete.

[244] In *the Greek*,—ἀγαπητὸς,—a word, often uſed by *Homer*, and rightly interpreted by the old *Scholia* on the firſt place where it occurs, which is in the *Iliad*, B. 6. v. 401, to ſignify μονογενὴς, *an only Child*; becauſe an *only* Child is naturally *cheriſhed* with more Tenderneſs and *Fondneſs*, than any *One* Child amongſt *Many*. We have added the word "*therefore*" in our tranſlation, to make this Meaning more obvious.—*Le Fevre* and *Dacier*, following the *Latin* Tranſlations, have ſuppoſed the word ἀγαπητὸς in the Paſſage now before us, to ſignify *amiable*, or *agreeable*; to account for which Epithet, given by *Socrates* to *Himſelf*, they have imagined, that his Intention was to *rally* himſelf on the *Deformity* of his *Perſon* and the *Meanneſs* of his *Birth*, by ſetting them in contraſt with the *Handſome Perſon*, and *high Birth* of *Alcibiades*: a Rallerie, which ſeems unſeaſonable, and therefore inſipid, in theſe latter and more ſerious Parts of the Dialogue.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

Tis true.

SOCRATES.

Did you not ſay, that I had been a little beforehand with you, when I accoſted you; for that you had it in your mind to addreſs Me firſt; as you wanted to aſk me, ——Why of all your Admirers, I was the only one who forſook you not [245]?

ALCIBIADES.

I did ſay ſo: and that was the very caſe.

SOCRATES.

This then was the reaſon: 'twas becauſe I was the only Perſon who admired You; the Others admired That which is Yours. That which is Yours hath already dropt its Flower; and the Spring-Seaſon of it is paſt: whereas You your Self are but beginning to flouriſh. If therefore the Athenian Populace corrupt you not, and make you leſs fair, I never ſhall forſake you. But this is what I chiefly fear, that you may come to admire and court the Populace, and be corrupted by them, and we ſhould loſe you: ſince many of the Athenians [246], Men of Virtuous Merit too, have been thus cor-

[245] See the Paſſage, to which *Socrates* here refers, in page 35.

[246] In all *Democracys*, or Popular Governments, ſuch as the *Athenian* was at the time of this Dialogue, ſuch Caſes happen frequently. For the Populace ſeldom beſtow their Favours on Any but Thoſe, who flatter

corrupted before now. For the People of magnanimous Erectheus [247] hath an outward Perſon fair, and engaging to behold. But we ought to ſtrip it of all its ſhowy Dreſs, and view it naked. Uſe therefore the Caution, which I give you.

ALCIBIADES.

What Caution?

SOCRATES.

In the firſt place, my Friend, exerciſe your Self [248]; and acquire the Knowlege of thoſe Things, which are neceſſary

flatter them, and fall in with Their way of thinking.——In *Abſolute Monarchys* the like Corruption of Heart and Mind is apt to prevail in Thoſe who Court the Favour of the Monarch; to whoſe Favour ſeldom is there any other Acceſs, than by flattering his Humour and Turn of Mind, or by contributing to the gratification of his Paſſions.——But in *Legal Kingdoms* and *Commonwealths*, governed by ancient Laws, held for Sacred, this corruption is rare; unleſs where the *King* or *Chief Magiſtrate* aims at ſetting himſelf above the Laws: nor is it wont to happen in *Mixt Governments*; unleſs *One Part* of the Government aims at ſubverting the Conſtitution, and getting into its own hands the Whole Sovereign Authority. But none of theſe Aims can eaſily be attained, without the Favour and Concurrence of the *Populace*.

[247] In *the Greek*,—μεγαλήτορος δῆμος Ἐρεχθέως.—*Homer* celebrates the *Athenians* under this very deſcription, in *Iliad:* L. 2. v. 547. by theſe words,—Δῆμος Ἐρεχθῆος μεγαλήτορος,—plainly alluded to here by *Plato*. —*Le Fevre* did but dream, when he imagined ſuch a Verſe in the Ἱκέτιδες of *Euripides*, or in any other Grecian Tragedy, now extant.

[248] In *the Greek*,—γυμνάσαι.—We do not pretend to *inform* our Readers, we only *obſerve* to them, that the *Rational Faculty* or Power

is here meant.—The Rational Faculty is *exerciſed* only by *reaſoning*: And the *Subject*, on which it is exerciſed *ſpontaneouſly*, from the neceſſity of its *own Nature*, is the *Good* of that *Being*, which is indued with it, or in which it reſides. For *Good* is the *Firſt Principle*, and the *Ultimate End* of *all Being*, and of *every Power* with which *any Being* is indued. The Inquiry therefore into what is *Beſt*, or *moſt* for a Man's *own Intereſt*, is unavoidably the firſt, the chief, and the conſtant *Exerciſe* of every Man's *Mind*. Now the Way, naturally taken by the Human Mind, in its Inquiry after the *Good of Man*, is by *Analytical Reaſoning*;—by reſolving *Good in general*, Good common to all Beings, into its *Principle*; that is, by inveſtigating the *Principle of all Good*: from the nature of which Principle, every thing, derived from it, and partaking of it, partakes alſo of the nature of Good.—In every Step of this *Analyſis*, the Mind riſes from the *Species* or *Sorts* of things to their *Genera* or *Kinds*, and from leſs general Kinds to the more general, by *Induction*; from the agreeing Natures and Propertys of all collateral and congenial Sorts or Kinds, inferring That General Nature, in which they all agree, becauſe Common to them all.—Having thus attained to know the *Principle* of all Good, the Mind deſcends again, thro the more and the leſs general *Kinds of Good*, to that *Sort* of Good, which is the peculiar *Good of Man*; *diſtinguiſhing* all along, and laying out of her way ſuch Goods, as belong to the *Human* Species *in common* with *other* Kinds and Sorts of Being.—An Hypotheſis, or hypothetical Inſtance, will make this eaſier to be underſtood.—Let us then ſuppoſe, that whatever is *preſervative* of the *Frame*, the *Powers*, and the *Energys* of any Being, is *good* and *advantageous* to that Being. If this ſuppoſition be admitted, it will follow, that the *Nature of Good* conſiſts in *Energy*. For as the *Frame* of every thing which is contrived by Human Art and Wiſdom, is with a *view* to its *paſſive Powers*; and as theſe Powers are given it for the ſake of their being *employed* to the *uſe of Man*;—ſo every *Vital Form* is contrived by the Wiſdom of Nature with a *view* to its *energetic Powers*; and with theſe Powers it is indued for the *ſake* of their *Energys*, to accompliſh by theſe means the Pur-

poſes of *Nature*; and She her Self is always *energiſing*, in the Production of thoſe *Forms*, with all their *pregnant Powers*.—But in tracing this *general Nature of Good* up to its *Firſt Principle*,—Univerſal Being intelligent, or MIND,—we muſt, to reaſon rightly, ſee *the Good* of every *Species* and *Kind* of Being to have *this Nature*. We muſt ſee it in all the *Mineral Tribes*, in all the *Claſſes of Vegetables*, in all *Kinds of Animals*; running, in fine, thro *every* mortal or periſhable *Form*, and thro *every Part* of it, which is deſtined to any *particular Uſe*. We muſt ſee it alſo in the *Celeſtial Bodys*; and in thoſe *Elements* of *Outward* Nature, which *conſpire* and *co-operate*, as neceſſary Means, to the Production, Growth, and Preſervation of all thoſe *lower Forms*; impregnating their *Powers*, and aiding them in their *Energys*.—All theſe Beings we deem *abſolutely good*, when they *energiſe* perfectly, according to their own ſeveral Natures; and *relatively good*, when their Energys are *moderated*, and their Actions *bounded*, ſo as to ſerve the Purpoſe of that *Wiſdom*, which hath eſtabliſhed the *Order of Things*,—that Univerſal Mind, whoſe ſole *Purpoſe*, and the *End* of whoſe *own continual Energy*, is *Univerſal Good*.—But this is not all: we have hitherto gone no higher than the *Corporeal World*: to diſcover that the Nature *of Good* conſiſts in *Energy*, we muſt ſee it to be ſo in *our Selves*, in our very Selves, our *Rational Souls*. Conſider we then, in What this Soul of ours takes Delight, and *rejoices*, *feeling* it to be its own *proper* Good. Is it not in the *Exertion* of her *Powers*,—in opening and inlarging her *Underſtanding*,—in improving or employing her *Memory*,—in extending her *Knowlege*,—in learning *Arts*, and acquiring *Science*?—Is it not in the inveſtigation of *Truth*, in the eradicating of falſe Notions, or the corroborating of ſuch as are juſt, in her Self or in other Minds, by the *inward Exerciſe of Reaſon*, or by *rational Converſe* and *Debate*?—Is it not in the *Energys* of *thoſe Sentiments*, and in the *Exerciſe* of *that Affection*, which *Friendſhip* raiſes? is it not even in her *Conſciouſneſs* of having a *Friendly Diſpoſition* and *Social Inclinations*,—thoſe latent *Powers* within her, which are *ready* to *energiſe* and *operate* whenever they meet with *Objects ſuitable*?—Is ſhe not happy in the *Conſciouſneſs* of her natural

tural and rightful *Power* to govern every Thing irrational, with which ſhe is connected; and in the *Exerciſe* of that *Power* over the blind Affections, over the Paſſions of the lower Soul, over the Body which ſhe inhabits, and over every thing belonging to that Body?—Is ſhe not moſt happy, in *energiſing* thus and *exerciſing* this *Power*, when ſhe feels her ſelf moſt free and moſt at large?—And would ſhe not feel her ſelf perfectly free, perfectly at large, and therefore compleatly happy, if ſhe always energiſed and governed in perfect Union with *Right Reaſon*? For Right Reaſon is the ſame with *Univerſal Mind*, That ever-active *Power*, which governs the whole Univerſe,—and whoſe ceaſeleſs *Energy*, being *Good its Self*, and energiſing in, and with, all Beings, ſo far as they energiſe *rightly*, is *Their Good* alſo, the *Higheſt Good* of them all, in proportion to the *Capacitys* of their *ſeveral Natures*?—Having thus, in purſuance of our Hypotheſis, traced the Nature of Good *upwards*, till we have arrived at the Fountain or *Principle* of Good,—and having ſeen, that *Good* every where conſiſts in *Energy*,—we ſee our *Hypotheſis* agreeable to Truth: and we have now nothing more to do, in ſearching out the *proper Good of Man*, than to *deſcend* again; and in all our way *downwards*, rejecting thoſe *Powers*, which Man, by means of his Body, poſſeſſes *in common* with all *Corporeal Nature*,—rejecting alſo thoſe, of which all *Brute Animals* partake,—rejecting every *Energy* of Any of theſe Powers, as foreign to our Inquiry, becauſe None of them is the *proper* and *peculiar* Good of Man, we bring our *Inquiry* into a narrow and ſtill narrower Compaſs; until at length alighting, we find our *End*, and with it, our *own proper Good*, in ſuch *Energys* of the *Rational Soul*, as Thoſe above-mentioned.—Some ſuch *Analytical Reaſoning* as This, on the ſame *Subject*, the *proper Good of Man*, is, as it ſeems to Us, the particular *Exerciſe* (of the Mind,) here meant by *Plato*; becauſe This very Subject has a nearer affinity than any Other, to the Subject of this Dialogue,—the *proper Nature of Man*. For it is neceſſary for us to know, What is the *Nature* of Man, before that 'tis poſſible for us to know, What is the *Good* of Man: and, on the other hand, to know the Nature of *Man*, is of no more importance to Us, than it is to know

know the Nature of any *other Being*, but on this account,—that unleſs we know *our own Nature*, it is impoſſible for us to know *our own Good*. —But let us ſuppoſe, that by the term "*Exerciſe*," in the Paſſage now before us, no *particular* Subject is intended, and nothing more than Exerciſe of the Mind *generally*,—its Exerciſe on *any* Subject *whatever*; —yet we cannot doubt, but that the *Kind of Exerciſe*, here meant to be recommended, is *the reaſoning analytically*; becauſe this Way of Reaſoning is That *Dialectick*, always uſed by *Socrates*, in *Plato*'s Dialogues, for the *opening* and *unfolding* of the Mind, in all her Inquirys after Truth.—No other way indeed can be taken, to unfold or open the Mind, and therein to diſcover Truth, than to *collect* the *Sorts* of Things into their proper *Kinds*, and to *diſtinguiſh* the *Kinds* of Things into their ſeveral *Sorts*. For the *Species* and *Kinds* of Things *in the Corporeal World*, are *Forms* mixed with *Matter*; but, *in Mind*, they are *Ideas*: and theſe *Ideas*, from the *leſs general* to the *more general*, are as it were the ſeveral *Wrappers* or *Teguments* of the *Intellect*, one involving other, from the *outermoſt* to the *innermoſt*,—to That, which immediately involves the Principles of Mind, and thro which they ſhoot their enlight'ning Rays forth on All things, on every *Genus*, every *Species*, and all *Individuals*. For *One* and *Many*, *Same* and *Different*, not only give immediate Brightneſs and Clearneſs to all *Mental Ideas*, but throw their Light on all the *Forms of Nature*.—The inveſtigating of any Truth whatever in this Dialectical way of reaſoning, is by *Ariſtotle* called γυμνασία, *Exerciſe* [of the Mind,] the very Term, here uſed by *Plato*. See the Firſt Book of his *Topicks*, Chapter the Second. In commenting on which, *Alexander Aphrodis:* hath theſe words,—χρήσιμος ἡ τοιαύτη γυμνασία, ἡ κατὰ λόγους, πρὸς εὕρεσιν τῶν ζητουμένων τε καὶ ἀληθῶν. προπαρασκευάζει γὰρ τὴν ψύχην πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν. "*Such an Exerciſe, this, the* "*Dialectical, is of uſe for the finding out of what we ſeek after*, [in "our Debates on any Point,] *and for the diſcovering of any Truths*, [in "reaſoning by our ſelves.] *For it prepares the Soul for* [the Studys "of] *Philoſophy*."—Now, tho we ſhould admit this Dialectical Exerciſe, *in general* and *at large*, to be the *Exerciſe*, recommended here by

ceſſary to be learnt by every Man who engages in Political Affairs [249]: but engage not in them, until you are thus exerciſed, and thus inſtructed: that you may come to them, prepared with an Antidote, and ſuffer no Harm from the Poiſon of the Populace [250].

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by *Socrates*, yet to *Alcibiades* it could only be recommended with a view to ſtrengthen his Mind, and enable him to acquire *Moral Wiſdom*, (that is) the *Knowlege of Himſelf*, and (conſequently) of *his own true Good*; this being the chief End, evidently and profeſſedly propoſed by *Socrates* in the preſent *Dialogue*, or *Dialectical Inquiry*.

[249] That the Things, here meant, are the *Laws of Univerſal Juſtice*, and the *Common Intereſts* of all *Nations* and all *People*, has ſufficiently, we preſume, been ſhown already. For the *Knowlege* of theſe things, is the *fundamental* Knowlege, neceſſary to every Stateſman, in every Civil State: and in the nature of Things, and order of Science, it is *previous* to the Knowlege of any *Municipal* or *Civil Laws*, and to a Knowlege of the *Particular Intereſt* of any One *Civil State*: becauſe ſuch *Peculiar Law*, if juſt, and ſuch *Particular Intereſt*, if true, is as *One Species* under ſome *General Kind*, the *Common Nature* of which Kind is extended to *all* its *Species*.—If in this Note, and the Note preceding, we have rightly explained the Meaning of our Author, then the Studys, here recommended to *Alcibiades*, are thoſe of *Moral Wiſdom* and the *Science of Juſtice*; and to apply our Minds to theſe Studys is to take Care of our very Selves.

[250] For the *Populace* in every *Civil State*, for want of *Moral Wiſdom* and the *Science of Juſtice*, are apt to think, that the *Aggrandiſement* of their State in *Wealth* and *Power*, by whatever Means it be attained, whether juſt or unjuſt, is the *Intereſt of the Publick*. In *Popular Governments* therefore, ſuch as the *Athenian* was at the time of this Dialogue, Whoever aſpired to govern thro the Favour of the Populace, muſt,

ALCIBIADES.

What you ſay, Socrates, to Me ſeems right. But explain, if you can, more clearly, how, or in what way, we ſhould take care of our Selves.

SOCRATES.

Is not This then ſufficiently clear to us from what has been already ſaid? For What we are [251], has been tolerably well agreed on. Indeed, before That Point was ſettled, we feared leſt we ſhould miſtake it, and imagine that we were taking care of our Selves, when the Object of our care all the while was ſome other thing [252].

ALCIBIADES.

This is true.

SOCRATES.

Upon that, it was concluded by Both of us, that we ought to take care of the Soul, and that to This we ſhould direct all our Attention and Regard [253].

muſt, to pleaſe them, have fallen in with Their Notions; and relinquiſhing the Paths, pointed out by Philoſophy, muſt have run on with Them in the popular Road, thro frequent Wars with all their injured Neighbours;—as in fact they did, till They and their State met with a final Overthrow, from Enemys, too powerful for Them to reſiſt, brought on them by Themſelves.—How ſimilar to This, *mutatis nominibus*, the Caſe is of *Abſolute Monarchys* and *mighty Empires*, unleſs there happens in them a continued Succeſſion of *Princes*, in ſome degree *Wiſe* and *Juſt*, is evident from the Hiſtorys of all Nations.

[251] See Page 286.

[252] See in Page 266.

[253] See Pages 291, and 293.

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ALCIBIADES.

It was evident.

SOCRATES.

And that the care of our Bodys and our Poſſeſſions ſhould be delivered over to Others [254].

ALCIBIADES.

We could not doubt it.

SOCRATES.

[255] In what way then may we attain to know the Soul its

[254] See Pages 292, and 294.

[255] This *Fifth* and laſt *Part* of the Dialogue begins not with giving a *Summary* of the whole *Fourth Part*, which began ſo far back as at Page 222, and is but juſt ended;—nor, as *Serranus* imagined, with a *Recapitulation of the whole Reaſoning*.—It begins with referring us only to the Paſſages, pointed out in the Four Notes immediately preceding This, to remind us of what is there proved,—that all *external Things* are *inferior* to the *Soul of Man*.—For we now proceed to Beings of *higher Order*,—Forms, *ſuperior* to the *Human Soul*, with all her *Capacitys* and *Powers*. The Beſt and Utmoſt, to be ſaid of which Soul, is This;—that ſhe is naturally the *Receptacle* of all the *Sciences*; and hath a *Capacity* of knowing all things in *Outward Nature*, as far as they are the Objects of Knowlege;—that ſhe poſſeſſeth a *Power* of beholding the *Reality* of Things; and the *Capacity* of contemplating even *Truth its Self*;—that ſhe poſſeſſeth alſo a *Power* of conſtantly *willing* and habitually *chuſing* True *Good*, and of always *deſiring* the perpetual Enjoyment of it; together with a *Capability* of *attaining* it;—that ſhe hath, *eſſential* to her, the *Principles of Mind*, and conſequently, of *Truth*, *Rectitude*, and *Good*, thoſe natural and proper *Objects* of her *Underſtanding*

its Self [256] with the greateſt Clearneſs [257]? For when we know This, it ſeems, we ſhall know our Selves. Now, in the name

and her *Will*; for Their Principles are the ſame with the Principles of Mind:—It is indeed, thro her *Eſſence*, which ſhe derives from the Great *Mind Univerſal*, that ſhe poſſeſſeth thoſe Capacitys and Powers above-mentioned.—And as ſhe is related thus nearly to *Truth*, *Rectitude*, and *Good*, Theſe are ſo *congenial* and *connatural* to her, that ſhe never entertains Falſhood and Wrong, but under the *appearance of Truth* and *Right*; nor ever embraces *Evil*, unleſs it be ſo diſguiſed, as to be taken by her for *Good*.—But ſhe is very liable to be thus impoſed on, even by her own native *Principles of Rectitude*. For if ſhe gives her whole Attention to the *Objects of Senſe*, ſhe will, of her ſelf, inveſt them with that *Beauty*, which is the natural Object of her *Love*, and will attribute to Them that *Good*, which is the natural Object of her *Deſire*. Seeking for *Truth* and *Reality* in all things, ſhe will for ever wander thro the infinity of thoſe Phantaſms and Shadows of things ſubſtantial,—dreaming, all the while, of real *Beauty* and of true *Good*. —Out of theſe Dreams our Philoſopher is about to waken his young Pupil,—to recall home his Thoughts, ranging over all *Greece* and *Aſia*, —to turn them inward on Himſelf,—and to point out to him the *Place within*, where only he could meet with *real Beings*, find what he was ſeeking for, and attain that *Wiſdom*, his want of which he had diſcovered.

[256] Or the *Self-Sameneſs of the Soul*.—Inſtead of the word,—αὐτὰ,—here printed in *the Greek*, we ought perhaps to read,—αὐτὸ,—a word, occurring twice before in this Senſe, and anſwering beſt to the word—τοῦτο,—which follows.

[257] In *the Greek*,—ἐναργέϛατα·—inſtead of which, *Le Fevre* is of opinion, that we ought to read—ἐναργέϛερα,—*more clearly*, in the comparative degree only: and *Dacier* thinks his Father-in-law to be in the Right.—But this alteration would, as we apprehend, *weaken the Senſe*.

For

name of the Gods, whether are we not ignorant of the right Meaning of that Delphic Inſcription, juſt now mentioned?

ALCIBIADES.

What Meaning? What have you in your Thoughts, O Socrates! when you aſk this Queſtion?

SOCRATES.

I will tell you, what I ſuſpect that this Inſcription means, and what particular thing it adviſeth us to do. For a juſt reſemblance of it is, I think, not to be found wherever one pleaſes [258]; but in one only thing, the Sight.

ALCIBIADES.

How do you mean?

SOCRATES.

Conſider it jointly now with Me. Were a Man to addreſs himſelf to the outward human Eye, as if it were

For the way of Knowlege, here meant, and ſoon to be diſcovered to us, is the *Light of Intuition*, or Truth Self-evident,—a Light, ſo much brighter than the *Light of Demonſtration*, as This laſt receives all the Clearneſs and Evidence which it has, from that Fountain of Light, which enlightens all things,—*Mind its Self*, with its *ſelf-evident Principles* of Knowlege.

[258] In the Greek,—πολλαχῆ, *in many places*, (that is) any where in *the multitude of Outward Things*. A Platonical Mode of Expreſſion, this, ſignifying here,—that the Knowlege of a Man's true Self is not to be attained in Such a Way, as the Knowlege of any Other thing is,—thro the *outward Senſes* and thro *Reaſoning*.

ſome other Man; and were he to give it this Counſel,—— "See your Self;"——What particular thing ſhould we ſuppoſe that he adviſed the Eye to do? Should we not ſuppoſe, that 'twas to look at Such a Thing, as that the Eye, by looking at it, might ſee its Self?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly we ſhould.

SOCRATES.

What Kind of Thing then do we think of, by looking at which we ſee the Thing at which we look, and at the ſame time ſee our Selves [259]?

ALCIBIADES.

'Tis evident, O Socrates, that for this Purpoſe we muſt look at Mirrors [260], and other Things of the like Kind [261].

[259] That this Sentence is *Interrogative*, is plain from the Anſwer, made to it by *Alcibiades*. It ought therefore to be printed as ſuch, in all future Editions. And ought not then the firſt word of this Sentence to be printed—ἐννοῦμεν, as we have ſuppoſed in our tranſlation, inſtead of ἐννοῶμεν, which we read in all the Editions paſt, except that of *Aldus*? Ἐν νοῷ μὲν, as we read in *Aldus*, is manifeſtly wrong, but eaſily accounts for the depravation of the Right Reading. See Note 271.

[260] *Mirrors* were, in thoſe days, made of *Metals*, finely poliſhed.

[261] Meaning—any other Bodys ſmooth and opaque; as Ivory, and ſeveral Kinds of Stone, when poliſhed:—ſuch pellucid Bodys alſo, as have their anterior Surface, or their Top, ſmooth; but behind their back-Surface, or at their Bottom, have an opaque and hard Body; as Looking-Glaſſes, and gentle Rivulets in hard Soils.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

You are right. And has not the Eye its ſelf, with which we ſee, Something of the ſame Kind, belonging to it [262]?

ALCIBIADES.

Moſt certainly it has.

SOCRATES.

You have obſerved then, that the Face of the Perſon, who looks in the Eye of Another Perſon, appears viſible to himſelf in the Eye-Sight of the Perſon oppoſite to him, as in a Mirror. And we therefore call this the Pupil [263],

[262] And of that particular Sort, mentioned in the Note preceding, which are *ſmooth* and *pellucid*, but whoſe *hinder Surface* is *opaque*: as we learn from the Anatomy of the Eye.

[263] In all the Editions of *Plato* we here read—κορυφὴν,—the abſurdity of which Reading would be no leſs aſtoniſhing to Us, than it was to Monſ. *Dacier*, if we did not imagine, that a probable account might be given of its Origin: for which account we refer our Readers to Note 271.—But, that we ought here to read—κόρην,—is evident from the reaſon, immediately ſubjoined by *Plato* himſelf, why the *Pupil of the Eye* had that name given it. For in the Pupil is ſeen a *Picture* as it were, in *Miniature*, of the Face of that Perſon, who looks in it, if directly oppoſite. And in *Latin*, the *Etymologiſts* tell us, that this Part of the Eye is metaphorically termed *Pupilla*, from *Pupa*, a *Puppet* or *Baby*; an Etymology, which is the more probable, becauſe the ancient Latin Word, for the *Pupil of the Eye*, was *Pupula*, properly ſignifying *a little Baby*. We uſe the ſame metaphorical expreſſion in our own Language, when we tell our *bright-eyed Maidens*, to indulge their hopes of being Wives and *Mothers*, that we ſee *Babys* in *their Eyes*.

becauſe

becauſe it exhibits the Image of that Perſon who looks in it.

ALCIBIADES.

What you ſay, is true.

SOCRATES.

An Eye therefore beholding an Eye, and looking in the moſt excellent Part of it, in That with which it ſees, may thus ſee its Self.

ALCIBIADES.

Apparently ſo.

SOCRATES.

But if the Eye looks at any Other Part of the Man, or at any Thing whatever, except [264] what This Part of the Eye happens to be like, it will not ſee its Self.

ALCIBIADES.

It is true.

SOCRATES.

If therefore the Eye would ſee its Self, it muſt look in an Eye, and in that Place of the Eye too, where the Virtue of the Eye is naturally ſeated; and the Virtue of the Eye is Sight.

ALCIBIADES.

Juſt ſo.

[264] The *Exception* is meant of *Mirrors*, and of ſuch other Bodys as are mentioned in Note 261.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Whether then is it not true, my Friend Alcibiades, that the Soul, if ſhe would know her Self, muſt look at Soul [265], and eſpecially [266] at that Place in the Soul,

[265] Meaning—at the *Soul of another Man.* For a Man's *own Soul* cannot be here meant, nor even That which is higheſt in it, his *Intellect:* becauſe to know or ſee one's own Soul is the propoſed *End*; and in the Sentence now before us are ſhown the *Means,* which can never be the ſame thing with the End.—Beſides this; the *Similitude* of the Eye, ſeeing its Self in the *Eye of another Perſon,* ſhews that *another Soul* is meant, of *That* to which the Similitude is *applied.*—And farther; this *other Soul* muſt be *Such* as a Man's *own:* for the *Similitude* will not ſuffer us to ſuppoſe a *different Kind of Soul* to be here intended; neither are we as yet advanced, tho advancing apace, to the conſideration of the *Divine Mind.*—Now the only *Medium,* thro which we can ſee the *Rational Soul* of another Man is that of *Rational Diſcourſe* with him, and chiefly in the way of *Dialectick*; becauſe in This the Rational Faculty is *exerciſed* the moſt *perfectly,* and *employed* the moſt *ſuitably* to her own Nature; and becauſe thro This the *Energys* of a Man's *own Reaſon,* excited by Colliſion with thoſe of *another Man's,* ſhine out, and ſparkle, and are clearly ſeen by Both the Partys. Of this Dialectical way of reaſoning, *Plato*'s *Dialogues* are the moſt accurately finiſhed Models, ever exhibited to the World.—Such are the readieſt and ſpeedieſt *Means* of our becoming acquainted with our own *Reaſon.* But the Paſſage, we have in hand, ſeems to convey a Meaning, more extenſive, to be explained in the Note next following.

[266] This word—"*eſpecially,*"—directing our *principal* Attention to the *ſuperior Part* of the Soul, implys, that the word—"*Soul,*"—in the preceding Member of the Sentence, means *the whole Soul:* and if ſo, it is there inſinuated, that we cannot ſee even the *inferior Parts* of

our own Soul by any other means, than by looking at the *ſame Parts* of the Soul in *other Men*. And that otherwiſe we cannot, is moſt certain. For the *Inferior Parts* of the Soul are blind, and can by no means be brought to ſee Themſelves. And the *Superior Part* can no otherwiſe ſee them, than by the ſame means by which ſhe ſees *her Self*, (that is) by *Reflection* from the Souls of Others.—This *Mirror* is commonly ſuppoſed to be held up to our View by a Converſe with *living Characters* and *real Perſons*. But if we depend on *ſuch* a Mirror, it always will deceive us; until the *Eye* of our own Soul be perfectly clear and bright, and hath ſeen its Self *firſt*. For, in the Commerce of the World, our own *Paſſions* and *Prejudices* combat with thoſe of other Men; *thoſe of other Men* wear many various *Diſguiſes*, and ſhun the appearing what they are; and an *inborn Affection* for whatever a Man takes to be *Himſelf*, muſt, if he miſtakes it, blind his mental Eye to a right View of *his own Paſſions*, *Fancys*, and *Opinions*. We cannot know, when we violate the Law of Reaſon, or tranſgreſs the Boundarys of Right and Wrong, before the Law and the Boundarys are known to us: nor can we diſcover any *Falſhood* or any *Evil*, under their *Diſguiſes* of Truth and Good, till by long and intimate acquaintance with *Truth* and *Good*, we are able to diſtinguiſh *Una* from *Dueſſa*, the *genuine* from the *counterfeit*.—We ſhall be no leſs deceived, if we imagine, that *Hiſtorys*, or *Comedys*, or *feigned Dialogues*, are ſufficient to give us an *Inſight* into the *Souls* and *Minds* of Men, and may ſupply the Want of *Moral Science*. For, admitting that in theſe Studys our Paſſions are not apt to intermeddle,—and ſuppoſing that we come to them with Minds unprejudiced,—yet how ſhall we guard againſt our being miſ-led by the *Prejudices* or *Partiality* of *Hiſtorians*, their *Exaggerations*, *Fancys*, and *Refinements*, in deſcribing *Characters*, and aſſigning the *Motives* of Men's *Actions*,—unleſs we are armed with a previous Knowlege of what *Qualitys* are *conſiſtent* in each *Character*,—what *Virtues* are *compatible* with what *Vices*,—what *Effect* the various *Opinions*, as well as the ſeveral *Paſſions* of Men, have upon their *Conduct*,—and above all, how *mutable* are the *Tempers* and the *Minds* of Men, if not *fixed by Science*?—How ſhall

ſhall we detect the *falſe Colouring* of *Poetry* and of *Oratory*, unleſs we have before noted the *natural Colours* of each Character in real Life? And this we may do thro Moral Science. For be the *Characters* of Men ever ſo *various*, the *Fund* of every one of them, except the *Philoſophic*, is either—*native Honeſty* and *Goodneſs*,—or ſome *blind Affection*, or *Paſſion*, *predominant* in the Soul,—or a *Mixture* of any two, or more, of theſe *Paſſions* or *Affections*, repugnant ſometimes to each other, and making a *Ferment* in the Soul,—or the *Mixture* of any one or more of them *with native Honeſty and Goodneſs*,—whilſt ſometimes one and ſometimes another of the Ingredients in theſe mixt Characters gaineth the Aſcendant.—And ſince all the Paſſions and Affections are reducible under certain *Sorts* and *Kinds*, they are *Objects of Science*; as all other things are, which may be thus *aſſembled* and *united*, and again thus *divided* and *diſtinguiſhed*.—The *natural* and *ſocial Affections* indeed are ſeldom aſhamed to ſhow their Faces; but the *ſelfiſh Affections* and the *Paſſions*, tho they bear certain *Characteriſtic Marks*, viſible to All when they are undiſguiſed, are uſually *concealed* from vulgar Eyes, by *wearing* over them a *Maſque* of fair Words and plauſible Pretences,—by *poliſhing* them with the fine Files of *Sophiſtry* and *Rhetorick*,—or by *varniſhing* and giving them a falſe *Gloſs*, which paſſes only for the *high Relief* of *Poetic Imitation*.—And no Man can pull off thoſe *Viſors*, or ſee thro any of theſe *fair Semblances*, worn by *Others*, if he is deceived by the *Impoſtures* of his own *Paſſions* and unrectified *Affections*.—The *Science* therefore *of Morals*, thro which alone a Man's *whole Soul* is diſcovered to Himſelf, (that is,) to his ſuperior Part, his Reaſon or Underſtanding, is fundamentally neceſſary to his being acquainted with the real Characters of other Men. After this previous Knowlege, *Hiſtory*, *Comedy*, and *Dialogue-Writings*, will be of great Uſe, in giving us *particular Inſtances* of thoſe Moral Truths, and *perſonal Examples* of thoſe Virtues and Vices, which we already know in *Theory* and in *the general*.—We ſhall not then miſtake the Character of the Firſt *Cyrus*, tho drawn by a *Xenophon*, nor that of our King *Henry the Seventh*, tho painted by a *Bacon*.—We ſhall not then admire the *fine Gentlemen*, exhibited on our

Soul [267], where Wiſdom [268], the Virtue of the Soul [269], is ſown

Comic Stage by the *Poets* of the laſt Century.—Nor need we then fear the being diſtracted by the *bandying* of Sentiments and Notions, to and fro, between the *Perſons* of a *feigned Dialogue*; when to the reading of them we bring with us the true *Standard* of *Rectitude* in *Morals*.—What this Standard is, and how to be obtained, we are juſt come to the Dawn of a Diſcovery.—In the mean time, we think it would be doing a Negative Piece of Injuſtice to our Author, if we did not mention His *Dialogues*, eſpecially thoſe of the *Diſputative* Kind, as *Exceptions* to what we have ſaid above concerning the *Inſufficiency* and the *Danger* of *Dialogue-Writings*. For in the *Dialogues* of *Plato*, here excepted, the *Secondary Characters*, who diſcloſe the ſeveral falſe Sentiments and Notions, inſpired by the ſeveral Paſſions and ſelfiſh Affections of the Soul, are *contraſted* with a Character, the neareſt to the Ideal *Exemplar vitæ morumque*, that ever did Honour to *Human Nature*. For, tho aſſiſted by a *Genius* truly *Divine*, it is not pretended by the Diſciples of SOCRATES, that he *Himſelf* was any thing more than a *meer Man*. *Socrates* therefore was the fitteſt Character to exemplify the Excellence of the *Human* Mind, when applying its ſelf to That which is *Divine*: and on the other hand, the *Sophiſts* were the fitteſt Characters to repreſent the extreme *Depravity*, the incurable *Ignorance*, and endleſs *Error*, of the *Human Soul*, when it has cut off all Communication with the *Divine Mind*, by preſuming its ſelf ſufficiently wiſe and knowing, of its Self, and in no need of any application to *Things Divine*. For the Paſſions and the ſelfiſh Affections eaſily impoſe on ſuch *forlorn* and *ſolitary Minds*; by the help of *Imagination*, they eaſily ſophiſticate *Human Reaſon*, and engage it to eſpouſe, ſupport, and lead Their Party; and having obtained this Point, they act without any other Controul, than that of their wily Conductor, *Human Reaſon*, now debaſed, and metamorphoſed into *Cunning*.

[267] *Philo*, the *Platoniſing Jew*, ſeems to have had this Paſſage of *Plato* in his Thoughts, when he wrote thus, in his Treatiſe περὶ κοσμοποιΐας,

ποιᾶς, pag: 7, Edit: *Turneb:*—ὅπερ νοῦς ἐν ψυχῇ, τοῦτ' ὀφθαλμὸς ἐν σώματι. βλέπει γὰρ ἑκάτερος· ὁ μὲν τὰ νοητὰ, ὁ δ' αὖ τὰ αἰσθητά. *That, which Mind is in the Soul, the Eye is in the Body: for Each of them ſees,—the one, Things Intelligible,—the other, Things Senſible.*—But if *Philo* meant to tread exactly in the Steps of *Plato*, he miſtook *Plato*'s Meaning. For the Analogy, drawn by *Plato* in the Paſſage now before us, is not between the *Soul* and the *Body*; nor conſequently, between the *Mind* and the corporeal *Eye*;—but between the *Soul* and the corporeal *Eye*, and between thoſe *Powers* in which the reſpective *Sight* of each of them is ſeated.—Rightly therefore is this *Analogy* repreſented by *Ariſtotle*, in *Topic:* Lib: 1, Cap: 17, thus,—ὡς ὄψις ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ, νοῦς ἐν ψυχῇ. *As Sight is in the Eye, ſo is Intellect in the Soul.* For *Ariſtotle*, as well as *Plato*, always uſeth the Term νοῦς to ſignify the *Intellect*,—That Power, which is *higheſt* in the *Soul of Man*, and alſo in the *Univerſe*.

[268] *Ariſtotle*, in *Metaphyſic:* Lib: 1, obſerves, that *Wiſdom*, or *Philoſophy*, (as *Human Wiſdom* is more modeſtly and more juſtly called,) conſiſts in knowing *(pro modulo humano)* the *Cauſes* and the *Principles* of Things. All of theſe, which are knowable, (for meer *Matter*, the *Subject* only of *Forms*, is not an Object of Knowlege,) are to be referred to *Mind* its Self, as the *Firſt Cauſe* and *Higheſt Principle* of all things. —For if all things are *generated* and *produced* thro *Motion*,—if the *Principle* of all *Motion* be *Life*,—and if *Mind* be *Life its Self*, the *Fountain* of all *Life*,—it follows, that MIND is, properly and ſtrictly ſpeaking, the Firſt *animating*, Firſt *moving*, and Firſt *producing* Cauſe of all things.—Farther; if every *Being* in Nature has ſome *certain Form*, eſſential to it,—if this *eſſential Form* continues *the ſame*, ſo long as the Being laſts,—and if Nature *invariably* produces a *perpetual* Succeſſion of Beings, having *the ſame* eſſential Forms *as* the Beings which preceded them,—the Cauſe of theſe *Sameneſſes*, of this *Certainty*, *Immutability*, and *Conſtancy*, can only be aſcribed to *Mind*; becauſe, all *Corporeal Nature* being in ceaſeleſs *Motion*, and all the *Parts* of all *Bodys* being in perpetual *Change*, no other thing than *Mind* is *fixed* and *permanent*; *invariable* and always the *Same*. MIND therefore muſt be the ſole

forming Cauſe of all the ſucceſſive *Forms of Nature:* and thus it is, that *Nature*, full of *Mind* and *Life*, is inceſſantly *operative* and *plaſtic*, as well as *animative* and *productive*.—But farther; ſince it is the Nature of all Mind to *form with Deſign*, (that is,) to *deſign* or *plan* whatever it *forms*; if Mind be the forming Cauſe of all the Forms of Nature, theſe *Forms* muſt be *in Mind*, before they exiſt *outwardly in Nature:* for all *deſigning* and *planning* is firſt *within the Mind*. And if the forming *Mind of Nature* is *eternal*, *invariable*, and always *the Same*;—if therein no *new Ideas* ever ſtart up, and no new Plans are formed, unthought of before;—it follows, that all the *Ideas* of this eternal Mind are *eternal* likewiſe.—To ſpeak accurately therefore, theſe *eternal Ideas* are the *Formal Cauſes* of all things which may be ranked under any *definite Kinds* and *Species*.—For all the *Individuals* of any *Species* derive their eſſential Forms from *ſome one* of theſe eternal Ideas; and *becauſe of this Idea*, they are *the Beings which they are*. The Knowlege therefore of theſe *Mental Ideas*, or *Intelligible Forms*, and the Knowlege of *Mind* or *Intellect*, where they are ſeated, is to know both the *Formal* and the *Efficient Cauſes* of Things.—Farther ſtill; if the *Final Cauſe* and the Firſt Principle of All things be Good its Self;—if *Good its Self* be either ſome *Univerſal Idea* in Mind Univerſal and Divine, or be *Mind its Self*, or be the Same with *One its Self*, the firſt and higheſt *Principle of Mind*;—if *Mind*, conſidered as *intelligent*, be no other Thing than the *Place*, in which all *Ideas* meet, by which they all are *comprehended*, and by the Virtue of which they are all of them *united*;—and conſequently if, in viewing her *Ideas*, the Mind views her Self;—then, the *Intellection* of theſe *Mental Ideas*, and eſpecially of thoſe which are Primary, the *Principles of Mind*, is *Self-Intuition*, or the *Self-Knowlege of Mind* or Intellect; and at the ſame time is the Knowlege of *Cauſes* and *Principles*, and therein, of All Things.—This then is WISDOM, and is ſeated only in That MIND which is DIVINE. Hence it follows, that thoſe *Ideas* are *divine*, themſelves: and indeed *divine* muſt be whatever is *eternal*. —But *Man*, however, hath a *Power* to partake, in ſome meaſure, of theſe *Divine Ideas*, and therefore, of *Self-Knowlege*;—partly, becauſe

he

he hath the *Seeds* of Mental Ideas *latent* in the *Principles* of his ſuperior Part, the Offspring of *Mind its Self*;—and partly, becauſe this *Parent-Mind Univerſal* is ever preſent to all *Minds Particular*.—For in every *Human Mind* all *Ideas* lye involved. They are gradually evolved and opened to her Apprehenſion and Intellection by *Objects of Senſe*, which raiſe up and expand thoſe Ideas, thro the *Connection*, there is, in the *Human Soul* at leaſt, between *Senſe* and *Mind*.—And Firſt ariſe the Ideas of *One* and *Many*, *Same* and *Different*; becauſe every Thing, whether ſeen or heard, partakes of theſe *original* and *primary* Forms.—Next ariſe the Ideas of *Beauty*, *Harmony*, and *Order*; thoſe of *Concord*, *Union*, and *Good*; thoſe of *Rectitude*, *Juſtice*, *Equity*, and other Such; becauſe Theſe Ideas are *Univerſal*, and, as far as Matter and outward Nature will admit of Forms ſo excellent, are imparted, more or leſs, to All things,—to all Beings, their Energies, and Operations.—Afterwards in the Mind ariſe *Generical* and *Specifical* Ideas, in number proportioned to the extent of her attainments in Knowlege, and to her Perception of the *Sameneſſes* and *Differences* of all the various *Forms of Nature*.—But, becauſe the *Up-riſing*, or firſt appearance, of theſe *Ideas* in the Human Mind, is always *occaſioned*, and perhaps generally *cauſed*, by *Objects of Senſe*, or by the *Traces* of theſe Objects remaining in the *Memory*,—their Firſt Appearance in the Mind is attended always with *Senſible Images*; and Theſe are apt to ſtick cloſe to them for ever after.—Were it poſſible for the Human Mind, as *Ariſtotle* ſeems to have ſuppoſed, to deveſt herſelf of theſe attendant *Images*, or abſtract her *Ideas* totally from Senſible Objects, we do not apprehend, What difference there would be, in ſuch a caſe, between *Ideas* in the *Divine* Mind, and thoſe *abſtract Ideas* in the *Human*.—In our *Argument* and *Notes* to *the Parmenides*, we ſhall attempt to prove, what we are perſwaded of, our ſelves,—that *Ariſtotle* in his Doctrine of Forms *intelligible* and *abſtract*, if he really differed at all from *Plato*, differed only in this ſingle Point.—However this may be; it is moſt certain, that Man, ſo long as his Mind continues free, and is undiſturbed by the real Wants of his Body, hath the *Power* of turning his *Attention*, whenever he pleaſes,

pleaſes, from Objects of *Senſe*, to thoſe of *Reaſon* and *Intellect*,—from *Body* and the *External World*, to Himſelf and the Seat of Ideal Forms within him;—that here he will meet with the Great *Parental Mind*, and with His *perfect* Ideas, ſuch as are *pure*, and *free* from the Mixture and Corruption of all *Images* derived from Senſe;—and that, by *looking at Theſe*, he may in ſome meaſure *purify* thoſe *Ideas* of *his own* Mind, which have been *excited* by the Objects of his outward Senſes; but which can never perhaps be thorowly diſcharged from the Impurity of *Senſible Images*, the Remains of thoſe Objects.—To inſtance in thoſe Ideas, which have the neareſt relation to the Subject of this Dialogue, —the Ideas of *Beauty* and *Good*,—the Soul of Man, ſo long as ſhe remains connected with *Body*, ſeems unable to deveſt her ſelf intirely from *corporeal Images* of Beauty and Good. The higheſt Excellence, at which ſhe now ſeems capable of arriving, is *Love* of *true Beauty* and *Deſire* of *true Good*. For to the *Enjoyment* of that Beauty, and to the *Attainment* of that Good, *Body* is an *Obſtacle* unſurmountable. And this higheſt Excellence belongs to the *Philoſophic Character* alone, which is the utmoſt Reach of *Human Wiſdom* and *Human Virtue*. Whatever is beyond it, is *Divine*; of which the Soul of Man hath at preſent but a bare *Capacity*.

269 If the Rational Soul be conſidered *in her Self* only,—and not as connected with Body, nor as having Power to govern the Paſſions and blind Affections of the Animal-Soul,—her *Virtue* or *Excellence* conſiſts in the actual *Knowlege* or Intelligence of *her Self*, and of the *Forms* within her, and of *Good*, the Fountain of all thoſe Forms;—a *Knowlege*, from which ſhe immediately derives her *Power* as well as *Right* to *govern*. —Conſonant with our Explication of the Paſſage, now before us, is a Paſſage in the Writings of *Atticus*, out of which we have ſome conſiderable Extracts given us by *Euſebius*, in *Præparat: Evangel:* Lib: 15. In this Paſſage, that zealous *Platonic*, who was contemporary with the Emperor *Marcus Antoninus*, in defending *Plato*'s Doctrine of *Ideas* againſt the Objections of *Ariſtotle*, ſays,—τὴν τούτων νόησιν τὴν σοφίαν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, δι' ἧς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τέλος καὶ ἡ μακαριστὴ βιοτὴ παραγίνεται·

ſown and grows; and alſo, at whatever elſe this Virtue of the Soul reſembles [270]?

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γίνεται· "*that the Intellection* [or underſtanding] *of theſe* [Ideas] *is* "*Wiſdom, and* (is) *the Knowlege, thro which the End of Man is attained,* "*—a Life of Bliſs,*" (that is) the Knowlege of true Good.—But we have an Evidence, much more unexceptionable, to prove that we have not miſtaken *Plato*'s Meaning; and that is *Plato* Himſelf. For in his *Republick*, L. 7. pag: 92 Edit: *Cantab:* he ſays, that "*the Soul's other* "*Virtues, as they are called, reſemble thoſe of the Body: for that in* "*truth, not being innate, they are acquired thro Habit and Exerciſe:* "*but the Virtue of the Underſtanding approaches to what is more divine.*" And a little before, he tells us, that this *Virtue of the Underſtanding* conſiſts in ſeeing αὐτὴν τὴν δικαιοσύνην *Juſtice its Self*, and in viewing τἀγαθὸν *the Eſſence of Good.*—Again, in his *Theætetus*, having ſaid juſt before, that *the moſt honeſt of Men* ἡμῶν δικαιότατος *is, the moſt of all things, like unto God*, he ſays, that *to know God is Wiſdom and true Virtue.* And again, that *a Reſemblance to God conſiſts in being juſt and holy*, (that is) conſcientious, *with Underſtanding*, (that is) with the Knowlege of true Good. *Theætet:* pag: 176 Edit: *Steph:* Hence we may with the utmoſt certainty infer, that GOD, according to the Doctrine of *Plato*, is JUSTICE ITS SELF, and the ESSENCE OF GOOD, the *Idea* therefore, the *Standard* and *Exemplar*, of all which is *right, juſt*, and *good*; and alſo, that He is WISDOM, (that is) the *Knowlege* of *Himſelf*, and of his own eternal *Rectitude* and *Goodneſs*.

[270] Meaning,—as will immediately afterwards appear,—*the Divine Mind*, ever preſent to the *Soul of Man*, in her higheſt Part, *her Intellect*, the Seat of *her Ideas*. Withdrawing her ſelf from all Objects of Senſe, and aſcending hither, the Soul diſcovers *her Nature* the moſt completely, becauſe ſhe here diſcovers *her Origin*, and the *Originals* of *her Ideas*. Converſing with thoſe *Divine Ideas*, ſhe gradually *purifys* and *perfects* her own, as far as her cloſe connection with Body will permit: in the

mean

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To Me, O Socrates, it ſeems true.

SOCRATES.

Do we know of any Place in the Soul more divine, than That which is the Seat of Knowlege and Intelligence [271]?

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mean time, as ſhe thus becomes more and more ſenſible of her own Defects, her *Love* of Perfect Beauty, and her *Deſire* of True Good, increaſe in the ſame proportion.—In this retired Converſe with the *all-perfect Mind* conſiſts that Kind of *Knowlege of our Selves*, called *Conſcience*,—the *Senſe* of our paſt *Deviations* from Rectitude and the Line of Duty,—and the *Senſe* of that Rectitude, *reſtraining* us from deviating again.—And farther, if we may preſume to conjecture aught on a Subject ſo far above human Reach, this ſublime and ſecret *Place* in the Soul, which is the *Seat of Conſcience*, is perhaps *the Medium*, thro which the *Divine Mind*, there always preſent, is *privy* to the *Thoughts*, and *cogniſant* of the *Actions*, of every *Man*.—If in this we have conjectured rightly, then the Latin word *conſcientia* is rightly explained by thoſe Authors, who ſuppoſe it to be derived from *ſcientia cum* DEO, *a knowing together with* GOD. And the word *conſcius* is rightly uſed, in this original and proper Senſe of it, by *Virgil* in this Hemiſtick,—*conſcia numina veri*, relative to the truth of a Fact.—And again by the ſame Poet, in another place,—*conſcius æther Connubii*.

[271] Concerning this Seat of Intelligence and Knowlege, *the Intellect*, ſee Note 228 to *the Banquet*, pages 239 and 240.—To νοῦς, *eternal*, and *univerſal*,—the *Divine Intellect*,—the *Alexandrian Platoniſts*, and the latter *Stoicks* who *platoniſed*, gave the Title of κορυφὴ, the *Summit-Point*, the *Top*, or *Crown* of all things,—a Metaphor, taken from the *Crown of the Head*, which properly it ſignifys.—And hence we think it probable, that ſome learned but haſty Tranſcribers, who apprehended the

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We do not.

SOCRATES.

This therefore in the Soul reſembles [272] the Divine Nature. And a Man, looking at This, and recogniſing all [273] That which is divine, and God and Wiſdom [274], would thus gain the moſt Knowlege alſo of Himſelf [275].

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the *Deſign* and *Drift* of *Plato* in this latter Part of the Dialogue, but did not follow the *Series* or *Chain* of his argumentation, were guilty of thoſe Two Miſtakes, ſeverally obſerved in Notes 259 and 263.

[272] From this Paſſage, we think, it appears plainly, that, whatever any other Philoſophers may have held, concerning the Divinity of the *Human Mind*, or ſuperior Part of Man's Soul, yet *Plato* did not deem it to be the *Divine Mind its Self*, nor any *Part* of the Divine Mind,—but only *reſembling* it, as being *derived* or *deſcended* from it:—a reſemblance, which becomes greater and more exact, in proportion to the *frequency* of the Soul's *Communication* with her Divine Origin: and no Communication is more *natural*, than That between the *Parent* and the *Offſpring*. Thus indeed, but in no other way, the Soul of Man may in time become a *Partaker of the Divine Nature*, θείας κοινωνὸς φύσεως.

[273] That is,—*all*, which is *univerſal* and *eternal*;—the *Beauty* and *Order* of *the Univerſe*;—that *Law of Rectitude*, or Right Reaſon, which *governs* in the Univerſe;—and thoſe Rules and Meaſures of *Univerſal Juſtice or Goodneſs*, thro which the Beauty and Order of it are *preſerved*, ſo as to be for ever *freſh*, flouriſhing in *full Vigour*, and fruitfull of Beneficence and Bounty, in their turns, to All.—Such are the *Ideas* of the *Divine Mind*.

[274] The Words of this intire Member of the Sentence, *in the Greek*, are theſe,—πᾶν τὸ θεῖον γνὺς, θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν.—The Order, in which

they are placed, is very remarkable. Firſt ſtand the INTELLIGIBLES, the Divine *Ideas*;—next is *God*, the Divine INTELLECT, the Seat of thoſe Ideas;—laſtly comes *Wiſdom*, (or Underſtanding,) the *Energy* of this Divine Intellect, or the actual INTELLIGENCE of thoſe Ideas,—the *Beatitude* of the Divine Being in the *Knowlege of Himſelf*.—This Order is admirably juſt, and is agreeable to the Order of Things in Nature. For tho we acknowlege it to be ſufficiently proved by *Ariſtotle*, in *Metaphyſic:* Lib: 14, Cap: 7, and 9, Edit: *Duvall:*, and more abundantly by *Plotinus*, in *Enneád:* 5, Lib: 5, that νῦς and νοητὸν, *Intellect*, and what is *Intelligible*, are *one* and the *ſame* thing; and that νόησις *Intellection* is νοήσεως νόησις *the Intellection of its own Intelligence*;—in plainer language,—that *Mind* is always its own *Object*; and that the Mind, in viewing, alway views and underſtands its Self;—yet, to know the *Dignity* and *Excellence* of Mind above all other Things, we are to conſider it, *not* as *intelligent*, nor as the *Subject* of Intelligence, nor as the *Place* of Intelligibles,—*but*, as *Intelligible* its Self, the *Object* of its own Intelligence, and by its Self alone fully comprehended.—The *Value* of all *Sight* or Perception, whether internal or external, is in proportion to the *Beauty* of its *Objects*. Some things, it is *not good* or deſirable, to ſee: and Some, it is *good* and deſirable, *not to ſee*. If therefore the *Objects of Mind* are the *faireſt* of all Objects, the *Sight* of them is the *moſt valuable* of all Sights. And if they are alſo the *beſt* of all things, and if the *enjoyment* of them conſiſts in *viewing* them, the *View* of them is of all things the *beſt* and the *moſt deſirable*. Hence it follows, that the *Divine Being* is *therefore* the moſt *excellent*, the moſt *happy* and *bleſt*, *not* becauſe He is *ſimply intelligent*,—but, becauſe He is *intelligent* (or has Intellection) *of Himſelf*, (that is) of *his own Ideas*, the *faireſt* and the *beſt* of all things,—THE BEAUTIFULL, and THE GOOD.—On this ſuperior Dignity and Value of *Mind*, conſidered as the *Object* of Intelligence, to *Mind*, conſidered only as the *Subject* of Intelligence, the *Place* or *Seat* of Intelligibles, depends the Truth of *Plato*'s Doctrine, taught in his *Philebus*. To prepare our Readers for which Dialogue, it is chiefly, that we have here, and in ſeveral places before,

ALCIBIADES.

It is apparent.

made this Diſtinction, which is meerly Logical, between *Intelligible* and *Intellect*.—In ſhewing the Juſtneſs of the Order, obſerved by *Plato* in the Sentence now before us, it remains that we conſider, why *Wiſdom*, or the *Intelligence* of Things *Intelligible*, is placed the laſt.—Thus placed, it is beſt adapted to the *Apprehenſions of Men*, and moſt agrees with their *Experience*. For with regard to *Human Knowlege*;—*firſt* are the *Sciences* and the *Arts*, which are to be learnt:—*after them* come *our own Minds*, the Subjects of this Learning:—and *laſtly* comes our *Knowlege* of Sciences and Arts, thro the *application* of our *Minds* to *theſe* their *Objects*. —Nor is it otherwiſe, with regard to our *Senſations*;—*prior* to Us are Many of the *Objects*, which ſurround us:—*then* come We with our *Powers of perceiving* them, thro our *Senſes*:—and laſtly, from the *application* of our *Senſes* to thoſe *Senſible Objects*, in our Souls there are produced *Senſations*.

275 If it be true, that the *Rational* Part of Man's *Soul* is an *Offſpring* of the *Divine Mind*, it follows of courſe, that a Man cannot attain to the perfect *Knowlege of Himſelf*, without acquiring the *Knowlege of the Divine Nature*. For, on that Hypotheſis, the *Human* Nature never attains its own *perfection*, till it becomes a Partaker of That which is *Divine*.—*Reaſon in Man* ſeldom exceeds its *Infancy*; is at beſt but in its *Growth*; and arrives not at *Maturity*, till it be united with That *Reaſon* which is perfectly and always *Right*, and is therefore nothing leſs than *Divine*.—Now to know the Nature and Propertys of any Being whatever, That Being muſt be viewed and conſidered, *not* in its *imperfect*, but in its *perfect State*. *Right Reaſon* therefore muſt be known by us, What it is, before we can know the Nature of *Reaſon*: and the Nature of *Juſtice* or *Goodneſs Univerſal*, as it is the *Object* of the *Divine Mind*, and the *Law* which governs the *Univerſe*, muſt be known by us, before we can form in *our own Minds* a true *Idea* of *thorow Honeſty and Goodneſs*.

SOCRATES.

And to know one's Self, we acknowlege to be Wiſdom [276].

ALCIBIADES.

By all means.

SOCRATES.

If then we are not wiſe, but are ignorant of our Selves, can we know What our Good is, and What our Evil?

ALCIBIADES.

How is it poſſible that we ſhould, Socrates?

SOCRATES.

For perhaps it appears impoſſible for a Man, who knows not Alcibiades himſelf, to know any thing, which relates to Alcibiades, as having that relation.

ALCIBIADES.

Impoſſible it is, by Jupiter.

SOCRATES.

Neither then can any thing, which is our own, be known

[276] The word, here uſed by *Plato*, is the ſame with That in *the Rivals*, page 66 of our tranſlation,—σωφροσύνη.—And it is uſed, here as well as there, to ſignify *Moral Wiſdom*, or *Prudence*, that Firſt of the Virtues termed *Cardinal*, on which all the reſt *turn*. See Notes 43 and 44 to the Dialogue, here referred to.

by

by us to be our own, any other way than thro [277] the Knowlege of our Selves.

ALCIBIADES.

How ſhould we?

SOCRATES.

And if we know not That which is Ours, neither can we know any of the Appertinances to what is Ours.

ALCIBIADES.

It appears, we cannot.

SOCRATES.

We therefore were not at all right, in admitting, as we did juſt now, that certain Perſons there were, who knew not Themſelves, but who knew what belonged to them, and was Theirs [278]. Neither can Such, as know not Themſelves, know the Appertinances to what is Theirs [279]. For it ſeems, that 'tis the Province of one and the ſame Perſon, and is from one and the ſame Science,——to know Himſelf,

[277] We cannot but commend the Judgment of Mr. *Etwall*, in rejecting the Alteration of the Greek Text in this place, propoſed by *Le Fevre*;—an Alteration, which would weaken the Force of it, and would rob us of the Benefit of *Plato*'s own *Illuſtration* of his own Argument.

[278] See pages 290 and 291.

[279] See pages 292 and 293.

——to

——to know the Things which are His,——and to know the Appertinances to thoſe Things[280].

ALCIBIADES.

I believe, it will be found ſo.

SOCRATES.

And whoever is ignorant of what belongs to Himſelf and is his own, muſt be likewiſe ignorant of what belongs to other Men, and is Theirs.

ALCIBIADES.

Undoubtedly.

SOCRATES.

And if he is ignorant of what belongs to other Men, will he not be ignorant alſo of what belongs to the Publick, and to other Civil States?

ALCIBIADES.

He muſt be ſo.

SOCRATES.

Such a Man therefore cannot be a Politician.

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly, he cannot.

[280] In *the Greek*,—αὑτὸν, τὰ αὑτῦ, τὰ τῶν ἑαυτῦ.—And correſponding to theſe are the words juſt before,—ἑαυτῦς, τὰ ἑαυτῶν, τὰ τῶν ἑαυτῶν.—This is the Paſſage, to which we referred in Note 239; and we preſume, it is ſufficient to eſtabliſh the Emendation, there propoſed.

SOCRATES.

Neither will he be fit to manage a Family [281].

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly, not.

SOCRATES.

Nor will he have any certain Knowlege of any thing which he is doing.

ALCIBIADES.

He will not.

SOCRATES.

And will not the Man, who knows not what he is doing, do amiſs?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly ſo.

SOCRATES.

And doing amiſs, will he not do ill and fare ill [282], both as a Private Perſon, and as a Member of the Publick?

[281] The Connection, or (rather) Sameneſs of *Moral Science*, by *Plato* termed the *Science of Juſtice*, with the Sciences of *Oeconomicks* and *Politicks*, is ſhown in the latter Part of *the Rivals*.—See alſo Note 192 to this preſent Dialogue.

[282] The *ſingle Expreſſion*, here uſed by *Plato*, is κακῶς πράξει. But, as it has a *double Meaning*,—*to act ill*, and *to fare ill*,—and as the Reaſoning requires that *Both theſe Meanings* ſhould be here underſtood, we have choſen to ſeparate, and to mention Both of them diſtinctly.—See before, in Note 77.

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ALCIBIADES.

No Doubt of it.

SOCRATES.

And the Man who fares ill, is he not in a bad Condition?

ALCIBIADES.

A very bad one.

SOCRATES.

And in what Condition will They be, who have an Intereſt in his Conduct?

ALCIBIADES.

In a very bad one, They too.

SOCRATES.

It is not poſſible therefore, that any Man ſhould be happy, if he be not wiſe and good.

ALCIBIADES.

It is not poſſible.

SOCRATES.

Thoſe then, who are Bad Men, are in a Bad Condition.

ALCIBIADES.

A very Bad one, indeed.

SOCRATES.

Not even by Riches therefore is a Man delivered out of

of a miſerable Condition; nor by any other thing than Wiſdom and Virtue.

ALCIBIADES.

Apparently ſo.

SOCRATES.

Fortifications therefore, and Shipping, and Harbours [283], will be of no avail to the Happineſs of any Civil States; neither will the Multitude of their People, nor the Extent of their Territorys; if they want Virtue.

ALCIBIADES.

Of none at all.

SOCRATES.

If then you would manage the Affairs of the City well and rightly, you muſt impart Virtue to the Citizens.

[283] Theſe three *Affairs of State* were at this very time in agitation at *Athens*; as we before obſerved in Note 23.—In this artful way,—the more artful, as it ſeems ſo natural and artleſs,—the Reader's Mind is recalled to the Introductory Part of the Dialogue,—the *Deliberations* of the *Athenian People* in their Public *Aſſembly*,—and the *Ambition* of *Alcibiades*, to ſhow his Abilitys in that *Aſſembly*, to take the Lead in thoſe *Deliberations*, and, by adopting the Syſtem of his Uncle *Pericles*, to ſucceed him in the Adminiſtration of *State-Affairs*.—Here we ſee the natural Connection between the *Subjects* of the *Introductory Part*, and the *Subjects* of the *Dialectical* or Reaſoning *Part*, the *Body*, of this Dialogue. We ſee the vain Ambition of *Alcibiades*, in aiming to *govern* his *Fellow-Citizens*, without his having *ſuperior Wiſdom*; and the vain Ambition of the *Athenians*, in aiming to aggrandiſe their State, and *ſubdue* their *Enemys*, without having *ſuperior Virtue*.

ALCIBIADES.

Beyond Queſtion.

SOCRATES.

But can a Man impart to Others That which he has not, Himſelf?

ALCIBIADES.

How ſhould he?

SOCRATES.

You your Self therefore [284] in the firſt place ſhould acquire Virtue; as ſhould alſo every other Man, who has any Thoughts of governing, and managing,——not Himſelf only, and his own private Affairs, but the People alſo, and the Affairs of the Publick.

ALCIBIADES.

True.

SOCRATES.

Not Arbitrary Power therefore, nor Command, ought

[284] Αὐτῷ ἄρα σοι, in *the Greek*, as it is rightly printed in the late *Oxford Edition* of this Dialogue, and juſtified by the Tranſlations of *Ficinus* and *Cornarius* from the MSS. which they had the uſe of. Mr. *Etwall* is worthy of Thanks from all Lovers of *Plato*, for his attention and care to give us this right Reading; and the more ſo, becauſe *Aldus*, *Stephens*, and Both of the *Baſil* Editors, have erroneouſly, and with Injury to the Reaſoning, printed—Αὐτὸ ἄρα σοι.—which Error of theirs *Serranus* renders into Latin,—"*Illud ipſum*,"—*that very thing*, meaning *Virtue*.

you

you to procure, neither for your Self, nor for the City,—— but Honeſty and Wiſdom.

ALCIBIADES.

It is evident.

SOCRATES.

For if ye act honeſtly and wiſely, your own Conduct, and that of the City too, will be pleaſing unto God.

ALCIBIADES.

'Tis highly probable.

SOCRATES.

And ye will thus act, by looking, as we ſaid before, at That Place in the Soul, which is divine and lightſome.

ALCIBIADES.

Evidently ſo.

SOCRATES.

And farther,——by directing your Sight hither, ye will behold and know what is your own Good.

ALCIBIADES.

True.

SOCRATES.

Will ye not then act both rightly and well [285]?

[285] *Rightly*,—as knowing What is *Juſt*;—and *well*,—as knowing What is *Good*.

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

And acting thus, I will insure Happiness both to your Self and to the City.

ALCIBIADES.

You will be a safe Insurer.

SOCRATES.

But acting unjustly, as looking toward that Place in the Soul, which is darksome [286], and where God is not [287], 'tis highly

[286] The *inferior* Part of the Soul,—that, which is the Seat of *Sensations* and *Fancys*, *Passions* and blind *Affections*.—In this Place no *Ideas* will ever spring up: and therefore no *Truths* of any *Science* can be here planted. For these *Truths* are the *mutual Relations* between *Ideas*, the Objects neither of Sense, nor Imagination, but of *Mind alone*.—If therefore the Soul be conversant only with *Objects of Sense* and their *Images*, she must *continue* always a *Stranger* to all Science, and to all Truths; or supposing her to have been *formerly acquainted* with any of these Mental Objects, she will soon have lost all *Sight* of them; and at last even the *Remembrance* of them will be gone; for This cannot be long maintained, without a Visit to them every now and then.

[287] The *Science of Mind*, and the Sciences depending on it, those of *Morals* and *Politicks*,—Excellencys, *peculiar* to the *Rational Soul* in her best *Human State*,—are the only *Medium* of *communication* between the *Human Mind* and the *Divine*.—The Mind of Man must have *Human Ideas* of *Honesty* and *Goodness*, of *Law* and good *Government*, before those Ideas can be refined and cleansed from the Alloy of *Human Imperfections*:

highly probable, that ye will be like to what ye look

perfections: for ſuch an Alloy will from the beginning have been mixed with thoſe Ideas, from the memory of *Human Examples*; by obſervation of which, and by experience, they were at firſt excited in the Mind. Minds therefore, in which ſuch Ideas never yet aroſe, can have no *intercourſe* with the *Divine Mind*, or with thoſe Ideas of *Moral* and *Political Perfection*, by which the Univerſe is governed. Nor can Men *act aright*, either as Private Perſons, or as Members of Civil Society, if they do not frequently *converſe* with thoſe *Divine Ideas*, thro *application* of their Minds to *Moral* and *Political Science*.—Moſt true, in this Senſe, is the Doctrine of *Marcus Antoninus*, in his 3d Book, §. 13, ex Edit: *Gatak:* where he ſays,—ὅτε ἀνθρώπινόν τι ἄνευ τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα συναναφορᾶς εὖ πράξεις, κ. τ. λ. "*In no Human Affair will you act* "*well, without having a reference at the ſame time to Things Divine.*" For, What Things are *Divine*, in the *higheſt* Senſe of the word, beſides the *Ideas of the Divine Mind*, we are at a loſs to know. Other things, often called Divine, are only ſo, in a *ſecondary* Senſe, becauſe they *flow from* the Divine Ideas, and may be juſtly called their *Offſpring*;—thoſe *nobler Parts of Nature*, whoſe *beneficial* Operations are the moſt *extenſive*; and thoſe *Human Virtues*, which *copy after* the *Divine univerſal Goodneſs*.—But the Sentence of *Plato*, now before us, puſheth the Point farther; it aſſerts, that the Moral and Political *Conduct* of Men, void of Moral and Political Science, will *in all probability* be *unjuſt*.—And were it not for *Right Opinion*, or Divine and Moral *Faith*, which may perhaps for a while in ſome caſes ſupply the want of Science, *Plato* would have gone farther ſtill, and have maintained, that Men, void of the *Science of Juſtice*, muſt *of neceſſity act unjuſtly*. For not being led by *Reaſon in Themſelves*, and conſequently having no commerce with *Right Reaſon*, they would be always driven by their Paſſions, and compelled to obey the Mandates of theſe lawleſs and deſpotic Lords.

at

at [288], be all in Darkneſs, without God, and ignorant of your Selves [289].

ALCI-

[288] The *Senſe*, or *Senſitive Soul*, is *modified* (to ſpeak in modern Phraſe) by every *external Object* which ſhe *perceives*; (that is,) ſhe is *impreſſed* by it in ſuch a manner, as to *receive* from it always her *preſent Form:* ſhe is, as it were, *united* with it; and as long as the Impreſſion remains in her, ſhe may, perhaps without too bold a Figure of Speech, be ſaid to *be* the *Object*, which ſhe *immediately perceives*, (that is) the *Image* of ſome external Thing.—However *obſcure* and *dubious* this Doctrine may appear, we venture to ſay, that 'tis as *evident* and *certain*, as any other account of the *manner* in which the *Senſe* is *affected* by *ſenſible Objects:* and in behalf of its *preference* to all other accounts, it is ſufficient to ſay, what cannot be denied, that *this manner of perceiving* is *analogous* to *that* manner, in which we have intuitive Evidence, that the *Mind* or *Intellectual* Soul perceives *intelligible Objects*; and That is, by receiving *Their* Forms as *her own*,—*uniting* with them, and *her Self becoming what They are*. Thus the *Rules* of Art *form* and *are* the Mind of the *Artiſt*; and the *Truths* of Science, the Mind of the *Mathematician*, and the Mind of the *Philoſopher*.—Other *Analogys* between *Mind* and *Senſe*, regarding their ſeveral Objects, ought to be mentioned, as they confirm the *probability* of what *Plato* here ſuggeſts, that the Soul muſt always *become like* unto whatever is continually or moſt frequently *in her View:*—*Mind* and *Senſe* are, *Both* of them alike, naturally inclined to, and forcibly attracted by, their ſeveral proper Objects: *Both* of them alike are naturally attached to, and cloſely adhere to, thoſe their Objects, becauſe naturally fitted to them: the *Good* of *Each* conſiſts in the *Enjoyment* of them: and the *enjoyment* of them conſiſts in the *being united* to them. But in attaining their different Goods, there is a great *Difference* between *Mind* and *Senſe*. For the *Objects of Mind* are placed within the Mind's *own Reach*; ſhe has only to look for them *within her Self:* but the *Objects of Senſe* are *extrinſecal*

to

to a Man's Self, and not in his own *Power*.--And here we find the *Source* of all *Injuſtice*. Every Man muſt of neceſſity *deſire* and *purſue* That, which he apprehends to be his *Good*; and of equal neceſſity muſt he *embrace* all the *Means*, which offer, of attaining it: *unjuſt Means* therefore will be as welcome, as thoſe which are *juſt*, to a Man who knows nothing *better*, no *higher Enjoyment*, than the Good of *Senſe*. If he is not reſtrained by Fear of Evil to the *Senſe* or *Imagination*,

Throw Statutes to the Dogs; *he'll none of 'em*,

whether human or divine.—Farther we have to obſerve, in confirmation of *Plato*'s Sentiment in this place,—that every Man, being by nature fitted only for a *Social and Civil Life*, which cannot ſubſiſt but thro Maxims, Laws, and Cuſtoms, *agreed in* by all Such as unite together in Civil Society, by nature *aſſimilates* himſelf to Thoſe with whom he is ſo *aſſociated:* nor only does he *conform* to their *Manners*, but he *imbibes* their *Sentiments* and *Opinions:* he *ſympathiſes* with their *Paſſions*, and eaſily catches the *Contagion:* he is *well-affectioned* to their *Perſons*; and abſtractedly from the conſideration of any joint or common Intereſt, he *wiſhes* their private *Welfare*, preferably to that of *Strangers*.—*Tanti eſt, quibuſcum vixeris*.—But this is not all:—the Providential Mind of Nature hath ſo *fitted* the Mind of Man to any of thoſe *Stations* in Human Life, which are diſtributed amongſt the Human Kind by Divine Fate, that each Man naturally conceives an *Affection* for that *Scene of Things* to which his Senſes firſt opened, as ſoon as his Memory can retain their Images. This Affection is ſtrengthened by *Habitude*; but is gradually weakened by a Change of *Scene*, and different *Habitudes*. It is not confined to *Place*; but extends to all *Things* within our View, *inanimate* as well as *animate*; and is more or leſs ſtrong, in proportion to the *frequency* of our *Converſe* with them, our *habitual Uſe*, or *accuſtomed Sight* of them. If a Change of Fortune changes the Scene around us, tho from worſe to better, we feel ſome Regret at *parting* with our *old* and *firſt acquaintance*; our Attachment to them remains, in ſome meaſure, for a long time; and our cordial *Affection* is only by

ALCIBIADES.

In all probability, That would be the Caſe.

SOCRATES.

For, O my Friend Alcibiades! if a Man hath the Power of doing what he pleaſes, and at the ſame time wants Un-

degrees *conciliated* to Better Things, as they become more and more *familiar* to us. If this then be our caſe, with regard to ſuch Objects of Senſe, as reach no farther than meer *Imagination*, how much more intimately and deeply muſt the Soul be affected by ſuch outward Objects, as excite *Love* and *Deſire?* On theſe, be they ever ſo mean, the Soul cannot but *delight to dwell* without end, until *Better Objects* are preſented to her View,—until ſhe turns her Eye, from *Outward Things* and from their *Images* in the *Fancy*, to *her Self* and her own *connate Ideas*,—from the *doubtful Light* of *Senſe* and *Imagination*, to the *clear Light* of *Science* and the *Radiancy* of *Intellect*. Then, and not till then, will her *Habits* gradually be changed, from vicious and baſe, to virtuous and noble: her *Deſire* of Goods unſatisfactory, as well as unſtable, will give place to the Deſire of *Good durable and ſubſtantial:* and her *Love* of tranſient and defective Beautys, to a Love of *Beauty perfect and eternal.*

289 Our Ignorance of that Part of us, which is *rational* and *divine*, of neceſſity infers our Ignorance of the *Divine Nature:* becauſe we can have no *Connection* with any thing *Divine*, no Acceſs to it, nor even the moſt diſtant View of it, any other way than by the *Medium* of that *Reaſon* and *Intellect*, imparted to *Us*. And *Want of Science* in things *Divine*,—in what is perfectly *right* and *fair* and *good*,—muſt always be followed by a *Conduct wrong, unfair and evil*; unleſs ſuch a Conduct be, in ſome meaſure, prevented by *Right Opinion*, or that θεῖα μοῖρα, often mentioned by *Plato*, and particularly near the concluſion of his *Meno*.

derſtanding,

derſtanding, What will be the probable Conſequence of ſuch arbitrary Power, to Himſelf, if he is a Private Perſon, and to the State alſo, if He governs it? As in the caſe of a Bodily Diſeaſe, if the Sick Perſon, without having Medical Knowlege, had the Power of doing what he pleaſed, and if he tyranniſed ſo as that no Perſon would dare to reprove him, What would be the Conſequence? Would it not be, in all probability, the Deſtruction of his Body?

ALCIBIADES.

It would indeed.

SOCRATES.

And in the affair of a Sea-Voyage, if a Man, void of the Knowlege and Skill belonging to a Sea-Commander, had the Power of acting and directing in the Veſſel, as He thought proper, do you conceive What would be the Conſequence, both to Himſelf and to the Companions of his Voyage?

ALCIBIADES.

I do; that they would all be loſt.

SOCRATES.

Is it otherwiſe then in the Adminiſtration of the State, or in any Offices of Command or Power? if Virtue be wanting in the Perſons who are appointed to them, will not the Conſequence be an evil and deſtructive Conduct?

ALCIBIADES.

It muſt.

SOCRATES.

Arbitrary Power then, my noble Alcibiades! is not the Thing, which you are to aim at procuring,——neither for your Self, nor yet for the Commonwealth,——if you mean either your own private Happineſs, or that of the Publick: the only way to Happineſs is Virtue.

ALCIBIADES.

True.

SOCRATES.

And before one acquires Virtue, it is better to be under Good Government, than it is to govern,——better, not only for a Child, but for a Man.

ALCIBIADES.

Evidently ſo.

SOCRATES.

Is not That which is the beſt, the faireſt alſo [290]?

ALCIBIADES.

It is.

[290] 'Tis a fundamental Doctrine of *Plato*'s Philoſophy, that *Beauty* and *Good* are inſeparably united. Particularly ſee page 112, et ſeq.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

And is not That which is the faireſt, the moſt becoming [291]?

ALCIBIADES.

Without doubt.

SOCRATES.

It becomes a Bad Man therefore to be a Slave: for it is beſt for him ſo to be.

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

Vice therefore is a Thing ſervile, and becoming only to the Condition of a Slave.

ALCIBIADES.

Clearly.

SOCRATES.

And Virtue is a Thing liberal, and becoming to a Gentleman.

ALCIBIADES.

It is.

SOCRATES.

Ought we not, my Friend, to ſhun every Thing which is ſervile, and becoming only to a Slave?

[291] See *the Greater Hippias*, page 65, et ſeq.

ALCIBIADES.

The moſt of all things, O Socrates [292]!

SOCRATES.

Are you ſenſible of the preſent State of your own Mind? Do you find it liberal, and ſuch as becomes a Gentleman, or not?

ALCIBIADES.

I think I am very fully ſenſible of what it is [293].

SOCRATES.

Do you know then, [294] by what Means you may eſcape from That Condition, which you are now in,——not to

[292] *Socrates*, in exciting *Alcibiades* to the Study of Wiſdom and true Virtue, had reſerved this *Motive* for the *laſt* to urge to him, as knowing it would be the *moſt forcible* of any, to a Youth ſo noble and high-ſpirited. That it proved ſo in effect, appears from this Anſwer of *Alcibiades*.—We have here therefore a ſtriking Proof, that *Socrates* excelled in *true Oratory*, the *Art of perſwading* to what is either abſolutely, or at leaſt relatively, *the Beſt*.

[293] *Alcibiades* hath diſcovered, that he is ignorant of *Himſelf*, ignorant of *his own Good*, and ignorant therefore that this Good is *Virtue*.

[294] This Sentiment alludes to the well-known Medical Axiom,—that in the caſe of a Sick Perſon, when the *Nature* of his *Diſeaſe* is once diſcovered, 'tis eaſy for a Phyſician to find out, by what *Means* the Patient, if curable, may be cured.

name

name what it is, when it happens to be the caſe of a Man of Honour [295]?

ALCIBIADES.

I do.

SOCRATES.

By What?

ALCIBIADES.

Thro You, Socrates, if You pleaſe.

SOCRATES.

That is not well ſaid, Alcibiades!

ALCIBIADES.

What ought I then to ſay?

SOCRATES.

You ought to ſay, if God pleaſes [296].

ALCIBIADES.

I adopt thoſe words then for my own. And I ſhall add to them Theſe farther;——that we ſhall be in danger, Socrates, of changing Parts [297],——I, of aſſuming Yours, ——and You, of bearing Mine. For it is not poſſible for Me

[295] Intimating, that 'tis the direct Contrary of That which becomes Such a Man, as being diſhonorable, baſe, and abject.

[296] For the right explication of this Paſſage, ſee before in pages 44 and 45.

[297] In *the Greek*,—σχῆμα, *Figure*.—*Alcibiades* here alludes to *Figured Dances*, where different Perſons had different Parts aſſigned them,—eſpecially

Me to avoid the following You every where from this day forward, with as much aſſiduity, as if I was Your Guardian,——and You, My Pupil [298].

SOCRATES.

My Friendſhip then for You, noble Alcibiades! may be compared juſtly to a Stork [299]; if, having hatched in your Heart,

eſpecially perhaps to thoſe Dances, where the Parts were divided into Two general Kinds, Some being appointed *to lead*, and Others *to follow*.

[298] That Alteration of the Greek Text in this place, propoſed by *Le Fevre*, derogates, we think, from the Force and Beauty of the Sentence; in which, according to the received Reading of it, the Parts, to be ſuſtained *henceforward* by *Socrates* and *Alcibiades*, are, Both of them, expreſsly and diſtinctly mentioned. It is needleſs, and therefore ſeems inſipid, in *Alcibiades*, to remind *Socrates*, as he does according to *Le Fevre*'s Alteration, of the Parts they have *hitherto* ſuſtained. Nor could *a Reader of this Dialogue* be well ſuppoſed by *Plato* to have *forgotten* the Beginning of it, ſo as to need the being *reminded*, that *Socrates* had for a long time followed *Alcibiades*, wherever he went.—What led *Le Fevre* into this Miſtake, to imagine an alteration in the Text neceſſary to be here made, was, as his own Note ſhows, his not conſidering, that παιδαγωγοῦμαι is not only a *Verb Paſſive*, but a *Middle* or reciprocal *Verb* alſo, ſignifying to *walk attended* or followed *by a Tutor*, Guardian, or Governor, *of Youth*,—and that the word, here uſed by *Plato*, παιδαγωγήσῃ, is in the *Future Tenſe* of this *Middle Verb*: the Prepoſition ὑπὸ ſerves only to *introduce the Perſon*, with whoſe aſſiduous *attendance*, like that of a *Pædagogue*, from this time forward he was *to walk*.

[299] This generous and grateful Inſtinct in *the Stork* is mentioned by *Ariſtotle*, in his *Hiſtory of Animals*, B. 9, Ch: 13, as a Matter of common

Heart, and there cheriſhed, a winged Love [300], it is afterwards to be by this Love, in return, cheriſhed and ſupported.

ALCIBIADES.

And this you will find to be the very caſe: for I ſhall begin, from henceforward, to cultivate the Science of Juſtice [301].

SOCRATES.

common Report, and much talked of. 'Tis recorded alſo by *Pliny*, in his *Natural Hiſtory*, B. 10, Ch: 23; and by *Plutarch* in his Treatiſe of the *Sagacity of Animals*.

[300] By This is meant the *Love of Wiſdom*. See Note 122 to *the Banquet*.—An occaſion is given by the Simile of *a Stork*, to give this Love the Epithet of *winged*; which apt Metaphor, we imagine, is here uſed by *Plato*, to intimate to us, that by this Love of Wiſdom the Soul is *elevated above* all other Loves, and *riſes* to the greateſt *Heights* ſhe is capable of reaching.—The ἔρως, or Friendſhip, which *Socrates* had conceived for *Alcibiades*, was a *Deſire* of *inſpiring* into Him this *Love of Wiſdom*, or (in the metaphorical Language of *Diotima* in *the Banquet*, pages 176, and 191, et ſeq:, perhaps here alluded to,) a Deſire of generating, and begetting on His fair Natural Diſpoſition, that faireſt and beſt Offſpring, the Knowlege of *Himſelf*,—the Knowlege of *True Good*,—and, thro this Knowlege, a fixed Attachment to *thorow Honeſty*.

[301] This Sentence will, we are aſſured, completely ſatisfy our Readers, of the Truth of what we deſired them, in Note 208, to give us Credit for,—the neceſſary *Connection*, or rather *Union*, of the principal Matters, handled in this Dialogue,—the Knowlege of a Man's *true Self*,—the Knowlege of Man's *true Good*,—and the Knowlege of univerſal Juſtice, or *thorow Honeſty*.—For 'tis obvious to ſee, in the

SOCRATES.

I wiſh you may perſevere. But I am terribly afraid for you: not that I in the leaſt diſtruſt the Goodneſs of Your Diſpoſition; but perceiving the Torrent of the Times, I fear you may be borne away with it, in ſpite of your own Reſiſtance, and of My Endeavours in your Aid.

Sentence now before us, that *Alcibiades* himſelf, a meer Novice in philoſophical Subjects, underſtood, that *Socrates*, by perſwading him to take a *right care of Himſelf*, meant to perſwade him to *ſtudy Moral Wiſdom*,—that he underſtood *this Wiſdom* to be the *Science of Juſtice*,—and alſo, that on *this Science*, the permanent *Good and Happineſs* of every Private Perſon, and of every Civil State, ever muſt depend.—In diſmiſſing our Readers for this time, the beſt Preſent or Token at parting, we can make them, Such a one, as is ſuitable to their paſt Entertainment, is an Explication of thoſe obſcure words in *Marcus Antoninus*, ὅτε ἔμπαλιν,—which immediately follow and conclude the Sentence, cited from him in Note 287. If in that Note we explained aright ſo much of the Sentence as we there cited, then ὅτε ἔμπαλιν muſt mean, that *converſing with* and *contemplating the Divine Ideas will be of no Benefit to us, unleſs we apply thoſe Ideas to our own Actions*.—But if our Explication of this Paſſage ſhould be thought wrong, as giving it a Senſe *too Platonical*, we ſhall add to this Preſent another, unqueſtionably ſolid,—no leſs *Stoical* than it is *Platonical*,—and of higheſt Value, not only in its Self, but as a *Memorial* alſo of the *Subſtance of this Dialogue*,—a Reflection, made by the ſame philoſophic Emperor, in Lib: 4, §. 37, according to *Gataker*'s diviſion of the *Sections*.—We ſhall give it to our Readers, in *Caſaubon*'s accurate tranſlation, B. 4, §. 30,—*The only Study, and only Wiſdom* [of a Man] *is to be juſt in all his Actions*.

Page 289. in the Note, Line 4. read *Doctrine of this Dialogue*; and in the Line next to it, read *latter Part of which*.

THE

SECOND ALCIBIADES,

A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

PRAYER.

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LONDON:

PRAYER

CONCERNING

DIVORCE

A

SECOND ARGUMENT

THE

SECOND ALCIBIADES,

A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

PRAYER.

PLUTARCH'S

COLLEGII

DIALOGUE

OF

SECOND ALCIBIADES,

THE

TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

WILLIAM, EARL of *SHELBURNE*,

ONE OF THE LORDS, APPOINTED

PRIVY COUNSELLORS TO THE *KING*,

THIS TRANSLATION OF

THE SECOND ALCIBIADES OF PLATO

IS MOST RESPECTFULLY OFFERED

by his LORDSHIP'S

most obedient

humble Servant,

FLOYER SYDENHAM.



THE ARGUMENT.

THE Second Alcibiades, *in the ſuppoſed* Time *of it, is* ſubſequent *to the* Firſt *of the ſame Name*; *as the* Leſſer Hippias *is, to the Greater. There is not indeed ſo near a Connection between the* Two former *in this reſpect, as there is between the* Two latter; (*the nearneſs of whoſe Connection may be ſeen in Note to the* Scene *of the* Leſſer Hippias;) *but there is a much greater Similitude between the Two former with reſpect to their* Subjects *and their* Deſigns.---*The* Subject *of the* Firſt Alcibiades *is the Rational Part of Man's Nature, by which he hath a* Capacity *of acquiring* Moral Science. *And the* Second Alcibiades *is a Dialogue concerning the* Object *of that Science,* Univerſal Juſtice, *conſidered as the* Chief Good *of Man.*---*The* Deſign *of the* Firſt *is to convince Men of their Ignorance in the* Science of Juſtice, *and their Ignorance of that* Faculty *in them, which is the Seat of all true Science*;--- *to perſuade them to* cultivate *that* higheſt *Faculty, and to* ſtudy *that* Beſt *of all Sciences, before they ſeek to have a Share*

in

in the managing of Political Affairs, or in the giving of Laws to Moral and Free Agents;----and laſtly, to teach them the only Right Way *of ſuch Culture, and to ſhew them the only* Right Road *to ſuch Science.----Analogous to this is the* Deſign *of this* Second Alcibiades; *'tis to convince Men of their Ignorance of* What is Good;---*to perſuade them to lay aſide the* wiſhing *and* praying for *any Particular Things, which they may* imagine *to be good, until they* know, *in What their* Chief Good *conſiſts, and conſequently, What ought to be the* ultimate Object *of all their Wiſhes and Prayers;----to prove to them, that without this Knowlege, which is* Moral Wiſdom, *all other Knowlege is pernicious, or, at leaſt, dangerous;---and laſtly, to point out to them the only* Teacher *of this Knowlege,* Right Reaſon, *and not* Imagination.----*Hence we ſee, that, inaſmuch as Whatever is truly* fair *is alſo truly* good,----*inaſmuch as the* Sovereign Fair, *Univerſal Juſtice its Self, or Right Reaſon, is the* Sovereign Good *of all Rational Beings,---the* Subject *and the* Deſign *of* Both *theſe Dialogues, named* Alcibiades, *are eſſentially the* ſame.---*But becauſe in* the Firſt *of them the Subject is conſidered more* generally, *tho at the ſame time 'tis treated of more copiouſly and at large; while* the Second *views it in one* particular *light only, as it is the* Chief Good of Man; *yet becauſe in this* partial *(tho principal) View, it is here examined more* minutely; *and the neceſſity of Moral Wiſdom, in order to Happineſs, is made apparent more diſtinctly; for theſe reaſons, this* latter *Dialogue may juſtly be*

looked on as a Supplement *to the* former.---*Nor indeed, in point of* Time, *are theſe Two Dialogues greatly* diſtant. *For it will appear from ſeveral Circumſtances, ſpecified in the Notes on thoſe Paſſages where they occur, that Both are ſuppoſed to have been held in the* ſame Year.----*The* Conduct *of this Dialogue, in the* ordering *of its Parts, accords with the Sketch above drawn of its* Deſign; *the* Order *being ſuch, as to advance, ſtep by ſtep, the* ultimate End *of it; namely, to ſhew, that Wiſdom and Virtue are neceſſary for Man to attain to, if he would be happy, and are attainable by no other means than a conſtant application to the* Divinity within. *For (to begin from the End, and to meaſure backward the Steps of this Dialogue,) only thus can we acquire Knowlege of our real, true, and laſting Good; only thus can we know, What prudently to wiſh and pray for; only thus can we avoid the falling into Follys, the natural conſequence of our Ignorance in that reſpect; and only thus can we be ſaved from Madneſs in our Thoughts and Actions, the neceſſary Effect of unbounded Paſſion*[1].---*In what*

[1] *Athæneus*, near the End of his Eleventh Book, ſpeaks of ſome Perſons, who attributed this *Second Alcibiades* to *Xenophon*. In point of Time indeed, 'twas poſſible, that *Xenophon* might have been the Author of it: for, tho He was older than *Plato* by twenty Years, yet he wrote none of his Moral Works, until the latter age of his Life; whereas *Plato* began the writing of his Dialogues, when he was a young Man. But, if what we have ſaid above, concerning the Conduct of this Dialogue, be juſt, we have given ſufficient Proof, that

what way the Subject *is* introduced, *comes now to be related. At the firſt Opening of the Scene, we diſcover* Alcibiades, *in a grave Mood, walking toward the* Temple of Jupiter, *with a Purpoſe of praying there for ſome particular and eſpecial Favour. Theſe Circumſtances, being obſerved by* Socrates, *who meets and accoſts him, naturally lead to a Converſation concerning* Prayer; *the* Object *of which being ſome real or imaginary* Good *to be obtained, and the* Nature *of it being a* Petition *to ſome real or imaginary* Deity, *deemed* able to beſtow *that Good on Thoſe who petition for it, and* diſpoſed to grant *it to Such of the Petitioners as merit the Divine Favour, a Converſation on the neceſſity of knowing* What is truly good *naturally follows; and thus the weighty* Subject *of this Dialogue is* introduced *with the utmoſt Propriety, and a graceful Eaſe.----Hence we find, that the* Title, *given to this* Second Alcibiades, *in all the Copys of* Plato, *and continued in our Tranſlation, becauſe no abſolute neceſſity appears*

that thoſe Perſons were miſtaken. For *Xenophon*'s manner of writing has That original and peculiar Air, which would not permit him to imitate *Plato*'s Manner; much leſs, to copy after *Plato's Alcibiades* ſo cloſely, as to make This Dialogue a meer *Supplement* to That. But perhaps thoſe Perſons, cited (tho not named) by *Athenæus*, had ſo little Taſte and Judgment in Compoſition, as not to diſcern the Difference of Style and Manner, between the Writings of *Xenophon* and *Plato*; Each of whom excelled in that Kind of Style, and that Manner of Writing, to which his *Particular Genius, Idioſyncracy, or* μοῖρα, led him, when he wrote.

for

for altering it, is, however, not quite proper; as it denotes the Subject of the Introduction, *rather than That of the* Dialogue *its Self.----The* Genius *of this Dialogue appears from what we have ſaid of its* Deſign: *like the Other of the ſame Name, it* excites *to the* Study *of Moral Wiſdom; and alſo* aſſiſts *in the* attaining *it, by pointing out the only proper* Means *of ſuch Attainment, or rather by pointing to the only true* Teacher *of it. Accordingly, the Ancients placed* the Second Alcibiades, *where they placed* the Firſt, *in the Claſs they called* Maieutic.----*The* Outward Form *of it, from the Beginning to the End, is* Dramatic; *the* Cataſtrophe *being a Change of Mind in* Alcibiades, *who reſolves to follow the Advice of* Socrates, *by forbearing to ſpecify, in his Addreſſes to the Divine Being, his Wants and his Wiſhes, till he ſhall have attained to a Senſe of his* real Indigence, *thro the Knowlege of his* real Good, *the only right and proper Object of Prayer; in the mean time, relying on the Goodneſs and Providential Care of this very ſame Divine Being, who, as ſoon as he is capable of that Knowlege, will not fail to be his Teacher, if applied to with a ſimple and undiſtracted Mind.*

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE,

SOCRATES, ALCIBIADES.

SCENE,

The Way to the Temple of JUPITER.[1]

[1] At *Athens* were Two Edifices, built in honour of *Jupiter*. One of theſe was a moſt magnificent *Temple*, called the *Olympium*, and ſituate in the *Lower City*. The Other was only *a Chappel* in the *Upper City*, ſacred to Ζεὺς ὁ σωτὴρ, *Jupiter the* [univerſal] *Saviour*, and adjoining to another Chappel, ſacred to Ἀθηνᾶ ἡ σώτειρα, *Minerva the Saviour* [of Athens]. Both theſe Chappels ſtood at the Entrance of the *Treaſury*; One probably on each ſide, as Guardians of the Public Money: and this Treaſury ſtood at the Back of that beautiful *Temple of Minerva*, called the *Parthenon*.——Now, had *Socrates* met *Alcibiades* in the Aſcent, which led firſt to the *Parthenon* and thence to the Chappels behind it, no reaſon appears for his ſuppoſing, that *Alcibiades* was going to pay his Devotions to *Jupiter*, rather than to *Minerva*, the Guardian-Deity of *Athens*. But the maſculine Article τὸν, uſed in this place by *Plato*, before the Noun θεὸν, forbids us to imagine, that *Minerva* could be here meant. For at *Athens*, as *Minerva* was ſtyled ἡ θεὸς, *The Goddeſs*, by way of eminence, ſo *Jupiter* was ſtyled either ſimply θεὸς, *God*, or ὁ θεὸς, *The God*, as being Supreme. Beſide this, we are to obſerve, that in the *Chappel* of *Jupiter* in the Upper City, He was worſhipped in a *Particular* Character, as the *Preſerver* of his Votarys, in Dangers from which they had eſcaped; as not only is to be preſumed from the Title of *Saviour*, by which he was there invoked, but alſo is clearly proved from the *Plutus* of *Ariſtophanes*, A. 5. Sc: 2. and from the Oration of *Lycurgus* againſt *Leocrates*, pag: 188, & 253, Edit: *Taylor*. Now there is not the leaſt appearance, that *Alcibiades* had had any ſignal Deliverance from Danger, or that he was now going to offer a Thankſgiving Sacrifice, as it was cuſtomary to do on ſuch Occaſions. From all this we juſtly may conclude, that the *Scene* of this Dialogue lyes in a *Street* leading to the Temple of *Olympian Jupiter* in the Lower City.

THE SECOND ALCIBIADES.

SOCRATES.

ALCIBIADES!---Are you going to the Temple, to make your Petitions to the God?

ALCIBIADES.

Your Conjecture is perfectly right, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

Indeed your Countenance appears close and cloudy; and and your Eyes are turned tow'rd the Ground, as if you were wrapped in some profound Thought.[1]

ALCI-

[1] The first *symbolical* Precept, which the *Pythagorean* Philosophers gave to their Disciples, was this,—"*When you go from your house, with intention to perform your Devotions at the Temple, neither speak nor do any thing, in the Way thither, concerning any Business of Human Life.*"—a Precept, recorded among others of like Kind by *Jamblichus*, in the last of his λόγοι προτρεπτικοὶ, and rightly there interpreted,

preted, pag: 134, to this purport,——that a Man ought to purify his Mind, by abſtracting it from Earthly Cares, and from all Objects of Senſe, whenever he contemplates Divine Things; becauſe theſe are abſtracted or pure from Matter, themſelves; and Pure naturally joins and unites with *homogeneous* Pure. Farther, Divine Things being ſtable and always the ſame; but Human Things, unſtable and for ever changing; they are in this reſpect alſo *heterogeneous*, and, as the ſame great *Platoniſt* elſewhere elegantly ſpeaks, *incommenſurable*, the one Sort of Things with the other; ſo that they mix not amicably together in the Mind. Hence it is, that Men of Science, if they engage in Human Affairs, at the time when they have their Minds intent on abſtract Ideas, are very apt to commit Blunders: and hence alſo, on the other hand, the dwelling perpetually with Senſible and Outward Things, or with their Images in the Imagination, is an Impediment in the Mind's Way to Intelligence or to pure Science. —— From the very grave and ſerious Air, with which *Alcibiades* makes his firſt appearance in this Dialogue, one might imagine, that *Plato* meant to repreſent him, as having been inſtructed in the *Pythagorean Precept* above-mentioned, taken in its literal Senſe; as full of religious Thoughts, and abſorbed in an awful Idea of the Deity, to whoſe Temple he was now approaching.——*Serranus*, to mention no Others, ſeems to have imagined Such to be the Senſe of the Paſſage now before us.——But 'tis obſervable, that the Word, uſed by *Plato* in this place, to denote what Kind of Look *Alcibiades* had at that time, always ſignifies ſomething unpleaſant, either *ſour*, or *ſad*, or *gloomy*, in the Countenance; ſomething very different from that appearance, of *ſerene*, *open*, and *chearful* Serioufneſs, which right notions of the Divine Nature never fail to diffuſe over the Face and the whole Air, when the Mind is occupied in Thoughts truly divine, or ſuperior to Human Things.——The Mind of *Alcibiades* appears never to have been diſturbed, nor his Spirit ever to have been lowered by any ſuperſtitious Notions, or by a Belief in ſuch Gods as thoſe of the Athenian Populace. The Gloom therefore, which

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What profound Thoughts could a Man have at ſuch a time, Socrates?[2]

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which ſat in his Forehead, and bent his Eyes downward, could not be of the ſuperſtitious Kind; nor could *Socrates*, who well knew his Mind and Temper, have been in earneſt, when he ſeemed to attribute the reſerved and thoughtful Air of *Alcibiades*, at that time, to any Thoughts of a religious Kind. Of what other Kind they really were, we ſhall inquire in the Note next following.

[2] *Alcibiades* here evidently diſclaims his being in a thoughtful Mood: he would have *Socrates* to believe himſelf miſtaken, in thus miſconſtruing his Air. But 'tis not to be ſuppoſed, that *Socrates*,—the *Socrates*, exhibited here by *Plato*,—did really ſo miſtake; nor, that he did not apprehend What it was, which gave *Alcibiades* ſuch an Air, ſuch as paſſes with the multitude for a Mark of Thoughtfulneſs. Neither is it to be ſuppoſed, that *Alcibiades*, with ſo great a Soul as he had, *affected* ſuch an Air, like *Maſter Stephen* in *Ben. Johnſon*'s Comedy of *Every Man in his Humour*, that he might ſeem "*proud, and melancholy, and gentleman-like*". Nor yet can we ſuppoſe it to be without a Meaning, pertinent to the Dialogue, that *Plato* here preſents us with a Picture of him ſo drawn. We preſume, that our excellent Painter of Human Manners meant, by theſe few firſt Strokes, to delineate the inward and true Character of *Alcibiades*, the Bent of his Genius, and the Vehemence of that Bent thro the Vigour of his Spirit. Now the Hiſtory of his whole Life informs us, that the Bent of his Genius, or his Turn of Mind, lay towards the aggrandiſing of himſelf in the Common-wealth, and the attaining of Power to govern in all State-Affairs. Ambition therefore was the predominant Paſſion of his Soul. He was conſci-

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ous, that he poſſeſſed great Natural Abilitys of *Mind*, and that his *Spirit* was full of Life and Vigour. In all ſuch caſes, not only the *Paſſions* of the *Soul* are, of themſelves, vehement and headſtrong, but the *Will* moreover, if ignorant of *True Good*, gives them a free Courſe; and all the Powers of a *Mind*, untaught by *Wiſdom*, favour the impetuouſneſs of their Career. Now nothing is more ſerious, nothing more in earneſt, than any ſtrong Paſſion whatever; and if thoſe Powers of the ſuperiour Soul, Diſcernment, Foreſight, and Contrivance, are on the Side of the prevailing Paſſion, and employed in the Service of it, nothing is graver, nothing is of an aſpect more important. But no other Paſſion gives ſo much employment to thoſe Powers of the rational Soul, as doth *Ambition*, becauſe of the greater extenſiveneſs and variety of its Objects, the greater number of Rivals for the poſſeſſion of them, and more and greater Difficultys in the purſuit of them, than attend any other Paſſion. That the Ambition of *Alcibiades* was boundleſs, and that his Mind was wholly occupied by ſuch Thoughts, as Ambition naturally inſpires, we learn from the *Firſt* Dialogue of His Name, pages 40, 41, & 42, of the Engliſh Tranſlation: it is confirmed by many Paſſages in this *Second*. Farther; a little Experience of Mankind will teach us, that no Paſſion, if immoderate, and not under the government of Reaſon, dares to ſhew its genuine Face; but either conceals it under the Maſk of ſome Virtue, or of ſome pious and benevolent Affection, or elſe is aſhamed to appear at all in publick for fear of being diſcovered. Agreeably to this, *Alcibiades*, who had a Soul too great to be a Hypocrite, and wear a Maſk, evades the giving of a juſt Anſwer to the Obſervation made by *Socrates*; and thus avoids the confeſſing of Thoughts he was aſhamed of, by aſking a Queſtion,—ſuch a Queſtion, as, without expreſsly denying the Juſtneſs of that Obſervation, ſeems to imply a tacit Denial of it. *Alcibiades*, it ſeems, would have it underſtood, that *Socrates* was miſtaken; for that He was far from being thoughtful.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Thoughts, Alcibiades, ſuch as ſeem to Me of the higheſt importance. For tell me, in the name of Jupiter, do you not think, when we happen, whether in private or in public, to be making our Petitions to the Gods, that ſometimes they grant a Part of thoſe Petitions, and reject the reſt; and that to Some of their Petitioners they hearken, but are deaf to Others?[3]

ALCI-

[3] 'Tis very probable, that Some, who read this Paſſage, may think it too clear to need any Illuſtration. But perhaps to Such Readers, moſt of any, an Illuſtration will be needful. For the ſeeming Clearneſs of it muſt ariſe from a ſuppoſition, that nothing more was meant by it, than to lay down, for the foundation of the Reaſoning in this Dialogue, Conceſſions agreeable to the religious Opinions of the Populace in thoſe Times: the Gods being then vulgarly conſidered as capricious Beings, no leſs mutable than Men; ſometimes in a humour to grant all Petitions, and ſometimes otherwiſe diſpoſed, and ſparing of their Grants; partial alſo, in yielding to the Prayers of Some, what they denied to thoſe of Others. Such a ſuppoſition ſeems indeed to be confirmed by the very next Queſtion, propoſed by *Socrates*. But, tho the *Socratic* or *Platonic* way of Arguing is from Propoſitions, admitted for true by the Reſpondent in the Dialogue, as being univerſally or generally believed,—and tho Propoſitions untrue, taught only by Sophiſts, and received only by the Ignorant, are ſometimes ſo admitted,—yet where ſuch Conceſſions are likely to be injurious to the Cauſe of Truth, in a Matter of any Moment, we believe that *Socrates* never argues from them, unleſs it be to confute ſome Sophiſt, in driving him to aſſert an Abſurdity, or a Paradox, as the neceſſary Conſequence of his Conceſſions.

ſions. Now the general *Genius* of this Dialogue is not of the *confuting* Kind; nor, in particular, is that ſuperſtitious Notion, which the preſent Paſſage ſeems to countenance, confuted any where in the Dialogue. If therefore this Paſſage be capable of being underſtood in a Senſe, conſiſtent with juſter Thoughts of the Divine Nature, and at the ſame time, perfectly agreeable to the Tenor of this whole Dialogue, and to all the reſt of *Plato*'s Writings, it is probable, that 'tis the real Meaning of *Plato* in the Sentence now before us.——We begin the conſideration of this Point, by citing a few Paſſages in *Xenophon's Inſtitution of Cyrus*, according to Mr. *Aſhley*'s excellent Tranſlation, pages 114, 115, & 116,—" *that Such as made impious Prayers, would probably meet with Diſappointments from the Gods*":—" *that firſt rendering our ſelves Such as we ought to be, we ſhould then make our Prayers to the Gods*":——*and* " *that the moſt likely Perſon to obtain from the Gods his Suit, is not He who, when he is in diſtreſs, flatters ſervilely, but He who in his moſt happy Circumſtances is moſt mindful of the Gods*".——Theſe Sentences, which *Xenophon* puts into the mouth of *Cyrus*, as Leſſons taught him by his Father, but in which he delivers what he had himſelf learnt from his own great Maſter *Socrates*, are cited here by us, as Paſſages parallel to this of *Plato* in one reſpect only;——they ſerve to ſhew, that the Reaſoning of this Dialogue is not built on the Vulgar Superſtition; for that, in the opinion of the great Athenian Philoſopher himſelf, only Some Petitioners were heard, and only Some of their Petitions granted, by that Divine Being, to whom they were addreſſed, without his being on that account either capricious, or illiberal, or partial.——To proceed: 'tis agreeable not only to all the Philoſophy of *Plato*, but alſo, we preſume, to all true Religion, to deem of the Divine Nature, as all-Good, without the leaſt Mixture of Evil; and to deem of the Divine Being, the Subject of this Goodneſs, or in whom it reſides, as always *willing* and freely *communicating Good*, but never willing Evil to Any. From theſe Principles it follows, that all

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No doubt of it.

all thoſe Particular Intelligent Beings, who *will* what is truly *Good*, either to Themſelves or to Others, correſpond with the *Nature* and *Will* of the *Divine Being*; and that Such, as *will* what is *Evil*, are repugnant to him. True it is, that None can *will* any thing which appears to them to be *Evil to Themſelves*; becauſe no one can have any Malice againſt That which he deems to be *Himſelf:* but the Malicious muſt of neceſſity always will, wiſh, and intend *Evil to Others*, if it hath the appearance of being *Good for Themſelves:* and if they pray for this Evil to Others, their Prayers are impious; no leſs ſo than thoſe Prayers, ſpoken of by *Xenophon:* for thoſe Prayers, he ſays, are impious, becauſe they are "*contrary to the ſettled Laws of the Gods*" in their government of the Univerſe: and the Prayers of the Malicious are contrary to the Nature and Will of the Father of all Rational Beings. When therefore Any of theſe Beings pray maliciouſly againſt Others, their Prayers are rejected.——Farther; ſince the Divine Creator wills to his Creatures, not what they may *imagine* to be their Good, but what *really is* ſo, the Prayers even of the Well-diſpoſed in Heart, but unwiſe and ignorant of True Good, are not granted by the Governor of the World, if they pray for any thing which might prove an Evil.——We are very ſenſible, that Objections to the truth of this Explication of the Paſſage, now before us, may naturally ſuggeſt themſelves to a Reader of the Paſſage, which immediately follows it: thoſe Objections we ſhall endeavour to anſwer in the next Note: but we cannot here obviate them any otherwiſe, than by deſiring the Reader to take notice, that we are now ſpeaking only of Addreſſes, made to the *Sovereign Mind*, the all-wiſe and all-good Governor of the Univerſe.

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Do you not think then, that much previous conſideration is requiſite, to prevent a Man from praying unwittingly for Things which are very evil, but which he imagines very good; if the Gods, at that time when he is praying to them, ſhould happen[4] to be diſpoſed to grant whatever Prayers he happens

[4] It is moſt certain, that this Paſſage is very applicable to ſuch Prayers, as were addreſſed to thoſe imaginary Deitys, worſhipped by the Populace of *ancient Greece:* and 'tis poſſible, that to many *modern* Readers it may ſeem applicable to ſuch Prayers only. But if we conſider the Nature, and the natural Effects, of ſincere Prayer,—and whence it is, that Prayers, addreſſed even to imaginary Deitys, often ſeem to be efficacious, and ſometimes really are ſo,—we ſhall find, that the Meaning of the Paſſage may be extended to Prayers intentionally addreſſed to the One Supreme Being; for it will appear, from what Cauſes it proceeds, that even Theſe are often inefficacious.—Prayer then, or Religious Petition, is an application of the Mind, either to ſome *Idea* in the *Intellect*, or to ſome *Image* in the *Imagination*,—an Idea, or Image, which the Mind preſumes to be a Being *different* from her Self, but *preſent* to her, either *within*, and privy therefore to her Thoughts and Wiſhes, or elſe *without*, hearing and underſtanding the Words of her Prayer;—a Being, far *ſuperior* to her Self, and *able* to beſtow the Boon prayed for.—If the Mind moreover believes this Being, ſo applied to, whether real or imaginary, *propitious* to her, and *yielding* to her Supplications, this Act of Prayer, performed devoutly, has a wonderfully great *Effect* on the *Soul* of a religious and devout Supplicant.—The chief Objects of Worſhip to the Grecian Multitude, whatever Names were given them, or Fables told concerning them, were, in reality, thoſe great *Aſſemblages*

blages of *Elementary* Bodys, the *Sea*, the *Air*, and the *Æther*; and alſo thoſe Bodies *Celeſtial*, whoſe Influence on Earth is evidently perceived and felt, the *Sun* and the *Moon:* for every diſtinct Part of Nature was in ancient Greece believed to be the Seat of ſome *particular* and ſeparate *Intelligence*, as much ſuperior to the Human *Mind*, as the *Bodys*, believed to be their *Seats*, were of more Strength, Activity, and Force, than the Human *Body*.—Beſides theſe Deitys, who were ſuppoſed to rule and direct only the *Corporeal* Parts of Nature, the Grecians believed alſo, that great Abilitys of the Human Soul, uncommon Strength of Underſtanding, Force of Spirit, and Livelineſs of Fancy, with thoſe Virtues and Graces, thoſe Sciences and Arts, in which one Man excells another, were inſpired into him by certain Other Deitys,—Such Deitys, as ſeverally had in Themſelves the Perfection of thoſe ſeveral Mental or Moral Excellencys.—The *External Deitys*, (for ſo may properly enough be called Thoſe, whoſe Power extended no farther than *Outward Nature*,) were addreſſed with Prayers and Supplications, whenever they appeared *unfavorable* to the Huſbandman, the Merchant, or the Traveller; when the Sky looked *angry*, and ſhot forth Thunder and Lightning; when the Air and the Sea ſeemed *enraged*, and terrified the Sailor; and when Droughts or Inundations *threatened* Famine and Deſtruction to the Inhabitants of Earth. For it was believed, that the *Wrath* of theſe incenſed Deitys might be appeaſed by Sacrifices, preſent Offerings, or Vows of future. This *Belief* ſupported the Suppliant's Courage, during theſe Commotions in the Elements, or during any unuſual Appearances in the Sky: for, in proportion to its *Strength* and *Stability*, it ſupplyed him with *Hopes*, more or leſs ſtrong and laſting, that He ſhould be preſerved from the impending Evils; and theſe *Hopes* animated and redoubled his *Efforts* for his own Preſervation. Accordingly, as ſoon as thoſe Commotions ceaſed, or thoſe ſtrange *Phænomena* diſappeared, Whoever had eſcaped the Danger or the Dread, being ignorant of their natural Cauſes, attributed ſuch

a Ceaſing, or Diſappearing, partly at leaſt, to the Efficacy of his own Prayers. And in conſequence of the ſame Belief, Whoever had happened to ſuffer, either in his Perſon or in his Property, from thoſe violent and ſudden Changes in the Atmoſphere, (as it happens often to Many on ſuch Occaſions,) was generally deemed to have been obnoxious to the Divine Wrath, more than Such as had eſcaped; and his Prayers were ſuppoſed not to have been heard, nor his Sacrifices, Offerings, or Vows accepted.—The *Internal Deitys*, (for ſo we may juſtly call Thoſe, whoſe Power was thought to operate only *within the Soul of Man*,) were invoked with Sacrifices and Prayers by Such, as were deſirous of excelling in any inward Accompliſhments, or of making Acquiſitions in ſome Science or Art. But ſince it happens oftentimes, that Men undertake the Study of an Art or a Science without an adequate Capacity of Mind, and without a Diſpoſition of Soul and Body proper for the Undertaking, in every ſuch Caſe all their Sacrifices and Prayers muſt be unattended with Succeſs: whilſt Such Perſons, as have from Nature a Genius correſponding with the Deity whom they apply to, ſeldom fail of ſucceeding in their Application: for, their Spirits being elevated by a Belief of ſupernatural Aſſiſtance in their Studys, their Minds become Enthuſiaſtic; and their Mental Powers approach nearer and nearer to That Deity, whom they invoke to aid them, that is, in reality, to Perfection in that Kind of Excellence, to arrive at which they ſtrive with ſo much Ardour.——The Minds of the ignorant and ſuperſtitious Vulgar deſcended to lower Objects of their Worſhip: Some of which were the ſubordinate Powers of Animal, Vegetable, and Plaſtic Nature: Others were ſuch Paſſions of the Human Soul, as are wont to be the moſt vehement, and to urge Men to Actions the moſt violent. For every *Power* of every Part of Nature, and every *Paſſion* of the Irrational Part of the Human Soul, had been not only perſonified, but alſo deified, *by the antient* Greek Poets; who, according to the true Genius of Poetry, took delight in raiſing *Qualitys*, *Actions*,

Actions, and *Paſſions*, to the Rank of *Subſtances*; and in attributing to Things *ſenſeleſs* a particular Life, Senſe, and Intelligence, to Each of them its own; in a word, in exalting every Being, or Attribute of Being, above its real Dignity in Nature.—Now the praying devoutly to theſe inferior Deitys of the Vulgar was attended with Conſequences of the ſame Kind, as thoſe which followed from devoutly praying to the ſuppoſed higher Deitys before-mentioned: it excited Men to Induſtry, and gave Encouragement to them in their Labours or Endeavours; and where a certain Mind, Spirit, or Fancy, in the Devotee, was neceſſary to accompliſh the Event prayed for, the praying, with a ſtrong Belief of being divinely aided, could not but contribute to the Succeſs of the Prayer, if it ſucceeded, and if other Cauſes more powerful did not counteract: for the Event, prayed for in theſe caſes, was at leaſt not leſs uncertain, not leſs a meer Contingent, than the Succeſs of Prayers, addreſſed to thoſe Other Deitys.—The generative and productive Power of Vegetables and Animals is often over-powered by ſuperior and more general Cauſes. So that Prayers, addreſſed to *Ceres* or to *Bacchus*, to *Priapus* or to *Lucina*, were inefficacious, whenever theſe Deitys happened to be oppoſed by *Neptune* or *Juno*, by *Apollo* or *Jupiter*, by *Saturn* or *Neceſſity*. Again; if Two different Perſons happened to have one and the ſame Object of their *Deſires*, or if Each were the Object of Animoſity to the Other, they could not, Both of them, be ſucceſsful in the firſt caſe, or victorious in the latter. It was therefore impoſſible for *Venus* or *Mars* to grant the Petitions of Both the Partys who prayed to them in theſe caſes; One of the Two muſt have been rejected.—We need not ſpeak of Prayers addreſſed to *Fortune*,

——*the changling Deity of Fools*;

becauſe She was acknowleged by her Votarys themſelves to hear no Prayers, but to be *deaf* as well as *blind*. Yet Her Votarys felt from their Prayers One Effect in common with Thoſe who prayed to the Other imaginary Deitys; their Hopes were afreſh enlivened, as often as they prayed, and gave them freſh Vigour in their Purſuits

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becauſe She was acknowleged by her Votarys themſelves to hear no Prayers, but to be *deaf* as well as *blind*. Yet Her Votarys felt from their Prayers One Effect in common with Thoſe who prayed to the Other imaginary Deitys; their Hopes were afreſh enlivened, as often as they prayed, and gave them freſh Vigour in their Purſuits

or

or Undertakings.—In the ſame Ages however, in which theſe ſuperſtitious Notions and Cuſtoms prevailed amongſt the Multitude, a Few there were, who were better inſtructed, as having been *perfected* in the *Greater Myſterys* as they were called, Myſterys, derived to *Greece* immediately from *Orpheus*. Theſe Few were Perſons, whoſe noble Birth, liberal Education, and ample Fortune, had lifted them above the Populace. Yet not to All ſuch Perſons were the Secrets of the *Orphic Theology* imparted; but to Thoſe of them only, whoſe natural Capacitys and acquired Endowments of Mind, added to their other Advantages, gave them good Pretenſions to a Share in the *Government of the Common-wealth*, when Age ſhould have ripened their Abilitys, and Experience in Human Life ſhould have taught them Wiſdom. *Alcibiades* was every way qualified for ſuch future Pretenſions, and had therefore been admitted into thoſe Secrets of the *Orphic Doctrine*, which we ſaid were imparted only to a ſelect Few. We take notice of this Fact, relating to *Alcibiades*, as it confirms what we are endeavouring to eſtabliſh by this Note, and by That which immediately precedes. For it muſt be granted highly improbable, that *Plato* would introduce *Socrates* reaſoning with *Alcibiades* from Opinions believed by Neither, and even make theſe falſe Opinions the Foundation of the whole Dialogue. Now, by being perfected in the *Myſterys*, called *Eleuſinian*, (from *Eleuſis*, an Attic Town where they were celebrated,) *Alcibiades* had learnt, that the natural Powers of every Being, whether ſmall or great, whether leſs or more general, centered all of them in *One all-powerful Being Univerſal*. And, having hence diſcovered, that the *popular Religion* was at the beſt only *Symbolical*, he could addreſs no real or ſincere Prayers to any of the *popular Deitys*. But he had not by thoſe Means been taught the *Nature* of that One Univerſal Being, any farther than is expreſſed in the following *Orphic Verſes*, Part of the ἱεροὶ λόγοι,—

Εἷς ἐς' αὐτογενὴς, ἑνὸς ἔκγονα πάντα τέτυκται·
Ἐν δ' αὐτοῖς αὐτὸς περινίσσεται· οὐδέ τις αὐτὸν
Εἰσοράᾳ ψυχῶν θνητῶν, νῷ δ' εἰσοράαται·
————μοῦνον δ' ἐσόρα κόσμοιο τυπωτὴν
Ἀθάνατον.——
Οὐδέ τις ἐὼν ἕτερος, χωρὶς μεγάλου βασιλῆος.

One Be'ing is ſelf-exiſtent: from this One
Produc'd are all things, by this One are fram'd.
He moves them interchangeably around,
Himſelf within them; with corporeal Eye
By no man ſeen, ſeen only by the Mind.
Thus view the deathleſs Former of the World,
Sole King: nor is there Other, Him beſide.

With only this ſmall degree of Light had the Mind of *Alcibiades* been *enlightened*; (to make uſe of Terms employed in the *Myſterys*;) and only this little way was he advanced towards *Perfection* in the Knowlege of Divine Things, by his having had ſuch *religious Myſterys* revealed to him. But he had not from thence learnt, that this ſole Governor of the Univerſe governs it by a *Law immutable and invariable*; that this Law is, in the *Corporeal* World, *Neceſſity* and *Fate*, and therefore abſolutely *inviolable*; that, in the *Rational* World, it is *Univerſal Juſtice*, not to be violated with Impunity by any Perſon in any Condition or Circumſtances whatever. In partaking of thoſe *Myſterys*, he had not been taught *his own Nature*, as it ſtands related to that *Univerſal Being*. He knew not therefore, by any ſuch Means of Information, that his *Body* and *Fortunes* were ſubject to the everlaſting Law of *Neceſſity* and *Fate*; his Mind and Conſcience, to the eternal Law of *Righteouſneſs*; ſo that no Prayers or Sacrifices could avail aught, to exempt Either Part of him from That Law, to which by Nature it was ſubject.—He had not learnt, from any Diſcipline he had undergone,—*quæ ſit natura boni, ſummumque*

mumque quid ejus.—What is of all things the moſt *deſirable* to Rational Beings, as being the moſt *agreeable to their Nature*; and What, therefore, if they knew Themſelves, would be the conſtant *Object of* all their *Wiſhes.* Neither had he learnt,—*quid fas optare*;—What alone, 'tis *agreeable to the Nature of the Divine Being*, that the only Creatures, capable of praying to him, ſhould *pray* to him *for.*—As long as the *Enlightened* by Prieſts who preſided over the *Myſterys*, continued in darkneſs and ignorance as to thoſe moſt important Truths, ſo long muſt the *Objects* of their *Wiſhes* and *Prayers* have been the very *ſame* with thoſe of the ignorant and *unenlightened Multitude:* the only real *difference* between them, in their Prayers, was about the *Number* of Beings, to whom they addreſſed thoſe Prayers; and about the *Name* or *Names*, by which they invoked them in their Addreſſes.—With regard to the *obtaining* what they *prayed for*, it was alſo equally *uncertain.* The Government of the World ſometimes did, and ſometimes did not, co-incide with their Prayers; and as to what depended on Themſelves, their Faith, however different the Object of it might be, was equally favorable to them All. For a firm Belief of divine or ſuper-natural Aſſiſtance, in whatever way and from whatever Being it be ſuppoſed to come, muſt alike invigorate the Believer's own Efforts; and vigorous Efforts, employed in the Uſe of Means proper to effect the End aimed at, are, in the pre-eſtabliſhed Order of Events, generally attended with Succeſs. Whenever they are unſucceſsful, it muſt be when they are oppoſed, from other Quarters of the Moral World, by Efforts ſtill more vigorous, or by Opportunitys of uſing Means ſtill more proper to the ſame End; or when they are impeded and turned out of their way by a ſtrong Current of Human Affairs, running counter or tranſverſly; or when they are diſappointed by what we call *Accidents* in the Natural World; and theſe are *unforeſeen Motions* of Corporeal Things, directed in their Courſe either by the Laws of Corporeal Nature blindly, or by the Will of Men intentionally, tho without reſpect to any Others who may by theſe Means be diſappointed.—What Prayers only have

Virtue

happens to make[5]? As Oedipus, they ſay, inconſiderately[6] prayed the Gods, that his Sons might divide their Patri-

Virtue to obtain, in ſome Degree, the Things prayed for,—What Prayers only are truly pious, worthy of the Divine Nature to receive, and of the Human Nature to offer,—That Wiſdom alone can teach us, by which alone we can be taught What is the End of Man, What his Good is, and What his Evil; to inform us of which only Divine Teacher, is the principal Deſign of this Dialogue, as, in the Concluſion of it, will appear.

[5] That is, whenever a *Man's Prayers* happen to *correſpond* with the *Divine Will*. For the *Will of Man* only is ſubject to *Contingency*: in the *Divine Will* there is no Principle of Mutability *within*, nor is it liable to ſuffer Change thro any Motion of Things *without*. The Truth of this appears from that indiſſoluble *Chain* of Things, by which, in the *Moral* as well as in the *Natural* World, the *ſame Cauſes* draw after them always the *ſame Events*: tho to Us, who ſee not *all the many* concurring Cauſes, (only *One* of which is the Will and Conduct of One ſingle Man,) the Events, which they produce, may ſeem, in Nature, *caſual*,—in Human Affairs, *fortuitous*,—and in Things Divine, a *New Direction* from above.

[6] This Sentence is evidently meant to prove the neceſſity of *much conſideration*, before a Man prays; by ſhowing, from the example of *Oedipus*, the Miſchiefs often conſequent to *raſh* and *unpremeditated* Prayer. An *oppoſition* therefore ſeems intended between the αὐτίκα in this paſſage, and the προμήθεια, *premeditation*, or *previous conſideration*, above recommended. Accordingly, we have ventured, againſt the Opinion of *Erneſtus* in his Notes to *Xenophon's Memorab:* L. 4, C. 7, to give this *Oppoſed Meaning* here to the word αὐτίκα, by rendering it, in Engliſh, *inconſiderately*; a Meaning, very little different from the *primary* and uſual Senſe of the Word, in which it ſignifies the ſame with παραυτίκα, that is, *immediately*, *directly*, *without delay*.

mony between them by the Sword[7]. Inſtead therefore of praying for his Family, as he might have done, that the Evils, which it then ſuffered, might be averted, he curſed it by praying[8] that more might be ſuper-added. The Event

[7] The ſame Relation of this Curſe is given by *Euripides* in *Phæniſſæ*, v. 68. by *Sophocles*, in *Oedipus Colon:* v. 1437, & 1447 & ſeq: (where *Oedipus* himſelf re-iterates the Curſe:) and by the Scholiaſt on *Æſchylus*, in *Septem apud Thebas*, v. 613, 713, 729, & 853.

[8] *Curſes*, in thoſe ancient days, were *Prayers*, addreſſed to the *Infernal Deitys*,—to *Tartarus*, or everlaſting Darkneſs,—to primæval *Night*,—but chiefly to Thoſe who were fabled to be the *Daughters of Night*,—the *Eumenides*. For no Deitys, who dwelt in Light, were imagined to be the Authors of Evil ever to Any. In conformity with theſe Practices and Opinions, *Sophocles*, in the laſt of the two Paſſages cited from him in Note 7, and *Statius* in his *Thebaid*, Lib: 1, v. 56 & ſeq: give to this *Curſe*, pronounced by *Oedipus* againſt his Sons, the Form of a *Prayer*, addreſſed to thoſe *Powers of Darkneſs*. Hence appears the Ignorance of the Author of the κυκλικὴ Θηβαΐς, or old Greek *Ballad*, *Of the Seige of Thebes*, cited by the *Scholiaſt* on *Sophocles*, pag: 577, Edit: P. Steph: For, after he has told a very ſilly Tale, how the Two Sons of *Oedipus*, having had an Ox killed for a Sacrifice, ſent a Joint of it to their Father who was then blind,—and how *Oedipus* had expected the prime Piece of all,—he concludes this Part of the Story in manner and form following;—that is to ſay, being interpreted (as it ought to be) in *Ballad-Style*, and *Ballad-Metre*,—

As ſoon as e'er he underſtood,
'Twas only the Ache-Bone,
For Him too mean, unworthy Food;
Againſt the Ground, in wrathful mood,
He ſtraitway daſh'd it down.

Event of which Curſe was this, that not only what he prayed for was accompliſhed, but from that accompliſhment followed other Evils, many and terrible, which there is no need to enumerate [9].

ALICBIADES.

But, Socrates, you have now ſpoken of a Man who was inſane, for Who, think you, in his ſound Mind would venture to make ſuch Sort of Prayers?

SOCRATES.

Whether is it your opinion, that to be inſane is to be in a State of Mind contrary [10] to That which is Sound?

ALCI-

Then pray'd he to th'. Immortals all,
But chief to Jove on high,
That Each by T'other's hand might fall;
And ſo to Pluto's darkſome Hall
They Both at once might fly.

[9] The Particulars are briefly related by *Appollodorus*, in *Bibliothec:* Lib: 3, Cap: 6 & 7.

[10] In the Greek it is ὑπεναντίον. Some learned Logician, who may happen to read This, will be apt to think, until he has read a little farther, that we ought to have rendered it into *Engliſh* by the word *ſub-contrary*. But, in reading on, he will ſoon find, that *Plato* means *point-blank* oppoſite, or *directly* contrary. He will probably then think, either that an Error has here crept into the Greek Text, or that *Plato* himſelf erred, in uſing an improper word. To exculpate our Author, his Tranſcribers, and his Printers, we are to conſider

the different *Meanings* of the Greek Particle ὑπὸ, (to which the Latin Particle *ſub* exactly anſwers,) in compoſition.—Often it *diminiſhes* the Force of the Noun or Verb, to which it is prefixed; as it does in the words, ὑπόγλυκυς, ſubdulcis, *ſweetiſh*; ὑπαπορᾶν, ſubdubitare, *to be ſomewhat in doubt*. But it cannot have this Meaning in the place now before us, becauſe the word ὑπεναντίον has here the *full Force* of the word ἐναντίον, *contrary*.—Sometimes ὑπὸ, compounded with a Noun or Verb, hath the Force of λάθρα, and ſignifys the *Secrecy* of the Thing denoted by the Noun, or the *ſecret* Doing denoted by the Verb; as, for inſtance, in the words ὑποβολὴ, ſuggeſtio, an *indirect* or *ſly intimation*; ὑποβαίνων, ſuggreſſus, *coming on ſecretly*; ὑποφεύγων, ſuffugiens, *running away by ſtealth*; ὑποκλέπτειν ſuffarari, *to ſteal away* [a Perſon or Thing]. And in this Senſe the word ὑπεναντίον ſeems uſed by *Ariſtotle*, in the beginning of the Firſt Book of his *Topicks*. For he is there ſpeaking of thoſe *Reſpondents* in Dialectic Argumentation, who make their Reſponſes *contrary* to what they ought, without knowing or intending it, from meer want of Skill in arguing Dialectically. But *Inſanity* of Mind is *contrary* to *Soundneſs* of Mind, with as *evident* and *apparent* Signs of Contrariety, as appear in any other Two Contrarys in Nature. Ὑπεναντίον therefore cannot mean λάθρα ἐναντίον, *ſecretly contrary*, in the preſent Paſſage.—A third Force of the Particle ὑπὸ, in compoſition, imparts to the Noun or Verb, with which it is combined, its own ſimple and primary Meaning, that is, *under*; as it does, for inſtance, in the words, ὑπόγαιος, *ſubterraneous*; ὑποτείνειν, *to ſubtend*; and in a metaphorical Senſe, ὕπαρχος, *an Under-Ruler*; ὑπᾴδειν, *to bear an Under-Part in ſinging*. In a like metaphorical ſenſe,—becauſe every Particular Thing is derived from That Univerſal, of whoſe Eſſence and Power it partakes, and *under* which it therefore *ranks*,—and becauſe, in every Kind of Being, whatever is true of *All* who partake of the Kind, is true alſo of *Any* of the Kind, as being included in *All*,—wherever Two Univerſal Propoſitions, are *contrary* to each other, as theſe Two, for inſtance,—*Every Man is Wiſe*,—*No Man is Wiſe*,—there

the Two Particular Propoſitions, included in them,—*Some Man is Wiſe*,—*Not every Man is Wiſe*, or *Some Man is not Wiſe*,—are by *Ariſtotle*'s Commentators called *ſub-contrary* Propoſitions. Now, if the uſe of the term *ſub-contrary* be admiſſible, when 'tis applied to ſuch *Propoſitions*, as may *Both* of them be *true*, (and it has been always ſo applied by the *Peripatetic* and *Scholaſtic* Logicians tho not by *Ariſtotle* himſelf,) we think it ought not to be deemed improper in *Plato*, if he applys it to ſuch *Simple Terms*, as ſignify Things, *contrary* to each other in their natures, but ranking *under Other Contrarys*, as *Species* under their *ſeveral Genera*. And that in the Paſſage now before us it is ſo applied, we thus prove, from the authority of *Plato*'s greateſt Diſciple, *Ariſtotle*. In his Treatiſe on *the Categorys*, Cap. 11, §. 6. after having obſerved, that *Some Contrarys* are found ἐν ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, *in Contrary Genera*, the Inſtances of This, produced by him, are δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία, *Juſtice and Injuſtice*: for *of the former* of theſe, ſays he, *Virtue is the Genus*; *of the latter*, *Vice*; τοῦ μὲν γὰρ, ἀρετὴ τὸ γένος, τοῦ δὲ, κακία. Now the ſame ſubordination is true of φρόνησις & μανία, *Soundneſs of Mind* and *Inſanity*: *Virtue* is the *Genus* of the *former*; and *Vice* is the *Genus* of the *latter*. For *Soundneſs of Mind* is the Virtue of the *Rational Part of the Soul*; as *Juſtice* is the Virtue of the *Whole Soul*: and the *Contrarys* of theſe Virtues are *different Species* of Vice, in the ſame manner; the Difference between them lying only in the Difference of their Subjects. *Ariſtotle* is certainly blameleſs, in his attributing *Contrariety* to any *particular Virtue* and its *oppoſite Vice*, when they are compared together; for *Contrarys* undoubtedly they are. And, if alſo they are conſidered as *Species* of *Contrary Genera*, very excuſable certainly is *Plato*, in his attributing to them *Sub-contrariety*: the only Objection, to which it ſeems liable, is That of an Accuracy too nice, and in this place perhaps needleſs.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

I am quite of opinion, that it is.

SOCRATES.

And are you not of opinion too, that there are Men who want Underſtanding, and Men who have not that Want?

ALCIBIADES.

I am.

SOCRATES.

Come then, let us conſider What Sort of Men theſe are. You have admitted, that Men there are who want Underſtanding, Men who do not want it, and other Men, you ſay, who are inſane.

ALCIBIADES.

True.

SOCRATES.

Farther now; are there not Some Men in a Good State of Health?

ALCIBIADES.

There are.

SOCRATES.

And are there not Others in a Bad ſtate of Health?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Theſe then are not the ſame Men with Thoſe.

ALCIBIADES.

By no means.

SOCRATES.

Whether now are there any Men, who are in Neither of thoſe ſtates?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly, None.

SOCRATES.

For every Man muſt of neceſſity either *have* good Health, or *want* good Health.

ALCIBIADES.

I think ſo too.

SOCRATES.

Well; do you think after the ſame manner, with regard to the having of Underſtanding and the want of Underſtanding?

ALCIBIADES.

How do you mean?

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Do you think it to be neceſſary[11], that a Man ſhould either *have* or *want* a good Underſtanding? Or is there, beſides, ſome Third and Middle ſtate of Mind, in which a Man neither *has* nor *wants* a good Underſtanding?

ALCIBIADES.

There certainly is not.

SOCRATES.

Every Man then of neceſſity muſt be either in the One or in the Other of thoſe Two Conditions.

ALCIBIADES.

So it ſeems to Me.

[11] In all the printed Editions of the Greek we here read, Δοκεῖ σοὶ οἷόν τε εἶναι, *Do you think it poſſible*, &c. And *Cornarius*, as if he found this Reading in the *Heſſenſtein* Manuſcript, tranſlates it into Latin thus,—*Videtur tibi fieri poſſe*, &c.—*Ficinus* & *Stephens* tranſlate it, as if they had read in their Manuſcripts, Δοκεῖ σοι δεῖν εἶναι, *Do you think that a Man ought to be*, &c.—Neither of theſe Readings can be right, becauſe they, Both of them, make this Dialectical Queſtion to be *fooliſh* as well as *impertinent*; and becauſe alſo Either of them ſpoils the Argumentation.—To make the Inference, in the next Sentence of *Socrates*, juſt and concluſive, we muſt here read, Δοκεῖ σοὶ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, as we have ſuppoſed in tranſlating it. The neceſſity of making this Emendation in the Greek Text was ſeen alſo by *D'acier*, as appears from his French Tranſlation.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Do you not remember that you admitted This, that Inſanity was contrary [12] to Soundneſs of Underſtanding?

ALCIBIADES.

I do.

SOCRATES.

And do you not remember that you admitted This alſo, that there was no Middle or Third State of Mind, in which a Man neither *has* nor *wants* a Good Underſtanding?

ALCIBIADES.

I admitted This too.

SOCRATES.

But how can Two Different things be Contrary [13] to One and the Same thing?

[12] The ſame word, ὑπεναντίον, is uſed here, as in the former Paſſage, to which Note 10 belongs.

[13] Here again the Greek word is ὑπεναντία·——This is the Place, meant in the beginning of Note 10. where we referred to *a little farther on*. For it is a Maxim with all Maſters in the Science of Logick, when they treat of *Simple Terms* ſignificant of Things, that *One only Term is contrary to One other*. Now if this Maxim reacheth, as certainly it does, to Terms ſignificant of ſuch Things as are contained in *One Common Genus*, it is ſtill more evidently true of the Terms of ſuch Things as rank *under Contrary Genera*, and are therefore called *Sub-contrarys* here by *Plato*.

ALCIBIADES.

It is by no Means poſſible.

SOCRATES.

Want of Underſtanding therefore, and Inſanity of Mind,[14] are likely to be found the Same Thing.

ALCIBIADES.

It appears ſo.

SOCRATES.

If then we ſhould pronounce, that all Fools were Madmen,[15] we ſhould pronounce rightly, Alcibiades.

ALCIBIADES.

We ſhould.

SOCRATES.

In the firſt place,[16] your Equals in Age, if Any of them happen to be Fools, as indeed they are, and Some of your Elders

[14] In other words more common, *Folly* and *Madneſs*.

[15] That the Philoſophers of the *Stoic* Sect derived from *Socrates* that celebrated Paradox of theirs, πάντας τὺς ἄφρονας μαίνεδαι, *that all Fools are Mad*, is a juſt Obſervation of *Cicero*'s in *Tuſcul: Diſputat:* L. 3. § 5. and Dr. *Davis*, in his Notes thereon, ſhews the Juſtneſs of it, by referring to the Paſſage in *Plato* now before us.

[16] In the Greek, αὐτίκα. It is well obſerved by *Vigerus de Idiotiſm: Grec:* that where this word αὐτίκα begins a Sentence, as it does here, it often hath the Meaning, which in our tranſlation we have aſſigned to it.——The tranſition from its *Primary* Meaning (obſerved in Note 6.) to *This* was eaſy: for when we have

Elders too, all theſe we muſt pronounce Madmen. For conſider, are you not of opinion, that in this City there are few Wiſe men, but a Multitude of Fools, whom You call Madmen?

have a mind to prove, or to illuſtrate, the truth of any *General Aſſertion* by *Particular Inſtances*, whatever of the *Kind* is *immediately* and *directly* before our Eyes muſt occur to us *in the firſt place*; and we naturally therefore produce it, for an *Inſtance*, before we ſeek farther.--It is probable indeed, that the Uſe of the word αὐτίκα in this *Secondary* Meaning gave occaſion to its paſſing into a *Third*, a little farther removed from its Original,—ſo as to ſignify in general *as for example*, or *as for inſtance*. For we do not controvert the Judgments of Learned Men, who attribute this *Third* Meaning to it ſometimes in ancient Writers: as Dr. *Taylor* does in his Index to *Lyſias*: But we cannot agree with *Erneſtus*, that it hath no other than this general, ſlight, and cold Meaning in the preſent Paſſage. *Socrates* ſeems here to intend a Bye-Caution to his Young Friend, to prevent him from being miſ-led, in his Notions of what is good and deſirable, (the Subject of this Dialogue,) by the Purſuits and Conduct of the reſt of the noble Athenian Youth. Beſide this, the preſent paradoxical Poſition of *Socrates* is one of thoſe Speculations, in which no *Inſtance* is of any Avail at all either to prove or to illuſtrate; 'tis ſuch a one, as theſe others;—*Senſe is every where attended with Mind:—Every Particle of Matter has Life in it:* for whether theſe Poſitions be true or falſe, the Truth or Falſhood of them is not rendered a whit more clear or certain by ſingling out any *Species* of Sentient Brute Animals, or any *Portion* of Matter ſeemingly inanimate, as an *Inſtance*.

ALCIBIADES.

I am of that opinion.

SOCRATES.

Can you imagine then, that, living in the ſame City with ſo many Madmen, we ſhould live with any Eaſe or Comfort? or that we ſhould not have ſuffered from them long ago, have been buffeted, and pelted, and have met with all other Miſchiefs, which Madmen are wont to perpetrate?[17] But conſider, my good Sir, whether we live not here in a different State of Things.[18]

ALCIBIADES.

What is then the truth of the caſe, Socrates, with reſpect to the Multitude? For it is not likely to be what I juſt now imagined.[19]

[17] *Socrates*, in This, ſtarts an Objection to his own Paradox, to have an opportunity of explaining and reconciling it to Common Senſe. What his View was in laying down ſo ſtrange a Poſition, we ſhall ſoon have occaſion to obſerve.

[18] For the baſer Multitude are witheld from doing many Injurys, partly by the Authority of the Laws which forbid to injure, reſtraining them thro *Awe*; and partly by the Pains and Penaltys inflicted on Offenders, reſtraining them thro *Fear*. But Madmen are under neither of thoſe Reſtraints.

[19] This—that the Multitude were really *mad*, in the common meaning of that word: an imagination, however, which *Socrates* had raiſed in him, by his Paradox yet unexplained.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Neither do I think it is ſo, my ſelf. But we ſhould conſider it in ſome ſuch way as This.

ALCIBIADES.

In What way do you mean?

SOCRATES.

I will tell you. We preſume, that Some Men there are, who are ill in Health: do we not?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly we do.

SOCRATES.

Do you think it neceſſary then, that every Man, who is ill in Health, ſhould have the Gout, or a Fever, or an Ophthalmy?[20] do you not think, that a Man, without ſuffering from any of Theſe Diſeaſes, may be ill of ſome Other? For Diſeaſes, we ſuppoſe, are of many various Kinds, and not of Thoſe only.

ALCIBIADES.

I ſuppoſe, they are.

[20] We have no ſingle Word in Our Language, to denote That Diſeaſe of the Eyes, called by the *Grecian* Phyſicians ὀφθαλμία, the Word, here uſed by *Plato*. They meant by it ſuch a *Serous Inflammation* of the Eyes, or Defluxion of Humours on them, as in *Latin* is called *Lippitudo*.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Do you not think, that every Ophthalmy is a Diſeaſe?[21]

ALCIBIADES.

I do.

SOCRATES.

And do you think, that every Diſeaſe therefore is an Ophthalmy?

ALCIBIADES.

By no means, not I.[22] Yet ſtill I am at a Loſs about your Meaning.[23]

SOCRATES.

[21] The *Greek* is printed thus;—ὀφθαλμία ἔν σοι δοκεῖ πᾶσα, νόσος εἶναι; to be thus tranſlated into *Engliſh*;—"*Do you therefore* [or *then*] *think, that every Ophthalmy is a Diſeaſe?*"—But there ſeems to be no room for a *Conjunction Collective* or *Illative*, or any other *Continuative* in this Queſtion; tho in the next indeed there is; becauſe the *next* Queſtion is made to *depend* on *this*, the *Terms* of This being only *inverted* in framing That. We therefore think, that the Second Word in this Sentence ought to be printed ὅ, or ὄχι, or elſe μῶν.—But whatever any future Editors of this Dialogue in the *Greek* may think of the neceſſity of ſome ſuch Alteration, we hope they will all take notice, that this Paſſage is wrongly pointed in *Stephens*'s fine Edition, tho rightly in all the former, and in the late fair Edition at *Oxford*.

[22] In the *Greek*,—Οὐ δῆτα ἔμοιγε [ſc. δοκεῖ].—In tranſlating theſe words, neither *Ficinus* nor *Serranus* ſeem to have attended to the Force of the word δῆτα after ὅ: for they have not given to this Anſwer of *Alcibiades* the Energy, which it has in the Original.—*Bembo*, the

the Follower of *Ficinus* uſually, hath here dared to ſurpaſs his Leader, by repeating the Negative Particle thus,—*Non a me* [*pare*], *non.* We have followed his Example in ſo doing. See *Vigerus de Idiotiſm: Græc:*

[23] In the *Greek*—ἀπορῶ μέντοι, πῶς λέγω.—All the Tranſlators of *Plato's Second Alcibiades*, except *Dacier*, interpret this Paſſage to the following Purport;—"*I am doubtful, however, what Anſwer I ought to give to this Queſtion*".—An interpretation, This, which hardly the Words, the Senſe not at all, will bear. The Queſtion, put by *Socrates*, was eaſy; the Anſwer to it was obvious: and *Alcibiades* without heſitation gave this right Anſwer, ſuch as every other Man would have given,—"*By no Means, not I.*"—*Socrates* took it for a ſufficient Anſwer; and his next Queſtion ſhews that he approved it, and that 'twas agreeable to his own Opinion. There is no reaſon therefore to imagine, that the Doubt in the Mind of *Alcibiades*, expreſſed in the Sentence now before us, may relate to the Queſtion of *Socrates*, concerning the neceſſary Connection between an *Ophthalmy* and *every other Diſeaſe:* it can relate only to the Point, for the illuſtrating of which, in the way of Analogy, all theſe Queſtions about Bodily Diſeaſes are introduced,—namely, the Connection between *Madneſs* and *Folly* or Want of Underſtanding.—This farther appears from what immediately follows; where *Socrates* firſt undertakes to get the Doubts of *Alcibiades* cleared up; and then,—after obſerving, that what they had Both agreed in, with regard to an *Ophthalmy*, was equally true of *all other Diſeaſes*; for that they were, all of them, but ſo many *Species* of *Diſeaſe* (or Indiſpoſition of the Body) *in general*; —he applys what he had ſaid, concerning *Bodily Diſeaſes*, to the great Point in hand, the *Diſeaſes of the Mind.*—On the whole, we believe, that our learned Readers will agree with us in thinking, that the laſt words of this Sentence ought to be read thus,—πῶς λέγεις.—And this Reading is alſo confirmed by a Paſſage not long before to the ſame Purpoſe,—Πῇ ποτε λέγεις; *In what way do you mean?*—*Dacier* perceived the neceſſity of referring the Sentence, now before us, to the *main*

SOCRATES.

But if you will give me your attention, in conſidering the matter, Both of us together, we ſhall go near to find the truth of it.

ALCIBIADES.

I give you, Socrates, all the attention I am Maſter of.

SOCRATES.

Was it not agreed by us, that every Ophthalmy was a Diſeaſe; tho not every Diſeaſe, an Ophthalmy?

ALCIBIADES.

It was agreed ſo.

SOCRATES.

And I think, it was rightly ſo agreed. For all Perſons, who have a Fever, have a Diſeaſe; not All, however, who have a Diſeaſe, have a Fever; neither have they, All of them, the Gout; nor All of them, an Ophthalmy. Every thing indeed of this Kind[24] is a Diſeaſe; but They, whom we

main Argument in this Firſt Part of the Dialogue, concerning *Madneſs and Folly*; but finding, that the *Words* agreed not with this true *Senſe* and *Meaning*, and a right Emendation of them not occurring to his Mind, he has here preſented us with an *Imitation*, rather than a *Tranſlation*.

[24] That is, every continued Indiſpoſition of the Body; whether the *whole Body* ſuffer from it throughout, as in a *Fever*; or whether it be ſeated in any *Organical Part*, ſerving to *Motion*, as in the *Gout*;

we call Phyſicians, ſay, that Diſeaſes differ in their Effects on the Human Body. For all Diſeaſes are not alike, neither are they all attended with like Symptoms: but Each of them operates with a Power peculiar to its Self; and yet Diſeaſes are they All. Juſt as it is with reſpect to Workmen; for Workmen we ſuppoſe Some Men are; do we not? [25]

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly we do.

SOCRATES.

Such, as Shoe-makers, Smiths, Statuarys, and a great multitude of Others, whom it is needleſs to enumerate diſtinctly. All Theſe have different Parts of Workmanſhip divided amongſt them; and they All are Workmen. They are not, however, Smiths, nor Shoe-makers, nor Statuarys, in-

Gout; or ſerving to *Senſation*, as in an *Ophthalmy*.—*Plato*, in his Choice of *Similitudes* and *Inſtances*, where they are requiſite to illuſtrate his Subject, (and he never uſes any but on ſuch occaſions,) is always ſo exquiſitely curious, and often, as here, ſo ſcientifically judicious, that, with reſpect to this Ingredient in Good Writing on Ideal or Intellectual Subjects, we know of no Writer, who is his Equal.

[25] In the Socratic Manner of arguing from Anſwers given to Interrogations, the Interrogating Party aſſerts nothing poſitively; nor even lays down the moſt Certain Principles for a Foundation of the future Reaſoning, until they are admitted for Truths by the Reſponding Party.

diſcriminately All of them together.[26] Juſt ſo Folly is divided amongſt Men. And Thoſe, who have the largeſt Share of it, we call Madmen: Such, as have a Portion ſomewhat leſs, we call Senſeleſs and Stupefied:[27] but if we chuſe to ſpeak of Theſe in gentler Terms, Some of us ſay, they are Magnanimous;[28] Others call them Simpletons; and Others again, Harmleſs, and Unexperienced in the World, and Speechleſs.[29] You will alſo find, if you reflect, many

[26] It may perhaps be doubted, whether the laſt Word of this Sentence in *the Greek* be from *Plato* himſelf, or whether it be a Marginal Gloſs. The Sentence ſeems eaſier and plainer, without it; but with it, rounder, more harmonious, and more in the Style of *Plato*.

[27] In *the Greek*, ἐμβροντήτους, literally to be tranſlated, *thunder-ſtricken*. For the Effect of *Lightening*, (when attended by *Thunder*,) and indeed of all ætherial or electrical Fire, is to *ſtupefy*, at leaſt for a time, whatever Animal it ſtrikes.

[28] This *Euphemiſmus* is apply'd, in the way of *Raillery* or *Good-Humour*, to ſuch Men as want Senſe or Underſtanding in the common Affairs of Human Life; as Men really Magnanimous, being uſually regardleſs of Things really little, and appearing ſo to Them, are looked upon as Fools or as ſenſeleſs by the Multitude, to whom thoſe little Things appear great and important.

[29] In *the Greek*,—Ἔννους,—a Word, which in the proper Senſe of it, is applied only to Infants, before they have attained to the Uſe of Speech.—This Epithet, and the Two preceding it, are uſed in the way of *Extenuation* or *Apology*,—the firſt, for the wholly *Uſeleſs* or Unſerviceable in any Affair,—the next, for the *Silly*, or Eaſy to be impoſed on,—the laſt, for the *Silent* from want of Ideas, having *nothing to ſay*.

other

other Names given them beſide Theſe. But they are all compriſed under the general Term, Folly or Want of Underſtanding. There is, however, a Difference between them, as One Art differs from another, One Diſeaſe from another. Or how otherwiſe doth the Caſe ſeem to you?

ALCIBIADES.

To Me, exactly as You repreſent it.

SOCRATES.

This Point therefore being ſettled, let us from hence return back again. For it was propoſed, I think, in the beginning of our Inquiry, to be conſidered by us, What Sort of Men wanted Underſtanding, and What Sort were Men of Good Underſtanding. For it was agreed, that Some there were of Each Sort. Was it not?

ALCIBIADES.

It was ſo agreed.

SOCRATES.

Whether then do you ſuppoſe, that Such Perſons have a Good Underſtanding, who know how they ought to act, and what they ought to ſay?

ALCIBIADES.

I do.

SOCRATES.

And what Perſons do you apprehend to be wanting in Underſtanding? are they not Such as are ignorant in Both thoſe Caſes?

ALCIBIADES.

Theſe very Perſons.

SOCRATES.

Will not theſe Perſons then, who are ignorant of What they ought to do and to ſay, both ſay and do what they ought not, without being ſenſible of it?

ALCIBIADES.

It appears ſo.

SOCRATES.

Well then, Alcibiades; of this Sort of Perſons, I ſaid,[30] was Oedipus. And you may find Many in our own times,

[30] For They, who ſpeak *raſhly* or *inconſiderately*, that is, without conſulting Reaſon before they ſpeak, (which, as *Socrates* obſerved before, was the caſe of *Oedipus*, in uttering the Imprecation on his Sons,) are not, at the time, ſenſible of their ſaying what they *ought not* to ſay: becauſe *Reaſon*, the only Judge of what *ought* and what *ought not* to be ſpoken, having not been conſulted, they ſpeak as they are prompted by *Paſſion* and Imagination.—The Words "*I ſaid*," Part of this Sentence, are alone ſufficient, ſetting aſide what we obſerved before in Note 6, to juſtify our interpreting the Word αὐτίκα by the Word *inadvertently*, in the Paſſage, to which that Note belongs. For only to That Paſſage, and That Word therein, taken in the Senſe aſſigned to it by our tranſlation, can *Socrates* have a Retroſpect in what he here ſays.

who,

who, tho' they are not ſeized with ſudden Anger, as He was, yet pray for Things hurtful to Themſelves; not ſuſpecting Evil in them, and imagining nought but Good. Oedipus indeed as he did not wiſh for any thing good, ſo neither did he imagine to be good the thing he prayed for. But ſome Others there are, whoſe Minds are in a Diſpoſition quite contrary to that of Oedipus.[31] For You your Self, in my opinion, if the God, to whom you are going to offer your Petitions, ſhould appear to you,[32] and, before you had made

[31] Meaning all thoſe Perſons, who, from natural Inſtinct, *wiſh for Good*; and in this reſpect are *in their Senſes*; but, through Ignorance, *imagin* to be a *Good*, That *Evil* which they pray for; and in this reſpect, *want Underſtanding*, or what we call *Good Senſe*.

[32] In the *Firſt Alcibiades*, pages 41 & 42 of this Tranſlation, *Socrates* makes an imaginary Suppoſition, ſimilar to the preſent, ſo far as it exhibits to the Fancy an Image of ſome God, making *Alcibiades* an Offer of abſolute Dominion. But the Offers, ſuppoſed to be thus ſeverally made to him, differ in theſe Points:—in the Firſt of them, the Empire of *Europe only*, with the Alternative of Death, is offered to his Option:—in this Second, the Empire of Europe, and That in immediate Poſſeſſion, is abſolutely offered to his Acceptance, without excluding the Hope of *extending* his Dominion *farther*.—The Difference between theſe Two ſuppoſed Offers correſponds with the different Deſigns of *Socrates* in ſeverally ſuppoſing them. His *General Deſign* indeed was the *Same* in *Both:* it was to diſcover *Alcibiades*, the Repreſentative of all ambitious Men, and conſequently thro Him every Other ambitious Man, to Himſelf. But his *Particular Deſign*, in ſuppoſing the Former Offer, was to ſhew,

ſhew, from the Inſtance of Ambition, that every Paſſion of the inferior Soul, having imaginary Good for its Object, never can be ſatisfy'd, becauſe the Object of it is infinite; and thence to perſuade Young Men to the Study and Culture of their better Soul, whoſe Object and End is true and eternal Good, in which alone are to be found Reſt and Peace and real Happineſs. The Particular Deſign of *Socrates*, in ſuppoſing the Preſent Offer, was to ſhew, that ambitious Men, and we may juſtly add All who are Slaves to any other Paſſion, place their greateſt Good in That, which is always dangerous, and has often proved fatal.—Theſe Special Deſigns are made apparent,—the Former, from the Choice which *Alcibiades* makes of *Death*, in preference to a *bounded Empire*;—this Latter, from the Acknowlegement of *Alcibiades* himſelf, that he ſhould be *overjoy'd* at ſuch an Offer; upon which Acknowlegement, *Socrates* immediately enters into a repreſentation of the *Calamitys* incident to Empire, by producing many recent Examples of the *violent Death* of Some, and the *miſerable Life* of Others, who, either by flagitious Crimes, or even by any undue Means, had attained to *abſolute Monarchy*, or to the *Chief Command* of Armys.—From the *Similarity* of the Paſſage now before us, to That in the *Firſt Alcibiades*, above referred to, we may obſerve the *Sameneſs* of the *Character* of *Alcibiades* in Both the Dialogues that bear his Name: and from this *Sameneſs of his Character* in Both we infer a *Propinquity of Time* between them; for that Both muſt be ſuppoſed to have been held during the ſhort Space of Time, in which *Socrates* alone could penetrate into his Thoughts, before he had made his Ambition manifeſt to the Publick by any Overt Acts, and long before he had met with any Diſappointment, to lower his towering Fancys, and contract his vaſt Views. Thus we argue from that Similitude in the main between the Two Paſſages, here obſerved.—The circumſtantial Difference between them is a remarkable Inſtance of *Plato*'s conſummate Art in the framing of his Dialogues: every Circumſtance being fitted only to That Dialogue,

made any Petition to him, ſhould aſk you, "whether your Deſires would be ſatisfied with your becoming Tyrant of Athens;" and, (if you held this Favour cheap, and no mighty Grant,) ſhould add farther, "and Tyrant of all Greece;" and, if he ſhould perceive, that you deemed it ſtill too little for you, unleſs you were Tyrant[33] of all Europe, ſhould promiſe you That alſo; and not meerly promiſe, but make you ſo immediately on the ſpot, if you were in haſte to have all the Europeans acknowlege Alcibiades, the Son of Clinias, for their Lord and Maſter;—— in this caſe, it is My opinion, that You your Self would march away full of Joy, as if the greateſt Good had befallen you.

ALCIBIADES.

I believe, Socrates, that I ſhould; and that ſo would any other Man whatever, had he met with ſuch an Adventure.

SOCRATES.

You would not, however, accept of abſolute Dominion over the Eſtates and Perſons of All the Grecians and Barbarians together, on condition of giving your Life in exchange for it.

logue, and to That Part of the Dialogue, where it is placed; and every Part being there placed, where moſt it may conduce to the Strength, and Uniformity, and Beauty of the Whole.

[33] The word *Tyrant*, every where in *Plato*, ſignifys a deſpotic or arbitrary Monarch. See Note 47 to *the Rivals*.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

I ſuppoſe, not. For why ſhould I, when it could be of no Uſe to me?

SOCRATES.

And, if you knew, that you ſhould make an ill Uſe of it to your own Detriment, would you not alſo in ſuch a caſe refuſe it?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly I ſhould.

SOCRATES.

You ſee then, how dangerous it is, either inconſiderately to accept of it, when offered, or to wiſh and pray for it, of your Self; ſince a Man, by having it, may ſuffer great Detriment, if not the total Loſs of his Life. In confirmation of This, we could mention many Perſons, who longed after Tyranny, and laboured to obtain it, as if ſome mighty Good were to be enjoyed from it; but having obtained it, were, from Plots and Conſpiracys to deprive them of it, forced to part with their very Lives. Nay, it cannot, I ſuppoſe, have eſcaped your own Hearing, what happened as it were but Yeſterday,---that Archelaus, Tyrant of the Macedonians,[34] was murdered by his Favourite; for this Favourite

[34] It muſt be acknowleged, that *Plato* has here offended againſt the Truth of Chronology, in mentioning the Death of *Archelaus*, if

Favourite was no leſs fond of the Tyranny, than the Tyrant was of Him; and imagined, that by obtaining the Tyranny

if he meant *Archelaus*, the Son of *Perdiccas the Second*. Monſieur *Dacier* has endeavoured to clear him from this Charge of Anachroniſm, by ſuppoſing the Time of this Dialogue to be Twenty Years later than the Time aſſigned to it in our *Argument*. But according to the computation of *Petavius*, it was not till Three Years after the Death of *Socrates*, that *Archelaus*, the Son of Perdiccas 2d. (ſpoken of by *Plato* in his *Gorgias* and in his *Theages*, as then ſitting upon the Throne of *Macedon*,) was aſſaſſinated and ſlain by *Cratæas* and Others, in a Conſpiracy againſt him; as we learn from *Ariſtotle*, in his *Politicks*, L. 5. C. 10. And *Scaliger*, in this Point, differs but little from *Petavius:* for, in his *Animadverſiones in Euſebii Chronicon*, pag: 108, col: 2. he ſays, that *Archelaus* was ſlain by *Craterus* or (as *Ælian* calls him) *Crateuas* in the Firſt Year of the 95th *Olympiad*, the very Year in which *Socrates* was put to Death, and Two Years after the Murder of *Alcibiades*. The Suppoſition therefore of *Dacier* is inſufficient for the Vindication of our Author; who muſt be found guilty of an Anachroniſm, in this Paſſage, if he meant *Archelaus*, Son to *Perdiccas* the Second. For the Death of *Alcibiades* at leaſt, if not that of *Socrates*, appears to have happened in the Life-time of This *Archelaus*. But is there not ſome Ground to ſuſpect, that the *Archelaus*, now before us, was prior to the Son of *Perdiccas* the Second? Whoever has travelled into the remoter Parts of the ancient *Macedonian* Hiſtory, well knows the Wildneſs and Uncertainty of the Country, till we arrive at the Reign of *Philip*, Father to *Alexander the Great*. Before this, indeed, we here and there meet with a plain Road, where a Spot of Ground has been cultivated by an *Herodotus* or a *Thucydides*. But ever and anon the Traveller finds himſelf again bewildered, without any Guides to conduct him, ex-

Tyranny, Himſelf, he ſhould be made a Happy Man; but that, after he had held the Tyranny three or four days, he Himſelf

cept *Euſebius* and *Dexippus*, the earlier of whom wrote ſix or ſeven hundred Years after *Plato*. Both of thoſe Chronologers have given us Catalogues of the *Macedonian* Monarchs as well before as after the Reign of *Perdiccas* the Second: but, in their Series of the Monarchs *after* him, we find Names inſerted in the One, which are omitted in the Other: and the Difference between them is ſo conſiderable, as to raiſe a juſt Suſpicion, that Neither of them is to be relied on. From ſuch a *Diſagreement* in their Accounts of *After-times*, it ſeems a probable ſuppoſition, that their near *Agreement* in recounting the Series of Macedonian Monarchs, *prior to Perdiccas* the Second, was owing to their equal Want of Lights to lead them thro thoſe darker Ages. And hence we infer the poſſible Exiſtence of an *Archelaus*, Tyrant of *Macedon*, in that early Period; whoſe Fate, and the Fate of *Archelaus*, Son to Perdiccas the 2d., being ſomewhat ſimilar, it may be ſuppoſed, that theſe Two *Archelaus*'s were ſoon and eaſily confounded together; and that afterward all Memory of the Former was by degrees abſorbed and ſunk in the Hiſtory of the Latter. To confirm this Suppoſition, it may be obſerved, that, altho in the Fragment of *Dexippus* we find no mention made of more than One *Archelaus*, yet Two of that Name are recogniſed by *Euſebius*: Both of whom indeed were, according to Him, poſterior to *Perdiccas* the Second; but This is irreconcileable with the Series of *Dexippus*, and with the Hiſtory of *Diodorus*. We ſuppoſe therefore, that *Euſebius* had received ſome traditional Account of Two Macedonian Monarchs, named, Each of them, *Archelaus*; but finding only One mentioned in the Catalogue of Thoſe, who were *prior* to *Perdiccas* the Second; and blindly following, as a meer Tranſcriber, the Order of this ancient Series; he knew not where elſe to introduce Another

Archelaus,

Himſelf was, in his turn, ſecretly murdered by ſome Others, who had conſpired againſt Him. Amongſt our own Fellow-Citizens

Archelaus, than in the Series *ſubſequent* to the Reign of that *Perdiccas*.—Theſe Suppoſitions of ours, ill-grounded and light as they may ſeem, receive ſome Solidity and Weight from conſidering the different Relations of the Death of *Archelaus*, given us by ancient Writers.—*Diodorus* of *Sicily* aſcribes it to an *accidental* Arrow, ſhot in ſome Chace by *Craterus* the Favourite of *Archelaus*, without any *Deſign* againſt his Maſter; ſuch an Arrow, probably, as killed our King *William the Second*, ſhot by Sir *Walter Tyrrel*, "whether miſtaking his Mark, or not, (ſays Mr. *Daniel* in his Hiſtory of that King's Reign,) is uncertain."—*Plato*, we ſee, ſuppoſes *Archelaus* to have been ſlain *intentionally*; and attributes the Murder ſolely to the Ambition of his Favourite, without mentioning this Favourite's Name.—*Ariſtotle*, as before cited, reports, that *Archelaus* was attacked and ſlain by Many, in a Conſpiracy, ſet on foot by *Decamnichus* from a Motive of juſt Reſentment, and joined in by the Monarch's Two Favourites, *Gratæas* and *Hellanocrates*, from ſuch a Motive as wholly juſtifies whatever Part they acted in the Deed.—Now theſe Three different Accounts are eaſy to be reconciled, if we ſuppoſe the *Archelaus* of *Plato* in the Paſſage now before us, and the *Archelaus* of *Ariſtotle* in his *Politicks*, to have been Two different Perſons; tho they were not diſtinguiſhed, but confounded together from the Cauſe before aſſigned, by *Diodorus* and the Annotators on *Ælian*'s Var: Hiſt: L. 8, C. 9, when they attribute the Death of the Latter *Archelaus*, the Son of *Perdiccas*, ſolely to his Favourite; which ſeems to have been the Caſe only of the Former.—Thus have we endeavoured to vindicate our Author from the Charge of Anachroniſm in this Place, by proving the Suppoſition of an *Archelaus*, prior to the Son of *Perdiccas* the 2d, not wholly groundleſs. But

Citizens alſo, you ſee, (for This we have not from the Report of Others, but have been Eye-Witneſſes of it, our Selves,) that of Thoſe who ſucceeded in their Ambition to command our Armys, Some were baniſhed,[35] and ſtill at this Day live in Exile from the City; Others loſt their Lives;[36] and Such as ſeem to have fared the beſt, Such as had gone thro many terrifying Dangers[37] in their Campaigns,

ſhould our Endeavours be deemed unſucceſsful, yet ſtill it muſt be held by all good Criticks leſs diſhonourable in *Plato*, to have erred againſt the Truth of Chronology, in alluding to a Fact which happened in a *Foreign Country*, than either to have been guilty of the moſt palpable Anachroniſms with regard to recent Facts in *his own City*, or elſe to have erred ſo groſsly againſt the Grammar of *his own Language*, as *Dacier* ſuppoſes, in order to prove him guiltleſs of any Anachroniſms whatever. The Errors, in which he is thus involved by his French Interpreter, will be ſpecified in Note 49.

[35] *Thucydides*, the Son of *Meleſias*, had been baniſhed by Oſtraciſm, four or five years before what we ſuppoſe the Time of this Dialogue; and we no where read, that ever he was recalled from Exile: nor indeed is it probable that he was, at leaſt during the Life of *Pericles*. Concerning this *Thucydides*, ſee Note 178 to *the Meno:* and concerning his Baniſhment, ſee *Plutarch's Life of Pericles*.

[36] This was the Caſe of *Callias*, the Son of *Calliades*; he was ſlain in Battle, about the Time when the above-mentioned *Thucydides* was baniſhed from *Athens*. See *Thucydides* the Hiſtorian, Lib: 1, §. 61, 2, & 3.

[37] In the Greek,—διὰ πολλῶν κινδύνων ἐλθοντες ϗ φόβων.—But we ſhould be glad to have the authority of ſome ancient Manuſcript, for reading the laſt word in this ſentence πόνων, inſtead of φόβων.

not

paigns, and were returned to their own Country, have ever afterwards ſuffered at home, from Sycophants and Detractors,[38] a Siege as fierce and as dangerous, as any from open Enemys in the Field, ſo that ſome of them at length wiſhed, they had never known how to command an Army, much rather than ever to have born the Burthen of that Command. Indeed if the Dangers and Toils,[39] which they underwent, had tended to their Advantage, they would have had ſomething plauſible to plead in behalf of their Ambition: but their Caſe is quite the Reverſe of that. In the ſame manner, with reſpect to the having of Children, you will find many Men who wiſh and pray for them; but, after they have[40] them, are brought, on that very account, into the greateſt Calamitys and Griefs: for Some, whoſe Children were incurably wicked, have ſpent all their After-Days in Sorrow: and Some, who had Good Children, but loſt them by ſome bad Accident, have been reduced to a State of Mind no leſs miſerable than the Others; and, like

not only becauſe the word πόνων conveys a better Meaning, but becauſe alſo the words οἱ κίνδυνοί τε καὶ πόνοι in the next ſentence evidently appear to have a reſpect to the mention of them Both, made juſt before. See Note 39.

[38] Such was the Caſe of *Pericles* himſelf at the very Time of this Dialogue, if we have ſettled the Time of it aright.

[39] In the Greek,—οἱ κίνδυνοί τε καὶ πόνοι. See Note 37.

[40] Perhaps the word ἤδη in the Greek, which, as it is printed, precedes the word γενέσθαι, ſhould be transferred from thence hither; that we might here read ἤδη γενομένων.

Them,

Them, have wiſhed that their Children never had been born. And yet, notwithſtanding the Evidence of theſe and many other Caſes of like Kind, it is rare to find a Man, who would refuſe thoſe Gifts of Fortune, were they offered to him; or who, could he obtain them by his Prayers, would forbear to pray for them. Few Men would reject even a Tyranny, if offered them; or the chief Command of an Army;[41] or many other things, which often bring more Miſchief than Benefit to the Poſſeſſor. Nay, there are Few Men, of Thoſe who happen not to have them at preſent,

[41] 'Tis obvious to be perceived, that the firſt part of this Sentence alludes to the open Confeſſion, made by *Alcibiades* but a little before, that he ſhould greatly rejoice at the Offer of a *Tyranny*, that is, of an abſolute and unlimited Monarchy. And 'tis natural to ſuppoſe, that the Words, to which this Note has an immediate reference, allude to a latent Ambition, diſcovered in him by *Socrates*, to procure for himſelf hereafter the *Command* of the *Athenian Armys*, after the Example of his Uncle *Pericles*. Such a ſuppoſition gives a more ingenious and *ſatyrical Turn* to this Part of the Sentence, and at the ſame time makes the *Satire* of it more *pointed*, and much more juſt, than if we ſuppoſe it to convey only a *General Satire* on ambitious Men, (of whom but a Few have any Views of this Kind,) or than if we ſuppoſe it to be indeed levelled at *Alcibiades*, but with a *retroſpect* only to his *paſt* Conduct, to his *early* Ambition, which *had been gratified*, and to the Command, which he *had enjoyed* of the Athenian Armys, and in which he had ever been *ſucceſsful* and *victorious*. Monſieur *Dacier*, who poſtpones the *Time* of this Dialogue till *after* all thoſe Victorys and Succeſſes, muſt have made one or other of theſe Two leſs probable Suppoſitions.

who

who would not be glad if ever they came into their Poſſeſſion. And yet Such, as obtain them, every now and then recant their Wiſhes, and pray to be diſencumbered of what they before prayed to have. I ſuſpect therefore, that in reality Men accuſe the Gods unjuſtly,[42] in ſaying, that the Evils which they ſuffer, come from Them;

For on themſelves they draw, thro their own Crimes,
(or Follys ſhould we ſay?)
More Griefs, than Fate allots to Human Life.

And to Me, Alcibiades, it ſeems probable! that ſome Wiſe Man or other, happening to be connected with certain Perſons void of Underſtanding, and obſerving them to purſue and to pray for Things, which it were better for them ſtill to be without, but which appeared to Them good, compoſed for his own uſe and theirs a Common Prayer; the Words of which are nearly Theſe,——

Sov'reign of Nature! grant us what is Good;
Be it, or not, the Subject of our Pray'rs;
And what is Evil, from thy Supplicants,
Tho ſupplicating for it, ſtill avert.

Now in this Prayer, it ſeems to Me, that the Poet ſays what is right; and that whoever makes uſe of it, incurrs no Danger. But if You have any thing to ſay againſt it, ſpeak your Mind.

[42] This Paſſage evidently alludes to a Speech of *Jupiter* in *Homer's Odyſſey*, Lib. 1, v. 32 & ſeq.

ALCIBIADES.

It is a difficult matter, Socrates, to ſpeak againſt any thing which is rightly ſaid. But what I am thinking of is, how many Evils are brought on Men by Ignorance: ſince to This it ſeems owing, that we labour to procure for our ſelves the greateſt Miſchiefs, without knowing What we are about; and how extreme our Ignorance is, appears in our praying for them. And yet no Man would imagine That to be his own Caſe; and Every one ſuppoſes himſelf ſufficiently knowing, to pray for things the moſt advantageous to Himſelf, and to avoid praying for things the moſt miſchievous: for to pray for Theſe things would in reality be like a Curſe, and not a Prayer.

SOCRATES.

But perhaps, my good Friend, ſome Man or other, who happens to be wiſer than You or I, might ſay, that we are wrong, in laying the blame ſo raſhly[43] on Ignorance, unleſs we

[43] We have tranſlated this Paſſage according to the Senſe, in which it is taken by all prior Tranſlators, *Latin*, *French*, and *Italian*. And they have taken it aright, if the Greek Original be here rightly printed. But we have ſome ſuſpicion, that all the Editions commit the ſame Error, in printing—τὴν ἔϛιν ὧν τε ἄγνοιαν,—and that we ought to read ὅτι ἔϛιν ὧν τε ἄγνοια,—in conformity with Another Paſſage, ſoon to follow, which evidently ſeems to allude to This. We recommend it to future Editors to compare the Two Paſſages together. In the mean time, ſuppoſing the preſent Reading to be right,

we proceed to ſpecify What Things we mean the Ignorance of. To Some Perſons alſo,[44] in certain Conditions and

right, we are to explain it thus;—that we ought not to bring an Accuſation againſt Ignorance *in General*; but to ſpecify, *what Kind* of Ignorance we mean to blame. Now the *Kinds* of *Ignorance* differ, according to the difference of the *Objects* of *Knowlege*. To know Some certain Things is neceſſary only to Some certain Perſons,—to Such, as profeſs ſome particular Art, or have occaſion to perform ſome Operation which requires a regular Method.—To Theſe Perſons, as the Knowlege of many Other Things is uſeleſs, ſo the Ignorance of them is harmleſs.—But Some Things there are, on the other Hand, the Ignorance of which is dangerous to All Perſons, and ſometimes ruinous; always ruinous to Thoſe who lead Others, and to Thoſe who are led by them, in Ways unknown equally to the Leaders and to their Followers. The Things, which it is thus neceſſary for All Perſons to know, or at leaſt to have Right Opinions of, are the Boundarys of Juſt and Unjuſt, Right and Wrong, Good and Evil.—*Alcmæon* and *Oreſtes* are inſtanced in by *Plato*, to ſhew the direful conſequences of Ignorance in theſe Points.

[44] Ignorance is *relative* not only to *Things*, the *Objects* of Knowlege, but to *Perſons* alſo, the *Subjects* of it. With regard to *Things*, it was obſerved in the preceding Note, that *Some Kinds* of Ignorance were generally harmleſs; but that *Other Kinds* were dangerous, and generally deſtructive. It comes now to be obſerved of Ignorance, with regard to the *Subjects* of it, that to moſt Perſons indeed the Knowlege or the Ignorance of many Things is a Matter of Indifference; but that to *certain Perſons*, in certain *Scituations*, and in certain Diſorders *of Mind*, Ignorance or Error concerning Things common and generally indifferent, is an Advantage, and a Preſervative from Ruin. For an Inſtance of this *ſalutary Ignorance*, a poſſible Caſe preſently after is ſuppoſed, of *Alcibiades* himſelf. See Note 49.

Circumſtances, Ignorance is a Good; tho it be an Evil to thoſe Others, we have been ſpeaking of.

ALCIBIADES.

How ſay you? Is it poſſible, there ſhould be any Thing, which it is better for any Perſon, in any Condition whatever, to be ignorant of, than to know?

SOCRATES.

I think it is: are not You of the ſame opinion?

ALCIBIADES.

Not I; by Jupiter.

SOCRATES.

Well now;---but obſerve, I am not going to charge You with having a Will, diſpoſed to have ever perpetrated[46] a Deed, like That of Oreſtes, upon his own Mother, as it is reported; or like That of Alcmæon,[45] or whoever elſe happened to act in the ſame manner.

ALCI-

[45] That Part of the Story of *Oreſtes*, which is here alluded to, is well known to Thoſe, who are verſed in Greek Learning, from the Χοηφόροι of *Æſchylus*, the *Electra* of *Sophocles*, and the *Electra* of *Euripides*.—For the Story of *Alcmæon*, we refer them to the old *Scholia* on *Homer's Odyſſey*, Lib: 11, v. 326; or to *Servius*'s Commentary on *Virgil's Æneid*, Lib: 6, v. 445. It is told more at large by *Apollodorus*, in Lib: 3, Cap: 6 & 7.—But leaſt Such of our Readers, as happen

ALCIBIADES.

Mention not ſuch a horrid Deed, I beſeech you, Socrates.

happen to be unlearned in the Hiſtory of ancient *Greece*, ſhould miſtake the Meaning of this Paſſage, they are to be informed, that *Oreſtes* and *Alcmæon* were guilty of ſo atrocious a Crime, as the Murder of their own Mothers, out of a miſtaken Notion of Filial Piety, and an Ignorance of the Bounds of Duty, towards a Father.—*Oreſtes* was the Son of *Agamemnon* and *Clytemneſtra*. His Mother, in the Abſence of his Father during the Siege of Troy, carried on an Amour with *Ægiſthus*, Couſin-german to *Agamemnon*. At her Huſband's Return home after the Deſtruction of Troy, She and her Paramour procured his Death; which was afterwards avenged by his Children. For *Oreſtes*, at the inſtigation of his Siſter *Electra*, ſlew the adulterous Pair together.—*Alcmæon* was the Son of *Amphiaraus* and *Eriphyle*. This Lady betrayed her Huſband into a Scituation, in which he muſt inevitably loſe his Life. He, knowing how ſhe had acted, and foreſeeing the Event, enjoined his Son *Alcmæon* to avenge his Death on *Eriphyle*, by taking away Her Life.—In neither of theſe Caſes, cited here by *Plato*, does there appear any Malice in the Young Princes againſt their Mothers; no Spirit of Revenge for perſonal Injurys done to Them; no Luſt of Riches or of Dominion; in ſhort, no Selfiſh Paſſion or Appetite whatever; no other Intention, than to perform an imagined Act of Duty to their Fathers, by doing ſuch an Act of Juſtice on their Mothers, as belonged not to Them to execute. It appears, that Both of theſe unhappy Princes perpetrated a Deed ſo unnatural, from erroneous Notions of Duty, Juſtice, and Honour; that is, thro Want of Moral Wiſdom, or true Prudence. We apprehend therefore, that the Drift of *Plato* in this Paſſage is to prove, from theſe ſad Inſtances of the fatal Effects of Ignorance in the Laws of Nature and Reaſon, the neceſſity of applying our Minds to the Study of Moral Science, in order to act rightly and to be happy.

SOCRATES.

The Man, who acquits You of a Diſpoſition to have acted in that manner,[46] you ought not, Alcibiades, to bid Him avoid the Mention of ſuch a Deed; but much rather ought you to lay that Injunction on a Man, who ſhould expreſs a contrary Opinion of you; ſince the Deed appears to You ſo horrid, as not to admit a caſual Mention of it in Converſation. But do you think, that Oreſtes, had he been a Wiſe and Prudent Man, and had he known How it was Beſt for him to act, would have dared to be guilty of any ſuch Action?

ALCIBIADES.

By no means.

SOCRATES.

Nor, I ſuppoſe, would any other Man.

[46] The *Verbs*, in this and the preceding Speech of *Socrates*, which are marked with the Number of this Note, are, Both of them, expreſſive of *Time paſt*. Whence we are to conclude, that *Dinomache*, the Mother of *Alcibiades*, was not living at the ſuppoſed Time of this Dialogue. In fact, She fell, one of the Firſt Victims to the great Plague at *Athens*. Her Brother by his marriage, *Pericles*, ſurvived her about Two Years, lingering all that time with the ſame Diſeaſe. We make this Obſervation, to aſcertain more preciſely the Time when this Dialogue was held; tho we are well aware that None, except Critical Admirers of *Plato* as a Dialogue-Writer, will think it of any Importance.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly, not.

SOCRATES.

The Ignorance therefore of What is Beſt is an evil Thing; and Whoever is ignorant of That Beſt,[47] will always ſuffer Evil.

ALCIBIADES.

So I think.

SOCRATES.

And did not He think ſo too? and do not all other Men think the Same?[48]

ALCI-

[47] In the Greek,—τὸ βέλτιστον,—the *Chief Good* of every man;—That, which of all things is always the moſt advantageous to him, as being, the moſt of all things, conducive to his Happineſs; and which is therefore his moſt important Intereſt always to be attached to, and never by any Paſſion or Fancy to be drawn away from that Attachment.

[48] Thoſe Men, who are by all Others deemed to be *totally ignorant* of their own Good, are called either *Ideots* or *Madmen*. The Multitude preſume Themſelves to be at a great diſtance from Both thoſe States, that of Idiocy and that of Madneſs. And, as they find Both of them incident to Human Nature, they pity, moſt of all men, Thoſe whom they apprehend to be in Either of them; and dread, moſt of all things, to be, thro Either, ſo devoid of Judgment, as not to know, What is Beſt, every One for Himſelf.—The ancient Grecians ſeem to have been impreſſed with theſe Sentiments ſo ſtrongly, that Such a man, as by Us is called an *Idiot*, was by Them ſaid to

be

ALCIBIADES.

I cannot deny it.

SOCRATES.

Farther then, let us conſider This alſo.[49] Suppoſing, that it ſhould come into your Head all at once,[50] from a ſudden

be ἀβέλτερος, as *not knowing* τὸ βέλτιον *That* [Thing or Action] *which is Better* than the reſt, amongſt many which lye before him for his Choice. See *Heſychius* and *Suidas* in voce ἀβέλτερος.

[49] An imaginary Caſe is here put, as an Inſtance, to ſhew, that thoſe Men, who are ignorant of its being their greateſt Intereſt to be thorowly honeſt, may imagine it their greateſt Intereſt to commit the moſt enormous Crimes; and that, for ſuch Men, in certain States of Mind, (that is, during the Prevalence of ſuch Imaginations,) and in going to execute their bad Purpoſes, to be blind, or to blunder in the Dark, is better, than to ſee clearly the Way they intend to go, or the Means proper for the accompliſhment of their Ends.

[50] Monſieur *Dacier*, in tranſlating this Paſſage, has foiſted into it the word *autrefois*, *formerly*, without any Ground given him by the Original, tho not without giving fair notice of the unwarrantable inſertion. According to his own account, he was tempted to take this liberty with his Author, by a Zeal, not only to acquit him from the Charge of an *Anachroniſm*, in ſpeaking of *Archelaus* as dead, in the life-time of *Pericles*,—but alſo to ſave him from a Charge of *Indelicacy*, in preſenting to the Mind of *Alcibiades* ſo horrid an Image, as That of aſſaſſinating his Uncle, his Guardian and beſt Friend.—The former of theſe Two Charges we have already conſidered in Note 34. And as to the latter, we ſhould think, that *Plato* himſelf has

ſudden Fancy of its being the Beſt Thing you can do, to take a Dagger with you, and go to the Houſe of Pericles, your Guardian and your Friend; and ſuppoſing, that, when you came there, upon your aſking, if Pericles was within, with

has ſufficiently guarded againſt it, in making *Socrates* to acknowlege the Mind of *Alcibiades* quite free from a Tendency to commit any ſuch Crime. To this Paſſage therefore may be apply'd the juſt Apology, made by *Socrates* but a little before, for his *ſuppoſing* the Caſe of a Crime ſtill more horrid and unnatural: with which Apology *Alcibiades* himſelf was ſo well ſatisfied, as not to take Offence at this Second *Suppoſition*. But ſince it appears not ſufficient to have ſatisfied the learned Critick, and ſince Some of our Readers may poſſibly labour under the ſame extreme Senſibility and ſuperfine Taſte, we beg leave to obſerve, that *Monſieur* ſeems to have been more delicate on theſe Points, than an ancient *Attic* Audience; or than a modern Audience of his own Countrymen at the Theatre of *Paris*; where, that polite People, without being offended, often hear Narrations of the moſt dreadful Deeds, ſuppoſed to have been done, or even to be then doing, *off the Stage* of Action or *Ocular Repreſentation*. Such a degree of Delicacy, as prohibits all Images of Horror, raiſed by Storys whether true or falſe, would deeply wound the *Hiſtoric* Muſe, and abſolutely be the death of the *Epic* Muſe, and of the *Tragic*.—We are aware with how much probability it may be urged, in behalf of *Dacier*'s nice Notions of *the Decorum* in Dialogues, that in Both the Caſes, here put by *Socrates*, in That of *Dinomache* and in This of *Pericles*, the very Perſon to whom theſe Caſes are put, that is, *Alcibiades* himſelf, is ſuppoſed to be *the Doer* of theſe horrid Deeds.—To this Plea we make the following Reply:—'Tis evidently the Deſign of *Plato*, in this Part of the Dialogue, to convince *Alcibiades*,

with intention to kill Him only, and no other Perſon, you ſhould receive this Anſwer,---He is within;---I do not ſay, that you have a Will or Inclination to verify any of theſe ſuppoſitions; I ſay no more than This,---ſuppoſing, you

cibiades, that Moral Science is neceſſary to Man on Two accounts:—Firſt, to aſcertain the Boundarys of Duty, ariſing in each particular Relation of Human and Social Life: for that, ſo long as theſe Boundarys remain uncertain, a Zeal to diſcharge our Duty, in One of theſe Relations, may engage us to the groſſeſt Violation of our Duty, in ſome Other Relation equally near and dear to us by nature:—The other neceſſary Uſe of Moral Science, ſuggeſted here by *Plato*, is to adjuſt the Standard of a Man's real Intereſt: for that, until This be done from Science, which never varys, we may be eaſily brought, by the Sophiſtry of artful Men, or by That of our own Paſſions, to fancy and believe, that on ſome occaſions it is our higheſt Intereſt to commit the baſeſt Crimes.—To give theſe Arguments the greater Force in the Mind of *Alcibiades*, it was proper that *Socrates*, in putting an imaginary Caſe of ſuch a Crime, committed thro Want of ſuch Science, ſhould ſuppoſe *Alcibiades* Himſelf to be the Criminal, and ſhould alſo prove it poſſible for him actually to become ſo. For in every Caſe, poſſible to befall our Selves, the ſuppoſing and fancying of it to befall us *actually*, ſtrikes us more forcibly, and makes a deeper impreſſion on us, than the Narrative or even the Sight of it without ſuch a home-application. Hence it is, that the weaker Sex, the Young, the Tender, and all Others of quick Senſes and lively Imaginations, are apt to be more affected with Tales and Spectacles of Diſtreſs or Terror, and to ſympathiſe more feelingly with the Sufferers, than Thoſe are, who are oppoſite to them in Sex, or Age, in acquired Habits, or natural Conſtitution.

ſhould

ſhould be ſeized with ſuch a Fancy,[51] (and nothing, I think, hinders a Man, who is ignorant of What is Beſt, from being at ſome time or other ſo ſeized,) in that caſe, an Opinion might be conceived, that the Worſt Thing a Man can do, is, in ſome circumſtances, the Beſt: do not You think it might?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly ſo.

SOCRATES.

If then, upon being admitted to his Preſence, you ſhould ſee and yet not know him, but ſhould miſtake him for ſome Other Perſon, I aſk you, whether you would, notwithſtanding that, be ſo furious as to kill him?

ALCIBIADES.

No, by Jupiter; I do not imagine that I ſhould.

SOCRATES.

For you would not be ſo furious, as to kill Any Perſon, whom Chance threw in your way; but Him only, at whom you aimed. Is it not for this reaſon, that you would not kill him?

[51] In the Greek,—εἰ, οἶμαι, δόξει σοι ὅπερ ἂν τὸν κωλύει κ. τ. λ.— The word οἶμαι here ſeems to be out of its proper place, and to belong to the *parenthetical* part of this Sentence, thus,—εἰ δόξει σοι ὅπερ, (or rather, as *Stephens* conjectures, ὅτιπερ,) οἶμαι, ἂν τὸν κωλύει δήπου τῷ γε ἀγνοοῦντι τὸ βέλτιστον παρασῆναι ποτὲ δόξαν ὥστε κ. τ. λ.

ALCIBIADES.

Without doubt.

SOCRATES.

And if you attempted the ſame thing ever ſo often, and ſtill miſtook Pericles, whenever you were about to execute your Deſign, you never would lay violent hands on him[52]?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly I ſhould not.

SOCRATES.

Well; and can you think, that Oreſtes would ever have laid violent hands on his Mother, if in like manner he had miſtaken her for ſome other Perſon?

ALCIBIADES.

I think, he would not.

SOCRATES.

For He too had it not in his Mind to kill any Woman

[52] The Reader may have obſerved, concerning the ſuppoſed Caſe, relative to *Dinomache*, that, tho it *once* was a *Contingent*, yet the *Poſſibility* of its ever happening is ſpoken of as *paſt*. And let him here obſerve of the Caſe, now before us, reſpecting *Pericles*, that 'tis ſpoken of, in every Circumſtance of it, as a Caſe *poſſible* to happen in ſome *future* time or other. Theſe Obſervations, taken together, will exactly aſcertain the Time of this Dialogue, ſhewing it to be after the Death of *Dinomache*, and before that of *Pericles*.

he

he ſhould chance to meet with, nor the Mother of any Man whatever, but his own Mother only.

ALCIBIADES.

It is true.

SOCRATES.

To miſtake therefore and not to know Things of that Kind,[53] is better for Men, who are in ſuch Diſpoſitions, and who are ſeized with ſuch Imaginations.

ALCIBIADES.

It appears ſo to be.

SOCRATES.

Do you now perceive, that for Some Perſons, in Some Circumſtances, to be ignorant of Some Things[54] is a Good, and not, as You juſt now imagined it, an Evil?

ALCIBIADES.

It ſeems to Me probable.

[53] That is;—the proper *Means* to their *Ends*; or the Perſons, Places, and Times, neceſſary to be known, for executing their Purpoſes.

[54] This is that Other Paſſage, to which, in Note 43, we refer the future Editors of *Plato*.

SOCRATES.

Farther; if you are willing to conſider what follows after This,[55] tho it be ſtrange and paradoxical, you may perhaps be of opinion, that there is ſome truth in it.[56]

ALCIBIADES.

Above all things, Socrates, tell me What.

SOCRATES.

That the acquiſition of other Sciences, without the Science[57] of What is Beſt, is, I may venture to ſay, likely to be found rarely beneficial, and generally hurtful, to the Perſon who has acquired them.[58] And conſider it in this

[55] Not, as a Conſequence, or Corollary, from any Poſitions proved before; but in the Series of thoſe Reaſons, which are here adduced by *Socrates*, to prove the *neceſſity* of acquiring *Moral Science*.

[56] Immediately before εἶναι, which is the laſt word of this Sentence in the Greek, the word τι ſeems to be omitted.

[57] The words τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιςημῶν, in the Greek of this Sentence, are ſufficient to ſhew, that, preſently afterwards, we ought to read ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ βελτίςου [ſc: ἐπιςήμης]. And this Reading, if it wanted confirmation, is indiſputably confirmed by a ſubſequent Paſſage, in which the very ſame paradoxical Poſition, having been proved, is repeated as a Concluſion from the Proofs.

[58] The laſt word of this Sentence in the Greek, we preſume, ſhould be read, not—αὐτὰ,—as it is printed; but, either—αὐτὰς [ſc: ἐπιςήμας], or—αὐτὸ, [ſc: κτῆμα]. The latter of theſe two Emendatory Readings is confirmed by that Paſſage, to which we have referred in the preceding Note.

way:

way: Do you not think it neceſſary, that, when we are about to engage in any Affair, or to ſpeak on any Subject, we ſhould really know, or at leaſt ſhould fancy that we know, the Subject we are about to ſpeak on, or the Affair we are going so readily to engage in?

ALCIBIADES.

I do think it is.

SOCRATES.

And do not our Public Orators, either knowing, or fancying that they know, What the City ought to do, give us accordingly their Counſel off hand on every occaſion? Some of them, on the Subject of War and Peace; Others, when the Affair of building Walls, or That of furniſhing the Port-Towns with proper Stores, is in Debate.[59] In a word, all the

[59] When *Plato* in his Dialogues, arguing by *Induction of Particulars*, is to bring *Inſtances* in proof of ſome *General Truth* relative to Human Affairs, he uſes to ſelect ſuch Inſtances, as are beſt ſuited to the Time, Place, and Perſon preſent: for Such are not only the moſt obvious and eaſy to that Party in the Dialogue who produces them, but are alſo the moſt lively and ſtriking to the Imagination of the other Party to whom they are produced: from Such therefore the intended Inference is drawn the moſt readily. Now, unleſs *Plato*, in the Paſſage before us, laid aſide this his own uſual and excellent Judgment in the ſelecting of his Inſtances, Thoſe, which are here brought, aſcertain the *Time* of this Dialogue, fixing it in the *Third Year* of the *Peloponneſian War*. For chiefly in this Year the Athe-

the Negociations between Our City and any Other, and all our Domeſtic Concerns, are they not conducted juſt as theſe Orators adviſe?

ALCIBIADES.

True.

SOCRATES.

Obſerve then, how we proceed in this argument, if poſſible.[60] Some Men you call Wiſe, and Others you call Fooliſh.

ALCIBIADES.

nian Counſels wavered about *continuing the War*: in this Year was finiſhed that important *Building*, the Wall that reached from the City to *Piræum*: in this Year alſo was that principal Athenian *Port-Town* compleatly *fortified*, and amply furniſhed with *Naval Stores*. That the ſame Year is the *Time* of the *Firſt Alcibiades*, is ſhewn in Notes 23, & 283, to that Dialogue,

[60] In the Greek we read,—ἂν δυνηθῶ,—*if I ſhould be able.*—And if this Reading be right, the words,—σοι δεῖξαι,—*to make it appear to You*,—or—σοι δηλῶσαι, or others of like Import, are omitted, either by the Printers, or by ancient Tranſcribers, or by a ſtrange Ellipſis of the Author's own. The tranſlation, made by *Cornarius*, ſupplys the Deficience thus,—*ſi potuero proferre*;—That by *Serranus*, thus,—*ſi id quidem docere poſſum*;—That by the late Oxford Editor, thus,—*ſi præſtare potuerim*;—and That by *Dacier*, thus,—*ſi je puis achever ma preuve*:—*Bembo*, in His tranſlation, preſerves the Ellipſis, thus,—*ſi io ſono poſſente.*—So that None, it ſeems, of theſe Tranſlators doubted the Soundneſs of the Text in this place. But we are inclined

ALCIBIADES.

I do.

SOCRATES.

Fooliſh do you not call the Many, and Wiſe the Few?

ALCIBIADES.

Juſt ſo.

SOCRATES.

And do you not give thoſe different Epithets to thoſe Two Sorts of Perſons, in conſideration of Something in which they differ?[61]

ALCI-

clined to think, that *Plato* wrote,—ἂν δυνηθῇς—if *You ſhould be able*, i. e. able ὁρᾶν to *perceive* or *apprehend* the whole Force of what is to follow. For 'tis probable, that the only Doubt, which *Socrates* had, was whether it was *poſſible* for *Alcibiades* to apply the Reaſoning, as *Socrates* meant he ſhould, to the popular Orators and Demagogues of that Age, or to imagine them All really ignorant of what was *Beſt to be done* in thoſe Affairs, on which they harangued the People with ſo much Applauſe.—However, as the printed Text conveys a Meaning agreeable to the uſual Modeſty of *Socrates*, we chuſe, in tranſlating it, to leave this Point uncertain,—to Whether of the Two Partys the Doubt of the Poſſibility relates. *Ficinus* and *Grynæus* ſeem to have taken the ſame Courſe, by their rendring it thus,—*ſi fieri poteſt*.

[61] The Difference between them will, at the End of the preſent Chain of Reaſoning, appear to be This,—that only the few Wiſe have the Knowlege of what is always *the Beſt*, or the *greateſt Good*, to

ALCIBIADES.

I do.

SOCRATES.

Whether do you call Him a Wise Man, who knows how to harangue the People on those Subjects of Debate we mentioned, without knowing What Advice is the Best in General, and What on the present Occasion?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly not.

SOCRATES.

Nor Him neither, I suppose, who hath the Knowlege of Military Affairs, but knows not When it is Best to go to War, nor How long a time to continue it. Is not my supposition just?

ALCIBIADES.

It is.

SOCRATES.

Neither then do you call Him a Wise Man, who knows how to procure another Man's Death, or the Confiscation of his Estate, or the Banishment of him from his Country, without knowing on What Occasion, or What Person, it is Best so to persecute.

to every *Civil State*, and to every *Member* of it, as well in his *private* as in his *publick* capacity,—namely, *Universal Justice*, or thorow Honesty and Goodness.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

Indeed I do not.

SOCRATES.

The Man therefore, who poſſeſſes any Knowlege of ſuch a Kind,[62] if that Knowlege of his be attended with the Knowlege alſo of What is Beſt, (and This I preſume to be the Same with the Knowlege of What is Beneficial;[63] Is it ſo?

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly it is:)

SOCRATES.

We ſhall ſay, that He is a Wiſe Man, and ſufficiently well able to judge for Himſelf, and to be alſo a Counſeller to the City. But of the Man who has not the Knowlege of What is Beneficial,[64] we ſhall ſay the Contrary. Or what is Your Opinion that we ought to ſay?

ALCI-

[62] That is, Knowlege or Skill in any *particular* Science or Art, only to be exerciſed *occaſionally*; in contradiſtinction to Skill in That Art, which is of *continual* and unintermitted *Uſe in Practice*,—namely, the Art of living well and happily,—an Art, founded on That Science, which is the moſt General of all, as all Things and all human Actions are the Subjects of it,—namely, the Science of Good and Evil.

[63] See Note 205 to *the Meno*, and Note 80 to *the Firſt Alcibiades*.

[64] In the Greek, as it is printed, we here read ποιοῦντα, a word, which is foreign to the Senſe. From what goes before, we con-

ALCIBIADES.

Mine agrees with Yours.

SOCRATES.

Well now; let us ſuppoſe a Man ſkilled in Horſemanſhip, or in Shooting with a Bow, or in Wreſtling, or Boxing, or other Combat; or in any thing elſe which Art teaches; What do you ſay concerning Him, who knows what is executed Beſt, in that Art which he has learnt? The Man, for inſtance, who knows what is performed Beſt in Horſemanſhip, do you not ſay of Him, that he is ſkill'd in the Horſeman's Art?

ALCIBIADES.

I do.

SOCRATES.

And the Man, who knows what is performed Beſt in Wreſtling, I preſume you ſay of Him, that he is ſkill'd in the Wreſtler's Art. Of a Man, who has the like Knowlege in Muſick, you ſay, that He is ſkill'd in the Muſician's Art. And of Men, who have the like Knowlege in the Performances of other Arts, you ſpeak after a like manner: or How otherwiſe?

jecture the Right Reading to be either ὠφελοῦντα, that is, ὠφελεῖν ἐπιςάμενον, or elſe τοιοῦτον, that is, *Such a one* as before deſcribed, ᾧ παρέπεται ἡ τοῦ βελτίςου ἐπιςήμη, whoſe particular Knowlege or Skill is attended with the Science of What is Beſt.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

No otherwiſe, than juſt as You ſay.

SOCRATES.

Do you think now, that a Man, ſkilled in any of theſe Arts, muſt of neceſſity be a Wiſe Man? or ſhall we ſay, that he wants much of being ſo?

ALCIBIADES.

Much indeed does he, by Jupiter.

SOCRATES.

Suppoſe then a Commonwealth, compoſed of good Bowmen and Muſicians, of Wreſtlers too and other Artiſts; and mixed with Theſe, ſuch Perſons as we juſt now mentioned, Such as underſtand Military Affairs, and Such as know how to perſecute a Man to Death; and ſuperadded to them, your Politicians, ſwoln with the Pride of managing State-Affairs; all theſe People void of the Science of What is Beſt; and not a Man of them knowing When, or in What Caſe, it is beſt to exerciſe the particular Skill or Knowlege, that each Man is Maſter of; What Sort of a Commonwealth do you think This would prove?

[65] Inſtead of οἷς ἄρτι εἰρήκαμεν, printed here in the Greek, we ſuſpect that we ought to read—ὧν α. ει.

ALCIBIADES.

But a bad one, Socrates, I think for My Part.

SOCRATES.

Neither would you, I ſuppoſe, heſitate to pronounce it ſo, when you ſaw Every one of theſe Men ambitious of being honoured, and making it his chief Buſineſs in the Commonwealth,

To' attain to more, and ſtill more, Excellence,[66]

(by Excellence I mean That which is the Beſt in his own Art,) but in What is Beſt for the Publick, and Beſt alſo for Himſelf,[67] generally miſtaken; as being, I ſuppoſe, without

[66] *Plutarch*, towards the End of his Treatiſe περὶ ἀδολεσχίας, *concerning Talkativeneſs*, cites the Two following Verſes, which appear to be taken out of ſome ancient Greek Poet,—

Νέμει τὸ πλεῖον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος,
Ἵν' αὐτὸς αὐτῷ τυγχάνῃ κρείττος ὤν.
He makes it the chief Buſineſs of the Day,
To' attain to more, and ſtill more, Excellence.

In the Paſſage now before us, we find the *latter* of theſe Two Verſes cited by *Plato*, word for word. The *former* of them indeed he has a little altered; but only juſt ſo much as to adapt it to his own Purpoſe; which could not be done without weaving it into his own Proſaic Style.

[67] In the Greek,—αὐτὸν αὑτῷ βελτίῳ—*Stephens*, perceiving This to be quite ungrammatical, propoſes, by a very ſcholar-like as well as ſenſible Emendation, that, inſtead of αὐτὸν we ſhould read αὖ τῷ. But perhaps the word αὐτὸν was altogether intruded here by ſome Tranſ-

out rational Principles, and governed only by Opinion. In this caſe, ſhould we not be right in pronouncing, that ſuch a Commonwealth was full of great Diſorder and of Lawleſs Doings?[68]

ALCIBIADES.

Right indeed, by Jupiter.

SOCRATES.

Did we not think it neceſſary for us, either to fancy that we know, or really to know, previouſly, the Buſineſs we are going to engage in, or off-hand to ſpeak upon?[69]

Tranſcriber, inattentive to the Grammatical Conſtruction of this Sentence, but who obſerved the words αὐτὸν αὐτῷ uſed in many following Sentences, which have the ſame Meaning with That now before us.

[68] It muſt be *full of Diſorder*; becauſe the ſeveral Members of it pull different Ways; whereas Order in a Political Body cannot be maintained, but by a conſpiring and a co-operating of the different Powers of its ſeveral Members to one and the ſame End,—the Health, and Strength, and Beauty of the Whole.—It muſt be *full of Lawleſs Doings*; becauſe the Common Good or Intereſt of all the Perſons, who compoſe a Commonwealth, either underſtood or felt or believed in by them All, is the only firm Security to the Permanence of their Common Law, the Law common to them All; and becauſe alſo a Zeal to promote the Public Good, moving the Mind of each Individual, more powerfully than any other Motive, to thoſe Actions of his in which the Publick is concerned, is the only firm Ground of the Conformity of all his Actions to that Common Law.

[69] See in Page 69 a Queſtion of *Socrates*, to which This evidently has a Reference.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

We did.

SOCRATES.

And did we not alſo think, that if a Man engages in any Buſineſs which he knows, and his Knowlege of it be attended with the Knowlege of What is Beneficial, he will be in a way of profiting both the Publick and Himſelf?[70]

ALCI-

[70] This Interrogative Sentence of *Socrates* no leſs evidently refers to a Sentence in Page 73, beginning with theſe words,—*The Man therefore*,—a Sentence, that will greatly help us in amending This; the Greek of which, as it is printed, runs thus;—Οὐκοῦν κἂν μὲν πράττῃ ἃ τις οἶδεν, ἢ δοκεῖ εἰδέναι, παρέπεται δὴ τὸ ὠφελίμως καὶ λυσιτελέντως ἡμᾶς ἕξειν, καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ;—Now in this Sentence the words ἢ δοκεῖ εἰδέναι, not only are not found in the Sentence, to which This refers, and the Senſe of which it repeats with but little variation in the Words, but they alſo convey a Meaning contrary to the Mind of *Socrates*. For He takes every occaſion to inculcate, that only a Man's real Knowlege, ſhown by his Speeches, or his Actions, and not his own falſe Conceit of it, nor other Men's too high Opinion of it, can be of any laſting Advantage either to Himſelf or to Others.—Of equal Moment with this *Interpolation*, (a Fault, to which the words οἰηθῆναι εἰδέναι in the preceding Sentence, where they are uſed rightly, ſeem to have given occaſion,) is another Fault in the Sentence now before us, an *Omiſſion* of the words ἢ τῷ βελτίστῳ ἐπιστήμῃ, or others to the ſame Purport. For, without ſome ſuch words, this Sentence, in which *Socrates* delivers his Opinion in the way of a Queſtion, is quite contradictory to his Opinion, delivered but a little before, in that Sentence above referred to. Our ſuppo-

ALCIBIADES.

How could we think otherwiſe?

SOCRATES.

But that if it be attended with Ignorance of What is

ſition, that ſuch words are here omitted in the printed Editions of *Plato*, but ought to be inſerted, is confirmed by the Latin of *Ficinus*, who tranſlated faithfully from a Manuſcript Copy of *Plato*, (probably the *Medicean*,) with which *Grynæus* afterwards compared and corrected that Tranſlation. For both *Ficinus* and *Grynæus*, in their Latin, infert theſe words,—"*addit autem ſcientiam optimi.*"—In this Sentence alſo are wanting the words ἐδόκει ἡμῖν; unleſs *Plato* purpoſely omitted them, as thinking it needleſs to repeat them, after they had been expreſſed in the Queſtion immediately preceding. There remains yet another Fault in this Sentence, the word ἡμᾶς, a word, which the grammatical conſtruction by no means admits of.—If our conjectural Emendation of this Sentence, which we now beg leave to offer to the Learned, ſhould appear to be a juſt one, it will appear at the ſame time, on examination, that all the Faults in it, as printed, are owing originally to a meer *tranſpoſition* of ſome of the words in tranſcribing it,—an Error, frequently found in ancient Manuſcripts, and the cauſe of thoſe many additional Errors, as well in printed as in written Copys, which were afterwards committed with intention to correct the former.—The propoſed Reading is this;—Οὐκοῦν, κἂν μὲν πρᾴτῃ ἅ τις οἶδε, παρέπηται δὲ εἰδέναι τὸ ὠφέλιμον, [or παρέπηται δὲ ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμη, as *Ficinus* and *Grynæus* ſeem to have read,] ἐδόκει ἡμῖν, λυσιτελοῦντως ἕξειν τῇ πόλει, καὶ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ.

Beneficial,

Beneficial, the Contrary will happen; he will neither profit the Publick nor Himſelf?[71]

ALCIBIADES.

Certainly we thought he would not.

SOCRATES.

And what? are you ſtill of the ſame opinion? or have you in any reſpect altered your way of thinking about theſe Matters?

ALCIBIADES.

Not at all: I think as I did, ſtill.

SOCRATES.

Let me aſk you then, whether you did not ſay, that you called the Many, Fools; and the Few, Wiſe Men?[72]

[71] This Sentence, Interrogative alſo, is thus printed in the Greek, —Ἐὰν δέ γ', οἶμαι, τἀναντία τούτων, ὅτε τῇ πόλει, ὅτ' αὐτὸν αὑτῷ;—It plainly reſpects that Paſſage in Page 73, cited in the laſt preceding Note. The Senſe of it therefore muſt be the ſame with the Senſe of That: to expreſs which Senſe exactly, we preſume that we ought here to read, as follows;—Ἐὰν δ' ἄγνοια [ſc. τῷ ὠφελίμῳ παρέπηται], τἀναντία τούτων, κ. τ. λ.—There is thus, we ſee, but little Alteration made, even in the Letters; and the Corruption of this Paſſage was not perhaps made with more Eaſe, than That with which the genuine Reading has been reſtored.

[72] See in Page 71.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

I acknowlege it.

SOCRATES.

And do we not ſtill ſay, that the Many are miſtaken in their opinion of What is Beſt, for that they are generally, I ſuppoſe, without rational Principles, and only governed by Opinion?[73]

ALCIBIADES.

We ſtill ſay the Same.

SOCRATES.

It is the Intereſt therefore of the Many, not to be knowing in any Affairs,[74] nor to conceit themſelves knowing; if, what

[73] See in Pages 76 and 77.

[74] The *Athenian Government*, at the time of this Dialogue, had ſo far degenerated from the excellent Conſtitution of it, eſtabliſhed by *Solon*, (who had wiſely tempered *Ariſtocracy*, by mixing with it a due Portion of *Democracy*,) that 'twas now fallen chiefly into the hands of the *Populace*. For the meaneſt of the Citizens (and Such are, in every populous City, by much the greater Number,) had lately obtained Each of them a Voice in the *Public Aſſembly*; where, by a Majority of Voices, all Points of greateſt importance to the whole Commonwealth were finally determined; and What was to be done by their Armys or Embaſſys abroad, or by the Executive Power at home, was concluſively reſolved on. Theſe undoubtedly are the Affairs, here meant; and not the Affairs of each Man's private Occupation: to the advancement of theſe laſt, however, and to his Gain

what Affairs they know, or conceit they know, they will be the more forward to engage in; and, engaging in them, will receive more Harm than Benefit.

ALCIBIADES.

What you ſay is very true.

SOCRATES.

Do you ſee then; do I not appear to have been actually in the right, when I ſaid, that the Acquiſition of Other Sciences, without the Science of What is Beſt, is rarely beneficial, and generally hurtful, to the Perſon who has acquired them?[75]

ALCIBIADES.

If I did not think ſo at that time, yet now, Socrates, I do.

SOCRATES.

'Tis incumbent therefore on every Civil State, and every Private Perſon, if they would manage their Affairs rightly, to depend abſolutely on This Science; juſt as the ſick Patient depends on his Phyſician; or as the Mariner, who would eſcape the Dangers of the Voyage, depends on the

thence ariſing, Each Man, we are told, made the Public Intereſt ſubſervient. See the Sentence of *Socrates*, in Page 76, beginning with "*Neither would you.*"

[75] See in Page 68.

Com-

Commander of the Veſſel. For[76] without This Science, the more vehemently an inward Gale[77] impells a Man, whether it ariſe from the conſideration of his Wealth, or Bodily Strength, or ſome other Advantage of the ſame Kind

[76] Of this Paſſage in the Greek, Monſieur *Dacier* ſays,—"*C'eſt un des plus difficiles endroits de Platon.*"—Indeed, as it is printed, 'tis quite unintelligible. For, after a Comma put at the word πλεῖν, it proceeds thus,—ὅσῳπερ ἂν μὴ πρότερον ἐπιῤῥίσῃ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς. Ἄνευ γὰρ ταύτης, ἢ περὶ κ. τ. λ. But what, if it were printed thus?—Putting a full Stop at πλεῖν, let the next Sentence immediately begin,—Ἄνευ γὰρ ταύτης, ὅσῳπερ ἂν λαβρότερον ἐπιῤῥίσῃ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ περὶ κ. τ. λ. All the Difficulty is now vaniſhed, by this ſlight Tranſpoſition, and an eaſy Alteration of μὴ πρότερον to λαβρότερον, a word perhaps miſtaken by the Writer to whom it was read, from his not being ſo thorowly well verſed in the Language of *Homer*, as a Man muſt be, before he can every where underſtand the Language of *Plato*. πρότερον therefore being, as we ſuppoſe, by this Miſtake, written in ſome Manuſcript Copy of this Dialogue, 'tis probable, that ſome Reader of it afterwards, who ſaw the abſurdity of that word, condemned it by Writing in the Margin μὴ πρότερον, and that the next half-learned Tranſcriber, inſtead of omitting πρότερον, took μὴ alſo into the Text. Both theſe ſpurious words are rightly omitted in the *Heſſenſtein* Manuſcript, as we are informed by *Cornarius*; but the genuine word, in the mean time, was loſt.

[77] In the Greek,—τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς,—by which we underſtand τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πνεῦμα in the Nominative Caſe *before* ἐπιῤῥίσῃ, and not, as *Cornarius* imagined, τὸ πλοῖον, or ἀκάτιον in the Accuſative Caſe *after* that Verb.

with either of Thoſe,[78] ſo much the greater Miſcarriages will of neceſſity, it ſeems, befall him, from thoſe very Advantages. And, in like manner, the Man, who has acquired what is called much Learning, and many Arts, but is deſtitute of This Science, and is driven along by Each of the Others, will not He meet with, and juſtly too indeed, a very tempeſtuous Voyage? and ſuppoſing him to continue ſtill at Sea, without a Commander of the Veſſel in which he ſails, it will not be long[79] before he periſhes. So that to ſuch a Man very applicable, I think, is that Verſe, where the Poet ſays of ſome Perſon, in diſpraiſe of him,

Much knew he, and in many things had Skill;
But whate'er things he knew, he knew them ill.[80]

[78] That is,—either in *Outward Circumſtances*, or in *Body*; meaning, probably, thoſe other Advantages which *Alcibiades* poſſeſſed, from the Greatneſs of his *Family*, and the Handſomeneſs of his *Perſon*. For the whole of this Reaſoning is aimed at *Alcibiades*, to ſhew him the Danger of neglecting the Study of Moral Science. The word τύχης therefore, propoſed by *Dacier* inſtead of the word ψυχῆς, would expreſs but Half the Meaning of *Socrates*.

[79] In the Greek,—χρόνον ὑ μακρὸν βίον θεῶν.—*Stephens* propoſes βίυ θέων to be read for the two laſt words. And we embrace his Propoſal of reading βίυ, but conjecture the right Reading of the very laſt word to be rather βιῶν.

[80] We have thus tranſlated the Greek Verſe,—

Πολλ' ἠπίστατο ἔργα, κακῶς δ' ἠπίστατο πάντα,—

the better to accommodate it to That Senſe, which *Plato* gave it, for Reaſons to be mentioned in Note 82.

ALCIBIADES.

How, Socrates, doth this Verſe of the Poet fall in with what we are ſpeaking of? For to Me it ſeems nothing to the Purpoſe.

SOCRATES.

Very much to the Purpoſe is it. But Poets, you muſt know, write enigmatically, almoſt All of them, but This Poet more eſpecially. For it is the Genius of Poetry, in general, to uſe an enigmatical Language; and it is not for any ordinary Perſon to underſtand it. But when, beſides this difficulty, the poetical Genius, ſo enigmatical in its Self, ſeizes a Man, who is backward in communicating his Knowlege, unwilling to tell us plainly what he means, and deſirous to conceal his Wiſdom as much as poſſible from the World,[81] it appears in the higheſt degree difficult to find out the real Meaning of any Such Poet. For you can by

[81] From this Paſſage it appears, what Opinion either *Plato* himſelf, or other Learned Men in his time, entertained of *Homer*, as a *Philoſopher*. For he here repreſents the Great Poet, as poſſeſſed of ſome profound Knowlege, which he thought proper and prudent to conceal from the Bulk of Mankind; and therefore making the diſcovery of it ſo difficult, on purpoſe that only Thoſe, whoſe Genius led them to Philoſophy, and whoſe outward Circumſtances of Fortune permitted them to follow their Genius, might be able to make ſuch a diſcovery from His Writings.

no means think, that Homer,[82] ſo very divine a Poet as he was, could be ignorant, how impoſſible it was for a Man, who poſſeſſed any Science whatever, not to know it well.[83]

But

[82] We ſee, that the ancient Poem, intitled, from the Name of the Hero of it, *Margites*, in which was the Verſe above cited, is expreſsly attributed to *Homer* by *Plato*, in this Place; as it alſo is by *Ariſtotle*, in his *Poeticks*, Cap: 4, and in his *Nicomechean Ethicks*, Lib: 6, Cap: 7. What ancient Writers have acceded to Their Opinion, and What Others have differed from it, may be ſeen in *Fabricii Bibliothecâ Græcâ*, L. 2, C. 2, §. 24, n°. 17.

[83] *Plato* here, and every where elſe indeed, very juſtly uſes the word *Knowlege* in a ſtrict and proper Senſe, excluding all Error, Doubt, and meer Opinion or Belief. For whatever a Man *knows not well*,—if it concern his Actions or Operations, he will be more likely to perform or operate wrong than rightly, becauſe there is but *one right* way of doing or operating any thing, but *many* are there *wrong*;—and if it be a Matter of Speculation, he muſt ſpeculate concerning it with ſome degree of Doubtfulneſs or Uncertainty, and therefore cannot properly be ſaid to *know it at all*. From thinking in this manner with regard to the *Sciences*, as well the *Moral* as the *Mathematical*, did *Plato* riſe to that very exalted Idea which he had of *Science in general*, as having its Eſſence only in *Univerſal Mind*, where lye the Principles of all the ſeveral Sciences, and from which is derived to every Particular Science whatever it contains of Certainty or Demonſtration. See Note 214 to *the Meno*.—To direct the Mind of *Alcibiades* to this Fundamental Science, the Fountain of all the reſt, is, we preſume from the Tenor of this Dialogue, *one of the Reaſons*, why *Socrates* interpreted this Verſe of *Homer*'s in a Senſe different from the Poet's own Mind; for, we apprehend, that by *knowing ill* was meant what is called *Superficial Knowlege*,

ſuch

But he expreſſes himſelf enigmatically, I ſuppoſe, by uſing, inſtead of the Words, *Evil*,[84] and *to know*, the Derivative Words, *Ill*, and *he knew*.[85] If then we uſe the two proper Words, there is formed this Sentence, in plain Proſe indeed, but expreſſive of the Poet's Meaning,—*He was knowing and ſkilled in many things, but to know all thoſe things was to Him an Evil.*——'Tis evident then, that if much Knowlege was to Him an Evil, what Knowlege he had was worthleſs, and he Himſelf was ſome worthleſs Fellow; ſuppoſing any Credit to be due to the Concluſions from our paſt Reaſonings.

ſuch as is not applicable to any good Uſe in Life.—The *other Reaſon*, we believe, was to guard the Readers of *Homer* againſt their being miſled by his great Authority, and induced to think, that ſuperficial Notions of any thing deſerve the Name of *Knowlege*. See *Argument of the Io*, Page 12, at the bottom.

[84] In the Greek,—ἀντὶ τοῦ κακοῦ,—We ſuſpect the Right Reading to be,—ἀντὶ τοῦ κακὸν, that is, ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος KAKON, *inſtead of the Noun* EVIL: as ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπίσασθαι, juſt after, means—ἀντὶ τοῦ ῥήματος ἀπαρεμφάτου καὶ πρωτοτύπου 'ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ, *inſtead of the Infinitive and Primitive Verb*, TO KNOW.

[85] We have here a Specimen of Plato's uncommon Skill in *Philoſophical* or Univerſal *Grammar*. It appears, not only by his deducing the Adverb ΚΑΚΩΣ, *Ill*, from the Subſtantive Noun KAKON, *Evil*, but alſo by (what ſhews a much deeper Theory of Words, conſidered as the Parts of Speech,) his deriving 'ΗΠΙΣΤΑΤΟ, *he knew*, a Verb of the Indicative Mode, from the Infinitive, or moſt general Verb, 'ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ, *to know*. See Mr. *Harris's Hermes*, B: 1. Ch: xi. and viii.

ALCI-

ALCIBIADES.

And I think, Socrates, it is their Due: for I ſhould hardly give Credit to any other rational Concluſions, if I denied it to Thoſe.

SOCRATES.

And you think rightly too. But, in the name of Jupiter, let us proceed. For you ſee, how great are the Perplexitys, attending the Subject in which we are engaged; you ſee alſo, what the nature is of thoſe Perplexitys.[86] And you ſeem to Me to have a Share in them, your Self; as you never reſt from changing your Thoughts over and over again upon this Subject; diſcarding the Opinions, which you had before ſo ardently embraced, and continuing no longer in the ſame Mind.[87] Should the God then, to whom you are going to make your Prayers, appear to you, now after all

[86] That, in the firſt place, they relate to What is deſirable and the juſt Object of our Prayers, and What is not ſo; and that, in the next place, they relate to Knowlege, What Kind of it is always beneficial, and What Kinds are or may be hurtful. Here we are to obſerve, that of theſe Two Inquirys, in which *Alcibiades* ſo much wavered, and in which the Multitude ſo greatly err, the latter is for the ſake of the former, and is to be made previouſly: for we muſt acquire the *Knowlege* of *What is Beſt*, before we can be ſenſible of its being the proper Object of our Deſire.—And thus we may perceive, what reference this ſeemingly long Digreſſion, concerning Knowlege, has to the main Subject and Deſign of this Dialogue.

[87] See before, in Pages 47, 56, 58, 67, and 82.

our

our Concluſions; and ſhould he aſk you, before you had preſented any Petition whatever to him,---whether or no your Deſires would be ſatisfied, if you obtained any of thoſe Dominions mentioned in the beginning of our argument;[88] ---or ſhould he leave to your Self the naming of What you wiſhed for;---in which way, think you, could you beſt avail your ſelf of this Opportunity? whether in accepting any of the Grants offered you, or in naming ſome Other Thing you wiſhed for?

ALCIBIADES.

Now by the Gods, Socrates, I ſhould not know What to ſay to ſuch a Propoſal. Indeed I think, that 'twould be raſh in me to make any deciſive Anſwer at all; and that great Caution is abſolutely requiſite in ſuch a caſe; to prevent a Man from praying unwarily for Things Evil, while he imagines them to be Good; and from doing as You ſaid, ſoon afterwards, recanting his Choice, and praying to be delivered from what he had before prayed to have.

SOCRATES.

Did not then the Poet, whom I cited in the beginning of this Argument, know ſomewhat more than We do, in ſupplicating Jupiter to avert from us what is Evil, even tho we prayed for it?[89]

[88] See before, in Page 47.
[89] See before, in Page 55.

ALCIBIADES.

Indeed I think ſo.

SOCRATES.

The Lacedæmonians therefore, O Alcibiades! admiring and imitating This of the Poet, or whether they had of themſelves conſidered the Subject in the ſame manner as He did, every One of them in Private, and All of them in Publick, make a Prayer ſimilar to His: for they beſeech the Gods to grant them ſuch Good Things as at the ſame time are Fair;[90] and nothing more were they ever heard to pray for.

[90] *Plutarch*, in his brief Collection of the ancient *Lacedæmonian Inſtitutions*, has recorded This, for One of them,—εὐχὴ δ' αὐτῶν, ſays he, διδόναι τὰ καλὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς· καὶ πλέον οὐδέν. Vol: 2, Pag: 239, Edit: *Franc:* thus interpreted by *Craig*, in his *Tables of their Laws*, Tab: 1, Inſtit: 3. *Votum omnium ſit, ut Dii honeſta ob bonas actiones dent; nihilque amplius.* But the Senſe, conveyed by this interpretation, tho it be tolerably good, is not the Senſe of *Plutarch* in that Paſſage, if he had the ſame Meaning with *Plato* in the Paſſage now before us: and that he had, appears, we think, from his uſing the very ſame Words, in all probability borrowing them from *Plato*.—Now, in what Senſe *Plato* underſtood the *Prayer of the Lacedæmonians*, appears from his introducing the mention of it, as a Prayer *ſimilar* to the *Prayer of the Poet* before cited. This *Similarity* can regard *only* the *Subject-Matter* of Both thoſe Prayers; becauſe the *only Point*, which he now has under conſideration, is What ought to be the Subject-Matter of our Prayers.—In the Prayer of the Poet, *Good Things* are prayed for, ſimply and generally, without ſpecifying

for. Accordingly, no People have hitherto been more proſperous than They. And if it has happened to them, not to proſper

ing any particular Wants or Wiſhes: it ſeems intended therefore to ſtifle Men's Deſires and Fancys of any Particular things as *good*, by ſuggeſting to their Minds a Suſpicion of their Ignorance of What is good, and by inculcating a ſimple and abſolute Reliance on the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of the Sovereign of Nature.—In the Prayer of the Lacedæmonians, *Fair* things and *Good* things are prayed for in diſtinct terms: here therefore the Word *Good* ſeems to be uſed in the *moſt general* Senſe, as comprehending *all Goods*, whether of *Mind*, of *Body*, or of *Fortune*; and the Word *Fair* ſeems to limit the Deſire of *Good in general*, and to confine it to ſuch *Goods* as are alſo *Fair*, τὰ καλὰ ἀγαθὰ, the Goods of a Rational Soul, *Wiſdom* and *Virtue*.—So that the Poet's Prayer, and That of the Lacedæmonians, are in This reſpect ſimilar,—in calling off the Fancy from External things, and ſuppreſſing the Deſire of them: but in This they are diſſimilar,—in that the *Lacedæmonian Prayer* ſeems intended farther to teach Men, What things in general are always *Good* and *Deſirable*, namely, Such only as are *Fair*; while the *Poetical Prayer* does not pretend to teach Men, What things are Good; nor does it preſume, that uſing the term *Fair* will *explain* the term *Good*; for perhaps it ſuppoſes Men no leſs ignorant of What is truly *Fair*, than of What is truly *Good*,—until they are taught by the Divine Teacher within them. In the mean time therefore, before the Knowlege of true Good is acquired, *Socrates* recommends the Uſe of the *Poet*'s Prayer, rather than that of the *Lacedæmonians:* by which recommendation he means to give the ſame excellent Advice, given by *Epictetus*,—Τὴν ὄρεξιν παντελῶς ἐπὶ τῷ παρόντος ἄνελε· ἂν τε γὰρ ὀρέγῃ τῶν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τινος, ἀτυχεῖν ἀνάγκη· τῶν δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὧν ὀρέγεσθαι καλὸν ἂν [εἴη], οὐδὲν οὐδέπω σοι πάρεστι. *Enchird:* Cap. 7. but

proſper in all things, it was not becauſe they prayed amiſs; but becauſe the Gods, I preſume, have it in Their Choice, either to grant a Man That for which he prays, or to ſend him the Reverſe. I have a Mind to relate to you ſomewhat elſe on this Subject, what I once heard from certain Elderly Men;---that, in the Differences between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians, it ſo fell out, that, whenever they came to a Battle, whether by Land or by Sea, Our City was always unſucceſsful, and was never able to get one Victory:---that the Athenians therefore, uneaſy at theſe Miſcarriages, and at a Loſs for ſome Contrivance to put an End to their preſſing Evils, held a Council, and came to this Concluſion,---

in Mr. *Upton*'s Edition, Cap. 2. by Miſs *Carter* well tranſlated thus, —*For the preſent, totally ſuppreſs Deſire: for, if you deſire any of the Things not in our own Power, you muſt neceſſarily be diſappointed; and of thoſe, which are* [*in our Power*], *and which it would be laudable to deſire, none, as yet, is in your Poſſeſſion.* On this Paſſage, *Simplicius*, in his *Commentary*, juſtly obſerves, that *it is not ſafe to have any Deſires at all, before we learn What Things are fit to be deſired.* οὐκ ασφαλὲς ὀρέγεσθαι ὅλως, πρὸ τοῦ μαθεῖν τίνων ὀρέγεσθαι χρῆ. Pag: 49, Edit: L. Bat:—It ſhould ſeem, however, that *Socrates*, by citing the Words of the *Lacedæmonian* Prayer, intended to give his Pupil a *general* Hint of What Things were truly deſirable; and by ſo doing, to prepare his Mind for the *Particulars* of that Divine Teaching; as he had done before, in his Firſt Converſation with him. See the *Firſt Alcibiades*, page 119, and thoſe which follow it; as alſo Note 80 to that Dialogue.

that

that their beſt Way would be to ſend to Ammon,[91] and conſult Him what they ſhould do; and at the ſame time to aſk him this Queſtion farther,—on what account the Gods always give Victory to the Spartans their Enemys, rather than to Them; tho of all the Grecians, We, ſaid they, bring them the greateſt number of Sacrifices, and thoſe the faireſt in their Kinds; and tho We, beyond all other People, have decorated their Temples with the Preſents, that are hung up in them; and in honour of the Gods have made yearly Proceſſions, the moſt ſolemn and the moſt coſtly; and have paid them a greater Tribute, in Money, than all the reſt of the Grecians put together: whilſt the Lacedæmonians, they ſaid, never regard any of theſe things; but, on the contrary, worſhip the Gods in ſo ſlighting a manner, as to make their Sacrifices, commonly, of Beaſts full of Blemiſhes; and, in all other inſtances, fall far ſhort of Us, ſaid they, in honouring the Gods; at the ſame time that the Riches, They are Maſters of, are not leſs than Ours. When the Ambaſſadors

[91] The Oracle of *Ammon* was highly celebrated for the Truth of its Predictions. It had been anciently conſulted by *Hercules* and by *Perſeus*. Long afterwards it was conſulted by *Cræſus*, when he was meditating to ſtop the Progreſs of *Cyrus*'s Arms in *Aſia*. In what Veneration it was held by the *Romans*, we learn from the 9th Book of *Lucan*. And from the preſent Paſſage in *Plato*, as alſo from the Lives of *Lyſander*, *Cimon*, and *Alexander*, in *Plutarch*, it appears, to have been, amongſt the Grecians of thoſe days, in as great Vogue and Credit as any Oracles of their own.

had

had thus ſpoken, and had inquired of the Oracle, What they ſhould do, to find an End of their preſent Misfortunes, the Prophet made no other Anſwer than This; (for without doubt the God did not permit him;) ſending for the Athenian Ambaſſadors, he ſpake to them theſe words,——Thus ſaith Ammon;[92] He ſaith, that he prefers the pious Addreſſes of

[92] *Ammon*, at whoſe Temple, ſcituate in the Deſerts of *Libya*, his Oracle gave Reſponſes, was by all foreign Nations underſtood to be a Name given to the Supreme God, and not to any Inferior Deity. The *Romans* called him *Jupiter Ammon*; as the Name of the Supreme Being with Them was *Jupiter:* and we learn from *Herodotus*, that Ζεῦς, (the Supreme God or *Jupiter* of the *Grecians*, and of their Colonies in *Aſia*,) was called *Ammoun* by the *Egyptians*; and, as it appears from *Lucan*, by the *Æthiopians* alſo, the *Arabians*, and the *Indians*. Nor is This at all contradicted by what we read in *Macrobius*, (Saturnal: L. 1. C. 21.) that the *Libyans* worſhipped the *ſetting Sun* by the Name of *Ammon:* for he mentions this very Fact, as one Proof, among many, that the Worſhippers of *Jupiter*, and the Worſhippers of *the Sun*, agreed in the Object of their Worſhip; for that Both Partys meant to worſhip the Same Being, the Supream: that other Nations, who invoked him by other Names, had the ſame Meaning, that learned Antiquarian proves in the ſame Book, from the Beginning of Chapter 17, to the End of Chapter 23. This Hypotheſis is confirmed by *Nonnus*, in his Poetico-Romantic Hiſtory of *Bacchus*, in which are theſe Verſes, addreſſed to the Evening Sky by the Hero of his Poem, during his ſhort Stay at *Tyre*, where the Air is remarkably, at all times, clear;—

Βῆλος ἐπ' Εὐφρήταο, Λίβυς κεκλημένος Ἄμμων,
Ἄπις ἔφυς Νειλῶος, Ἄραψ Χρόνος, Ἀσσύριος Ζεύς.

Along Euphrates (weſtward) thou art call'd
BELUS; *and wide where Libya ſpreads her Sand,*
Great AMMON: APIS *art thou by the Nile;*
Arabian CHRONUS, *and Aſſyrian* ZEUS.

Dionyſiac: Lib. 40. v. 397.

This Paſſage is followed by a few Lines in honour of the *Phœnix*, a fabulous Bird, ſacred to *the Sun*; he then proceeds thus,—

Εἴτε Σάραπις ἔφυς Αἰγύπλιος ἀννέφελος Ζεὺς,
Εἰ Χρόνος, εἰ Φαέθων πολυώνυμος, εἴτε συ Μίθρης
Ἥλιος Βαβυλῶνος, ἐν Ἑλλάδι Δέλφος Ἀπόλλων.

Whether SARAPIS *rightly thou art named*
In Egypt, when they view the cloudleſs Sky;
Or more delighted heareſt thou the Name
Of SATURN, *outmoſt of the moving Orbs;*
Or when thy Vot'rys call thee PHAETHON,
Th' imperial many-titled Star of JOVE.
When the bleſt Sun darts his enlight'ning Rays
On all things, duly Thee do they ſalute
MITHRA *in Babylon, and all thro Greece*
Delphian APOLLO?——

And a little after,—

Εἴτε συ Παιήων ὀδυνήφατος, εἰ πέλες αἰδὴρ
Ποικίλος, Ἀστροχίτων δὲ φατίζεται· [f. φατίζεαι·] ἐννύχιοι γὰρ
Οὐρανὸν ἀστερόεντες ἀπαυγάζεσι χιτῶνες·
Οὔασιν εὐμενέεσσιν ἐμὴν ἀσπάζεο φωνήν.

Or doth it better pleaſe thee to be hail'd
All-healing PÆON? *or, while now I gaze*
Thy nightly Robe, with heav'n-illuming Stars:
Beſpangled, wilt thou with propitious Ear
Receive my' Addreſſes, when I thus preſume,
Beholding thee with Star-Light all array'd,
Thee to invoke ASTROCHITON?——

Thq

The intelligent Reader, we hope, will not think theſe Quotations foreign to the Subject of this Dialogue, when we have informed him, with what Views we here introduce them.—The evident Deſign of *Plato*, in the Paſſage now before us, is to ſhew What Kind of Prayers are agreeable to the Mind of the Supreme Being. Now his Mind can be known only to Himſelf, and to Thoſe, to whom he is pleaſed immediately to reveal it. That the Validity therefore of our Author's Reaſoning may appear, 'tis neceſſary to have it proved, that the Athenians, in conſulting *Ammon*, meant to conſult the *Supreme Being*; the revelation of whoſe Mind was, until after the time of *Socrates*, from a long time before, generally believed to be made *occaſionally*, and *only*, to certain Prieſts and Prophets, who were attendant on the Oracles deemed Divine; one of which Oracles was this in *Ammonia*. What Oracles really are Divine, and how to be conſulted,—to Whom alſo, and in what Manner, the Mind of the Supreme Being is made known,—theſe things are diſcoverable only by true Philoſophers,—by Such as *Socrates*, who, in the laſt Part of this Dialogue, gives an intimation, ſufficient to aſſiſt his Diſciples in making thoſe Diſcoverys, Themſelves.—But, in referring our learned Readers to ſo many Chapters in *Macrobius*, and in quoting ſo many Verſes out of *Nonnus*, we had theſe farther Views. Thoſe References and Quotations juſtify what we advanced in Notes 191 and 201 to *the Banquet*, concerning a very ancient and very general Error, which aſſigned to the Supreme Being an eſpecial *Throne*, or Place of Reſidence, in ſome Part of Outward Nature, ſuppoſed by moſt People to be either the *Æther*, or the *Sun*, or elſe one of the Planets. They farther ſhew this Error to have infected the moſt learned Nations: and thus they evince the neceſſity of the *Final Doctrine* of this Dialogue, for the curing of an Error ſo unphiloſophical, ſo friendly to Superſtition, ſo fatal to the Cauſe of true Virtue. For the Nature of Things cannot be known, without knowing What is moſt Divine in Nature; this being the

Cauſe

of the Lacedæmonians to all the Sacrifices of all the Grecians.--These words, and no more, ſpake the Prophet. Now it ſeems to me, that, by pious Addreſſes,[93] the God means

Cauſe of all the reſt: What is moſt Divine in Nature cannot be known, without knowing, where it peculiarly reſides, and where only 'tis to be found: unleſs This, the true Throne and Temple of preſent Deity, be known, it cannot be rightly and duly worſhipped; and, in Thoſe who are ignorant of the right Worſhip, there cannot be That real Religion, which is the only Principle of true Virtue.—All our Views, in this and every other Note we have written, tend either to open or to illuſtrate the Views of *Plato*.

[93] In the Greek,—εὐφημίαν,—a Term, which, in its primary ſignification, denotes any Speeches, or Words, expreſſive of the Speaker's *Good Opinion* of the Perſon, to whom, or of whom, they are ſpoken. And becauſe the inward Approbation of large Multitudes is uſually expreſſed, without Words, by Shouts of Applauſe, theſe very Plaudits, or Acclamations, came afterwards to be called εὐφημίαι. And farther becauſe, when a Speech is ſpoken before any Aſſembly of People, whether great or ſmall, the Silence of that Aſſembly denotes their good Opinion of the Speaker, and that what he is ſpeaking deſerves their hearing, Silence its ſelf, on ſuch an occaſion, was called εὐφημία. In the Paſſage, now before us, we have tranſlated this Term into Engliſh in a Senſe agreeable to That, which is here given it by *Socrates* very juſtly. For, as the praying for *good* things *in general*, the Poet's Prayer, is a Mark of the Petitioner's Confidence in the *Divine Wiſdom*, to chuſe for him, *better* than he could for himſelf,—ſo the praying for things *fair* as well as *good*, the Lacedæmonian Prayer, evidences an Opinion in the Petitioner, that *Virtue* is the *Beſt Thing*, that Man can aſk, or God can beſtow; it argues a Belief, that to beſtow it, that is, to aſſiſt Man in attaining

means only That Prayer of theirs. And it is indeed much more excellent than the Prayers of any other People. For the reſt of the Grecians, when they have either led up to the Altar Oxen with their Horns gilded, or brought rich Offerings and Preſents to hang up in the Temples, pray for whatever they happen to deſire, whether it be really Good or Evil. The Gods therefore, when they hear their impious Addreſſes,[94] accept not of their coſtly Proceſſions, Sacrifices,

it, is moſt agreeable to the Divine Will; and implys alſo ſome anticipating Notion, that the Divine Eſſence is Juſtice or Goodneſs its Self, *The perfect Fair*.

[94] In the Greek,—βλασφημέντων αὐτῶν ἀκέοντες,—that is, in a literal tranſlation, *hearing them blaſpheme*. But, ſince the *Blaſphemy*, here ſpoken of, is evidently *oppoſed* to the εὐφημία *the pious Addreſſes* of the Lacedæmonians, we have tranſlated this Paſſage ſo, as to preſerve the *Oppoſition*. To *blaſpheme*, is (in the General Senſe of the Word) to *ſpeak diſreſpectfully* of any Perſon who deſerves Reſpect. But 'tis uſually applied (as it is by *Plato* in this place,) only to *diſreſpectful* Speeches or Words, ſpoken of *Divine Beings*. In This Senſe it is, that the Prayers, uſed throughout all Greece, except in the Spartan Territorys, are here termed *blaſphemous*: for they imply Opinions *diſreſpectful* to the *Divine Nature*: they imply an Opinion, that *External Goods* are the *Beſt Things*, which the ſuppoſed Divine Beings, whom they petition, are able, or at leaſt are willing, to grant them: they imply an Opinion, that the Beings, whom they deem Divine, are pleaſed with ſuch a Kind of Worſhip, as they Themſelves would be pleaſed with, pompous Proceſſions, coſtly Sacrifices, and rich Preſents; and conſequently an Opinion, that the Minds of thoſe Beings are not a whit wiſer or better than their own. Their

Sacrifices, and Preſents. So that much Caution and Conſideration ſeem to me requiſite on this Subject, What is fit to be ſpoken to the Gods, and What is not. You will alſo find in Homer Sentiments ſimilar to thoſe I have been expreſſing: for he tells us, that the Trojans, on a certain Night, taking up their Quarters without the City-Walls,

In honour of the bleſt Immortals, ſlew
Unblemiſh'd Hecatombs:——[95]

and that the Smoke from theſe Sacrifices was by the Winds wafted up into Heaven;[96]

Prayers, in fine, ſhew that they are totally ignorant of What is truly Divine in Nature, that 'tis Mind and Wiſdom; and that, in reality they are, all of them, Worſhippers of *Body*, of *Corporeal Nature*, and of *Fortune* relative to Body, under different Names and Titles.

[95] In the Greek,—Ἕρδειν ἀθανάτοισι τελείσασ ἑκατόμβας,—A Line, this, not found in the Copys of *Homer*, now extant; but, in *Barnes*'s Edition, ſupplied from this Paſſage of *Plato*; and by *Erneſtus* ſhewn to be genuine, from the next Line, which ſuppoſes the Mention made of a *Sacrifice*, juſt before.

[96] Κνίσῃ δ' ἐκ πεδίου ἀνέμοι φέρον οὐρανὸν εἴσω. This Line of *Homer* appears in all the Editions of that Poet. *Plato* is here obliged to take this Sentence quite *out of* the *Metre*; becauſe he is relating, only at ſecond hand and as *told by Homer*, a Fact, the Narration of which *Homer* himſelf puts immediately into the *Mouth of the Muſe*: and, for the ſame Reaſon, we have given a *Proſaic* Tranſlation of it. In the preceding Line, as alſo in thoſe which follow, *Plato* was able to preſerve the *Metre*, while he only changed the *Indicative* Verbs into *Infinitive*.

Sweet odorif'rous Smoke; yet by the Gods
Rejected, and the ſav'ry Taſte refus'd.
For ſtrong Averſion in their holy Minds
Was rooted, againſt Troy's devoted Tow'rs,
Againſt th' injurious Might of Troy's proud King,
And 'gainſt the Trojan People, who witheld
Helen, unjuſtly, from her wedded Lord.[97]

It was of no Advantage therefore, it ſeems, to Them, to ſacrifice, or to offer Preſents, to the Gods whom they had made their Enemys. For the Divine Nature, I preſume, is not of ſuch a Kind, as to be ſeduced by Preſents, like Thoſe, whoſe Trade it is to make the moſt of their Money, and who care not by what means they are enriched. Beſides, we plead very fooliſhly, in our expoſtulations with the Gods, if we think to get the better of the Lacedæmonians by ſuch Arguments. For 'twould be a ſad thing indeed, if the Gods regarded our Preſents and our Sacrifices, and not the Diſpoſition of the Soul, when a religious and juſt[98] Man addreſſed

[97] The Verſes, here tranſlated, are not found in any of the Editions of *Homer*, except in that of *Barnes*; but, as *Erneſtus* judiciouſly obſerves, they are altogether worthy of that greateſt of all Poets.

[98] In the Greek,—ὅσιος καὶ δίκαιος,—words, which in many Sentences, beſide this, *Plato* couples together, as ſignifying Qualitys nearly and naturally allied, or rather, as ſignifying One and the Same Thing, conſidered in different reſpects. For he terms a Man δίκαιος, *honeſt and good*, in reſpect of his *Habits* of Honeſty and Goodneſs; Habits, that give a Bias to all he ſays or does; and from which

addreſſed them. Nay, in my opinion, they have much more regard to This, than they have to thoſe pompous Proceſſions and coſtly Sacrifices. For nothing hinders, but that Any, whether Private Perſons or Civil States, let them have ſinned againſt the Gods and againſt Men ever ſo greatly, may be well able to pay the Gods ſuch a Tribute yearly. But They, not being to be bribed, diſdain all that outward Worſhip; as ſaith the Divine Oracle, and as alſo ſaith the Prophet of the Gods.[99] It ſeems therefore, that Juſtice and Prudence[100] are honoured, above all things, by the Gods, and by Men too, Such as have Good Senſe and Under-

which Habits flow all thoſe Words and Actions of his, wherein Honeſty or Goodneſs is concerned as their leading Principle or Motive. And the Same Man is by *Plato* termed ὅσιος, *holy*, in reſpect of that *Divine Principle* within him, commonly called *Conſcience*, by which he is governed, and by his conſtant following of which he has acquired his habitual Honeſty and Goodneſs. With a view to this Divine Principle, Such a Man is, in our Language, termed *conſcientious*; and with a view to the Divine Principle in all Nature, *Univerſal Mind*, the Fountain of that Divine Principle in the human Soul, only Such a Man truly is, and ought to be termed, *wiſely* and truly *religious*. Rightly therefore has *Plato* done, in thus often coupling together true Religion and true Virtue; for in the rational Soul of Man they are by nature inſeparable Companions. But, concerning the cloſe Connection between them, ſee more at large in Mr. *Aſhley*'s excellent *Preface* to his *Xenophon*.

[99] This is the Paſſage, referred to in Note 45 to *the Io*.

[100] See Note 142 to *the Firſt Alcibiades*; and alſo Note 44 to *the Rivals*.

ſtanding.

ſtanding. Now the Prudent and the Juſt are no other Perſons, than Such as know What Behaviour and What Speech is proper to be uſed in our Intercourſe, whether with Gods or with Men. But I ſhould be glad to hear from You, what your Thoughts are on this Subject.

ALCIBIADES.

For My Part, I am of the ſame Opinion with You, Socrates, and with the Oracle. And indeed 'twould ill become Me, to give my Vote oppoſite to the Judgment of the God.

SOCRATES.

Do you not remember, that you acknowleged your being much at a Loſs concerning Prayer; for fear you ſhould unwarily pray for Evil Things, imagining them to be Good?[101]

ALCIBIADES.

I do remember it.

SOCRATES.

You perceive then, that 'tis not ſafe for you, to go and make your Prayer at the Temple, as you intended; leſt your Addreſſes ſhould happen to be impious,[102] and the God hearing them ſhould wholly reject your Sacrifice, and

[101] See above, in Page 89.

[102] In the Greek,—*βλασφημῶντός σε*—See before, in Note 94.

you

you perhaps ſhould draw upon your own Head ſome farther Evil.[103] It ſeems to me therefore, that your beſt Way is to be at Quiet.[104] For, becauſe of your Magnanimity, (That faireſt of Names, given to Folly,[105]) I ſuppoſe, You would not be willing to make uſe of the Lacedæmonian Prayer.[106] 'Tis neceſſary therefore, that a Man ſhould wait, till

[103] See before in Page 18.

[104] That is,—to ſuppreſs all Diſquietude of Deſire, to indulge no particular Wiſhes, and conſequently to make no Prayers for any particular ſuppoſed Good. Ἡσυχία, the word, here uſed by *Plato*, commonly ſignifys *Tranquillity*, or *Quiet*; but ſometimes it alſo ſignifys *Silence*. From what goes before the preſent Paſſage, and from what follows it, 'tis clear, that *Socrates* here means *Silence* in forbearing to make any ſuch Prayers, as were uſually attended with Sacrifices; Theſe being generally deemed powerful to conciliate the Divine Favour, and to procure a favorable Regard to thoſe Prayers. But he recommends this *Silence*, only as the conſequence of that internal *Quiet*, when the Soul, conſcious of her own Ignorance of *what things* are *good*, diſturbs not herſelf with forming any Wiſhes or Deſires, except Such as from her Nature ſhe cannot help forming, That of *Good in general* and undefined, and That of *Happineſs*, a Thing unknown, and unimagined, but, to compleat which, no Good is ſuppoſed wanting.

[105] See above, in Page 42.

[106] For what is called *Magnanimity*, or Greatneſs of Soul, generally hinders Men, who are poſſeſſed of it, but who are unenlightened by Wiſdom and Right Reaſon, from perceiving their Rivals and Enemys (as the Commonwealth of *Lacedæmon* was to That of *Athens*) to be, in any reſpect, wiſer and better than Themſelves: or, if ſuch Men have Senſe enough to perceive it, their *Magnanimity*, as it is called,,

till he has learnt, What Diſpoſition he ought to be in, towards the Gods and towards Men.[107]

ALCIBIADES.

But, Socrates, how long will it be, before That Time comes? and Who is He, that will inſtruct me? For I ſhould be very glad, methinks, to ſee that Man, and to know Who he is.[108]

SOCRATES.

It is He, whoſe Care You are the Object of.[109] But, as Homer ſays of Minerva, that ſhe removed the Miſt from before

called, being mixed with *Folly*, will not permit them to follow after *Truth* or *Rectitude*, whereſoever, or in whomſoever, they perceive it, becauſe they love not Truth and Rectitude above all other things.

[107] This is a Leſſon, taught only by *Right Reaſon*, or *Wiſdom*, and taught to Thoſe only, who, by conſulting That Reaſon, truly philoſophiſe. But *Alcibiades* did not apprehend This, as will preſently appear.

[108] *Alcibiades* ſeems to have ſuppoſed, that *Socrates* intended to undertake that Taſk, himſelf, one time or other; as we collect from this Paſſage, compared with ſome other Paſſages that follow. This therefore, as We underſtand it, implys a Deſire, that *Socrates* would *now* declare thoſe his ſuppoſed Intentions; and a Deſire alſo, that *ere long* he would enter on the Office of inſtructing him in the *Principles* of true Religion and right Morals: for, whatever thoſe Principles are, their Seat muſt be *within*; they muſt lye in a *right Diſpoſition* of *Heart* and *Mind*.

[109] 'Tis highly probable, that the Surmiſe of *Alcibiades* was, in part, true; and that *Socrates* really did deſign to aſſiſt him with His *Advice*,

before the Eyes of Diomede,

That he might clearly ſee, and God from Man
Plainly diſtinguiſh,——

ſo

Advice, in that moſt important Work of rectifying his Heart and Mind. 'Tis alſo probable, that *Socrates* would have ſucceeded in his Deſign, if *Alcibiades* had given him Opportunitys of carrying it on, by meeting him in the *Lycæum*, and other Places, frequented by the Philoſopher. For the Young Gentleman began to admire him, and had a great Reliſh for his Converſation, was charmed with his Manner of arguing, and, conſequently, very attentive to his Arguments. But he wanted a conſtant Deſire to improve his Underſtanding by the Study of Truth and Wiſdom: for his Deſires of Power and popular Honours were more ardent: and he was more charmed with the probable Hopes he had of gratifying thoſe Deſires, than he was with the Preſence and Converſation of *Socrates*. He therefore plunged into *Political Action*, before *Philoſophy* had taught him true *Principles* in the Science of *Politicks*, and how to act rightly in Political Life,—indeed, before his *Rational Powers* had arrived at the Years of their *Maturity*, and before *Reaſon* could poſſibly have Weight enough with him to over-balance his *Paſſions*. The arrival of this Seaſon, this Summer-Seaſon of the Soul, *Socrates* waited for; as he had not only too much *Modeſty*, to undertake profeſſedly the Office of a *Teacher* in Philoſophy, or the Taſk of giving Philoſophical Inſtructions to any Others in a Dogmatical or *Didactic* Way,—but alſo, too much *Wiſdom*, to think of giving any ſuch Inſtructions, even in his own Sceptical or *Inquiring* Way, to Thoſe who were incapable of receiving them,—and too much *Politeneſs*, to affront *Alcibiades*, by telling him of his preſent Incapacity. However, as he was not only unwilling to diſhearten his Young Friend, or to blaſt his Hopes, by

ſo muſt He in the firſt place, as it ſeems to me, remove from your Soul the Miſt, that now happens to ſurround it;

diſclaiming thoſe Intentions, of which he perceived himſelf ſuſpected,—but, on the contrary, was willing to encourage him, and to favour his Expectations, without wounding either his own Sincerity or his own Modeſty,—and, as we ſhall preſently ſee reaſon to ſuppoſe, with a view, at the ſame time, to *prepare* him for thoſe *Inſtructions*, (or rather, to make an Opportunity of hinting to him, What Preparations would be neceſſary for receiving them,) he makes him an *ambiguous* Anſwer,—ſuch an Anſwer, as to be conſiſtent with *Politeneſs*, in keeping alive the Hopes he had conceived, and yet Such, as to be exactly agreeable to *Truth*, and pregnant with profound *Wiſdom*. For *Socrates* well knew, that the Rational Part of Man's Soul was derived immediately from Mind its Self, the Mind of Univerſal Nature; or, in other words, that the *Source* of That *Reaſon*, which is in every *Man* more or leſs, is *Truth* in the Nature of Things,—*Being*, eternal and immutable,—Reaſon, unerringly right,—if there be any ſuch thing in Nature, as Truth, or true Being, or right Reaſon. *Socrates* knew, that in like manner as thoſe Brute-Animals, who at their Birth are blind, are yet born with a *Capacity* of receiving the Light of Day into their Eyes,—a *Capacity* of ſeeing all external Objects, preſented to their View by that Light,—and a *latent Power* of following Such of thoſe Objects, as Senſe and inſtinctive Appetite prompt them to follow as their Good,—ſo Man, by his internal Frame, is born with a *Capacity* of receiving the Light of Truth into his Soul,—a *Capacity* of viewing and contemplating all Ideas, thoſe ſole Objects of Reaſon and of Intellect, preſented to his Mind by that inward Light,—and an *innate* Liberty or *Power* of copying after ſome or other of thoſe Ideas, in every one of his own Actions and Operations. But the *Energys*, for the

the ſake of which all Brute Animals and Men are endued by Nature with their ſeveral Capacitys and Powers, do not take place, till afterwards; and when they do, they are weak and ſmall in their Beginnings, advance gradually in Strength and Comprehenſiveneſs, and attain not to that degree of Perfection, intended them by Nature, until the Animal, or the Man, arrives at the mature State of his Being; nor even then neither, unleſs they have all along been duly exerciſed, and have had due Nouriſhment adminiſtered to them, by being exerciſed upon (or employed about) their natural and proper Objects. Then, when the Rational Soul of Man, or the Rational Part of his Soul, or his Rational Faculty, (for by theſe different Expreſſions, owing to different Hypotheſes, none of them quite certain, the ſame Thing is meant,) has attained as much Perfection, as it is capable of in Body, and ſo far perfectly energiſes, it becomes a Δαίμων, or a Particular Divine Genius, within the Man,—Such a Genius, as governed *Socrates*; for by Another Such, in every Age and in every Country, is governed every Wiſe and Good Man. To the *Care* of this *Particular Genius* is immediately committed by Nature the Man, in whom it reſides: to his farther Care belong all thoſe Perſons, over whom that Man has any Influence, (if their own Reaſon be inſufficient to govern them aright,) Some by the Laws of Nature, Others by the Laws of Friendſhip, or of Conſanguinity, and Others again by Social Truſt, or by Civil Compact,--Wives and Children, Friends and Relations, Pupils and Diſciples, Subjects and Domeſticks, Companions, Neighbours, and Fellow-Countrymen; and more remotely, all Men, with whom he has any Intercourſe or Connection.—But this governing or leading Genius ought on no other account to be ſtiled either Θεῖος or Δαιμόνιος, and therefore on no other account has a Right to be obeyed or followed, than becauſe the Rules, by which he governs or directs Others, are dictated to Him by that original, eternal, and abſolutely divine, *Genius of Nature*, every where and always preſent to every Particular Mind,

—*Mind* or Reaſon *Univerſal*.—Now this Univerſal Mind, the Governor of the Univerſe, is, in all *Corporeal* Beings, *Neceſſity* and *Fate*, ſtamping on them thoſe inviolable Laws, their paſſive Powers, out of his Care to preſerve the outward Order and Beauty of the Univerſe.—In all *Sentient* Beings he is *Inſtinct*, impreſſing within them deeply their ſeveral Energys, and Springs of Action, their Appetites, and Averſions, with all the Paſſions thence ariſing, Laws to Them which they cannot diſobey, out of his *Care* for their Preſervation.—In all *Rational* Beings, as Such, he is *Right Reaſon*, the Law of Their Nature, implanting in them a Capacity or dormant Faculty of Reaſon, out of his Care to maintain Virtue, the Moral Beauty of the Univerſe. And this *Care* he takes, becauſe Virtue alone is productive of Happineſs to Beings, on whom he has ſtamped an Image of Himſelf. Farther too, ſince Virtue muſt be free, or it is not Virtue, he has not only exempted theſe Beings, ſo far as they are Rational, from the Laws of Corporeal Neceſſity, but has alſo given them Power to govern the *Spirit* of their own *Souls*, Power to reſtrain and manage, to turn from wrong Objects, and guide toward the right, their Love and Hatred, Deſire and Fear, and thus to make all the Animal-Paſſions ſubject to Their Will and Pleaſure. In giving them *Reaſon*, he has given them *Free Will*; which that they may not forfeit, and bring themſelves under the Power of *Neceſſity*, he has given them a natural or innate Senſe of Juſtice and Injuſtice, or Moral Good and Evil,—a Senſe, which he takes *Care* to preſerve and ſtrengthen, by his own manifeſted Preſence in that Part of the Soul, where is ſeated *Conſcience*, that is, the *Knowlege* of our own *Moral Actions*, together with the *Senſe* of Moral *Right and Wrong*.—However, tho a Man be at liberty to turn his Mental Eye, away from that Place, and the invariable Objects there abiding, toward his Imagination, and the continual Succeſſion of Objects there fluttering, (for his Soul would otherwiſe not be *free*,) yet if he uſe this Liberty too often or too much, he will at length loſe the

it;[110] and after That, he will apply thoſe Medicines, by means of which you will clearly diſtinguiſh Good from Evil. For at preſent, I think, you would not be able ſo to do.

ALCI-

the Liberty of making his Retreat, or of retiring, when he pleaſes, from the View of theſe fleeting Images, to converſe with Right Reaſon and Truth, with real Being, and with Good its Self, in the ſecret Receſſes of his Soul. But ſo long as he retains his inward Liberty, thro which he hath the Power of governing himſelf aright, it is preſerved to him only by the Frequency of this Retirement, and the Company which he there enjoys. Thus it appears, that *every Man*'s Rational Soul, his Reaſon, or Mind, to whoſe immediate *Care* is committed the Whole Man, is, its Self, eminently the *Care* of the Parent-Mind, *Mind Univerſal*; for Univerſal extends to *All Particulars*. This Parental and *Providential Care* is the *Care* meant by *Socrates* in this Anſwer of his to the Queſtion of *Alcibiades*. But *Alcibiades*, not underſtanding it rightly, (for his Mind was not yet ſufficiently opened to apprehend its true Senſe,) ſeems to have been confirmed by it in his Surmiſe, that *Socrates* meant the *Regard* or Attention which he had to him, *Himſelf*.

[110] Nothing is, perhaps, more difficult to the Mind of Man, than to diſcern the Difference between *Ideas* and *Imaginations*, between Things *divine* or invariable, and Things, on the other hand, *variable* and meerly *human*, whether in our own Minds, or in the Minds of other Men appearing in their Actions. This Difficulty ariſes from hence,—that *Ideas* in *Human* Minds are always *clothed* with *Senſible Images*; and that 'tis not poſſible for us, without a total Abſtraction from *Senſe* and *Imagination*, to view them *naked*. Only *Wiſdom* can enable us to make ſuch an Abſtraction, or to ſee thro that Clothing, which, as it were a *Miſt* within the Soul, hides from her Mental

Eye

ALCIBIADES.

Let him then remove that Miſt, or any other Obſtruction that he pleaſes: for he will find Me readily diſpoſed to follow any of His Preſcriptions, whoever the Man is, if by thoſe Means I may become a better Man, than I am at preſent.[111]

SOCRATES.

Eye the real and pure Eſſences of Things. And only therefore thro *Philoſophy*, or the *Study of Wiſdom*, can we attain to know the Difference between Such Men as excell the Fellows of their Kind in That which is abſolutely, or in its Self, excellent, (Men, who were anciently ſtiled either θεῖοι *Divine Men*, or δαιμόνιοι *ſuperior to* ordinary or *meer Men*,) and Thoſe who excell only in ſome Art, relative to Human Life, and attainable by Men of common Underſtanding.—Whether *Homer* had, or had not this Meaning, couched under an Allegory, in the Paſſage above alluded to by *Plato*, (a Paſſage, that occurs in the 5th Book of the *Iliad*, Line 127,) it is not our preſent Buſineſs to examine. 'Tis clear, that *Plato* alludes to it, only by way of a *Simile*: and ſuppoſing the Paſſage in *Homer* to be *Allegorical*, no *Simile* can be more juſt or adequate. For the Metaphorical *Miſt*, here meant by *Plato*, is the Obſcurity ariſing in our Minds from *Senſe* and *Imagination*; thro which *Obſcure Medium* viewing all things, we are very apt to miſtake tranſient, uncertain, and imaginary Objects, for permanent, unqueſtionable and real. Now, under this Error, it is no wonder if we take the *Pleaſures* and *Pains* of Senſe and Imagination to be our own *Good* and *Evil*, the Good and Evil of the Rational Soul or Mind.

[111] Suppoſing *Alcibiades* to have been ignorant of the profound Meaning of *Socrates*, (as we preſume he was at that time,) theſe words of his, in which he profeſſes an intire Reliance on the Wiſdom and Skill of his future Inſtructor, and a perfect Readineſs to follow His

SOCRATES.

'Tis wonderful to conſider, how greatly he is diſpoſed towards the making you ſo.[112]

ALCIBIADES.

Till That Time therefore, I think, 'tis the better way to defer my Sacrifice.

SOCRATES.

You think rightly too. For 'tis a ſafer way, than to run ſo great a Riſque.[113]

ALCIBIADES.

'Tis undeniable, O Socrates.[114] In the mean time, however, ſince you ſeem to Me to have counſelled well, I ſhall put

His Directions, ſeem intended to confirm *Socrates* in the Deſign, which *Alcibiades* on good Grounds imagined him to have conceived.

[112] In this Sentence, *Socrates* ſpeaks with the *ſame* Kind of *Ambiguity*, which he had uſed juſt *before*; but *now*, as it ſeems to Us, with a particular View of confirming in him his profeſſed Readineſs to learn, and his Reliance on the Perſon who was to teach him, What is True Good.

[113] See the Paſſage in *Simplicius*, cited in Note 90.

[114] In all the Editions of the Greek, where we read,—Ἀλλὰ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες;—we preſume, that οὐχί, or ſome other word equivalent, is omitted, and ought to have been inſerted, immediately after the word πῶς. *Ficinus* and *Cornarius* ſeem to have found ſuch a word in the Manuſcripts, They had the Uſe of. For they tranſlate this Paſſage

put this Crown[115] about Your Brows. And to the Gods we ſhall preſent Crowns,[116] and all other accuſtomed Offerings,

ſage thus,—*Sic eſt*,—and *Ita eſt*.—Indeed *Serranus* and *Bembo* tranſlate it from the printed Editions, or according to the Common Reading, thus,—*Sed quomodo?* and *Ma come?—But how* is the Senſe, given it by theſe latter Tranſlators, conſiſtent with the *full Aſſent*, which *Alcibiades* had expreſsly but juſt before, to the Concluſion drawn by *Socrates?* The Riſque, or Danger, had already been ſufficiently explained. See Pages 18, and 89: Nor does *Socrates* appear to have conſidered this Sentence as a *Queſtion*, ariſing from any *Doubt* in *Alcibiades:* for he gives no Anſwer to it at all; but plainly ſuppoſes the Point to have been ſettled between them, and the Argument to be compleatly ended.

[115] All Thoſe, who went to the Temples, with intent to petition the Gods for any particular Favour, carried along with them Crowns or Garlands; and Theſe they wore, whilſt they were praying.—It was from ſuch a Crown, held by *Alcibiades* in his Hand, that *Socrates*, in meeting him, conjectured rightly, whither he was going.

[116] The learned Arch-Biſhop *Potter*, in his *Archæolog: Græc:* B. 2. Ch: 4, very juſtly obſerves, that Crowns and Garlands were ſome of the Preſents, offered to the Gods by their Petitioners, to obtain ſome future Benefit. And from the Paſſage now before us we infer, that the very ſame Crowns or Garlands, worn by thoſe Petitioners during their Prayers in the Temples, they uſed, at their departure, to take off from their own Heads, and to put them on the Heads of the Divine Images; from whence, afterward the Prieſt took, and hung them up on the Side-Walls of the Temple.—*Plato* here exhibits *Alcibiades* giving to *Socrates* the very Honour which he had deſigned for the *Image of Jupiter*. By This, we preſume, he meant to ſignify,

ings, then, when I ſee That Day arrived. Nor will the time be long, before its arrival, if it ſo pleaſe the Gods.

SOCRATES.

Well, I accept of This: and ſhould have pleaſure in ſeeing the Time come, when You your Self[117] ſhall have received ſome other Thing in return for Your Preſent to Me.[118] And as Creon, when Tireſias, ſhewing him his Crown [*of Gold*], ſaid, it had been given him [*by the Athenians*], in honour of his Science, as the Firſt-Fruits of [*their*[119]]

nify, that Whoever could teach Wiſdom and Virtue, as *Alcibiades* ſuppoſed of *Socrates*, was to be eſteemed and honoured as a *Divine Man*.

[117] In the Greek,—ἄλλο δὲ [f. ἄλλό τι] ἀντὶ τῶν παρὰ σοῦ δοθέντων ἡδέως ἴδοιμι δεξάμενον ἐμαυτόν.—In which Sentence the laſt Word is, we doubt not, a corrupt Reading, and was by *Plato* written σεαυτόν. For we cannot apprehend, how a Man, who *has received* a Preſent, can be ſaid to make a *Return* for it, by *his own receiving* of any *Other* Preſent from the ſame or any other Perſon.

[118] The Return, here meant by *Socrates*, conſiſtently with his Principles, and agreeably to the Intentions we have attributed to him, was not, as *Alcibiades* imagined, to *teach* him Wiſdom, or to *make* him a Wiſe Man, but to *aſſiſt* him in the ripening of his Underſtanding, and in the opening of his Mind to receive Wiſdom from his only true and *Divine Teacher*.

[119] In this Sentence all the Words, incloſed within Hooks, we have tranſlated from *Euripides*, to render this Paſſage of *Plato* clearer to Thoſe, who have not read the *Phæniſſæ* of that Poet, from which Tragedy it is taken.

Victory obtained over the Enemy, is by Euripides made to ſay,

This Crown, a happy Omen and Preſage,
I deem, of Conqueſt on our Theban ſide.
For You know well, how tempeſt-toſt a Sea
We ſail on ——[120]

I, in the ſame manner, deem this Honour, you have now done me, to be a good Preſage. For, as I think my ſelf ſailing on a Sea, no leſs tempeſt-toſt[121] than That of Creon, I ſhould be glad to bear away the Crown of Victory from the reſt of your Admirers.[122]

[120] See the *Phæniſſæ*, v. 865.

[121] By this Sea, *Socrates* ſeems to mean the *Mind* of *Alcibiades*, wavering in *Opinion*;—wavering between *Reaſon* on the one ſide, and *Paſſion* on the other;—drawn one way by his Admiration of *Socrates*, and by the attractive Force of Truth, when preſented to his View; but driven the contrary way by his Admiration of outward Greatneſs and Power, and of the Perſons poſſeſſed of thoſe Advantages. See in the *Firſt Alcibiades*, Pages 128, 135, 146, & 344. And in the preſent Dialogue, ſee Page 88.

[122] The fine Turn, which *Socrates* here gives to his Acceptance of the Crown, preſented to him by *Alcibiades*, is perfectly in Character, being, at the ſame time, moſt ingenious, elegant, wiſe, modeſt, and polite. He accepts it, not as an Enſign of *Divine Honour*, as it was meant by the Donor; but as a Token of (future) *Victory*,—Victory over his Competitors for the Friendſhip of *Alcibiades*, whom They endeavoured to corrupt,—and Succeſs in his own Endeavours to engage him wholly in the Study of Wiſdom and the Purſuit of Virtue.

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